PROSPECTS FOR THE SOVIET GAS CONDENSATE INDUSTRY

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00283R000700080003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 2, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: March 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

Directorate of
Top Seeret-
Intelligence
70 C a S is '.ya. 4s'
Prospects- for' the Soviet
Gas Condensate Industry
Top Secret
GI 84-10051 C
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Prospects for the Soviet
Gas Condensate Industry
This paper was prepared byl Office
of Global Issues. Comments and queries are welcome
and may be directed to the Chief, Resource
Analysis Branch, OGI~
Top Secret
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Prospects for the Soviet
Gas Condensate IndustryF__1 25X1
Key Judgments After three decades of steady increases, the rate of Soviet oil production
Information available growth has begun to slow and may level off and subsequently decline
as of 1 March 1984 during the last half of the 1980s. One of the few bright spots in the Soviet
was used in this report.
oil picture for the 1980s is the expected growth of the gas condensate
industry. Indeed, potential increases in production of condensate, a liquid
hydrocarbon found in both oil and gas fields, may determine whether the
Soviets reach oil production goals-which now include condensate-or
suffer a further slide in oil output later in this decade
Although the Soviets do not publish condensate reserve data, information
we have pieced together suggests reserves are ample to support major
increases in production beyond the current level of about 660,000 barrels
per day (b/d) or 24 million tons per year using a conversion factor of 10
barrels of condensate per ton. Soviet planners are now attempting to solve
many of the condensate sector's problems with an eye toward greatly
expanded production by the end of the decade. We believe the Soviets plan
an estimated 80,000- to 110,000-b/d annual increase in condensate
production in that time frame. Our analysis indicates the Soviets will be
able to add this amount of condensate each year from newer fields;
declining production from older oil and gas fields will most likely limit the
net annual increase to an average 50,000 to 60,000 b/d, enough to boost
annual condensate production to 1 million b/d by 1990.
To successfully implement future condensate production and processing
projects, however, the USSR must substantially increase its purchases of
Western equipment and technology. As is the case throughout its oil
industry, the USSR's condensate technology is about 10 to 20 years behind
that of the United States, creating a substantial dependence on Western
designs and equipment for recovering and processing condensate. Several
of the most important future condensate producing fields have extremely
high levels of sulfur and carbon dioxide and will require expensive and
complex extraction and processing equipment that Soviet industry is
currently unable to manufacture. For the foreseeable future, the USSR
will have to rely heavily on the West-particularly France, West Germany,
Japan, Italy, and the United States-for much of the equipment and know-
how to realize its condensate production potential.
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Increased Soviet condensate production will ease the burden of supplying
oil to East European satellites and will aid the Soviets in maintaining
important hard currency earnings generated from petroleum exports to
Western and Third World customers. Condensate's rising production totals
will also supply the Soviets with greater amounts of more valuable light pe-
troleum products-such as motor gasoline, marine diesel, and kerosene-
which are in short supply in the domestic economy and are in greater
demand on the world market than heavier fuel oil types. As with the rest of
the Soviet oil industry, however, these economic gains will require an
increased dependence on Western equipment and technology to produce
and process gas condensate.
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Prospects for the Soviet
Gas Condensate Industry
Introduction
After three decades of large and steady increases,
Soviet oil production growth has begun to slow and-
depending on the investment choices Moscow
makes-may level off and subsequently decline dur-
ing the last half of this decade. Soviet oil production,
which includes gas condensate in the Soviet reporting
system, averaged about 12.3 million barrels per day
(b/d) in 1983, only about 300,000 b/d more than in
1980.' Though still posting small annual increases, the
Soviet oil industry has yet to reach an annual plan
target this decade, and output has been growing at
less than 1 percent since 1980.
If the Soviets are to avoid an oil production decline
during this decade, a large part of the burden will fall
on the relatively obscure gas condensate industry.
Soviet crude oil
production has remained stagnant since the late 1970s
and that statistical gains registered since then are due
almost entirely to expanding condensate production.
Many also believe that future production goals could
well be out of reach if the condensate industry is
unable to provide steadily rising volumes of gas
liquids for inclusion in the "oil" statistics.
