USSR: AEROFLOT EXPANSION GOALS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00283R000200090006-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: November 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence 25X1
USSR: Aeroflot
Expansion Goals
CI 83-10254
November 1983
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Directorate of
Intelligence
USSR: Aeroflot
Expansion Goals
This paper was prepared by
of the Office of Global
Issues with contributions from L
Office of Central Reference and
of the
of the
Defense Intelligence Agency. It was coordinated
with the Department of State. Comments and queries
are welcome and may be directed to the Chief,
Geography Division, OGI,
Secret
GI 83-10254
November 1983
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USSR: Aeroflot
Expansion Goals I 25X1
Key Judgments Aeroflot is an important element in the Soviet Union's contacts with the
Information available rest of the world. In spite of worldwide concern over the recent Korean Air
as of 20 October 1983 Lines incident, we believe the USSR will quickly resume its long-term
was used in this report.
campaign to expand Aeroflot's international network. Aeroflot now serv-
ices 94 countries (including 82 non-Communist nations}-more than any
other international airline. Fifteen years ago it serviced only 44. We believe
this expansion has occurred primarily for political reasons because most of
Aeroflot's international routes-especially Third World routes-operate at
a hard currency loss.
Despite this rapid expansion, the Soviets have been kept out of some key re-
gions of concern to Moscow. In particular, they have been unable to
conclude agreements with most of the Latin American countries. While
seeking access to these and other'countries, they will be working hard to
expand the number and frequency of Aeroflot flights to countries they
already service. The most likely forms of expansion would include direct in-
ternational service from additional Soviet cities, service to more cities in
Western Europe, and improved service to some Third World countries like
Libya, Nigeria, and Morocco.
iii Secret
GI 83-10254
November 1983
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"MUM
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IL-86, the fla shi of the
Aeroflot fleeti
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USSR: Aeroflot
Expansion Goals
Aeroflot Today
For the Soviets Aeroflot is an important link with the
rest of the world. It is the world's largest airline,
accounting for a fourth of all passenger kilometers
flown worldwide. Published route data show it links
more than 3,600 cities and towns within the USSR
and operates international service to 94 foreign coun-
tries (including 82 non-Communist countries). Ac-
cording to International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) figures, the route network, which extends
more than 1 million kilometers worldwide, carried
108 million passengers in 1982-mostly Russians and
East Europeans. Aeroflot's vast fleet of aircraft and
most of its skilled personnel focus almost exclusively
on domestic operations, which account for some 97
percent of all passengers carried.
Aeroflot has developed a broad-but thinly served-
international network concentrated primarily in Eu-
rope. The airline also provides regionally comprehen-
sive service to Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast
Asia. Service to Latin America is sparse. Although
domestic flights usually operate at or near capacity,
US Embassy reports indicate that the international
services generally fly with load factors of 50 to 60
percent-comparable with those of Western airlines.
In past years the quality of the Soviets' international
service has been severely criticized, and in the last
decade the Soviets have moved to improve opera-
tions-with new equipment, more skilled pilots, and
the use of Western catering services-and to upgrade
safety to Western standards.
Administratively, Aeroflot is directly subordinate to
the USSR's Ministry of Civil Aviation, .which was
established in 1964. Aeroflot's operations constitute
by far the largest portion of the ministry's activities.
Aeroflot's prime responsibility is commercial service,
both within the Soviet Union and in the international
arena. Soviet civil aviation responsibilities outside
Aeroflot's charter but still directed by the ministry
include general aviation, agricultural aviation and
industrial support, pilot training, weather collection,
and the operation of airfields.
Before 1970 the airline used antiquated equipment,
lacked most passenger amenities common in the
West, and had a very poor suety record. In the 1960s
while much of the rest of the world was commonly
using short-to-medium-range jets Aeroflot relied
primarily on turboprops. Few if any meals were
served on its Spartan international flights. Most
important were the numerous problems relating to
safety:
? Aeroflot pilots particularly in domestic service-
were often observed arriving for duty drunk. 25X1
? Many pilots with military backgrounds flew civil-
ian aircraft in the same hard style they used with
fighters and bombers.
