DRUG TRAFFICKING: THE ROLE OF INSURGENTS, TERRORISTS, AND SOVEREIGN STATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00283R000300010008-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: November 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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( h) Intelligence
I I
,yl r a q' - r- fl (s' f Van t 1
and Sovereign States
Drug Trafficking: The Role
of Insurgents, Terrorists,
GI 83-10265
November 1983
Copy 365*
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Directorate of
Intelligence
and Sovereign States
Drug Trafficking: The Role
of Insurgents, Terrorists,
International Security Issues Divisi~fice of
Global Issues. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations. Comments and queries are
Secret
G183-10265
November 1983
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Drug Trafficking: The Role
of Insurgents, Terrorists
and Sovereign States
Information available
as of 10 November 1983
was used in this report.
Insurgent groups take advantage of their control of traditional narcotics
growing areas to grow, process, and traffic in illicit drugs. The activities of
several of the major groups in Southeast Asia-the Shan United Army and
the Shan United Revolutionary Army, for example-are so dominated by
the narcotics business that these groups are more like criminal organiza-
tions than insurgencies bent on toppling the local government. Other
insurgent groups-the Burmese Communist Party and the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia, for example-see the narcotics business as a
lucrative, relatively low-risk way to finance their insurgent efforts.
A few terrorist groups, such as the Basque Fatherland and Freedomi(ETA)
and the Palestinian terrorist group, the 15th of May Organization, have
used known drug traffickers as low-level operatives and couriers. Urban
terrorist groups, however, do not appear to be involved systematically in
illicit drug trafficking.
Cuba, Bulgaria, and North Korea form a unique set of countries that as a
matter of government policy engage in or condone trafficking in narcotics
outside their national boundaries.
A few other states-notably Bolivia during the Garcia Meza regime and
Burma under the present government-are so beset by the corruption of
key officials as to either preclude or frustrate international efforts to
control narcotics production and trafficking in those countries. In these
instances the level of corruption exceeds that commonly found in drug-
producing or transit countries.
iii Secret
GI 83-10265
November 1983
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 The activity of these traffickers complicates drug control efforts in several
ways. Few source country governments are prepared or willing to clash
with insurgent growers and traffickers or with terrorist groups only to stop
narcotics activities. In the case of Cuba, North Korea, and-perhaps to a
lesser extent-Bulgaria, complicity on the part of the senior leadership
precludes the effective involvement of these countries in international
antinarcotics efforts. In states where corruption is excessive, proposals to
intensify drug control efforts may be met with apparent cooperation but
undercut by corrupt officials. We believe the activities of these traffickers
will not lead to a significant increase in the availability of drugs in the
United States nor will they threaten the hold that major criminal
organizations have on the international drug market.
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Drug Trafficking: The Role
of Insurgents, Terrorists,
The cultivation and initial processing of illicit drug
crops is dominated by ethnic and tribal groups in
remote areas in Southeast and Southwest Asia-in
the case of opium-and by numerous independent
farmers in Latin America-in the case of coca and
marijuana. Trafficking in illicit drugs at the wholesale
and retail level-which involves processing, smug-
gling, and distribution-continues to be largely con-
trolled by criminal organizations with international
connections. Some insurgent groups, a few terrorist
organizations, and a number of sovereign states also
play a role in drug trafficking. This paper reviews the
activity of these "nontraditional" traffickers and as-
sesses the impact they have on the international drug
The involvement of insurgent groups in narcotics
trafficking varies. Some, particularly those in South-
east Asia, are so heavily engaged in narcotics produc-
tion and trafficking that they have become criminal
organizations rather than true insurgencies, although
most insurgents that are heavily engaged in narcotics
trafficking appear to do so primarily to support their
insurgent activities. Finally, some insurgent groups
further revolutionary aims.
