THE ROLE OF LDC TRADE LINKAGES IN THE DEBT PROBLEM

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: January 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Confid?"+
Intelligence
in the Debt Problem
The Role of
LDC Trade Linkages
An Intelligence Assessment
GI 83-10233
October 1983
Copy 4 3 A
U
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Directorate of Confidential
Intelligence
The Role of
LDC Trade Linkages
in the Debt Problem
International Trade Branch, OGI
are welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
This paper was prepared byl lof
the Office of Global Issues. Comments and queries
Confidential
GI 83-10233
October 1983
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Summary
Information available
as of 15 August 1983
was used in this report.
The Role of
LDC Trade Linkages
in the Debt Problem
We believe two factors have been instrumental in spreading the debt
problem from one less developed country to another over the past year.
First, banker confidence has been severely shaken by the problems of
several large debtors. This has led to loan cutbacks not only to countries in
financial trouble but also to neighboring states in stronger financial shape.
Second, the debt problem has been spread among the LDCs through trade
linkages. Much has been said about the impact of banker confidence on re-
gional lending. Little has been said, however, about the significance of
intra-LDC trade linkages because the effects are less obvious. This paper
examines these linkages and estimates the impact of import cuts by 15 key
debt-troubled LDCs on the export and growth performance of Third World
countries facing financial problems, that is, the debt-troubled and poten-
tially debt-troubled LDCs.
Intra-LDC trade presently accounts for about a third of total LDC trade,
up from just 20 percent in 1970. The trade linkages in some cases are quite
large. Brazil, for example, buys 60 percent of its foreign purchases from
other developing countries. Brazilian import reductions, therefore, can
have an important impact on LDCs. For some other countries, like Mexico,
the dependence on LDC suppliers is quite small. Focusing on trade shares
in isolation, however, generally leads to an underestimation of the potential
impact that import cuts can have because they do not capture feedback ef-
fects. Because import cuts by one country are transformed into lower
exports for others, this means slower economic growth and yet another
drop in import demand, which feeds back to the country that initially
lowered its import demand. Taking into account these feedbacks, we
calculate that, if the key debt-troubled LDCs reduce their imports by 18
percent this year, as we expect, the GNP of all financially troubled LDCs
would be nearly 1 percent lower than if the debt-troubled countries had
continued to import at the 1975-81 trend rate. Moreover, the financially
troubled LDCs would see their exports reduced by 2.7 percent, or $5
billion.
In view of the trade linkages among the Third World countries, import cuts
by debt-troubled LDCs will reduce LDC export gains this year and next,
making it more difficult for developing countries to work through their
financial difficulties. To the extent that the trade links inhibit LDC
recovery, they also slow the confidence building needed to maintain the
flow of commercial bank and supplier credits. In addition, as LDCs seek
iii Confidential
GI 83-10233
October 1983
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ways to limit imports while simultaneously boosting exports, they are likely
to set up new trade barriers. With export prospects to other LDCs limited,
pressure to increase sales to the developed world could intensify protection-
ist pressures in industrial countries.
While the effects of trade reductions on the debt crisis are small compared
with those caused by bankers' concerns spilling over from one country to
another, they nevertheless make a difference at the margin. A further
decline in living standards brought about by reductions in per capita GNP
or per capita imports could contribute to political instability and civil
unrest. Protests have already broken out in a number of debt-troubled
countries, and hostility from strong interest groups could threaten serious
disorder in others. The extent to which a decline in intra-LDC trade will
weaken domestic economic performance and, in turn, feed into the political
equation will vary widely among countries, depending on the importance of
their LDC trade linkages. Argentina, Brazil, and Chile could be signifi-
cantly affected; among the potentially troubled LDCs, Colombia, Para-
guay, and Uruguay would be the hardest hit. For some countries, such as
Indonesia, Mexico, Venezuela, Nigeria, and Zaire, import cuts by other
debt-troubled LDCs will have little impact on either total exports or GNP
growth.