? Crashes were frequent. In a 12-month period during
1972173, for example, at least 10 scheduled airlin-
ers crashed, killing more than 500 persons.
In response to recurring criticisms about the quality
and safety of service, Aeroflot officials have placed
high priority on fleet modernization, improved serv-
ices, and better flight safety on international opera-
tions. The best trained and most experienced Aeroflot
pilots and other personnel have been assigned to
international operations. Western catering services
and advertising, decor, and ticketing procedures are
now used.
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As a result of the yearlong spate of accidents in the
early 1970s, the Soviets established an Aviation 25X1
Suety Committee to oversee the effort to improve
safety. Day-to-day operations, as well as suety, have
benefited from the flow of more modern jet aircraft
into the inventory during the 1970s. As a conse-
quence, Aeroflot has acquired a reputation for pro-
viding creditably safe, satisfactory service that meets
international standards.
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throughout the 1980s.
Most of the jets entered service during the last
decade, when deliveries averaged 140 aircraft per
year. The inventory includes aircraft with a mix of
capabilities for short-range (YAK-40), medium-range
(TU-134), medium- to long-range (TU-154), and long-
haul (IL-62) operations with passenger-carrying ca-
pacities ranging from 30 to about 200. The newest
additions include the USSR's first wide body, the
350-passenger IL-86, and the 100-passenger trijet
YAK-42-the first aircraft built to conform to West-
ern safety standards. The overwhelming majority of
jets are passenger aircraft, but there are about 45
long-haul IL-76 cargo transports that can carry up to
44 tons. Although the pace of modernization has
slowed, the conversion to jets is likely to continue
estimate the fleet now has more than 1,800 jets
Aircraft Fleet
During the past two decades the Soviet leadership has
emphasized the modernization of Aeroflot's fleet. We
range jets.
Aeroflot also has some 1,700 turboprops, which usual-
ly are pressed into service only during peak holiday
periods. More than half are shorter range AN-24s
that carry 50 passengers. The primary cargo-carrying
capability among the turboprops consists of 165 AN-
12 medium-range transports. In the short-range cate-
gory, the most significant cargo/passenger capability
is provided by 400 AN-26s. Most of the remaining
inventory consists of about 200 IL-18 four-engine
aircraft that had been the workhorses of the airline
before the introduction of the medium- and long-
Aeroflot's International Operations
Civil aviation in the USSR celebrated its 60th anni-
versary in 1983. Aeroflot was established as the
Soviet national airline in 1932 from an amalgamation
of small regional carriers operating primarily in Euro-
pean USSR. By the early 1950s, the development of
the airline's international route network was under
way. With Moscow as the hub, flights were initiated
to Eastern Europe and then to most West European
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Table 1
Aeroflot Inventory of Significant
High-Performance Aircraft a
Type and Model
NATO
Designation
Total
365
3,033
3,485
Jet
191
1,369
1,830
TU-104 (A and B)
Camel
190
136
0
TU-124
Cookpot
1
66
.20
TU-134 (Standard-A)
Crusty
0
232
380
TU-154
Careless
0
128
400
IL-62/M
Classic
0
89
140
YAK-40 (Standard-B)
Codling
0
710
780
IL-76
Candid
0
8
45
YAK-42
Clobber
0
0
45
IL-86
Camber
0
0
20
Turboprop
174
1,664
1,655
AN-10
68
74
0
Cub
Coke
Coot
Cleet
ll Aeroflot's fleet also includes about 250 multiengine piston
aircraft.
capitals. Building on these services, the USSR began
to expand routes and by the late 1960s had begun
serving selected countries in the Middle East, Africa,
and South Asia.
Inauguration in 1968 of transatlantic service to the
United States and Canada was the cornerstone for
another decade of rapid Aeroflot expansion: between
1968 and 1977 the number of countries served in-
creased from 44 to 77, and the number of weekly
flights more than doubled (see maps at end of text).
Most importantly:
? Routes to Sub-Saharan Africa quadrupled, to in-
clude a total of 23 countries.
? Service to the Middle East and North Africa in-
creased from 10 to 13 countries.