Condensate production is one of the few potential
bright spots for the Soviet oil industry over the
balance of the 1980s. Besides partially compensating
for the expected downturn in crude oil production,
expanded condensate production could provide new
supplies of lighter petroleum products for both foreign
sales and domestic use. There are, however, substan-
tial problems in the Soviet condensate industry that
must be dealt with satisfactorily by Soviet planners if
the promise of increasing condensate production is to
be realized. In light of its growing role and higher
priority in Soviet energy plans, an accurate assess-
ment of the prospects for the Soviet gas condensate
industry is important in understanding the USSR's
energy supply situation over the rest of this decade.
Condensate in the Soviet Economy
Until recently, the Soviets neglected the important
energy and chemical value of condensate and did not
make extensive use of it in the economy. Large
amounts were flared, left in natural gas reservoirs, or
simply lost due to lack of processing facilities. Recog-
nizing its obvious value and versatility in the last
decade, the Soviets are now paying much greater
attention to condensate. The Soviets claim that 1 ton
of condensate is equivalent to 1.5 to 2 tons of oil for
fuel purposes and that 1 ton of processed condensate
is equivalent in value to 3 to 5 tons of refined oil.
Soviet journals state that condensate products are
used as fuels and in the petrochemical industry to
produce a great variety of chemicals, solvents, dyes,
and plastics (figure 1).
Where processing facilities are still unavailable and in
areas that are too remote to justify pipeline or railway
construction, condensate is often burned directly for
fuel. Large amounts of unprocessed condensate are
often used with dry natural gas to fuel electric power
plants and other industrial plants. Liquefied gases
from condensate are also used for household heating
in sparsely settled rural areas. To make better local
use of condensate, the Soviets have begun to assemble
small condensate processing plants to provide local
sources of motor and diesel fuel and eliminate long-
distance transport of fuel supplies.
Processed condensate also plays an increasingly im-
portant role in Soviet transportation, refining, and
petrochemical industries. The USSR's growing fleet
of vehicles is making increased use of diesel fuel and
gasoline produced from condensate. Soviet open
sources state that over 1,000 cars in Moscow alone are
fueled by a benzene-propane fuel mixture processed
from condensate. A prominent example of conden-
sate's versatility as a petrochemical feedstock is the
Orenburg complex in the southern Urals where con-
densate is transported by pipeline to the Salavat
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Gas Condensate:
Definitions and Terminology
Gas condensate, also called natural gas liquids
(NGL), is a hydrocarbon occurring either in natural
gas or oil-associated reservoirs of great depth and
high pressure. Condensate is normally in the vapor
phase, but condenses as reservoir pressure is reduced
during extraction. Processed components of conden-
sate such as propane, butane, and pentane are used as
petrochemical feedstock, motor gasoline, bottled gas,
and raw materials for other industrial uses. Although
condensate-and the lighter, higher priced hydrocar-
bons produced from it-is extremely valuable, its
volatile nature makes it difficult and expensive to
process, transport, and store, and frequently restricts
its use for industrial purposes.
Since condensate is neither natural gas nor crude oil
but can be produced from both, output can be report-
ed in a number of formats. In most countries, liquids
separated from natural gas at the oil or gas wellhead
(lease or field condensate) are reported as crude oil
production; those produced in natural gas processing
plants are reported as NGL. In some countries,
however, both the liquids produced in natural gas
processing plants and at the field are counted as
crude oil production.
an accurate picture of developments and trends in the
industry. We believe that the NGL added to Soviet
crude oil production figures include: (a) condensate
separated from gas in gas condensate fields, (b)
liquids or field condensate separated from associated
(with oil) natural gas, and (c) often, but not always,
the total NGL production derived from natural gas
processing plants (figure 1). All references to conden-
sate in this report consequently encompass these
three categories, a somewhat different definition than
is the case in most other condensate producing coun-
tries.
Soviet condensate figures.