Insurgent Activity
Two principal factors have contributed to the long
tradition of rural insurgent involvement in the drug
business. First, insurgent groups are most active in the
rural areas that growers of marijuana, coca, or opium
favor. Such areas, as in Colombia, Burma, and Paki-
stan, are usually remote with rough terrain that limits
the presence of central governments and hinders
efforts to eradicate illicit crops or control drug traf
fickingJ Second, many insurgent leaders recognize
that drug trafficking is a lucrative, practical, and
generally nontraceable method of f obtaining funds to
are only indirectly involved in drug trafficking-
extorting protection money from growers and traffick-
ers or, using drug smuggling networks to obtain arms
Insurgent/Criminal Enterprise. There are several
Southeast Asian insurgent groups engaged in the drug
trade almost to the exclusion of their professed insur-
gent goals. These groups differ in size and ideology-
some are remnants of the disbanded Burmese. Home
Guard Militia Units and others can trace their ante-
cedents to elements of the 93rd Division of the
Kuomintang Army-but most are warlord armies
whose drug trafficking complements their illegal com-
mercial activities 25X1
The Shan United Army (SUA) is one of the most
important smuggling and trafficking organizations in
the Golden Triangle (Laos, Burma, and Thailand). Its
3,000 to 4,000 armed members, according to Embassy
assessments, became heavily involved in drug traffick-
ing in the mid-1970s when the SUA leadership
decided to take advantage of Burmese antinarcotics
measures against competing trafficking organizatiou4.
Although generally not involved in the cultivation of
opium, as middlemen the SUA until recently con-
trolled an estimated 70 percent of the opium refining
and trafficking in the Thailand-Burma border area.
We estimate that some 80 percent of its funds come
from drug trafficking. According to Embassy;'reports,
the SUA has connections with Chinese crime,syndi-
cates in Hong Kong, Europe, and the United States.
Thai Government military operations since early 1982
have disrupted SUA operations) Nevertheless, we
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oecrer
The Chinese Irregular Forces (CIF) have the longest
history of drug involvement in the Golden Triangle,
having begun drug trafficking in the early 1950s.
According to US Embassy reporting, the 1,500-to-
2,500-member CIF is today primarily involved in the
production and trafficking of refined heroin for Thai,
Burmese, and international markets. The CIF offi-
cially denies any involvement in narcotics trafficking,
presumably to assure that its sanctuary inside Thai-
land continues. According to Embassy assessments,
the CIF, like the SUA, may have connections to
Chinese crime syndicates in Hong Kong, but direct
links between the CIF and organized criminal groups
in Europe and the United States have not been
The Shan United Revolutionary Army (SURA), estab-
lished in 1969, is a smuggling and trafficking group of
approximately 800 to 1,000 armed members active in
Burma's southern Shan State. It was formed from
remnants of the Home Guard Militia and a splinter
group of the Shan State Army (SSA) and is closely
allied with the 3rd Chinese Irregular Forces. Accord-
ing to Embassy reports, the SURA publicly claims to
seek autonomy for the Shan State; however, its
energies are devoted almost exclusively to narcotics
trafficking and smuggling. It extorts money and
opium from local farmers, levies taxes on opium
production, corrupts local officials, and operates sev-
eral opium refineries on the Thailand-Burma border.
Part Insurgent, Part Tracker. Other insurgent or-
ganizations directly involved in the drug trade have
maintained more of their insurgent character and
generally devote only a part of their resources to drug-
related activity. Unlike the SUA and CIF, these
groups pose a more serious military and political
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
is the largest and most formidable insurgent group in
Colombia. It entered the drug business around 1977,
exacting fees from traffickers for use of FARC-
controlled territory. It soon thereafter began to tax
coca production in its strongholds and, according to
the US Embassy, has even established production
quotas and wage guidelines for workers and growers.
Indeed, a number of Embassy reports indicate that
one of the FARC's fronts in southeast Colombia was
organized expressly for the control of coca production
with the aim of using the profits from the trade to
support its other fronts. Embassy reports also indicate
that FARC units in the Gulf of Uraba region are
involved in a brisk guns-for-drugs trade with orga- 25X1
The Burmese Communist Party (BCP) is the insurgent
group that most concerns Rangoon. Before 1978 drug
trafficking by BCP elements was minor and involved
individuals who trafficked without the explicit approv-
al of the party leadership. In 1978, however, we
believe the BCP began compensating for a sharp
reduction in Chinese assistance by resorting to party-
sponsored and centrally directed opium cultivation
and trafficking. Today the BCP controls large areas
of Burma's opium-growing regions and is the princi-
pal purchaser of raw opium from farmers. According
to Embassy assessments, the BCP refines a small
percentage of its opium into heroin at refineries inside
Burma and transports most of its opium and opium
products to the Thai border where it is refined into
heroin by other narcotics trafficking organizations.
The Shan State Army (SSA) is an ethnic insurgent
group established in Burma's Shan State in 1960. Its 25X1
2,000 to 4,000 armed members are active throughout
the area, encouraging opium poppy cultivation and
taxing production, local dealers, and passing caravans.
