EAST GERMANY: SOVIET PARTNER IN THE LDCS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00283R000100050009-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2010
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: October 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
East Germany:
Soviet Partner
in the LDCs
An Intelligence Assessment
State Dept. review completed
Secret
CI 83-10201S
October 1983
Copy 116
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National Security Unauthorized Disclosure
Information Subject to Criminal Sanctions
All material on this page
is Unclassified.
STAT
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East Germany:
Soviet Partner
in the LDCs
An Intelligence Assessment
Secret
GI 83-10201S
October 1983
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East Germany:
Soviet Partner
in the LDCs
Key Judgments East Germany is an active partner in the USSR's drive to increase
Information available Communist presence and influence in the Third World. The East German
as 4131 August 1983 programs are small compared with the Soviet effort but have grown in size
was used in this report.
and scope to the point where East Germany now provides a number of com-
plementary services that serve Moscow's foreign policy interests. These
services range from traditional military and economic assistance to special-
ized activities such as developing local security and intelligence services,
establishing party and media links, and providing technical training
courses. East Germany has contributed to the establishment or consolida-
tion of a number of pro-Soviet regimes, notably in Angola, Mozambique,
Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Syria. In addition, East Germany has used
links, with LDC Communist parties, media, labor unions, and front
organizations to increase Communist presence and influence in the Third
World. East German programs are most heavily concentrated in Africa
and the Middle East, but recently have become more active in Latin
America
We believe that the East Germans in some instances act as surrogates
performing duties at Soviet request and in other cases carry out programs
in general coordination with Moscow but with the specifics left to East
Berlin. The kinds of activities that appear to be most closely coordinated
are those dealing with intelligence and security, military assistance, and
covert support to nonruling leftist and Communist parties. Other activi-
ties-such as economic assistance-are apparently conducted much more
independently, although with Moscow's knowledge and encouragement.
In addition to supporting Moscow's foreign policy goals, East German
relations with the Third World have been driven by its desire to enhance its
own international prestige, particularly vis-a-vis West Germany, and more
recently, by economic necessity, particularly the need to gain access to
hard currency and export markets.
We expect that the East German interest in the Third World will continue
to increase because their activities provide benefits to the USSR and the
LDCs as well as East Germany. Of the various East German programs, in-
telligence and security assistance and political influence activities are most
likely to be expanded and pose the most direct challenge to US interests.
While Africa and the Middle East probably will continue to be prime
targets, recent East German activities in Nicaragua and Grenada indicate
an increasing interest in Latin America and the Caribbean.
iii Secret
G183-10201S
October 1983
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Our knowledge about the size and scope of East
German programs comes from
Embassy reporting, and East German and
LDCs, media agreements were signed with at least
six LDCs, and some 300 East German youths were
assigned to friendship brigades in nine LDCs.
Third World press. We are confident that our data
accurately reflect the general size and pattern of East
German activities, but we are less confident about the
specific details of individual programs. Our data
show that the East Germans are active throughout
the Third World and that their programs are most
heavily concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa and the
Middle East. Programs differ from country to coun-
try, but one or more of the following elements are at
the heart of East German efforts in each target
country:
? Intelligence and Military Advisers. We estimate
that in 1982 there were 1,000 to 1,500 East German
advisers in LDCs. Most of them were involved in
assisting leftist regimes develop their intelligence
and security apparatus. Others were employed as
weapons instructors, maintenance and repair tech-
nicians, logistic specialists, and staff advisers.
? Political Influence Mechanisms. East Germany uses
a variety of mechanisms to penetrate or influence
key sectors of LDC governments and populations-
such as providing political advice and support to
Marxist parties; training journalists and supporting
leftist newspapers; and exploiting youth, labor, and
front organizations. In 1982.friendship exchanges
were conducted with fraternal parties in seven
Soviet and East German offi-
cers reviewing Angolan military
? Military Supply Program. Since the start of its
military supply program in 1964, East Germany
has signed military sales agreements worth $860
million with about 30 LDCs calling primarily for
the supply of vehicles, artillery, small arms, and
ammunition. Sales exceeded $300 million in 1982
alone, largely reflecting sales to radical Arab
states.
