SOVIET POLICY ON OUTER SPACE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000100180002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 11, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 29, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

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-- The collection and dissemination of remote
sensing data.
-- The definition of the lower limit of outer
space.
-- Flight paths and uses of space shuttle systems.
General Principles
Soviet policy on outer space is governed by concern for
the physical security of the USSR and the political security
of the Soviet regime. Since the launch of Sputnik in October
1957, space activities by the USSR, as well as by other countries,
have continued to increase for a number of peaceful and military
purposes, including mass communications, education, telecommuni-
cations, meteorology, geodesy, hydrography, cartography, navi-
gation, and collection of intelligence, including for arms control
verification purposes. Moscow views many of the space activities
conducted by other countries as threatening to its control over
its own resources, activities, and populace. The Soviets have
thus objected to and obstructed initiatives taken by other
states that Moscow perceives as threatening. The USSR has also
proposed international agreements that would prohibit or inhibit
the utilization of a variety of space techniques that they see
as having potentially hostile military, economic, or political
applications. At the same time, they have sought to protect
their own civil and military activities in space.
The Soviet concept of national sovereignty and the Soviet
definition of "peaceful purposes" are central to Moscow's position
in all these negotiations. "Violation of national sovereignty" is
a term used by Moscow to describe actions that it considers to be
threatening not only physically, but also economically, socially,
politically, or ideologically. The Soviet Union has consistently
used the term "for peaceful purposes" to mean "non-military" in
contrast to the usual US interpretation of the same phrase to mean
"non-aggressive" or "beneficial."
The ASAT Negotiations
The 1978-79 ASAT negotiations focused on the prohibition of
certain acts against satellites, and a suspension of testing anti-
satellite systems.* The Soviet positions on prohibited acts against
satellites are of greatest significance for issues negotiated in
other forums (the Soviet position on eliminating the testing ASAT
systems, also relevant to other forums, is discussed below, under
space transportation systems).
*For purposes of this paper the word "satellite" is used rather
than the treaty term "space object." F__1 25X1
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In the ASAT talks, the two sides have defined as prohibited
those acts that damage a satellite, destroy it, or displace it from
its orbit or trajectory. Moscow has agreed that the treaty's pro-
tection from possible ASAT techniques should apply to satellites
used exclusively by either the US or the USSR, and has proposed to
extend protection to satellites used jointly with a third country
only if such use is within the framework of international cooper-
ation on the exploration and uses of outer space "for peaceful
purposes."
The Soviets insist that any future treaty must not provide
protection from ASAT techniques for satellites engaged in "hostile"
or "illegal" actions against the other country. The Soviets
consider hostile or illegal those acts that violate national
air space or territory, damage the environment, or are violations
of state sovereignty. Moscow states that a hostile act exclusion
is needed because the Soviet Union is concerned with non-weapons-
elated activities carried out by states against each other by
eans of satellites. When asked for a specific example, the Soviets
cited television broadcasts from satellites without permission
of the state to which the broadcast is directed.
Information Control and Direct Broadcast Satellites
The Soviets are particularly concerned over direct broadcast
satellites (DBS), because they are capable of transmitting programs
to home television receivers directly from a foreign broadcasting
service. Mowcow clearly fears that DBS would be inimical to the
security of the Soviet regime and to those of their East European
allies.
The Soviet attitude toward information control is basic to
the Soviet position on DBS. The USSR sees the media as tools
over which the state must retain full sovereignty if it is to
retain control over and mobilize society. All information from
abroad must be censored, therefore, to exclude what is considered
slanderous toward the USSR. The Soviet Union insists on the right
to be the final judge of which broadcasts are "illegal" and constitute
interference in its internal affairs. Soviets have cited as
examples broadcasts that incite to war or advocate national, racial
or religious hatred or violence.
The Soviet Union has consistantly tried to establish constraining
guidelines for DBS since 1968, when it initiated a working group
at the UN Outer Space Committee to study the social, legal, cultural,
and other implications of DBS. It also took the lead in gathering
a group of experts within the UNESCO framework to assist in the
formulation of "proposals concerning the international arrangements
and conventions to promote the use of space communications for the
furtherance of UNESCO's aims."
Pressures for a freer international flow of information
increased in the early 1970's as a result of the negotiations leading
toward the 1975 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(CSCE). The Soviets first tried to deflect these pressures, but
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then realized that they would have to deal with the issues
raised if they were to achieve their broader political and
security objectives in CSCE. Although the Final Act of CSCE
includes provisions for a freer flow of information by means
of radio and television broadcasts, it also provides that any
commitments to this end cannot involve interference in the
internal affairs of any state and that the implementation of these
commitments is subject to the domestic laws of the states
concerned.