? The number of South Asian and Southeast Asian
Published international schedules show that expansion
of Aeroflot's network has continued at a strong pace
over the past five years, with service extended to an
additional 17 countries. The most important new
routes are in the Central American/Caribbean area,
where flights were inaugurated to Mexico, Nicara-
gua, and Jamaica. Elsewhere, the Soviets added new
services to such varied locations as Djibouti, Ho Chi
Minh City, and Kinshasa. Most routes were added as
intermediate stops or short extensions on existing
Despite continuing efforts, Aeroflot has been unable
to move into several key regions-most notably Latin
America and Oceania. Almost all the countries that
countries serviced doubled from five to 10.
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have denied access to the Soviets have done so
because of security concerns. In some cases govern-
ment spokesmen have publicly voiced fears that Aero-
flot would be used for intelligence and military
functions:
Aeroflot currently serves only two South American
countries: Peru and Argentina. There are four weekly
flights to Lima and one to Buenos Aires. The airline
has no scheduled flights to areas of the southwest
Pacific, including Australia and New Zealand. The
only Soviet civil flights to these areas are unscheduled
and support trade or diplomatic missions; such
special-purpose flights may involve the use of either
Aeroflot or military aircraft. Other major countries
where the Soviets do not have scheduled Aeroflot
service include Saudi Arabia, Zimbabwe, South Afri-
ca, and the Philippines.
Aeroflot's Competitiveness
Because the Soviets view Aeroflot principally as a
political bridge between Moscow and the rest of the
world, they have been willing to operate the airline's
international service as a vast but only marginally
profitable route network. Although available data are
sketchy, we believe overall net hard currency earnings
are small at best. The most profitable international
routes are almost certainly those to Western Europe,
which account for about half of Aeroflot's weekly
international flights to non-Communist countries.
Load factors on these routes, especially the Paris,
Frankfurt, and Vienna services, are high through
most of the year. The hard currency receipts from
Aeroflot's European operations may to some degree
offset losses incurred on other international routes.
Pooling arrangements between Aeroflot and West
European carriers protect most of Aeroflot's West
European operations from direct competition. Under
these arrangements total revenues are pooled, ex-
penses paid from the pool, and net revenues divided
equally regardless of passenger load. Thus, Aeroflot is
assured an equal share of profits, or losses, from
Soviet-West European passenger travel even if its
fleet handles less than half the passenger traffic. We
believe that the Soviets are benefiting from these
pooling arrangements because many West Europeans
traveling to the USSR use their national airlines
rather than Aeroflot. Moreover, Moscow has negoti-
ated pooling arrangements with almost every West
European carrier.'
Aeroflot service to Third World countries probably
operates at a hard currency loss. We believe that
travel between these countries and the Soviet Union is
minimal. The bulk of the traffic most likely consists of
Soviet official delegations, technical personnel, and
military advisers, and Third World passengers travel-
ing to the USSR at Moscow's expense. Some individ-
ual routes-particularly those to South Asia-may
bring in a small amount of hard currency. Routes to
African countries south of the Sahara are probably
sizable financial losers for the Soviet Union, given
today's airline operating costs and what we know of
the load factors on these routes.
Although the Soviets have improved Aeroflot equip-
ment and passenger amenities on their international
service, the airline, for the most part, has not been an
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aggressive competitor in the international travel mar-
ket. Aeroflot's fares are comparable with those of
other international airlines and generally adhere to
International Air Transport Association (IATA) fare
structures. According to press reports, Aeroflot has
occasionally undercut IATA-set fares on selected
routes. We believe, however, that this undercutting is
no more common than that followed by many West-
ern airlines. In any event, should Aeroflot attempt to
introduce a broadly based fare reduction campaign,
foreign governments with which the Soviets have
bilateral agreements would probably counter by re-
stricting Aeroflot landings or reducing fares on their
own national airlines.
Bilateral Civil Aviation Agreements
Aeroflot's international route network is based on
published bilateral civil aviation agreements with
some 100 countries (table 2).' Most of these agree-
ments provide overflight rights, landing and service
privileges, and where appropriate reciprocal rights for
the country's national carrier in the Soviet Union.