? Economic Assistance. East Germany has signed
economic agreements totaling nearly $3 billion with
some 50 LDCs since the program began in 1955. A
large share of the recent agreements has been trade
credits that call for repayment in hard currency or
oil. In addition, East Germany had some 5,000
technicians in LDCs in 1982-three times the num-
ber in 1978-to help organize and develop govern-
ment administration, install and maintain East
German equipment, and work on development
projects.
? Trade. East Germany's trade with Third World
countries amounted to over $2 billion in 1981,
accounting for 5 percent of East German foreign
trade, as it has since the early, 1960s.
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East Germany:
Soviet Partner
in the LDCs
East German efforts in support of Moscow's foreign
policy objectives in the Third World have led to a
substantial expansion of relations with LDCs since the
early 1970s. Starting essentially as moral support for
Third World "progressive" states and "liberation"
movements, East German activities in the LDCs are
now varied and include government-to-government
diplomatic relations, party-to-party ties, cultural and
media links, intelligence and security assistance,
training programs, military and economic agree-
ments, and trade.
Although the East German programs are small com-
pared with those of the Soviet Union, they comple-
ment Soviet programs by concentrating on selected
countries and specializing in those areas that have the
greatest potential for influence in LDCs. For example:
? By providing intelligence and security assistance to
several African countries, the East Germans have
been instrumental in helping to secure Moscow's
position in the area.
? By developing party-to-party relations, East Berlin
has been able to provide support to nonruling leftist
and Communist parties in Latin America.
? East Germany's extensive media activities help meet
Moscow's goals of broadly disseminating Commu-
nist propaganda.
? East Berlin's support of youth movements and trade
unions exemplify East German efforts to penetrate
key sectors in LDCs in order to secure current and
future political advantage for itself and Moscow.
? East Germany's military supply program, while
small, is used selectively to help support the needs of
Soviet clients and potential clients.
In addition to supporting Soviet Third World policies,
East Germany's activities in the Third World are
apparently also motivated by East Berlin's desire to:
? Enhance East German international visibility and
prestige, particularly vis-a-vis West Germany.
? Provide East Germany with needed export markets
and hard currency earnings to help finance imports
from the West as well as from the Soviet Union and
other Warsaw Pact countriesi
Support of Soviet Third World Objectives
Of the USSR's Warsaw Pact allies, East Germany
plays the most active role in support of Soviet objec-
tives in the Third World. East Berlin no doubt shares
many of Moscow's motives for penetrating Third
World countries. East German leaders have frequent-
ly stated their support for-and willingness to act as
an instrument of-Soviet policy. For example, in a
speech to the Parliament in June 1979 on the signing
of "friendship and cooperation" treaties with Angola
and Mozambique, Foreign Minister Fischer acknowl-
edged that the treaties were an expression of the
"coordinated foreign policy of the states of the social-
ist community." We believe, however, that some of
the motivation for East Germany's activities stems not
just from shared ideals but also from a desire to
enhance its position with Moscow in hopes of increas-
ing Soviet support for East German political and
economic interests.
There are numerous examples of East German activi-
ties in the Third World that directly support Soviet
objectives:
? East Germans have helped to consolidate pro-
Soviet, Marxist-oriented regimes in South Yemen,
Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Angola.
? East Berlin responded rapidly and fairly generously
to the Sandinista takeover in Nicaragua, offering
some $30 million in military equipment and $110
million in economic assistance since late 1979. East
Germany has also provided limited aid and training
to Guatemalan and Salvadoran insurgents.
? East Germany has provided assistance to the Pales-
tine Liberation Organization (PLO), Syria, and Iraq
in support of Soviet Middle East policies. East
Germany's resupply of Iraq in the early days of the
Iran-Iraq war preceded Moscow's own shift to
supporting Baghdad, while Moscow was still trying
to solidify its relations with Tehran.
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Through its involvement in Third World media, East
Germany has had some success in casting events in a
pro-East, anti-West light. Such involvement includes
training journalists, providing news services, support-
ing party newspapers, and facilitating clandestine
radiobroadcasting.
Journalist Training
The Solidarity School run by East Germany's Jour-
nalist Union was established by the International
Organization of Journalists, one of the 10 major
Soviet front groups. The school has been largely used
to train journalists from African countries such as
Ethiopia,. Tanzania, and Zambia.