The profits are used to corrupt local officials and
The Kachin Independence Army (KIA), also founded in
1960, is an ethnic insurgent group of over 4,500 25X1
armed members that operates throughout the Kachin
and northern Shan States in Burma. The KIA taxes
opium production, local traffickers, and caravans and
acts as a broker between growers and other traffick-
 Occasional Trgfckers. Other insurgent groups have
only occasional contact with drug traffickers. Their
drug-related activities range from extortion of produc-
ers and processors to limited participation in domestic
The National Liberation Army (ELN) is a small
Castroite Marxist-Leninist organization established
in 1963 that operates throughout Colombia. Accord-
ing to unconfirmed Embassy reporting, ELN mem-
bers have been involved in extorting money from coca
The Popular Liberation Army ('EPL) was founded in
1967 and is associated with the pro-Beijing Colombi-
an Communist Party/Marxist-Leninist (PCC/ML).
The EPL is active in Colombia's Cordoba Department
and in the Gulf of Uraba region. Colombian authori-
ties have told US officials that they suspect that the
EPL gets some of its weapons from drug traffickers
operating in the Gulf of Uraba region and that some
EPL members may be engaged in marijuana cultiva-
The Sendero Luminoso (SL) is a Maoist insurgent/ter-
rorist group based primarily in,the Ayacucho region
of Peru that has extorted money from traffickers
operating in its territory, according to Embassy re-
porting. Members of the local press and Peruvian
officials have attempted to link the SL to systematic
drug trafficking, but we have no corroborative report-
Various ethnic tribal groups in Southwest Asia such as
Pakistani and Afghan tribesmen and Kurds have long
been involved in smuggling operations, some of which
involve narcotics. The Kurds, in particular, have an
experienced cadre of narcotics traffickers, couriers,
and processors who operate relatively freely through-
out western Iran and easternTurkey. There are
conflicting reports regarding the involvement of the
insurgents were at one time earning more than
$300,000 a month from the sale of drugs and gems.
Most evidence suggests that the insurgent organiza-
tions are not directly involved in the opium traffic,
although they are financed in part by taxes and
contributions from growers and smugglers.
Philippine insurgent groups apparently are involved in
the drug trade. During a recent discussion with US
officials, the head of the Philippine narcoticsicom-
mand noted that insurgent groups, including the New
People's Army (NPA), were cultivating and selling 25X1
marijuana locally to help finance their operations.
Terrorist Involvement
Terrorist groups are much less involved in drug
trafficking than insurgent groups are, although there
is some reporting from the Embassy and the press of
terrorists who use drug trafficking to support, their
activities. The most credible example of leadership-
directed terrorist involvement in drug trafficking
involves the Colombian 19th of April Movement
(M-19), which in October 1981 successfully used the
drug smuggling apparatus of Jaime Guillot Lara to
bring a large shipment of weapons into Colombia.
According to Embassy reporting, other instances of
M-19 drug-related activity involve extortion of money
from traffickers and growers as well as the kidnaping
of wealthy traffickers and members of their families.
The urban orientation of the M-19 before 1981 and
possible conflict with FARC units and with estab-
lished Colombian trafficking syndicates probably
have limited further M-19 involvement in drug traf-
Other examples of terrorists involved in drug-related
activity include:
According to Embassy assessments, the ETA
as employed known drug smugglers as low-level
operatives and couriers, and
some individual members occasionally use and traf-
fic in drugs.
? The little-known and probably defunct Basque Re-
sistance Army (ERE) allegedly financed itself large-
ly through the sale of dru s
this group was
dismantled in 1981, but some of its members may
now belong to other Basque terrorist groups'.
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Why Insurgents Traffic in Drugs
and Terrorists Do Not
Narcotics trafficking provides a potentially lucrative
and relatively risk free nontraceable source offunds.
Although some insurgent groups have been attracted
by these factors, urban terrorists have generally
avoided organized drug trafficking on a large scale.
We believe that this apparent paradox is explained by
several factors.