An additional complication in working with Soviet
condensate figures is converting them from Soviet
weight measurement in tons to the more common
Western practice of volumetric measurement in bar-
rels. Although the standard industry conversion fac-
torfor undifferentiated crude oil is 7.33 barrels to the
ton, we believe using this figure would substantially
understate Soviet condensate reserves and produc-
tion. The conversion factor used by the Soviets has
varied widely from year to year and field to field. A
ratio of 10 barrels of oil to 1 ton of condensate is, in
our judgment, a reasonable conversion value for
Soviet condensate production reporting is even more
difficult to interpret. Reporting on associated and
nonassociated NGL production totals has all too
often been inconsistent, with numerous statistical
contradictions. Moreover, the liquids that have been
included under the condensate category have changed
over time, making it extremely difficult to construct
petrochemical plant in the Bashkir ASSR and blend-
ed with crude oil to be processed into motor gasoline.
Ethane, a liquid petroleum gas component of conden-
sate, is also carried via pipeline to supply a petro-
chemical complex at Kazan'. Additional condensate
pipelines are planned or under construction to other
gasoline plants in the Urals. Two giant petrochemical
plants under construction at Tobol'sk and Tomsk in
West Siberia will also use condensate from the middle
The Reserve Base
Moscow has never published official condensate re-
serve totals, but they are undisputedly immense. On
the basis of recently published Soviet data
and engineering calculations of the
condensate content of Soviet gasfields, we estimate
current proved reserves to be in the range of 16-20
billion barrels-about one-fourth the size of Soviet
Ob' region and Urengoy to produce gasoline, natural
gas liquids, synthetic rubber, and plastics
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Figure 1
Soviet Gas Condensate Processing
Natural gas
well
Local
r processing
Condensate (heavier components)
Refinery
r-h
*
i Condensate
Unprocessed gas used Gas processing (lighter components)
l
f
Petrochemical plant
as power p
ant
uel plant (GPZ)
r--
Flared
Other
industries
Oil-associated
Oil-gas
gas well
separation
proved crude oil reserves (see table). We expect the
proved reserve base to grow rapidly over the rest of
the decade as development of the supergiant West
Siberian gasfields progresses. Whatever its exact size,
the reserve base is more than large enough to support
over 60 years of production at an estimated current
output level of 660,000 b/d. Thus, as is the case with
crude oil, future condensate output will be limited not
by the size of the resource base, but by the Soviet
ability to extract and process the condensate and
supply it to industrial consumers.
Estimated Soviet Gas
Condensate Reserves
Middle Ob'
Northern West Siberia
Non-West Siberia
'Refinery
Condensate reserves are widely distributed in the
USSR, with numerous deposits in West Siberia, Komi
ASSR, Central Asia, and the Ukraine (see map at end
of text).
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1.35 to 2.7
5.50 to 8.2
5.1 to 13.15
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a large part of conden-
sate reserves is situated in a relatively small number
of fields, and that Orenburg, Vuktyl in Komi ASSR,
Lyantor in the middle Ob' region, and Urengoy and
Zapolyarnyy in North Tyumen contain over 50 per-
cent of the country's explored reserves.
--]West Siberia contains from about
40 percent to perhaps as much as two-thirds of all
Soviet condensate resources. Our own analysis of
open-source reporting indicates
that West Siberia contains some 50 to 60 percent of
national condensate reserves-an estimated 1.3-2.7
billion barrels associated with oilfields and from 5.5 to
over 8 billion barrels with gasfields. The remainder is
concentrated primarily in western Kazakhstan, Cen-
Condensate Production
Despite the presence of a sizable reserve base, the
Soviets have been slow in bringing condensate produc-
tion on line. Limited commercial production began
during the middle 1950s near Baku in Azerbaijan. In
the 1960s the North Caucasus areas of Stavropol' and
Krasnodar became the principal Soviet condensate
producers, responsible for well over 60 percent of the
limited national output (figure 2). A major rise in
Soviet production was not achieved until the 1970s,
primarily due to the development of two giant gas
condensate fields-the Vuktyl field in Komi ASSR,
and the Orenburg field in the southern Urals. Vuktyl
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tral Asia, and the southern Volga-Urals.