Under normal operating conditions both parties are
usually able to exercise the privileges contained in the
agrecments. Occasionally, participants have placed
restrictions on some agreed privileges when the Sovi-
ets have attempted to carry out politically sensitive,
risky, and potentially high-visibility operations. For
example, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan have been reluc-
tant to grant overflight clearances to Soviet transports
during times of crisis even though Aeroflot designa-
tions were used on military aircraft involved in the
airlift activities.
Historically, when the Soviets have encountered an
outright refusal of overflight clearances, they have
accepted it and sought alternative routes. Moscow's
general respect for the denial of overflight clearances
probably stems from sensitivity about its own air-
space-as reflected in the KAL episode-as well as a
desire not to impede the expansion of legitimate
Aeroflot operations.
Military Uses of Aeroflot
Although Aeroflot is a commercial airline, it is gener-
ally known to have close and continuing links to the
military. Aeroflot aircraft, personnel, and facilities
around the world have the potential for supporting
limited military airlift operations, as well as selected
deliveries of military spare parts and medical supplies.
Aeroflot's large inventory gives the Soviets a capabili-
ty to augment military transport aviation (VTA),
passenger, and, to a lesser extent, cargo-lift capabili-
ties for a variety of domestic and international mis-
sions. A variety of reports indicates that virtually all
Aeroflot pilots and flight crews have military reserve
status in the Soviet Air Force, though their role in a
mobilization is uncertain.
Aeroflot's primary military role involves its participa-
tion in the semiannual rotation of Soviet troops to
Eastern Europe.
Aeroflot AN-12 medium-cargo transports are being
used to support Angolan forces. We believe that in the
more routine operations, scheduled Aeroflot flights
may have delivered small amounts of military-associ-
ated spare parts and other supplies to Nicaragua.
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Table 2
Soviet Civil Air Transport Agreements
Eastern Europe
Syria
Ghana
Bulgaria
Turkey
Guinea
Czechoslovakia
Yemen, North
Guinea-Bissau
Germany, East
Yemen, South
Kenya
Germany, West
East and South Asia
Liberia
Hungary
Afghanistan
Libya
Poland
Bangladesh
Malagasy Republic
Romania
Burma
Mali
Other European
India
France
Malaysia
Senegal
Greece
Mongolia
Seychelles
Ireland
North Korea
Sierra Leone
Italy
Pakistan
Somalia
Luxembourg
Singapore
Sudan
Malta
Sri Lanka
Tanzania
Netherlands
Thailand
Togo
Norway
Vietnam
Tunisia
Spain
Algeria
Zaire
Sweden
Angola
Zambia
Switzerland
Benin
Western Hemisphere
United Kingdom
Burundi
Argentina
Middle East
Cameroon
Canada
Cyprus
Cape Verde Islands
Chile a
Egypt
Central African Republic
Cuba
Iran
Chad
Jamaica
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Although it is impossible to detail the full extent of
such activities, a few examples serve to illustrate the
range of intelligence collection and military-support
activities associated with the Soviet airline:
? In the last three years Aeroflot representatives have
been publicly expelled from France, Spain, Italy,
and Indonesia for alleged espionage activities:
In France when the assistant director of Aeroflot,
Yuriy Solomonov, was arrested for espionage in
June 1982, the press reported he had classified
COCOM documents concerning international
lists of embargoed materials in his possession.
The Spanish Government reported in February
1980 that the director of the Aeroflot office in
Madrid was expelled for espionage activities.
? Aeroflot may occasionally transport undercover mil-
itary personnel before the outbreak of hostilities.
According to press reports, Aeroflot ferried Soviet
commandos into Kabul before the invasion of Af-
ghanistan in 1979. The commandos reportedly
seized the airport prior to the arrival of airborne
forces.
? Aeroflot aircraft have occasionally ignored assigned
flight paths and altitude clearances in the New
York-New England area where several sensitive
installations are located. In November 1981, for
example, a Soviet flight between Washington and
Moscow strayed from its prescribed flight path over
the United States on both inbound and outbound
flights, flying over several Air Force bases and the
Groton shipbuilding facility in New England,
flights to the Soviet Union for 60 days.