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Contents
Summary
Decline in LDC Imports, 1982-83
Trade and the Debt Problem
I
The Import Decline to Date-The Backdrop
1
Outlook for 1983
1
The Intra-LDC Trade Connection-A Regional and Country Perspective
2
The Intra-LDC Trade Connection-A System Perspective
3
A. Methodology: A Reduced Form Model of Trade Interaction
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The Role of
LDC Trade Linkages
in the Debt Problem
P
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Decline in LDC Imports, 1982-83
Trade and the Debt Problem. The number of develop-
ing countries requiring both debt rescheduling and
International Monetary Fund (IMF) assistance con-
tinues to increase. We believe two factors are respon-
sible for debt problems being transferred from one
country, or group of countries, to another over the
past year. The negative impact on banker confidence
caused by the severe problems in a few high-debt
LDCs, with resulting reductions in lending to other,
potentially debt-troubled countries, has been given
considerable attention. Less analysis has been done on
the role of intra-LDC trade. In some cases the import
cuts of major debt-troubled countries have signifi-
cantly reduced the export earnings of other LDCs,
thereby intensifying their foreign exchange problems.'
loans. To cope with their foreign exchange constraint,
governments introduced a number of import restric-
tions, including increased tariffs, additional quota and
licensing restrictions, and new foreign exchange
controls. For some countries, such as Chile and
Argentina, the slowdown in domestic economic activi-
ty, stemming from austerity measures and falling
exports, may have played an even greater role in
curbing foreign purchases.
About one-third of the import reduction by the debt-
troubled LDCs has been borne directly by those
countries and by the potentially debt-troubled LDCs.
Sales by potentially troubled countries to the debt-
troubled countries were down $4 billion last year, a
12-percent decline. Exports among the debt-troubled
LDCs themselves fell by 26 percent, or about $3
The Import Decline to Date-The Backdrop. Total
LDC imports fell 7 percent in value in 1982-the first
drop in nearly a quarter of a century-according to
IMF data. Nearly 60 percent of the reduction in LDC
imports is reflected in cuts by the debt-troubled LDCs
we examined. The imports of these countries fell $24
billion-nearly 18 percent-in 1982. Although some
debt-troubled LDCs began to cut back imports in the
first half of the year, most of the drop occurred in the
second half of 1982. The sharpest import declines-
40 percent or more-were reported by Argentina,
Chile, and Mexico.
The debt-troubled countries were forced to curtail
imports last year because of foreign exchange con-
straints caused by falling export earnings in con-
junction with rising debt service requirements and
bankers' unwillingness to extend new commercial
' The distinction between debt-troubled and potentially debt-trou-
bled countries is somewhat artificial. For analytical purposes 15
countries were labeled debt troubled on the basis of an evaluation of
their relative debt positions, considering both their level of debt and
their ability to service that debt. The 15 debt-troubled LDCs we
examined are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador,
Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Peru,
the Philippines, Venezuela, and Zaire. The 10 high-debt or poten-
tially troubled countries we refer to are Colombia, Egypt, India,
Malaysia, Pakistan, Paraguay, South Korea, Sudan, Thailand, and
billion.
The effect of import cutbacks by the debt-troubled
LDCs was most pronounced in South America:
? Chile's exports fell only 2 percent last year, but sales
to three debt-troubled LDCs-Argentina, Mexico,
and Peru-fell 28 percent.
? Brazil's exports to Argentina, Chile, and Mexico
were down 40 percent in 1982, nearly one-fourth of
the overall drop in Brazilian foreign sales.
? Colombia-a potentially troubled country-report-
ed a 50-percent decline in its exports to Western
Hemisphere LDCs largely because of the falloff in
sales to Argentina, Ecuador, and other financially
burdened nations in the region.
Outlook for 1983. Debt-troubled LDCs continued to
reduce their imports in the early months of 1983,
according to IMF data and US Embassy reporting.
First-quarter total imports of debt-troubled LDCs
were down nearly a fourth from the same period last
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year. Among the few countries for which first-half
data are available, Mexican imports were down 60
percent from 1982 while Brazil recorded a decline of
about 20 percent.
A number of factors have been keeping imports low so
far this year. Foreign exchange earnings have been
depressed because, in addition to lower earnings from
sales to other LDCs, exports to the industrial coun-
tries have been weak in the early phase of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) economic recovery. A shortage of trade
credits has also limited the ability of many countries
to import. In addition, most of the countries examined
here are under or are negotiating IMF stabilization
programs where restrictive monetary and fiscal poli-
cies have held down domestic growth and, in turn,
import demand.1
We believe, based on US Embassy reporting and
preliminary trade data, that total imports of the debt-
troubled LDCs will drop about 18 percent in value
this year, although we expect the decline will bottom
out by the end of the year. As in 1982, some of this
decline-because of intra-LDC trade linkages-will
be translated into an overall weaker Third World
export performance. In our judgment, the sharpest
import declines will be reported by the oil exporters-
primarily Mexico and Nigeria. Venezuela may have
to begin sharply curtailing its foreign purchases later
The Intra-LDC Trade Connection-A Regional and
Country Perspective
The importance of overall intra-LDC trade-and its
potential for transmitting financial problems-has
grown in recent years, rising from 20 percent of total
LDC exports in 1970 to its present level of 32 percent,
according to IMF statistics. Factors behind this
growth include the rise in petroleum prices and oil
trade between LDCs and the increase in intra-LDC
sales of semimanufactured goods. In addition, LDC
markets have grown more rapidly than those of
industrial countries-since 1970, developing-country
GNP has risen at twice the rate of the OECD.