News Services
The East German news agency, ADN, is increasingly
active in the Third World. The East Germans regu-
larly supply material to Tanzania's government press
service and local Tanzanian newspapers, and the East
Germans along with the Soviets regularly plant sto-
ries hostile to the West in the Zambian media. ADN
pieces are frequently printed in the Ethiopian press
and Ghana is reported to receive free wire service
from East Germany.
East German involvement in the media of other
countries has been less detectable, but ADN has
recently signed agreements with news services in such
countries as Burma, Cyprus, Greece, South Yemen,
and Syria. In India, East Germany continues to be
active in the media, conducting broadcasts in both
English and Hindi and maintaining a bureau in New
Delhi.
Support to Party Newspapers
East Germany also provides printing equipment and
supplies to a number offriendly Third World govern-
ments and to nonruling Communist and leftist parties
for their party newspapers:
? Grenada recently received a GDR grant for printing
equipment for its Free West Indian newspaper.
? According to press reports, East Germany covertly
provided financial assistance to the publishing
house of the pro-Soviet Greek Communist Party
through a front company in Luxembourg.
Clandestine Radiobroadcasts
East Germany has also provided broadcasting facili-
ties to a number of Western and Third World Com-
munist movements including Iran's Tudeh Party and
the Greek Communist Party. In most cases, the
listeners were led to believe that the broadcasts
originated in the target country. The only clandestine
stations still operating from Eastern Europe are' two
that broadcast in Turkish from. East Germany:
"Voice of the Turkish Communist Party" and "Our
Radio. " Broadcasts generally follow the Soviet line
in commenting on Turkish foreign policy and empha-
size themes designed to discredit the United States,
NATO, and the West. On many issues, moreover,
these broadcasts have been much more critical than
the more cautious official Soviet and East German
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Ethiopian journalists being
taught by East German instruc-
? East Germany has been among the most active
Warsaw Pact countries in assisting leftist insurgent
groups. It has provided support to the South-West
Africa People's Organization, the African National
Congress, and members of the PLO. These groups
also have official representation in East Berlin.
? East Germany provides printing equipment and
supplies to pro-Soviet leftist newspapers as well as
news services to a number of Third World countries.
? East Germany is also an active participant in inter-
national Communist front organizations such as the
World Peace Council and the Afro-Asian People's
Solidarity Organization. It has representatives on
the executive committees or secretariats of nine out
of the 10 major Soviet fronts, and one of the
fronts-the Women's International Democratic
Federation-is headquartered in East Berlin. East
Germany has also established friendship societies in
countries throughout the Third World and has used
these as well as cultural and sports activities as
vehicles for promoting Soviet views.
? East Germany has several training programs for
LDC personnel that complement Soviet and War-
saw Pact training programs. We believe that more
than 1,000 trainees from LDCs-mainly from Ethi-
opia, Zambia, and Mozambique underwent mili-
tary and paramilitary instruction in East Germany
between 1978 and 1982. Some 18,000 students from
LDCs have also received academic training in East
Germany.
? East Germany's Communist Party, the Socialist
Unity Party (SED), has continued to develop and
maintain direct links with leftist and Communist
parties in Africa, South Asia, and Latin America.
SED officials frequently attend party congresses
and have been involved in organizing and training
party cadre as well as providing advice and other
support. For instance, an agreement was signed with
the Congolese Labor Party calling for closer ties
with the SED, including continued training of
Congolese party cadre.
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Figure 1
East Germany: Military Sales to LDCs
1964-77
Total: $150 million
Coordination of Activities
There appears to be coordination and some specializa-
tion of activities between the USSR and East Germa-
ny in the Third World. The degree of coordination
apparently varies depending partly on geopolitical
interests, but, in general, Soviet-East German coordi-
nation appears to be most prevalent in activities
dealing with arms sales, intelligence and military
technical assistance, party cadre development, and
support to liberation movements
More coordination and specialization-particularly
between the USSR, East Germany, and, in some
instances, Cuba-is evident in Sub-Saharan Africa
and Latin America than in other regions. In Ethiopia
and Angola, for example, Moscow has provided the
bulk of the Bloc military and economic aid, Cuba has
supplied combat troops, while the East Germans have
concentrated on strengthening and reorganizing local
intelligence and security services
1978-82
Total: $710 million
Latin America
North Africa 2.5
In Latin America-particularly in Nicaragua-a
stronger East German effort in the area seems to have
followed party leader Honecker's visit to Cuba in
early 1980. The visit culminated in the signing of a
25-year friendship and cooperation treaty, the first of
its kind signed by Cuba with a Warsaw Pact state.