Lack of Opportunity. The involvement of insurgent
groups is generally limited to the areas that they
physically control or dominate; urban terrorists do
not control territory. Furthermore, the involvement of
insurgent groups is generally associated with cultiva-
tion, refining, or transport-not with the distribution
at the street level, which is predominately an urban
Availability ofAlternatives. Urban terrorist groups
have a wider variety of ways to make money than
have insurgent groups. Traditionally, urban terrorists
finance their operations through bank robberies, kid-
napings, or extortion ("revolutionary taxes"), or they
depend on some external source such as a patron
state or rieh supporter. Insurgent groups operating in
remote areas rarely have such a choice
less maintaining, drug distribution networks. Other
terrorists depend for their viability in their own
countries on maintaining a circumspect lifestyle that
does not arouse police suspicion. Associating with
elements of the drug trade is not compatible with
Ideological Considerations. Many terrorist leaders
realize that involvement in drug trafficking promotes
a public perception of the revolutionary as a common
criminal and drug pusher. Moreover, long-term ter-
rorist association with criminal elements and direct
involvement in drug trafficking could lead to a
gradual weakening of the terrorist structure and a
slide into the criminal realm. Limited evidence sug-
gests this has already happened to some insurgent
groups actively involved in drug trafficking. For
example, according to DEA reports, in 1980-81 the
numerical strength of a National Liberation Army
(ELN) unit operating in Colombia's Motilones moun-
tains may have dropped from 150 to less than 50
because some individuals found marijuana traffick-
ing and cultivation a more profitable pursuit.
Operational Diculties. Many urban terrorists are
so well known to the authorities or to the population
at large that they must live outside their own coun-
tries, which prevents them from establishing, much
? Rightist groups in Italy (Armed Revolutionary Nu-
clei-NAR) and Turkey (Turkish Nationalist Ac-
tion Party-NAP) have been linked to trafficking
by local press accounts, although details are sparse.
? The Palestinian terrorist group, the 15th of May
Organization, like the ETA, has been known to use
drug smugglers as low-level operatives and couriers.
States get involved in drug trafficking in two ways. .
Cuba, Bulgaria, and North Korea are unique cases of
states that as a matter of policy appear willing to
support, or at least condone, international narcotics
trafficking. They carefully isolate their own societies
and engage in drug trafficking in other countries as a
means of earning hard currency. In another set of
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Uses Traffickers Extorts Money
as Couriers and and Arms From
Low-Level Traffickers
Operatives
Protects
Trafficking
in Return for
a Fee, Serv-
ice, or Arms
Cultivation
of Drugs
Domestic Inter-
Trafficking national
Trafficking
Basque Fatherland and Liberty X
Movement (ETA)
Burmese Communist Party (BCP)
X
X
X
Chinese Irregular Forces (CIF)
X
X
15th of May Organization X
(Palestinian)
Kachin Independence Army (KIA)
X
X
X
National Liberation Army (ELN)
X
X
?
19th of April Movement (M-19)
X
Popular Liberation Army (EPL)
X
Provisional Irish Republican
Army (PIRA)
X
Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia (FARC)
Shan State Army (SSA)
Shan United Army (SUA)
X
X
X
Shan United Revolutionary -
Army (SURA)
X
X
X
Various tribal groups in
southwest lAsia
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states, corruption is so pervasive-even by the stand-
ards of most drug-producing countries-that under-
mining antinarcotics efforts is the government's de
facto policy. The current government of Burma and
the past regime in Bolivia are prime examples of drug-
related corruption at high levels that effectively
hinders drug control efforts through deliberate inac-
tion or the execution of highly publicized, yet token,
Cuba
Cuban complicity in drug trafficking is well docu-
mented in at least three cases. Additional information
suggests that Cuba may have facilitated drug traf-
ficking for some time and that such activity continues
The extent of Cuban involvement in drug trafficking
was first documented by the testimony of Colombian
drug traffickers Jaime Guillot Lara and Juan Lazaro
Crump and subsequently confirmed by MariolEsteves
Gonzalez:
Beginning in 1980, Jaime Guillot Lara, a Colombi-
an and self-described career smuggler, used Cuban
waters as a safehaven for his ships, which were
laden with Colombian marijuana destined for the
United States. In return, Guillot Lara paid the
Cubans $500,000 to $800,000 per trip and used his
vessels and smuggling networks to ship armsto the
M-19 guerrillas in Colombia.
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? Juan Lazaro ("Johnny") Crump, a'Colombian arms
dealer and narcotics trafficker who introduced
Guillot Lara to Cuban officials, negotiated permis-
sion to refuel aircraft used in smuggling in Cuba.