Furthermore, trade groups, such as the Association of
South-East Asian Nations, the Economic Community
of West African States, the Caribbean Community,
the Latin American Free Trade Association, and the
Andean Pact, have helped boost regional trade, al-
though in recent years strains within Latin and
African groups have lessened their importance
Trade linkages are fairly substantial within some
regions:
? Trade among Western Hemisphere LDCs account-
ed for 16 percent of total Western Hemisphere LDC
exports in 1981-the last year for which we have
reliable and internally consistent trade share data.
? Regional trade is also important in Asia, where
trade among neighboring LDCs accounts for one-
fourth of Asian LDC exports. Within Asia, the five
ASEAN countries-Singapore, Thailand, the Phil-
ippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia-export more
than 17 percent of their goods to each other.
? Trade linkages among the African states are rela-
tively weak. In 1981 intra-African trade accounted
for just 7 percent of the region's exports.
Cutting across the regional groupings, the potentially
debt-troubled LDCs sell about 5 percent of their total
exports to the debt-troubled countries, while trade
between the debt-troubled countries themselves ac-
counts for about 8 percent of their total exports. Of
the potentially troubled countries, two are particularly
vulnerable; half of Paraguay's and close to a third of
Uruguay's exports go to debt-troubled countries.
Among the debt-troubled countries, four-Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, and Ecuador-sell more than 10 per-
cent of their exports to other debt-troubled states.
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The Import Outlook for Selected Countries
Argentina's recession has bottomed out, but restric-
tions, import substitution, and low private investment
may keep imports down at around $5 billion on a
c.if. basis, compared with $5.3 billion last year and
mean greater agricultural imports. Even so, imports
are unlikely to exceed $10-11 billion, far below the
$14.6 billion figure in 1982 and the $24 billion level
an average of $10 billion in 1980 and 1981.
The Brazilian Government slowed the issuance of
import licenses and expanded the list of prohibited
imports this year. The dropoff in suppliers' credits
has also made importation more difficult. We believe
cash flow problems and restrictive import policies
will lead to an import drop on the order of 25 percent,
lowering imports to under $16 billion from $21
billion in 1982.
Chile's liberal trade policy has been tightened since
the uniform 10 percent tariff rate was raised to 20
percent last March. Chile's foreign exchange shortage
probably will hold imports a little below last year's
depressed level of about $3.5 billion.
For Nigeria, the list of goods subject to import 25X1
licensing was expanded and tariffs were sharply
increased in February. Even with the recent resched-
uling, importers are still having difficulty securing
letters of credit because trade arrears remain at more
than $5 billion. According to Embassy sources, the
government import goal is $600 million per month,
but imports are still running closer to $800 million.
Even at this rate, imports would be down 36 percent
from last year.
Peru's imports are projected, according to Embassy
reporting, to decline from $3.6 billion in 1982 to $2.8
this year. Increased imports due to low agricultural
output will be more than offset by declines stemming
from reduced industrial activity and cuts in public
Ecuador imposed new measures to restrict imports in
November 1982; a large number of items were banned
and stricter import financing rules were introduced,
according to US Embassy reporting. Imports may
drop from $2.5 billion in 1982 to about $2.2 billion
this year.
Mexican imports appear to have bottomed out in the
first quarter of this year, and some import restric-
tions have recently been eased to allow exporters to
import needed inputs. A poor harvest this year will
The Intra-LDC Trade Connection-A System
Perspective
The potential impact that debt-troubled LDC import
cuts can have on LDC exports is even greater than
suggested by the bilateral trade shares, because they
fail to take into account the feedback effects countries
have on each other. For instance, if Brazil cuts
imports by 10 percent, Chilean exports would be
reduced by 0.7 percent based on its Brazilian export
share. However, a falloff in Brazilian imports would
also reduce the export earnings of Argentina, Bolivia,
investment projects.