East Germany now has a contingent of military and
economic technicians in Nicaragua. The Soviets,
reportedly also look to East Germany as the vanguard
for the Warsaw Pact in relations with the Communist
parties and leftist groups in Latin America
Arms Sales. Warsaw Pact arms sales are coordinated
with and, in some instances, orchestrated by Mos-
cow-the amount of Soviet control varying with the
size of the order, the type of equipment involved, and
the political importance Moscow attaches to the
client/supplier relationship. East Germany's military
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Table 1
East Germany: Military Relations
With Non-Communist LDCs, 1964-82
Total
860
590
Sub-Saharan Africa
210
210
North Africa
20
Middle East
600
Asia
Table 2
East Germany: Intelligence and
Military Advisers in LDCs, 1982 a
Total
1,000-1,500
Africa
650-900
Middle East
300-550
Latin America
50
equipment sales account for less than 3 percent of
total Warsaw Pact sales to the Third World. As is the
case with other Warsaw Pact suppliers, sales are
mostly concentrated in the radical Arab states, south-
ern African, and, more recently, Nicaragua
Intelligence and Technical Assistance. There is evi-
dence that. some of East Germany's intelligence and
security assistance, specialized technical training, and
provision of advisers to Third World countries is done
at Soviet request or in close coordination with Mos-
cow
Party Relations. The East Germans also play a role in
helping the Soviets develop and maintain relations
with Third World Communist and leftist parties.F_
Support of Liberation Movements. East Germany's
support of liberation and revolutionary movements
has also closely paralleled that of the Soviet Union.
For example, the East Germans joined the Soviets in
backing Mozambique's FRELIMO and Angola's
MPLA long before these regimes came to power. On
some occasions, the East Germans appear to have
been used to establish contact with a movement when
it was politically inopportune for Moscow to do so.
For example, East Berlin established close relations
with the PLO when Moscow officially treated it with
caution
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ilonecker meeting with YAR
Vice President Abdul Aziz
In addition to backing Moscow, East German activi-
ties in the Third World also support two of East
Berlin's most important foreign policy objectives:
? The East German desire for international recogni-
tion and prestige comparable to West Germany.
? More recently, the need for increased earnings of
hard currency or opportunities to barter with LDC
raw materials for East German goods or services.F
The International Prestige Factor
The desire to attain recognition as a legitimate sover-
eign state is not the driving force it once was, as most
states now recognize East Germany. Nevertheless, we
believe that the rivalry with West Germany for
prestige and influence in the Third World remains
strong. With this in mind, the East Germans have
paid special attention to liberation movements and
new regimes in Africa and the Middle East. In
agreements signed with Third World countries, the
East Germans try to insert references to the inviola-
bility of the inter-German frontier and to seek ac-
knowledgment that West Berlin is not part of West
Germany.
East Berlin uses the image of increased prestige it has
gained in the Third World to bolster the legitimacy
of the East German Government with its own people.
Support of foreign revolutionary causes is justified to
the East German populace as a necessary contribution
of the "ultimate victory" of Communism over
imperialism. East German Communist Party leader
Honecker and other high-level East German officials
have made frequent visits to Africa, the Middle East,
and other Third World regions. These visits as well as
those of Third World governments and party leaders
to East Germany are well publicized in the East
German and Bloc media. 25X1
East Germany's investment has paid off well in gains
in international recognition and prestige. At the be-
ginning of 1970, East Germany was recognized by
only seven non-Communist countries. Today it has
formal relations with over 130 and assistance agree-
ments with 50. It has gained influence and respect,
particularly in Africa and the Middle East where it
has established close relations with a number of
countries as well as with many of the leading African
revolutionary movements and the PLO. It has signed
treaties of friendship and cooperation with Angola,
Mozambique, Ethiopia, South Yemen, and .Afghani-
stan and a joint declaration of friendship and coopera-
tion with Syria. Its influence also appears to be
increasing in other countries such as Zambia and 25X1
Nicaragua.