? Mario Esteves Gonzalez, a Cuban arrested for
marijuana trafficking in Florida in November 1981,
claimed, in public testimony that has partially been
corroborated by the US Drug Enforcement Admin-
istration (DEA), that he was trained by the Cuban
intelligence service and infiltrated via the 1980
Mariel boatlift into Florida where his mission in-
cluded the distribution of illegal narcotics.
There are a number of reports, not all of which have
been corroborated, that lend credibility to the state-
ments of Guillot Lara, Crump, and Esteves, including:
Cuban officials, including Fidel Castro, had consid-
ered a scheme in 1979 to deal with narcotics
smugglers in order to obtain hard currency for Cuba
and contribute to the deterioration of US society.
? Information gained in April 1983 from several DEA
informants indicated Cuba was commonly used by
smugglers as a refueling port and that Cuban port
authorities charge a docking fee of $10,000 per
smuggling vessel and $5 per gallon for fuel.
Cuban officials leased a
Panamanian-registered boat-the Don Miguel 1-
for a minimum of one year to transport drugs from
Colombia to Cayo Largo del Sur, a small island
currency, Havana offers safe passage to traffickers
and allows ships to refuel and obtain supplies at
various points off the north coast. All funds derived
reportedly are deposited in the National Treasury.
In spite of official denials that Cuba is involved in
drug trafficking, we believe the accumulated informa-
tion reflects an extensive pattern of Cuban dealings
with drug traffickers.
ther Cuban policy aims.
because of the mono-
lithic nature of the Cuban power structure, we believe
that these dealings are not private arrangements
carried out without the knowledge or blessing of the
Cuban Government. In fact, the establishment and
expansion of the Castro regime's links to drug traf-
ficking reflect a trend, in effect since the late 1970s,
toward closer cooperation between Havana and vari-
ous elements of the international underworld to fur-
Bulgaria
Smuggling of all types of contraband is a traditional
profession in the Balkans. Embassy and DEA reports
indicate that, since at least the mid- I960s, Bulgaria
has served as a major base of operations for Arab and
Turkish drug traffickers, operating with the knowl-
edge and apparent support of some high-level Bulgari-
an Government officials. Some of these established
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P
traffickers reside in and operate from Sofia-the
Vitosha hotel is well known to Interpol and DEA
officials as a headquarters for foreign traffickers-
while others transit Bulgaria, usually conducting their
business transactions through Sofia-based intermedi-
aries. In addition to receiving sanctuary for their
operations, traffickers can purchase contraband-
including cigarettes, whiskey, arms, and drugs-from
Bulgarian Government agencies. Implicit in the ar-
rangement is that all contraband must be sold outside
of Bulgaria.~___1
Bulgaria has used several government foreign trade
organizations as mechanisms to manage various
smuggling activities. As indicated by DEA reports
and Embassy assessments, the multipurpose state
enterprise "Kintex" is most frequently named as the
coordinator for all smuggling activities. Kintex began
supporting drug smugglers transiting Bulgaria in
about 1971. It levied transit fees and fines on smug-
glers who were not associated with it and resold drugs
confiscated by Bulgarian customs to those who were.
It provided traffickers with garages specially equipped
with machinery for building "traps" in vehicles to
conceal smuggled goods. Contraband was stored in
government-owned warehouses until the trafficker
was ready to transport his goods. If necessary, Kintex
also provided false visa documentation and customs
seals to exempt trucks from customs checks in transit
Embassy reporting strongly indicates that Kintex's
role in the smuggling of arms, whiskey, and cigarettes
is sanctioned by the Bulgarian Government. The
significant quantity of indirect evidence, the elaborate
structure of Kintex, and the high-level support of
Kintex's other commercial endeavors by officials in
the Bulgarian Government lead us to believe that
some of the ruling elite condone Kintex's drug opera-
In July 1982, the US Embassy in Sofia made the first
in a series of demarches concerning Bulgaria's toler-
ance of drug smuggling. Since that time a number of
drug smugglers operating out of Sofia have curbed
their more visible activities. We suspect that the effort
is a cosmetic one, made in response to US pressure,
and doubt that Bulgaria intends to crack down on
North Korea
North Korean involvement in drug trafficking came
to light initially in 1976 when several Scandinavian
countries caught and expelled a number of North
Korean diplomats for smuggling contraband; includ-
ing drugs. At the time, press and Embassy reports
indicated that North Korea was facing severe eco-
nomic difficulties and apparently had instructed its
embassies to reduce expenses and make do as best
they could. Several North Korean diplomats-'per-
haps with P'yongyang's blessing-apparently inter-
preted this as carte blanche to devise and experiment
with unorthodox and innovative financing schemes.