Venezuelan import restrictions imposed in November
1982 included a ban on 220 items, higher tariffs on
327 items, and other restrictions on an additional 440
private-sector goods. In February of this year a three-
tiered exchange rate system was established that gave
preference to "essential" imports. Venezuelan con-
trols could lead to a reduction in imports from $14.6
billion in 1982 to about $10 billion this year.
and Paraguay, who also sell to Brazil. The reduction
in these countries' exports would, in turn, lower their
GNP and probably force them to cut imports. These
second-round cutbacks would further reduce Chilean
exports; and, when these secondary and tertiary ef-
fects on trade and GNP are considered, Chile would
show a greater falloff in export earnings than would
have been expected based on bilateral trade shares
alone.
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Country Trade Linkages
Trade shares vary widely among individual LDCs. In
South America, for instance, more than 40 percent of
the exports of Paraguay and Bolivia go to other
South American countries. On the other hand, less
than 10 percent of the foreign sales of Peru and
Venezuela are in the South American market. Trade
ties are particularly strong among certain individual
South American countries. Argentina and Brazil
together account for 41 percent of Paraguay's exports
and 21 percent of Uruguay's exports. More than a
third of Bolivia's exports go to Argentina. Colombia
exports more than a tenth of its goods to Venezuela
and is further tied to Venezuela through some
600,000 guest workers and family members there.
Similar variations exist in other developing country
regions. Within Asia, the Philippines exports 15
percent of its goods to other Asian LDCs, while the
share is 40 percent for Malaysia. Although most
African trade is with the industrial world, some
countries do export a significant portion of their
goods to the African market. Kenya's exports to other
African states, for instance, accounted for nearly a
third of its total foreign sales in 1981, while the Ivory
Coast's intra-African trade amounted to 15 percent.
On the other hand, almost all of Zaire's exports go to
industrial countries.
Our analysis shows that:
? The 18-percent import cut we expect in debt-
troubled LDCs this year would reduce the aggre-
gate GNP of the potentially debt-troubled countries
by an estimated 0.6 percent, or $2.2 billion.
? Exports of potentially troubled countries would be
2.4 percent less than would otherwise have been
expected, while imports of this group would be
reduced by 0.7 percent.
? Several potentially debt-troubled countries, particu-
larly Paraguay, Uruguay, and Colombia, would be
severely affected by the import cuts of debt-troubled
countries. Their total exports would be reduced by
1 11 percent, 8 percent, and 7 percent, respectively.
? The import cuts of debt-troubled countries also will
have significant feedback effects on each other,
reducing aggregate exports by 2.8 percent and GNP
by 1.0 percent. Among the debt-troubled countries,
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile would be the hardest
hit, with their exports falling an average 5.5
percent.'
Implications
While the effects of trade reductions on the debt crisis
are small compared with those caused by bankers'
concerns spilling over from one country to another,
they nevertheless make a difference at the margin.
To estimate the probable overall impact on other
countries of debt-troubled LDC import cuts this year,
we used a reduced form model of world trade.'
Specifically, we calculated the difference between the
actual level of imports expected this year, given the
debt-troubled LDC import declines we project, and
the amount that would have occurred had imports
increased this year at the 1975-81 pace. This method
shows the extent to which the import cuts prevent
exporters from achieving accustomed increases in
sales
Any falloff in LDC exports dampens real output
growth, increases unemployment problems, and leads
to declines in living standards. Moreover, import
cutbacks in response to the drop in export earnings
`The debt-troubled LDC import cuts will also affect other groups
of countries. For nonoil LDCs as a whole, exports would be reduced
by an estimated 2.4 percent; GNP would be lowered by 0.8 percent.
The import cuts by the debt-troubled countries even affect the
OECD countries, reducing overall OECD exports by an estimated
3.3 percent. Among the developed countries, the United States
would be affected most because 14 percent of its exports go to these
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Lonnaennal
Figure 1
Key Debt-Troubled LDCs: Sources of Imports, 1981
bus
Other Industrial
Oil Exporting
Nonoil Exporting
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Costa Rica
Ecuador
Indonesia
Ivory Coast
Kenya
Mexico
Morocco
Nigeria
Peru
Philippines
Venezuela
Zaire
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IonIIaennaI
Figure 2
Nonoil LDCs: Exports to Regions
as a Share of Total Exports
Western
Hemisphere
contribute to shortages of needed inputs for manufac-
turing, consumer goods, and even foodstuffs. Domes-
tic economic problems, in turn, may contribute to
political instability and civil unrest, especially given
the low income base from which some of these
countries are starting. Protests have already broken
out in a number of debt-troubled countries as econom-
ic adjustment policies have squeezed the middle and
poorer classes, and hostility from strong interest
groups could threaten serious disorder in others.
