INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: PROSPECTS FOR THE SPREAD OF VIOLENCE TO THE UNITED STATES IN 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00283R000600030009-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2010
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: May 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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iFf Directorate of secret
International Terrorism:
Prospects for the Spread
of Violence to the
United States in 1984
An Intelligence Assessment
Secret
GI 84-10093
May 1984
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~,Ef Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
International Terrorism:
Prospects for the Spread
of Violence to the
United States in 1984
This paper was prepared byl Instability
and Insurgency Center, Office of Global Issues.
Information about the United States was provided
by and coordinated with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. The paper was also coordinated with
the Directorate of Operations. Comments and
questions are welcome and should be addressed to
the Chief, Terrorism Analysis Branc
Secret
GI 84-10093
May 1984
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International Terrorism:
Prospects for the Spread
of Violence to the
United States in 1984
Key Judgments The number of terrorist incidents committed in the United States declined
Irjormation available last year and remained relatively low during the first quarter of 1984.
as of 13 March 1984 Given the nature of terrorist groups and individuals willing to undertake
was used in this report.
terrorist actions, this situation could change quickly and without forewarn-
ing. Potential terrorist support networks are in place, and certain groups
have the motivation to commit terrorist attacks in the United States-
either opposition to US foreign policy or hatred of particular ethnic groups
in residence here. Moreover, in our judgment, the United States-because
of its open society and size-is vulnerable to terrorist operations. The
groups most likely to initiate attacks in this country fall into two categories:
the state supporters of terrorism-Iran, Libya-and separatist/irredentist
groups-the Armenians, Palestinians, and Croatians. Although Cuba
supports terrorist activity in other regions, neither we nor the FBI has
reliable information indicating that Havana is planning to instigate a
terrorist attack in this country. Events like the Los Angeles Olympics,
which could provide a worldwide stage for terrorist violence, offer an
opportunity for the level of the threat to increase
Secret
GI 84-10093
May 1984
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International Terrorism:
Prospects for the Spread
of Violence to the
United States in 1984
This report assesses the threat from foreign terrorist
operations in the United States during the remainder
of 1984. Our analysis focuses principally on the
identification of major organized terrorist groups that
by behavior or statements have indicated a willingness
or intention to target the United States abroad. We
have specifically excluded from consideration domes-
tic groups and individuals-including those espousing
Puerto Rican separation-because by statute they are
the concern of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) and state and local police agencies.'-]
According to the FBI, the number of acts of terrorism
committed in the United States by foreign terrorist
groups has been small over the past several years. In
fact, the Bureau reports that domestic terrorist inci-
dents from all sources actually declined in number
from 1982 to 1983 in spite of the publicity terrorists
gained from the spectacular bombings in Beirut. We
can make no correlation between increased terrorism
abroad and increased terrorism in the United States.
Consequently, we would not necessarily expect to see
a rise in terrorist incidents in this country just because
terrorism abroad had increased. Moreover, to the
extent that politically motivated terrorism has been
occurring in the United States, its perpetrators typi-
cally have been domestic US groups, like the Puerto
Rican separatists, who link their actions to Latin
American or Caribbean politics. The few terrorist
attacks by foreign groups that have occurred in the
United States have been limited in scope and aimed
largely at the traditional enemies of those groups.F_
some domestic groups have in the past received
various forms of support from Cuba. There are no indications that
such support has increased recently or that Cuba is directing a
terrorism offensive against the United States through these groups.
However, other factors particularly the Los Angeles Olympics-
serve to increase the potential for terrorist activity from such
The relatively low level of foreign terrorist activity in
the United States can be attributed to several factors,
but we believe the primary reason is that those
countries and groups we regard as potential threats
have either suffered organizational setbacks or have
more favorable theaters of operation abroad:
? The fundamentalist Islamic groups backed by Iran
view the United States as their enemy, but it is
easier for them to attack US interests in the Middle
East and in Western Europe than in this country.
Iranian activities in the United States over the past
few years have been limited to procuring arms, 25X1
proselytizing, collecting intelligence on opponents of
the Khomeini regime, and infighting between pro-
and anti-Khomeini groups.
? The Palestinian groups in the United States -like
their counterparts abroad-are preoccupied with an
internal power struggle and serious infighting. They
are watching the situation in the Middle East
closely, particularly Arafat's actions, before decid-
ing to change their tactics and engage in terrorism
in the United States. The Palestinians in the United
States also have generally chosen to avoid violence
so as not to jeopardize their efforts to establish a
political base of support here.