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Figure 3
Soviet Union: Gas Condensate Production,
1970-90
0 1970 75
U
90
Figure 4
Soviet Union: Crude Oil and Gas Condensate
Production Growth, 1970-83
1970 1975
10%
1980 1983
19%
production began in 1969 and rose to over 120,000
b/d in 1973, gradually declining to its current output
of about 55,000 b/d a year. At Orenburg the Soviets
completed the first two stages of the USSR's largest
gas processing complex during the 1974-75 period.
The field produced over 45,000 b/d of condensate in
1975, and, after the third stage opened late in 1978,
production continued to increase to its current level of
about 85,000 b/d. Orenburg and Vuktyl together
accounted for nearly two-thirds of all Soviet conden-
sate production during the middle 1970s-over
150,000 b/d of a national condensate total of about
250,000 b/d in 1975 (figure 3).
Since the early 1970s, data on condensate production
have been difficult to obtain. The Soviets began
listing condensate under crude production and, after
1975, stopped providing detailed condensate figures
on a national basis. Consequently, with the exception
of a few "showcase" producers, only limited published
data for individual fields and regions are available.
Nevertheless, we have pieced together a production
profile from these data
State Department sources and Soviet open
literature report that total 1976 Soviet condensate
production ranged between 275,000 b/d and 300,000
b/d. A steady rise in condensate production during
the late 1970s is consonant with five-year plan data
which indicate a production level between 490,000
b/d and 550,000 b/d for the period 1980-81. Given
the increased production of condensate from the
northern West Siberian gasfields, we estimate that
production has now risen to about 660,000 b/d a year.
Our analysis of production since 1975 suggests that
condensate has played a significant role in the growth
of Soviet crude oil output (figure 4). In the period
1976-83, condensate production more than doubled,
adding some 385,000 to 410,000 b/d, while crude oil
production grew about 2 million b/d-roughly 20
percent. Thus condensate provided 15 percent of the
total growth in Soviet oil production over this period.
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Moreover, condensate's share of annual production
increments is growing larger, making the performance
of the condensate sector even more crucial to Soviet
production goals. We estimate that condensate pro-
duction in 1983 increased by at least 55,000 b/d,
accounting for nearly two-thirds of the increase in
Soviet crude and condensate output over the 1982
total. Later in this decade, we expect condensate to
supply virtuall all the net annual increases to Soviet
oil production.
Problems of the Condensate Industry
Organizational, technological, and managerial prob-
lems have hampered Soviet efforts to raise condensate
production to a level more in line with the size of the
vast reserve base. The major institutional problem
appears to be condensate's stepchild status in the
Soviet energy sector. Condensate production and
processing has always been a rootless, fragmented
operation under the jurisdiction of several ministries,
but assigned primarily to none. Since condensate is
produced from both gas and oil fields, the Soviets
cannot assign condensate a separate ministry; both
the Ministry of Gas Industry (MGI) and Ministry of
Petroleum Industry (MPI) prefer to concentrate on
fulfilling their primary objectives of extracting dry
gas and crude oil. Because of this split, neither
organization feels fully responsible for the planning or
management of condensate development and produc-
tion.
Condensate production is further hampered by a
shortage of the necessary processing equipment and
technology. A high percentage of the oil well gas
recovered at oilfields has been flared rather than
processed to recover condensate components. In the
early 1970s, less than 60 percent of available conden-
sate was processed because of equipment shortages,
and open Soviet sources indicate that this figure has
risen to only about 75 percent in the 1980s. A similar
situation exists in the natural gasfields, where equip-
ment shortages often adversely affect condensate re-
covery. Few national figures are available on such lost
condensate, but in 1970, for example, condensate
production potential was estimated by Soviet econo-
mists to have been over 270,000 b/d compared with
the 115,000 b/d actually produced.