The aggregate impact of the decline in debt-troubled
LDC imports masks some relatively important coun-
try differences. For some LDCs such as Indonesia,
Mexico, Venezuela, Nigeria, and Zaire, import cuts
by other debt-troubled LDCs will have little impact
on either total exports or GNP growth. For these
nations, OECD import policies will be of overriding
importance on the trade front. Argentina, Brazil, and
Chile, however, would be significantly affected. Near-
ly a fifth of Brazil's and Chile's exports go to
financially troubled LDCs. Some potentially debt-
troubled nations-Colombia, Paraguay, and
Uruguay-would be even harder hit by a falloff in
sales to debt-troubled countries
If, as we expect, debt-troubled LDCs continue to
restrict import growth over the near term, a further
widening of the debt crisis may occur since the
transmission effect of the debt crisis through LDC
trade links will reinforce other trends. Banker confi-
dence will be weakened as export declines between
LDCs continue. It is also likely that suppliers will be
less willing to extend short-term trade credits, thus
further reducing a critical source of funds for cash-
short LDCs.
As LDCs seek ways to limit imports while simulta-
neously boosting exports, they are likely to set up new
trade barriers. In our judgment, rising protectionist
measures may lead to growing strains among LDC
trade partners and a weakening of regional trade
linkages. If LDCs cannot expand exports to other
LDCs, they would be forced to turn to the Western
industrial countries to sell their goods. Intense pres-
sure to increase sales to the developed world could
create additional North-South strains and possibly
intensify protectionist pressures in industrial
countries
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Appendix A
Methodology: A Reduced Form
Model of Trade Interaction
To estimate the total impact of import cuts by debt-
troubled LDCs on individual countries and groups of
countries in the world economy, we constructed a
reduced form model of world trade. In this model, the
world is divided into 29 countries or regions-15 debt-
troubled countries, 10 potentially debt-troubled coun-
tries, and the other oil-exporting LDCs, other nonoil
LDCs, Communist countries, and developed coun-
tries.
We used four items of information on each country or
region for modeling the international interactions
among the different economies; all data were derived
from data bases of the International Monetary Fund
and the OECD. The items included:
? The share of exports of each country or region sent
to the other 28 countries or regions in the model.
? The share of exports in the GNP of each country or
region.
? The elasticity of imports with respect to GNP for
each country or region.
? A rough estimate of elasticity of domestic spending
with respect to GNP for each country or region.' F
These estimates were then incorporated in a simulta-
neous equation system for each country or region. The
equation set is as follows:
%0 X = E (SHXi) (%0 Mi)
%0 Y = (WTX) (%A X) + (WTDS) (%A DS) -
(WTM) (%0 M)
%A M = (%0 Y) (MELAS)
%0 DS = (%0 Y) (DSELAS) + AU% ADS
%A = percent change
X = export earnings
SHXi = share of exports to its country/region
Mi =. import spending of its country/region
Y = total GNP
WTX = exports as a share of GNP
WTDS = domestic spending as a share of GNP
DS = domestic spending
WTM = imports as a share of GNP
MELAS = elasticity of imports with respect to-
GNP
DSELAS = elasticity of domestic spending with
respect to GNP
AU %A DS = autonomous, user-supplied, shifts in
domestic spending.
Using the model involves:
? Entering an assumed shock to the world economy-
in this study some drop in imports in a set of debt-
troubled countries.
? Allowing the model to calculate all the secondary
and tertiary domestic and international feedbacks.
? Observing the final results.
The model captures the full impact of import cuts by
debt-troubled countries. It accomplishes this by:
? Estimating the first-round effects of all the import
cuts on each country based on its trade shares.
? Calculating the impact of the corresponding export
declines on each country's domestic demand and
GNP.
? Estimating the resulting drop in each country's
import demand based on its import elasticity.
? Computing the effects of these second-round import
cuts on other countries and repeating this procedure
until the additional feedback effects approach zero.