Sanctions Stemming From the KAL Incident
Measures taken against Aeroflot in response to the
KAL shootdown were the first major, collective at-
tempt in history to constrain agreed flight and over-
flight privileges among countries not officially at war.
The United States, most NATO countries (except
France, Greece, and Turkey), Switzerland, and Japan
instituted a two-week ban on Aeroflot, landings (and in
some cases overflights) in addition to halting their own
national airline flights to the USSR. Ireland adopted
a partial boycott involving lesser sanctions. The Inter-
national Federation of Airline Pilots' Associations
(IFALPA) and selected trade unions also placed sanc-
tions on Aeroflot. In the most important move,
IFALPA called on its 67 member associations to halt
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The combined boycott actions resulted in the cancel- 25X1
lation of more than a fourth of Aeroflot's 223 weekly
international flights for the two-week period. These
actions also cut about half of the 78 scheduled
commercial flights to the USSR by non-Communist
carriers. Flight connections between Western Europe
and the USSR were the most severely affected. The
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denial of overflights in Europe also affected all but
one of Aeroflot's 13 weekly flights to the Caribbean
and Central and South America. The weekly service
to Buenos Aires via Dakar was the only flight not
diverted from its normal path. The other 12 were
rerouted via the north coast of Norway. Other routes
affected by the boycott included Aeroflot flights to
Canada and Japan and over Panama
The impact of the sanctions was muted by Moscow's
ability to develop alternative routes to its key trans-
port nodes that avoided flying over nations directly
involved in the boycott. This was possible because
none of Aeroflot's major international transit hubs-
Shannon, Cairo, Bombay, Karachi, Havana, and
Tripoli-was cut, although Ireland limited the airline
to transit/ refueling privileges only. We cannot calcu-
late revenue losses because financial data are not
published on these services. Even if all affected
Aeroflot flights were assumed to operate with a
maximum load factor, however, we estimate that
gross revenue losses were probably in the neighbor-
hood of only $5-6 million per week. Normally, such
flights probably operate at a 50- to 60-percent load
factor. Moreover, only half of these passengers would
pay in hard currency. Overall then, the two-week
shutdown probably cost Aeroflot in the neighborhood
of $2-3 million:
Aeroflot's Future Directions
Moscow will almost certainly continue to push expan-
sion of Aeroflot's route network to complete its world
airlinks.. Latin America will remain the focal point of
most of these efforts because of the present paucity of
Aeroflot service and because the Soviets have political
and economic reasons for strengthening their ties to
the region. Moscow is most interested in obtaining a
bilateral air agreement with Brazil, the key economic
and commercial force in South America. Although
rebuffed six years ago, the Soviets expressed interest
this year in reopening negotiations for an airlink
between Moscow and Rio de Janeiro. Elsewhere on
the continent, they have sought agreements with
Venezuela, Panama, Bolivia, and Ecuador, among
others. Although Panama and Colombia have rejected
such agreements within the past year, the Soviets will
probably attempt a return to the bargaining table in
each case
Soviet priorities for the remainder of the world are
difficult to assess. The most likely targets for Aeroflot
service will be countries in southern Africa, island
nations in the Indian Ocean, and countries in the
Southwest Pacific. In southern Africa, Zimbabwe
probably holds the most interest for the Soviets, and
proposals for Aeroflot basing could well surface in the
course,of trade talks. In the Indian Ocean, the
Maldives is the most likely prospect. The Soviets have
long pursued agreements with Australia and New
Zealand and will surely renew their efforts in the near
In addition to lining up new countries, the Soviets
may want to add more frequent service and stops in
countries they already serve, like Nicaragua, where
the need for additional service may increase. The
most likely forms of expansion would include direct
international service from additional Soviet cities,
service to more cities in Western Europe, and im-
proved service to some Third World countries like
Libya, Nigeria, and Morocco. In the last case, such a
move would run counter to current patterns of inter-
national service to most of the Third World, where
capital cities are being developed as local transport
hubs. Overall, the Soviets will demonstrate a flexible
approach, seizing opportunities for further expansion
of Aeroflot as they arise.
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