? The two principal Armenian terrorist groups-the
leftwing Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation
of Armenia (ASALA) and the rightwing Justice
Commandos for the Armenian Genocide (JCAG)-
have staged a few attacks against Turkish targets in
this country, but their major focus is on propaganda
activities and fundraising. These groups have tradi-
tionally avoided attacks on US interests. Both orga-
nizations have been relatively quiet over the past 25X1
few months: ASALA-rent by ideological feud-
ing-has been attempting to reorganize, and JCAG
has been preoccupied with ongoing trials of its
members in this country and in Yugoslavia. The
FBI believes that an eventual return to attacks by
these groups on their traditional enemies-the
Turks-is inevitable.
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? The Libyan-sponsored terrorist activity in this coun-
try has been restricted to attempted assassinations
of exiles-successful in at least one case. Involve-
ment in a number of African insurgencies over the
past two years, as well as in an attempt to obtain the
chairmanship of the Organization for African Uni-
ty, probably contributed to Qadhafi's lack of focus
on the United States as a target. There is evidence
that he has recently begun a campaign against
exiles in Western Europe, however, and he may
attempt to resume this activity in the United States.
? The Cubans may provide some support to Puerto
Rican separatist groups, but Castro appears to be
standing by his policy of not directly sponsoring or
initiating anti-American terrorism in the continen-
tal United States. Furthermore, we believe Havana
is wary of the Reagan administration's willing-
ness-as demonstrated in Grenada-to respond
with direct action in the Caribbean to any perceived
aggression by the Cubans.
? The Croatians, who in the past have directed at-
tacks against Yugoslavians in the United States, are
largely in disarray after suffering serious setbacks to
their organization here. In 1981 several leading
members were arrested and convicted of various
charges relating to their terrorist activities
Another important factor in the low incidence of
foreign terrorist attacks in the United States in the
past several years is the tendency of many foreign
terrorist groups-especially those on the left-to view
the United States as a difficult environment in which
to operate. These groups probably perceive the US
security and intelligence agencies as highly efficient,
US entry and exit procedures for foreigners more
complicated than in most of Western Europe and
certain parts of the Middle East, and US punishment
as surer and harsher. Consequently, we suspect that
most terrorist groups have concluded that, compared
to attacks in the United States, attacks against US
interests abroad are more cost effective, easier to
carry out, promise less chance of retribution, and offer
equal publicity benefits.
Many terrorist organizations that have attacked US
interests abroad apparently pose little threat in the
United States proper. The leftist/anarchist European
groups like the Red Army Faction are in this catego-
ry, along with most of the leftist insurgent groups in
Latin America and elsewhere in the Third World that
use terrorism among their tactics. In the past, such
groups have rarely operated outside their traditional
environments, and they have not established the
support mechanisms in this country needed tofacili-
tate operations here. Furthermore, the anti-US atti-
tudes of these groups that have led them to attack US
interests in their own countries have usually been
expressed in the context of hatred for alleged US
imperialism in their countries. Thus, an attempt by
such a group to stage an attack in the United States
would represent a major departure in both tactics and
ideology.
A threat of unknown but worrisome proportions
involves individuals already in residence in the
United States-isolated sociopaths, for example, or
ad hoc groups of crazies-who might identify with
the causes or actions of foreign terrorists and seek on
their own initiative to strike a complementary blow
here. Spectacular terrorist acts, at home or abroad,
often trigger copycat behavior in susceptible individ-
uals. Because such people usually operate alone or in
extremely small groups and because their activities
are linked only tenuously-if at all-to foreign
terrorist groups, they are hard to identify before the
fact and their intentions are not discernible through
intelligence collection or analysis.
the United States is vulnerable to attacks and because
terrorist groups have potential support networks in
place in the United States, the possibility that attacks
might occur this year cannot be ignored. At least
three occurrences could contribute to this:
? Well-publicized, international events, such as the
Olympics in Los Angeles, where various groups
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might be tempted either to air their grievances with
the world watching or to use the occasion to embar-
rass the United States.
? Any international activity of the United States
perceived as an immediate threat by certain re-
gimes, especially those of Khomeini and Qadhafi,
would give opportunity for violent response abroad
limited only by the absence of vulnerable, high-
profile US targets.
? Any spectacular terrorist incident abroad could
inspire self-styled radicals, especially ones already
resident here, to imitate such acts in the United
States.