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The model simulation used in this paper examined the
impact of debt-troubled LDC import cuts averaging
18 percent in conjunction with a "deviation from
trend"-the average growth rate of imports for these
countries from 1975 to 1981-on the order of 16
percent. This method encompasses import changes
from accustomed rates of growth. Thus, it captures, to
the extent possible, the full impact that the debt crisis
has had on the trade front
The model was also simulated zeroing in on only the
absolute declines expected this, year. The results
showed:
? Exports of potentially debt-troubled countries would
be reduced 1.4 percent from what they otherwise
would have been, while imports of this group would
be 0.4 percent lower. Aggregate GNP of the poten-
tially debt-troubled countries would be 0.3 percent
lower.
? Aggregate exports of the debt-troubled LDCs would
be reduced by 2.3 percent. GNP reductions ranged
from 0.3 percent for Mexico to 1.3 percent for
Chile
As expected, the simulation looking only at the abso-
lute import decline in one year showed less of an
impact on exports and growth. For the potentially
debt-troubled group, the level of GNP was 0.3 percent
higher, imports were 0.4 percent greater, and exports
were 0.9 percent higher when the deviation from trend
was not considered. Similarly, for the debt-troubled
countries, the deviation from trend accounted for 0.5
percentage points of the 2.8-percent reduction in
exports.
While these results are admittedly rough, we believe
they adequately capture the order-of-magnitude ef-
fects of shifts in one economy, or one group of
economies, on the rest of the world. The underlying
parameters used in the model are presented in the
following table; additional data, as well as detailed
results of the impacts on exports and GNP of the
declines in imports in each of the 29 counties and
regions, are available on request.'
6 It should be noted that the structure of this model causes it to
calculate the total impact after all lags are worked out; it is not
possible to use it to examine the time path of responses to a given
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Underlying Parameters
Export/GNP
Import/GNP
Domestic
Spending/
GNP
Import
Elasticity
Domestic
Spending
Elasticity
0.095
0.098
1.002
1.203
0.600
Brazil
0.090
0.093
1.003
1.187
0.600
Chile
0.235
0.280
1.046
1.622
0.600
Costa Rica
0.490
0.530
1.040
1.456
0.600
Ecuador
0.238
0.259
1.021
0.928
0.600
Ivory Coast
0.385
0.392
1.007
0.982
0.600
Indonesia
0.275
0.192
0.917
0.896
0.600
Kenya
0.256
0.346
1.090
1.037
0.600
Morocco
0.211
0.336
1.126
0.941
0.600
Mexico
0.124
0.141
1.017
1.395
0.600
Nigeria
0.257
0.334
1.077
1.158
0.600
Peru
0.203
0.243
1.040
1.258
0.600
Philippines
0.175
0.235
1.059
1.084
0.600
Venezuela
0.301
0.248
0.946
0.843
0.600
Zaire
0.183
0.315
1.132
0.595
0.600
Developed countries
0.203
0.212
1.009
1.175
0.500
Nonoil LDCs
0.253
0.323
1.070
1.274
0.600
Oil-exporting LDCs
0.651
0.290
0.639
0.758
0.600
Communist countries
0.087
0.090
1.003
1.075
0.600
Potentially troubled LDCs
Colombia
0.114
0.155
1.041
1.039
0.600
Egypt
0.251
0.371
1.121
1.282
0.600
India
0.072
0.089
1.017
1.273
0.600
Malaysia
0.546
0.610
1.064
1.405
0.600
Pakistan
0.086
0.172
1.085
1.213
0.600
Paraguay
0.076
0.163
1.087
0.921
0.600
South Korea
0.414
0.456
1.042
1.317
0.600
Sudan
0.076
0.160
1.084
0.808
0.600
Thailand
0.254
0.259
1.005
1.098
0.600
0.149
0.213
1.065
1
138
0
600
.
.