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East German supplies being un-
loaded in Mozambique.
The East Germans, nevertheless, have also suffered
some setbacks. East German police advisers in Soma-
lia were sent home in 1981 when Mogadishu refused
to renew their contracts, presumably a reflection of
Somalia's distancing itself from the Soviet Bloc. The
East Germans also experienced a setback in Zimba-
bwe that they now appear to be reversing. East
Germany, along with Czechoslovakia and the USSR,
backed the ZAPU which lost out to Mugabe's Zimba-
bwe African National Union (ZANU). Only after
reportedly agreeing to sever all ties with ZAPU was
East Germany able to establish diplomatic relations
with the new Zimbabwean Government in November
1980. Prime Minister Mugabe's visit to East Germa-
ny, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary in 1983 is indica-
tive of the improvement in relations
Economic Considerations
Although East Germany's economic and military
programs in the Third World were at first motivated
more by political and ideological considerations, Fast
Germany began to increase its emphasis on economic
considerations in the mid-1970s. At that time, eco-
nomic constraints began impinging on East Berlin's
ability to provide financial aid to Third World coun-
tries. This forced East Germany to look toward LDCs
to expand its equipment and services exports in hopes
of increasing hard currency earnings
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Figure 2
East Germany: Economic Agreements With LDCs
1955-77
Total: $1.3 billion
New measures during the past five years to increase
economic returns from LDC relationships have
included:
? Opening new markets for East German equipment
by expanding the size and scope of credits provided
under trade agreements. Of the $1.7 billion in
economic agreements signed in 1978-82, $1.3 billion
were trade credits, usually carrying 10-year repay-
ment terms at 4.5- to 9-percent interest. Only
countries with good credit records are being allowed
deferred payment terms.
? Focusing on agreements with countries that can pay
in hard currency or in needed raw materials such as
oil. This pattern has become more pronounced in
both military and economic agreements over the
past five years. Three-fourths of the $1.7 billion in
economic agreements is repayable in hard currency,
oil, or other raw materials. Seventy percent of the
$710 million in East German military agreements
with non-Communist LDCs over the past five years
have been with Middle Eastern oil producers, pay-
able in oil or hard currency.
1978-82
Total: $1.7 billion
? Raising charges for technical services and requiring
payment in hard currency. Because of the heavy
concentration of personnel in countries that had
been targeted for ideological purposes, East Germa-
ny had not enjoyed the same hard currency returns
that other East European countries had been earn-
ing on their technical services programs. In 1980
East Germany began to demand salaries based on
Western pay scales for technicians, with payment at
least partly in hard currency
Thus far the East German economic initiatives in
Third World countries have had limited results. Total.
exports to LDCs amounted to only $1 billion in
1981-down slightly from 1980-with the LDC share
of East German trade steady at 5 percent since the
early 1960s. We have not been able to quantify the
hard currency earnings from the trade.
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Table 3
East Germany: Economic Aid to
Non-Communist LDCs, 1955-82
Extended
Drawn
Extended
Drawn
Total a
2,976
959
Philippines
30
2
North Africa
402
135
Latin America
505
119
Algeria
377
127
Bolivia'
15
3
Tunisia
25
8
Brazil
219
19
Sub-Saharan Africa
687
189
Chile
20
15
Angola
20
16
Colombia
60
5
Burundi
NEGL
NEGL
Grenada
16
5
Cape Verde
7
4
Guyana
36
17
Congo
27
23
Mexico
20
4
Ethiopia
235
32
Nicaragua
112
45
Ghana
64
15
Uruguay
6
6
Guinea
24
24
Middle East
800
390
Guinea-Bissau
5
5
Egypt
264
170
Madagascar
9
1
Iran
100
Mali
NEGL
NEGL
Iraq
84
55
Mozambique
104
41
North Yemen
10
10
Sao Tome and Principe
5
South Yemen
42
32
Somalia
1
1
Syria
250
122
Sudan
46
18
Turkey
50
Tanzania
19
5
South Asia
166
81
Uganda
24
1
Afghanistan
42
15
Zambia
96
2
Bangladesh
25
12
East Asia
195
40
India
2
2
8
8
Pakistan
35
10
Indonesia
144
29
Sri Lanka -
62
42
Kampuchea
12
NEGL
Other
220
5
Laos
1
1
a Because of rounding, components may not add to totals shown.