Although the latter two circumstances are virtually
impossible to anticipate except in the most general
sense, the potential offered by the Olympic Games
this summer is an immediate and concrete problem.
Any foreign terrorist attacks in the United States this
year are likely to be carried out by one of three
countries supporting terrorism or one of the three
terrorist groups espousing separatist/ irredentist goals.
All six are strongly motivated by either opposition to
US foreign policy or hatred for ethnic groups resident
in the United States, and all have demonstrated
capability for staging violent terrorist attacks abroad.
In addition, they have in place, to some degree,
support networks in the United States or Canada
made up of individuals who share common ethnic,
religious, and political characteristics and who are
available as passive supporters if not active co-
conspirators or surrogates.
State Supporters
Iran. In our judgment, the Iranians are the greatest
potential threat in this country. This threat would
most likely be manifested by Iranian Government
planned and supported attacks against US Govern-
ment property or its prominent citizens, or by Shiite
attacks inspired by fanaticism associated with events
in the Middle East. Although the latter attacks
probably would be less sophisticated, they cause
greater concern because security officials are less
likely to receive prior warning. Violence directed
against Iranian dissidents in this country is another
possibility and a major concern:
? In November 1983 the FBI discovered that an
Iranian student organization was planning a bomb-
ing attack against a theater in Seattle, where an
audience of anti-Khomeini dissidents was expected.
We do not know that Tehran had knowledge of this
plot, but the incident substantiates our belief that
dissidents in exile in this country--and in others
remain in danger of violence from pro-Khomeini
fanatics.
population is already in residence here.
According to FBI reporting, Khomeini has discussed
an attack in this country with his compatriots in Iran
because he believes that the US Government has
targeted him for assassination. The FBI has no indica-
tion that he has specifically sent terrorists to the
United States, but large numbers of Iranians are
entering this country as students and a large Iranian
The Islamic Society is the largest student group here,
and we know it receives government support. Appar-
ently its main functions are to collect intelligence on
the anti-Khomeini students and to disseminate pro-
regime propaganda. We have no indication that the
organization is planning terrorist attacks against the
United States at this time, but its loose infrastructure
could be used in the future at the direction of the
Iranian Government. Similar student organizations in
other countries have been used in the past to stir up
trouble:
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We cannot conclude that Iranian student organiza-
tions are set up and controlled by Tehran to carry out
terrorist attacks or violence against dissidents, but
there is substantial evidence to indicate that such
organizations are potential tools of the regime. F_
Libya. Libyan dissidents in this country are in
danger as they are worldwide-of Tripoli-sponsored
assassination attempts.
? The recent bombings near the homes and businesses
of exiles in London and Manchester-which were
almost certainly carried out by Libyan terrorists-
and the attack on the Libyan dissidents in front of
the People's Bureau in London illustrate the intensi-
ty of Qadhafi's campaign in Great Britain.
The Libyan Government in the past directed assassi-
nation attempts in the United States (in at least one
case successfully) by recruiting assailants from within
the country. Use of this tactic in the United States is
now difficult because Libya no longer has a diplomat-
ic mission in this country to coordinate its terrorist
attacks. (The only quasi-official Libyan presence here
is a Students Bureau in McLean, Virginia.) Another
constraint on Qadhafi's activities in the United States
is the absence of both a US Embassy and a substan-
tial US civilian population in Libya that could be used
as hostages in a retaliatory situation.
Qadhafi presently focuses his terrorist activities on
Western Europe and Africa, where he is heavily
involved with a number of insurgent groups. Given the
accessibility of US interests and the extent of the
Libyan presence in those areas, Qadhafi is more likely
to limit his anti-US activities to attacks on our
interests abroad:
? The extensive US presence in Western Europe
offers Qadhafi an opportunity to engage in anti-US
operations in an area where his infrastructure is
already in place and his operations can be more
easily launched, at least in the near term.
Qadhafi has a mercurial temperament and could
quickly and without forewarning become more willing
to initiate direct terrorist actions in the United States.
This might have been the case in 1981 when there was
concern that he would dispatch hit squads to the
United States to assassinate President Reagan in
retaliation for the Gulf of Sidra incident. The squads
apparently were never dispatched from Libya, but we
believe that Qadhafi seriously considered doing so.