Even where the necessary equipment is available,
many oil and gas field managers, driven by oil or gas
production quotas, are still not efficiently extracting
condensate. In gasfields, much condensate is lost
during the gas production process when the Soviets let
formation pressures drop so low that condensation
takes place within the reservoir and the condensate is
lost. This occurrence can be avoided by "cycling," a
technique used for many years in the United States in
which processed dry gas is recycled back into the
reservoir to maintain formation pressure and is pro-
duced only after most of the condensate has been
recovered. Despite numerous recommendations in the
Soviet press during past years that the "cycling"
technique should be adopted, Soviet field managers
have only just started to use this approach on an
experimental basis at Novotroitskoye in the eastern
Ukraine. Ironically, this "cycling" technique has been
touted by the Soviets as a "revolutionary new ap-
proach" to condensate recovery despite its having
been mentioned in Soviet petroleum journals since the
early 1970s.
Outlook for Condensate Production
Because of the prospects of declining crude oil produc-
tion, Soviet planners believe that the condensate
industry must provide a prolonged period of substan-
tially increasing production if overall oil production
goals are to be met. Ambitious production goals for
the 1980s have been proposed although no specific
details have been announced. Our analysis, based on
that the Soviets hope for net additions to condensate
increments on the order of some 80,000 to 110,000
b/d per year over the rest of this decade, nearly
doubling current production efforts by 1990. F_
Despite the problems confronting the condensate in-
dustry, we believe the Soviets are still likely to boost
production substantially. By simply devoting more
time and attention to efficient extraction and process-
ing procedures, rapid progress is being made in the
middle Ob' oilfields. The condensate industry will also
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Urengoy: A Troubled Supergiant
Soviet organizational, technological, and managerial
problems affect condensate output at virtually every
field in the country. But nowhere are these problems
more painfully evident than at Urengoy-considered
to be the largest gas deposit in the world and the
highest priority energy development project in the
country. Urengoy has almost unlimited dry gas re-
serves and large amounts of condensate. It is slated
to supply some 40 percent of Soviet national gas
production and about 13 percent of condensate pro-
duction by 1985, with natural gas being the primary
fuel source for the gas export pipeline currently under
construction. Yet, Urengoy's development has been
delayed considerably by Soviet blundering.
The slow progress at Urengoy can be traced to the
lack of a truly authoritative central office with
complete decisionmaking authority, resulting in con-
tinuous organizational struggles for power and juris-
diction over various parts of the Urengoy `pie." The
various ministries have been unable to agree on a
comprehensive well-coordinated field development
plan. The MGI, nominally in charge of the Urengoy
project, cannot command needed cooperation from
other ministries responsible for vital supplies and
services. Consequently, the late arrival of critically
needed equipment,. spare parts, and skilled labor, as
well as support inffrastructure, such as electric power,
roads, and housing are bottlenecks to both dry gas
and condensate development.
Urengoy has also suffered from poor management of
the condensate effort, both in Moscow and in the
field. Planners have taken several years to decide
whether to locate small processing plants at the field,
build larger ones farther south in the middle Ob'
reap the benefits of spinoff production returns from
high-priority projects such as Orenburg and Urengoy
that are aimed at the extraction of oil, gas, sulfur, and
other chemical products. In addition, condensate pro-
duction will begin flowing from a number of new and
relatively accessible fields in the western part of the
country as well as several large oil and gas fields in
region, or pipe it to more distant processing centers in
Tomsk and the Urals-Volga region. Open sources in
late 1983 indicated that local plants will process the
condensate and that one plant was already under
construction. Aware of the indecision in Moscow,
production officials at Urengoy have chosen to post-
pone development of the more complex condensate
reservoirs.
Little has been reported in the press on technology
problems, but the Soviets are clearly worried that
their condensate drilling and processing technology is
not up to the task at Urengoy. Equipment capable of
handling the high pressures and depth of the conden-
sate reservoirs as well as the extreme climate and
permafrost is not sufficiently available, slowing drill-
ing progress considerably. In addition, the Soviets
continue to have difficulties developing the complex
equipment-compressor and cooling installations,
heat exchangers, and separators-needed to process
Urengoy s condensate.
Urengoy, proudly hailed by the Soviets as the world's
largest gaeld, should be a showpiece of the nation's
energy sector. As the litany of problems enumerated
above indicates, it is instead dangerously close to
becoming a symbol of Soviet ineptness, particularly
in condensate production. Though scheduled to pro-
duce about 110,000 b/d of condensate by 1985,
Urengoy, in our estimation, will be fortunate to
produce as much as 50,000 b/d.