The diplomats decided to enter the import-export
business by providing selected clientele with a variety
of goods not readily available in local markets. Liq-
uor, cigarettes, and watches-as well as drugs-were
among the more,popular items because they could be
brought in by diplomatic pouch, thereby evading the
typically high duties imposed on legal imports. The
profits from these transactions apparently were used
to defray Embassy and trade mission operating ex-
penses and to finance intelligence and propaganda
activities abroad. We do not know how long North 25X1
Korea had been trafficking in contraband, although
similar activities by the North Koreans have occurred,
according to press and Embassy reports, in Burma,
Nepal, Malaysia, Switzerland, Egypt, Argentina, and
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 More recently, -according to foreign press reports,
Indian officials arrested a North Korean diplomat in
October 1983 and demanded the recall of another for
income with bribes. One common device, according to
Embassy reports, involved the sale of coca-marketing
licenses, a procedure initiated by the government in
1978 to reduce the number of persons involved in coca
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We believe that such incidents suggest at least tacit
approval by P'yongyang of drug trafficking by its
diplomatic posts to help finance overseas operations.
If North Korea's attempts to establish diplomatic
relations with several major drug-producing coun-
tries-Bolivia and Iran-prove successful, it would
gain ready access to the raw material for heroin and
cocaine production and be able to expand its traffick-
Bolivia
The notorious 13-month regime of Bolivia's General
Garcia Meza (from July 1980 to August 1981) dem-
onstrates the effect of widespread state-abetted cor-
ruption on domestic drug control efforts.' One week
after his takeover-according to Embassy reports-
drug merchants in Santa Cruz reportedly offered
Garcia Meza $100 million in exchange for noninter-
ference in the cocaine industry. During Garcia
Meza's tenure, local officials often supplemented their
However, by 1980, it had become merely a means of
enriching civilian politicians, who received payoffs in
return for recommending issuance of the permits-in
some cases to known traffickers. Other officials be-
came more directly involved. Some delivered bribes
for major traffickers. Others sold protection to facili-
tate moving coca leaves from growing to processing
areas. Judges took bribes to free indicted drug mer-
chants, as did lower court officials, public prosecutors,
and prison officers. According to Embassy reports, the
military also was involved; Army troops ran cocaine
laboratories and Navy personnel transported coca
along Bolivia's rivers, while Air Force transports
reportedly flew coca to processing plants in the Beni
The symbol of corruption was Col. Luis Arce Gomez.
He was appointed Minister of Interior despite long-
time involvement with drug traffickers and a.record of
hindering narcotics investigations. While in office,
Arce not only ran his own cocaine network but also
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forced other traffickers to hand over a share of their
profits. According to reliable information provided to
US officials in La Paz, he deposited $2 million in cash
personnel changes.
The Garcia Meza government in effect did nothing to
control the illicit drug trafficking. It proposed unreal-
istic coca control programs; mounted blatantly token
enforcement operations; and, when pressed, offered
lame excuses for government inaction, effectively
thwarting attempts at drug control through subter-
fuge, redtape, countless commissions, and well-timed
Garcia Meza's ouster in August 1981 did not mitigate
the noxious effects of his rule. Corruption is still the
biggest stumblingblock to effective narcotics control
Suazo, has demonstrated concern about the deleteri-
ous effects of the cocaine industry on both the society
and the economy and in August 1983 signed a
multiyear agreement with the United States setting
up an $8 million narcotics control project. Neverthe-
less, because Siles must make enormous efforts to
maintain his leadership position amid the multitude of
problems besetting Bolivia, we do not expect that
Burma
Corruption among government, police, and military
personnel on the lower and middle levels is part of a
well-entrenched system in Burma that includes offi-
cial corruption in such things as narcotics or illicit
money transfers and extends to routine business activ-
ities such as bypassing customs duties, avoiding cus-
toms restrictions, rigging government contracts, and
cashing in on the flow of consumer goods. Over the
past eight months, however, Embassy reporting has
for the first time implicated numerous high-level
Burmese Government officials in corruption and the
facilitation of large-scale international narcotics traf-
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Corruption appears to be greatest within the Ministry
of Home and Religious Affairs, which is responsible 25X1
for the government's narcotics suppression programs.