Cuba. The Cuban Government in the past has provid-
ed financial, materiel, and political support to Puerto
Rican separatist/irredentist groups that engage in
terrorism and may do so in the future, although this
cannot be substantiated. Havana views this support as
an essential component of its role in leftwing revolu-
tionary movements in the Western Hemisphere. Al-
though we have no information that Havana is direct-
ly involved in instigating terrorist activities in this
country, Castro can exploit the Puerto Rican
independence issue and opposition to US foreign
policy in Central America through indigenous groups
that need little urging to attack the US Government.'
We do not believe that the Cuban Government will
change its position regarding terrorist activities in this
country. The Cubans already benefit from the inde-
pendent activities of a number of groups with whom
they share common political views; moreover, in the
wake of Grenada, they have become increasingly
' The FBI has stated publicly that most terrorist incidents in the
United States in 1983 were related to Latin American or Caribbean
politics. This includes Puerto Rican separatist and anti-Castro
groups. The latter in the past has successfully engaged in violent
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cautious about the risks of pushing the Reagan ad-
ministration too far:
? In a speech in November in which he eulogized the
Cubans killed in battle in Grenada, Castro took an
uncharacteristically defensive line and gave no indi-
cation that he would attempt to counter the new US
"activism" in the Caribbean)
Separatist/ Irredentist Groups
Palestinians. Like their counterparts in the Middle
East, the two principal Palestinian organizations in
this country, Fatah and the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), are preoccupied with
infighting.' According to the FBI, most of the specific
threats made by Palestinians in the United States are
directed at other Palestinians, some of whom are US
citizens. From what we know, the threats seem to be
directed at individuals who hold particular views
regarding intra-PLO politics. Unlike the Iranians,
who are willing to target indiscriminately, Palestinian
threats tend to be highly focused and not directed at
symbolic targets. The lack of indiscriminate threats
against US interests here can probably be attributed
to Palestinian efforts to build a political base of
support in the United States
The structure of the US branch of the Fatah organi-
zation directly parallels that in the Middle East: a
faction loyal to Arafat and a rebel faction. Both
segments apparently are watching the Middle East
situation closely, but the FBI does not believe a
terrorist attack in this country is likely during this
period of confusion and disorganization. This could
change as the Middle East situation unfolds and
Arafat's position becomes clearer:
decade-long ban on international terrorism,
Arafat will lift the ban if his political initiatives .
We believe that this would occur only if Arafat feels
that the survival of the PLO as an organization or
his leadership is threatened
' The Fatah mutiny against Arafat's leadership and policies in the
spring of 1983 resulted in a de facto split within the PLO, and
many radicals from other PLO groups--for example, the PFLP-
have aligned themselves with the rebels. Although the PFLP
According to the FBI, the Fatah organization in the
United States does have access to some weapons
stocks. The Bureau linked the cache of remote-control
devices and detonators found in Alexandria, Virginia,
more than a year ago to Fatah. It concluded, however,
that this materiel was designated for use overseas. It
has yet to find caches of weapons targeted for use
against US targets.
Rumors that the PFLP has been planning a terrorist
attack in this country are unsubstantiated, and the
FBI considers the evidence too circumstantial to
confirm a real threat. Moreover, according to the
FBI, the PFLP is principally involved in fundraising
activities in the United States, especially the sale of its
publications. We do not know if the proceeds are
leaving this country. The PFLP apparently also is in
close touch with Damascus, but we are not sure
whether Damascus has any control over the organiza-
tion's US branch.
Despite the infighting among the Fatah and PFLP
groups, some positive interaction still exists, mostly
through two organizations: the Palestinian Congress
of North America (PCNA) and the General Union of
Palestinian Students (GUPS). Although these con- 25X1
tacts are mostly concerned with financial matters,
they could potentially offer a mechanism for coordi-
nating more radical Palestinian activities in this coun-
try. We have no indication that such coordination is
occurring or is contemplated.
Armenians. The possibility of a direct threat to non-
Turkish targets in the United States from Armenian
terrorists is minimal at this time. The two major
Armenian terrorist groups active in the United
States-ASALA and JCAG-focus their attacks al-
most exclusively on their traditional enemy, the
Turks. We expect that both groups will continue
targeting Turkish installations and personnel in West-
ern Europe and the Middle East. Although there has
been a lull in this activity in recent months, we expect
this to change. When the change comes, it could also
have an impact on the domestic US scene. The
ASALA organization in the United States presently
lacks both discipline and leadership and suffers badly
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from fragmentation within its ranks over ideology and
the issue of indiscriminate bombings. These same
problems have so seriously disrupted ASALA in
Western Europe and the Middle East that the group
has not conducted any terrorist attacks since August
1983 when the group split.