West Siberia.' Our analysis indicates that these posi-
tive developments could result in an estimated new
condensate production of 80,000 to 110,000 b/d a
year over the rest of this decade.
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Reaching the Soviet goals of net additions of 80,000
to 110,000 b/d of condensate, however, will require
fundamental organizational and managerial reforms
in the energy sector and large increases in condensate
investment that, in our judgment, will be unattain-
able. The Soviet bureaucracy places a premium on
consensus and avoidance of risk, ensuring a conserva-
tive approach to solving organizational problems.
General Secretary Andropov publicized the need for
reorganization of the energy ministries but accom-
plished little before his death. His conservative suc-
cessor, Chernenko, is even less likely to promote
innovative organizational change. The ongoing invest-
ment squeeze in the economy, caused by slow econom-
ic growth and the escalating investment requirements
of other energy efforts, is likely to continue to restrict
the flow of money into the condensate industry.
Moscow simply cannot afford to take large amounts
of scarce investment funds away from the middle Ob'
oil region, the West Siberian gasfields, or the gas
trunk pipeline effort and divert them to condensate
extraction and processing. Another negative factor
will be the continuing inability of the Soviets to
provide skillful management of a number of the aging
fields that have been the mainstays of condensate
production over the past decade.
The Soviets have been noticeably silent about plans
for maintaining or augmenting production from older
fields. The Soviets have stated that expanded produc-
tion may be possible from deeper horizons recently
discovered at Vuktyl; however, no specific figures or
plans have been announced. Neither have specific
plans been announced for Orenburg, where produc-
tion could be sustained or even increased if additional
gas processing capacity were added. We believe the
condensate production from these fields-strongly
linked to oil and gas output-is likely to drop by
25,000 to 55,000 b/d per year given the poor Soviet
oilfield management record and the apparent lack of
detailed programs designed to sustain production
through the 1980s.
Without a major increase in effort, production de-
clines at these older fields will probably limit annual
condensate production increases to an average 50,000
to 60,000 b/d. These annual increments should in-
crease condensate output from its current level to
about 800,000 b/d by 1985 and about 1.0-1.1 million
b/d by 1990 (figure 4). Soviet performance at the
older oil, gas, and condensate fields will determine
whether or not output reaches the hi h or low end of
our estimate.
Implications for Moscow and the West
Although below Soviet aspirations, this projected level
of production coupled with the sizable reserve base
ensures for condensate a position of rising prominence
in the Soviet energy picture. If overall crude-conden-
sate production drops-as we believe it will-to be-
tween 11 million b/d and 12 million b/d by 1990,
condensate's share of this total could approach 10
percent, making the condensate sector as important as
major oil-producing regions such as Komi ASSR or
Kazakhstan. Condensate's rising production will go a
long way toward keeping a possible future Soviet oil
supply shortfall within manageable proportions.
Increased condensate production will also assist the
Soviets in supplying oil to Eastern Europe and main-
taining vital hard currency income from the world
market. Oil is now the largest single source of Soviet
foreign exchange and provides Moscow with a greater
hard currency return than all other export items put
together. Rising condensate production will supply the
Soviets with more valuable light refinery products
such as diesel, gasoline, and aviation fuel, which are
in greater demand on the world market than the
current heavier Soviet refinery product mix. The
Soviets are currently shipping these lighter petroleum
products in considerable quantities to important non-
Communist world countries such as Japan, India, and
Italy.
Increased condensate production will also have impor-
tant consequences for Soviet industry. Soviet petro-
leum refineries currently do not possess the cracking
capacity needed to meet the economy's demand for
light products. This problem will worsen during the
decade as the Soviet crude oil mix becomes heavier
while the demand for highly refined products grows.
Increased production of condensate and the light
products derived from it will help reduce potential
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shortages of such critical fuels as gasoline, kerosene,
and diesel as well as provide sorely needed inputs of
feedstocks for the petrochemical industry.