According to Embassy reports, the Military Intelli-
gence Service and the Department of Defense 4ntelli-
gence Service are suspected by Burmese officials of
arranging transfers of money, selling drugs seized in
government antinarcotics campaigns, and issuing '
passports to trafficking/financiers and couriers. As
with other Burmese institutions, control and efficien-
cy within this Ministry and the intelligence services' 25X1
bureaucracy are weak. Thus, officials in these areas
are in a position to arrange illegal transactions' with 25X1
Prime Minister Ne Win's heir apparent, Brig.lGen.
Tin On, was removed from his official position for
corruption and for his blatant attempt to expand his
political power base. Until May 1983, Tin Oo was the
joint General Secretary of the Burma Socialist Pro-
gram Party (BSPP)-the number-three position in the
party-as well as the third-ranking member of the
I
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00283R000300010008-6
or dismiss-and in some cases prosecute-these offi-
cials on a piecemeal basis rather than risk damaging
the political structure by extensive shakeups. Unfortu-
nately, when one corrupt
official is removed, another-equally corrupt-takes
his place. Publicly, Ne Win professes to remain
committed to the eventual elimination of narcotics
abuse in Burma; however, the pervasiveness of corrup-
tion-fed by the country's poor economy-will con-
tinue to thwart government narcotics control efforts.
General Executive Committee; he was popularly re-
garded as the second most powerful man in Burma.
Embassy reports indicate that Ne Win accused Tin
On of nepotism, ostentatious displays of wealth and
power, and protection of the corrupt activities of
former Home and Religious Minister Bo Ni. In fact,
Ne Win directed an investigation that appears to link
Tin Oo with Bo Ni's illegal smuggling and narcotics-
Most of the people accused of corruption gained office
because of their standing in the governing party or
because they are personal friends of Tin On, the
President, or the party chairman himself. The Bur-
mese Government probably will continue to transfer
states in the drug market will complicate efforts to
control international illicit drug trafficking through
bilateral and multilateral diplomatic measures. In-
creased drug trafficking activity by insurgents will
make it more difficult for source countries to control
domestic production and trafficking. The primary
responsibility for drug enforcement in most countries
lies with police and customs forces-forces that are
for the most part ill prepared to carry out their duties
in insurgent-occupied territory. In addition, in regions
where aerial herbicidal spraying is not an option,
manual eradication would require enough resources
and manpower to withstand an insurgent attack-a
commitment that for economic, political, and security
reasons most source countries would be hesitant to
make: In order to achieve even limited success, most
drug enforcement agencies would have to be aug-
mented and given better training and equipment, a
proposition that in countries like Peru would be 25X1
complicated by institutional rivalries between the
police and military. Enforcement or eradication suc-
cesses in Thailand, Mexico, and Turkey illustrate the
importance of military support in drug control. Police
are more willing to tackle local traffickers, who tend
to flee when the police approach, than they are to
tackle well-armed insurgents. Until source country
governments are militarily strong enough to enter
insurgent-controlled territory, insurgent drug fields
will be out of reach for eradication efforts. F__1 25X1
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An additional obstacle to antinarcotics policies is
corruption at high levels. Corruption within many
drug-producing countries is endemic, and criminal as
well as insurgent trafficking groups take advantage of
this condition to protect their interests and expand
their influence. This everyday "normal" corruption
hampers, but does not preclude, drug enforcement
efforts. Agreements can still be negotiated, signed,
and implemented with some hope of success. Howev-
er, in situations where high-level government and
military: officials directly responsible for their govern-
ment's narcotics programs protect traffickers, ob-
struct programs, and replace overly zealous subordi-
nates-as occurred during the Garcia Meza regime in
Bolivia or within the present Burmese Government-
pros ects for effective narcotics control are slim at
best~~
Nevertheless, we judge that increased involvement of
"nontraditional" traffickers-insurgents, terrorists,
and sovereign states-in illicit drug trafficking will
not be a major factor in the availability and supply of
drugs to consumers in the United States. The supply
of illicit drugs is determined primarily by the levels of
production, and these are affected more by economic
factors,'weather conditions, and host government
control 'efforts than by the number of producers.
Moreover, drug production is already in excess of that
needed to supply US consumers, and information
obtained from DEA indicates that this trend will
continue at least for the near term. These "nontradi-
tional" traffickers also lack the organization in the
drug-consuming countries to effectively challenge the
domination of the major criminal syndicates in the
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP85T00283R000300010008-6
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