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Appendix B
A Statistical Overview
Table B-1
Trade Trends in Selected Key Debt-Troubled Countries a
Exports
9,140
7,620
2,200
2,080
1,490
1,850
1,960
1,860
590
630
640
Imports
9,430
5,340
1,610
1,360
1,210
1,200
1,070
1,220
- 370
410
440
Brazil
Exports
23,290
20,180
5,410
4,980
5,070
4,750
5,190
5,780
1,900
1,910
1,970
Imports
24,080
21,070
5,500
5,410
5,200
4,980
4,370
3,840
1,390
1,260
1,190
Chile
Exports
3,910
3,820
970
990
960
890
910
1,060
330
350
380
Imports
6,360
3,530
1,050
1,090
730
690
700
680
230
240
210
Costa Rica
Exports
2,540
2,300
740
570
440
560
640
500
160
190
150
Imports
2,380
2,180
660
540
500
490
550
450
140
170
140
Mexico
Exports
19,380
21,580
4,360
5,000
6,190
6,130
4,970
5,110
1,650
1,660
1,800
Imports
24,070
14,560
5,550
4,140
3,080
1,840
1,630
2,130
680
760
690
Nigeria
Exports
17,370
14,280
3,780
3,260
3,470
3,780
1,730
3,000
780
1,240
980
Imports
19,600
15,120
4,820
4,190
2,790
3,330
2,390
2,340
780
780
780
Peru
Exports
3,250
3,230
780
870
780
790
660
740
210
300
230
Imports
3,450
3,600
1,020
880
890
820
660
630
200
200
230
Philippines
Exports
5,650
4,970
1,270
- 1,290
1,190
1,210
1,170
1,220
400
400
420
Imports
8,470
8,270
2,160
2,100
1,960
2,070
2,070
2,180
700
700
780
Venezuela
Exports
20,100
16,600
4,050
3,220
4,470
4,750
4,110
3,300
1,100
1,100
1,100
Imports
13,430
14,650
3,930
3,870
3,590
3,330
1,780
1,000
340
330
330
Note: Exports f.o.b. and imports c.i.f. are based on IMF Interna-
tional Financial Statistics and are seasonally adjusted.
Seasonally adjusted quarterly data may not add to annual totals.
Numbers in italics are CIA estimates.
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Table B-2
Debt-Troubled LDCs:
Exports to Troubled and Potentially Troubled LDCs
1981 Value
Share of
1981 Value
Share of
(million US $)
Total Exports
(million US $)
Total Exports
(percent)
(percent)
Debt troubled
1,070
11.7
Debt troubled
1,220
6.3
Potentially troubled
530
5.8
Potentially troubled
170
0.9
Brazil
Morocco
Debt troubled
4,080
17.5
Debt troubled
120
4.9
Potentially troubled
1,800
7.7
Potentially troubled
140
6.0
Chile
Nigeria
Debt troubled
720
18.4
Debt troubled
830
4.8
Potentially troubled
160
4.1
Potentially troubled
130
0.7
Costa Rica
Peru
Debt troubled
50
2.0
Potentially troubled
10
0.4
Kenya
Debt troubled 30 1.4
Potentially troubled 30 1.6
Confidential 12
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Table B-3
Potentially Debt-Troubled LDCs:
Exports to Troubled and Other
Potentially Troubled LDCs
1981 Value
(million US $)
Share of
Total Exports
(percent)
Debt troubled
570
19.1
Potentially troubled
10
0.3
Egypt
Debt troubled
0
0.1
Potentially troubled
50
1.6
India
Debt troubled
160
1.9
Potentially troubled
330
4.0
Malaysia
Debt troubled
120
4.1
Potentially troubled
110
3.8
Paraguay
Debt troubled
140
48.1
Potentially troubled
10
3.7
South Korea
Debt troubled
0
0.0
Potentially troubled
30
5.3
Thailand
Debt troubled
360
5.1
Potentially troubled
550
7.8
Uruguay
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Table B-4
Export Trade Share for 1981
Oil
Nonoil
Potentially debt-troubled LDCs
Other oil exporters
Other nonoil LDCs
Developed countries
Total
LDCs
Debt-
Troubled
LDCs
Potentially
Debt-
Troubled
LDCs
Other
Oil-Exporting
LDCs
Other
Nonoil
LDCs
24.5
8.1
3.7
1.4
11.3
19.8
5.5
2.0
0
12.3
31.3
12.1
6.2
3.0
10.0
37.4
5.3
5.2
8.3
18.6
27.9
5.3
5.6
1.2
15.8
32.9
5.6
5.1
5.8
16.4
32.5
7.5
3.7
6.8
14.5
a Includes trade with the USSR and Eastern Europe, countries not
specified in trade transactions, and countries in special trade
categories.
Developed Other
Countries Countries a
56.7
18.8
56.6
23.6
57.0
11.7
56.0
6.6
70.1
2.0
54.8
12.3
65.2
2.3
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Confidential
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