To successfully implement future condensate produc-
tion and processing projects, however, the USSR must
substantially increase its purchases of Western equip-
ment and technology. As is the case throughout its oil
industry, Soviet condensate technology is about 10 to
20 years behind that of the United States, creating a
substantial dependence on Western designs and
equipment for recovering and processing condensate.
Several of the most important future condensate
producing fields, such as Astrakhan' and Tengiz, have
extremely high levels of dangerous sulfur and carbon
dioxide. Successful exploitation of these fields will
require expensive and complex extraction and process-
ing equipment that Soviet industry is currently unable
to manufacture.
heavily on the West-particularly France, Japan,
Italy, West Germany, and the United States-for
much of the equipment and know-how to realize its
This technological dependency will also become more
acute as development efforts require deeper drilling at
sites such as Urengoy or as more complex reservoir
conditions are encountered at sites such as Karacha-
ganak and in offshore areas such as the Caspian Sea.
For the foreseeable future, the USSR will have to rely
condensate production potential
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Appendix
Key Soviet Condensate Fields
The Orenburg and Vuktyl fields will continue as the
largest individual condensate producers over the short
term. For the long-term production increase envisaged
by Soviet planners, however, new fields must be
developed. We expect increased development efforts
at Urengoy in West Siberia, the Astrakhan' and
Karachaganak areas of the southern Volga and west-
ern Kazakhstan, and several fields in Komi ASSR.
Smaller fields in the Caspian, Ukraine, and North
Caucasus areas are potential candidates for future
development. The Soviets also plan significant im-
provements in condensate extraction from the giant
middle Ob' oilfieldsl
Urengoy appears to have the most potential for in-
creased condensate production. In addition to the
enormous shallow deposits of dry gas, this supergiant
field contains massive amounts of condensate that the
Soviets expect to extract from deeper lower Creta-
ceous Valanginian structures. From an annual pro-
duction total of 25 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas,
extraction of up to 110,000 b/d of condensate is
expected annually by 1985, rising eventually to over
550,000 b/d by the 1990s. Development constraints
have been examined by Soviet experts, and, according
to one authority, up to 476 production wells producing
approximately 20 bcm of gas are required to produce
over 80,000 b/d of condensate annually from
Urengoy. Almost 3,200 wells producing over 250 bcm
of gas would be needed to extract about 550,000 b/d
of condensate a year from the field. Urengoy is
already facing serious production problems due to the
lack of necessary drilling and processing equipment
and continuing lags in the construction of on-site gas
processing facilities necessary for treating the dry
natural gas and extracting the condensate fractions.
In spite of numerous infrastructure and organization-
al problems, the first condensate production well at
Urengoy apparently started operation in mid-1982,
and the 1983 condensate plan for Urengoy was set at
over 10,000 b/d. We doubt the Soviets will be able to
produce the sharp rise in gas output needed to achieve
the 110,000-b/d condensate goal planned for 1985.
Another major gas condensate development area
slated for startup in the mid-1980s is Astrakhan, a
high-sulfur gas condensate field in the southern Volga
discovered in 1976. This difficult-to-develop sour gas-
field is scheduled for a late 1984 or early 1985 startup
with early condensate production expected to range
from 27,000 b/d to over 55,000 b/d annually. Present
plans also call for the construction of a condensate
and sulfur processing plant with an ultimate natural
gas capacity of 18 bcm. The Astrakhan' field, how-
ever, poses several potentially severe developmental
problems-deep producing horizons (4,200 meters),
high reservoir pressures (630 atmospheres), and an 25X1
unusually high percentage of hydrogen sulfide and
carbon dioxide (each about 25 percent). The Soviets
are attempting to overcome these problems with
specialized equipment purchased from a number of
Western countries. Negotiating delays, hard currency
shortages, and operating conditions beyond Soviet
technical capabilities probably will delay condensate
production for several years beyond the scheduled
date.