In our judgment, the Justice Commandos pose a more
serious threat to Turkish targets in the United States
than does ASALA. The accused slayer of the Turkish
Consul General in Los Angeles in 1982 was recently
convicted in California. Two JCAG members were
sentenced on 9 March 1984 to 20 years in prison for
the March 1983 assassination of the Turkish Ambas-
sador to Yugoslavia. Neither we nor the FBI expects
any immediate terrorist retaliation for these convic-
tions. JCAG probably will refrain from any terrorist
activities at least until the conclusion of another
trial-which began on 31 January 1984 in Califor-
nia-involving five key members and the seizure of a
bomb aboard an aircraft at Boston Airport in October
1982. In view of the Armenian community's support
for the defendants, JCAG is unlikely to commit any
attack that may reflect negatively on the possible
acquittal of any of these defendants.
Croatians. Croatian extremist groups have two goals:
the destruction of the Yugoslav state and the estab-
lishment of an independent state of Croatia. To this
end, various emigres have organized worldwide and
aimed most of their attacks against Yugoslav officials.
Croatian terrorists have sought not only to gain
publicity for their cause but also to avenge the
murders of Croatian emigre activists believed to have
The US organizations of the Croatian National
Resistance and the Croatian Independence Movement
were effectively weakened in 1981 and 1982 when
several members were arrested and convicted of ter-
rorist offenses. We concur with the FBI's assessment
that these groups do not pose a major threat within
the United States, although it is not inconceivable
that they would attempt to attack Yugoslav targets at
Although we have no hard intelligence that any
terrorist organization is planning an attack during the
Los Angeles Olympics, the opportunity that such an
event offers for terrorists to gain worldwide publicity
is substantial. Attacks at the Olympics would proba-
bly come from state-sponsored terrorists who wish to
attack the United States or certain separatist/irreden-
tist groups whose traditional targets were in Los
Angeles for the games.
Because of the enmity with which Iran views the
United States and the large concentration of Iranians
in southern California (estimated at 200,000), the FBI
considers-and we concur-that the greatest poten-
tial threat to the Games is Iranian directed or inspired
terrorism. Given the size of the potential support
network already in place and the availability of
weapons and explosive materiel in the Los Angeles
area, Iran would not need to send a "hit team" from
the Middle East or Europe but could rely on assets
such as the Shiite supporters already in place. In view
of the potential seriousness of the Iranian threat,
security agencies are watching the Iranian community
very closely, and we should receive prior indication
that an attack was being planned.
The FBI is also particularly concerned about possible
Armenian terrorist attacks against Turks. The Arme-
nian community in southern California is estimated at
300,000. Trouble would most likely come from
JCAG, which, unlike ASALA, is well organized and
has tremendous resources in the area-sufficient to
plan and stage a terrorist attack. In the past, however,
JCAG has been careful to target Turkish diplomats,
and CIA analysts believe that an attack at the
Olympics would signify a radical change in their
targeting strategy and would be counterproductive to
the group's goal to develop a support base in this
country
Actually, almost any terrorist group with sufficient
motivation could probably attempt an attack during
the Olympics. It is not difficult to procure weapons
and explosives in the United States, and the numerous
the Los Angeles Olympics.
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foreign communities throughout the country, and
particularly in major metropolitan areas like Los
Angeles, could certainly provide support networks.
Various foreign groups have the motivation and the
capability to attempt low-level violence, such as small-
scale bombing attacks and shootings in the Los
Angeles area. In most cases, we would not have much
advance warning of these actions, but, given the
security and intelligence precautions being taken for
the Games, we would expect prior indications of any
plans of a more sophisticated or large-scale attack.
The 1984 World's Fair in New Orleans and the
Democratic and Republican conventions in San Fran-
cisco and Dallas this summer could attract terrorist
groups-domestic or state sponsored-who see the
events as an an opportunity to attack the United
States and exploit the media. These events probably
would not attract separatist/irredentist groups be-
cause their traditional enemies would not be involved.
There are no indications, however, that any foreign-
based group is targeting these events. Moreover, we
believe that the Olympics is a more attractive target
for potential terrorist activity because of the world-
wide interest and publicity the Games receive. It is
unlikely that a foreign group contemplating a major
attack at the Olympics would also have the resources
to target one of these events.
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