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Table 4
East Germany: Economic Technicians in
Non-Communist LDCs, 1982
Total
4,835
North Africa
700
Algeria
250
Libya
400
Tunisia
50
Sub-Saharan Africa
2,510
Angola
750
Ethiopia
500
Guinea
200
800
100
Nicaragua
50
Other
30
Middle East
1,405
Egypt
100
Iraq
350
500
Syria
350
Other
105
South Asia
115
100
15
a Number present for one month or more, rounded to the nearest 5.
We believe that most East German programs will
continue to grow over the next several years. In our
view, economic aid and trade agreements will grow
only slightly-the emphasis being on hard currency
earnings-and will have little direct impact on the
United States. In contrast, East Germany probably
will make increased use of its intelligence and security
training programs and its political influence mecha-
nisms, activities that affect US interests more direct-
ly. In addition, East Berlin's military supply program,
Table 5
East Germany: Trade With
Major LDC Partners
Total
947
2,295
2,041
North Africa
43
352
243
Algeria
21
163
76
Libya
4
152
150
Morocco
14
19
12
Tunisia
4
18
5
Sub-Saharan Africa
17
259
257
Angola
83
60
Congo
NEGL
1
4
Ethiopia
NEGL
40
19
Ghana
4
15
14
Mozambique
83
112
Nigeria
1
14
45
Sudan
10
8
2
Tanzania
2
15
1
East Asia
13
48
43
Indonesia
6
22
28
Malaysia
7
26
15
Latin America
139
389
412
Brazil
75
182
200
Colombia
11
67
43
Mexico
10
64
80
Peru
35
10
17
526
927
711
Egypt
183
93
89
Iran
18
166
184
Iraq
218
455
216
Kuwait
9
11
12
Lebanon
17
33
38
60
118
130
21
51
42
113
145
189
100
134
180
5
6
4
8
5
5
Europe
96
175
186
Cyprus
2
11
9
Greece
52
105
82
Portugal
11
8
9
Spain
31
51
86
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Secret
East German airliner carrying
Nicaraguan wounded to East
Berlin for treatment.
We expect that countries in Africa and the Middle
East will remain prime targets for East Germany, but
the opportunities for increased East German involve-
ment in Latin America may be of most concern to the
United States. East Germany's recent efforts in Cen-
tral America and the Caribbean, its ties to leftist and
while small in comparison to Moscow's, can be used
selectively in those areas where Moscow is reluctant
to show its hand directly
We believe that these trends are already evident in
recent East German moves:
? In Nicaragua, the East Germans reportedly are
involved in assisting the Sandinistas reorganize their
party along Communist lines, as well as providing
intelligence and security assistance. East Germany
is providing limited assistance to insurgents in Gua-
temala and El Salvador.
? In Syria, East Berlin has agreed to provide the
ruling Ba'th Party with cadre training and assist-
ance in party reorganization.
? During 1982 East Berlin signed agreements to
provide news services to the local press in Greece,
Cyprus, and Syria and provided a grant for newspa-
per printing equipment to the government of Grena-
da.
Communist groups, and its effort to develop economic
relations in the region indicate a growing interest in
Latin America. How much further East Berlin will go
is not yet clear. In considering this question, East
Berlin will have to balance its desire for ties and
influence with revolutionary regimes and nonruling
leftist parties with its efforts to develop relations with
countries like Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico, where
East Germany has a growing economic stake. F_~ 25X1
The impetus for continued expansion of East German
activities in the Third World comes from the potential
benefits to all parties the East Germans, the USSR,
and the LDCs themselves. In addition to helping
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secure its international. position, East Germany's ac-
tive role in the Third World reinforces its special
relationship with Moscow. It also provides some op-
portunities-albeit as yet small-for economic gain.
For the USSR, the presence of its Warsaw Pact ally
in the Third World takes some of the burden off
Moscow and helps diffuse some of the Western and
Third World criticism of superpower interference.
The Soviets can be expected to again look to the East
Germans to test the waters in a target LDC when it is
politically inopportune for them to do so. The LDCs
benefit from East German programs because of the
specialized technical. expertise the East Germans have
developed.
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Secret
Secret
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/09: CIA-RDP85T00283R000100050009-3