Karachaganak, some 80 kilometers south of Orenburg
in northwest Kazakhstan, may also become an impor-
tant condensate producer. This field, which is regard-
ed as a southwestern extension of the Orenburg field,
is projected to produce over 55,000 b/d per year by
1985. Although no firm dates have been set, the
Soviets also have high hopes for new production from
several other rich condensate fields just north of
Karachaganak in the southern Volga-Urals area such
as Nagumanskoye and Berdyanskoye near Orenburg.
The Soviets also intend to produce over 25,000 b/d of
condensate per year by the late 1980s from the
promising Tengiz oil and gas field in northwestern
Kazakhstan near the Caspian Sea. Tengiz, like Astra-
khan', contains extremely high percentages of sulfur
and carbon dioxide-a potential drawback to meeting
future production schedules
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plans for constructing condensate pipelines
from both Astrakhan' and Karachaganak 3 to the
Orenburg gas processing complex and for the erection
of a major condensate line from Urengoy to Surgut,
Tobol'sk, and on to the Volga-Urals area. All these
plans appear to be part of a major effort to upgrade
the priority of condensate and petroleum products
pipeline construction, traditionally lagging far behind
gas and crude oil trunkline construction efforts. We
believe this effort will be constrained by severe com-
petition for resources with the rapidly expanding
natural gas pipeline net during the rest of the decade.
Komi ASSR
would achieve equal prominence with West Siberia in
future condensate production. Some sources have
stressed the need to more efficiently process associat-
ed gas from the large Usa-Vozey oilfields, and the
Soviets have also expressed optimism about the pros-
pects of future condensate production from deeper
horizons at Vuktyl, as well as the recently opened
Zapadno-Soplyas condensate field-hailed in the So-
viet press as the eventual condensate replacement for
Vuktyl. The prominence accorded this field is some-
what puzzling since it apparently contains only about
one-tenth of the natural gas reserves of Vuktyl. If
condensate reserves are roughly analogous, this field
would not seem to be a promising replacement candi-
date. The Komi region has traditionally taken a back-
seat in the allocation of investment funds and equip-
ment to the oil industry flagship West Siberia. The
Soviets have been conspicuously silent as to precise
development plans for the Komi condensate industry,
an indication that condensate development will proba-
bly continue to lag.
Other promising candidates for future production
appear to be the high-sulfur fields associated with the
newly constructed Mubarek gas processing plant in
Uzbekistan, the very promising giant Sovetabad gas
condensate field in southeastern Turkmen SSR, Cas-
pian offshore gas condensate fields such as Bulla-
More and others, and possibly gasfields in the
' Several unofficial open-source Soviet reports indicate that th
Karachaganak-Orenburg pipeline was completed in late 1983.
Ukraine such as Novotroitskoye, where the "revolu-
tionary" cycling process is being tested. In spite of
generally declining oil and gas production in these
areas, the Soviets appear to be optimistic about NGL
production possibilities judging from the Novotroits-
koye experiment and the recent construction of a
natural gas liquids refinery plant at Dolina in the
western Ukraine. Output totals from these areas are
not expected to be large enough to significantly affect
national condensate production.
The Soviets also have high hopes for condensate
extraction increases from the large oilfields in the
middle Ob' region of West Siberia. They plan to
significantly raise the percentage of utilization of
byproduct petroleum (casing head) gas from about 75
percent in 1983 to over 85 percent by the end of 1985,
with a resulting rise in condensate production to over
190,000 b/d.
I
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
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Figure 5
Soviet Gas Condensate Industry
The United States Government he. anot nd ecognizv d
the incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, thusnis
into the Soviet Union. Other boundary representation
is not necessarily authoritative.
Black
Sea
~Vozey
?Usa
?
11 essoyakha
? Zap o1 arnyy
Urengoy ?Urengo
Zapadno-Soplyas
?Vuktyl
or.* Fedorovo
Salavat
brcnburg?.Orenburg
achagartak? ??Berdyanskoye
?Astrakhan' INagumanskoye
'Krasnodar
Caspian ?Tengiz
Sea
Bulla-
More
Aral
Sea
Mubarek.
?Sovetabad
,take
Baikal
Gas condensate fields
? Oil-associated field
e Natural- gas- associated field
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Lake
Balkash
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