In two UN forums, Moscow initiated steps to water down
the impact of the CSCE provisions. At the annual UNESCO
Conference in 1972, the Soviets introduced a proposal (which
eventually became the 1978 Declaration on the Mass Media) that
was designed to gain international sanctions for their views
on the need for state control over press, radio, and television
broadcasts. At the same conference, UNESCO passed a declaration
--responding to the 1968 Soviet initiative--specifying that
"satellite broadcasting shall respect the sovereignty and equality
of all states," and including a provision for prior consent of the
receiving state. The same year, Foreign Minister Gromyko proposed
in a letter to the UN Secretary General that each country be
given the right to restrict satellite television broadcasts and
to take any measures necessary for that purpose within the country,
in outer space, or in "other places beyond the bounds of national
jurisdiction of any state." To date, the Outer Space Committee
has agreed on all aspects of a treaty regulating DBS except for
prior consent, program content, unlawful or inadmissible broad-
casts, and "spillover" (transmissions intended for domestic
reception in one country that are received in an adjacent country).
At the 1979 session of the Outer Space Legal Subcommittee, the
Soviets threatened to move the issue to the UN General Assembly,
which they believe is more likely to vote in favor of their
positions. They asserted that the subcommittee had failed to
reach agreement on one of the most urgent political issues
for all UN states.
In 1977, under the auspices of the UN's International Tele-
communications Union (ITU), which has responsibilities in the
technical area for satellite communications, the Broadcast
Satellite Administrative Conference assigned frequencies to
individual countries in the Eastern Hemisphere. These assignments
made direct television broadcasting illegal without the consent
of the receiving state on the grounds that the government of the
receiving state must make the necessary frequencies available.
Given both the growing availability of DBS Technology that will
occur in the 1980'.s and the deterioration of Soviet relations
with the West that will increase Moscow's fears of a return
to the broadcasting practices of the 1950's and the 1960's,
the Soviets undoubtedly will continue to press for international
conventions restricting direct satellite broadcasts. They
may also urge moving the issue to the UN General Assembly.
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Although the fundamental Soviet attitude regarding any
purposes.*
Remote Sensing Systems
The collection by another country of data about the USSR
by means of remote sensing devices in space and the dissemination
of such data to third parties greatly concerns the Soviets.
The root of this concern is that such data could have military
significance, particularly to the Chinese. This concern is
reflected in Soviet negotiating positions, even though the Soviets
themselves offer data derived from their own remote sensing
systems to Third World countries for resource development
o data gathered about the USSR remains protective, Moscow has
agreed that the United States can legitimately use "national
III~JJI,~ technical means" to gather data necessary to verify the USSR's
compliance with the bilateral SALT agreements. The Soviets add,
violate their national sovereignty.
however, tnat tney regara the garnering OL 1nte111yCii LuL
military purposes beyond what is required for SALT verification
as an infringement of the USSR's national sovereignty. The
Soviet Union has not, however, defined what it believes are the
limits to the legitimate collection of data by national technical
means of verification. At the ASAT talks, the Soviets have
reserved the right to use ASAT techniques against satellites that
In the UN Outer Space Committee the Soviets maintain that
the USSR has sovereignty over resource data about the Soviet
Union and that such data cannot be transferred to a third country
without Soviet permission. In the ASAT talks they have maintained
that only those joint US-third country satellites that are used
solely for "peaceful purposes" should be protected from ASAT
techniques. They have argued that photographic data of better
than 50-meter resolution has military and economic value. They
continue to maintain that there are no demonstrable, legitimate
"peaceful uses" for data of better resolution than 50 meters, and
that it should not be disseminated to a third country without the
consent of the target state.
recently offered a LANDSAT receiving station.
*The US allows other countries to receive data directly from the
At the 1979 meeting of the Legal Subcommittee, the Soviets
proposed a new definition of remote sensing that spelled out
their view of the military value of data gained by these means.
The Soviet definition included the collection of data not only
about the earth's natural resources and environment but also
about manmade objects and formations. When queried, the Soviets
indicated that the definition was intended to include objects and
formations of significance to defense. The Soviets undoubtedly
are concerned over the projected 1981 launch of a US civilian
earth resource satellite (LANDSAT) with improved remote sensing
capabilities, and the planned release of its better quality data
to third countries, including China, to which Washington has
remote sensor, the USSR does not.
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Defining the Lower Limit of Outer Space
The Soviet Union has maintained at the ASAT talks that
deliberate intrusions into its air space by satellites exemplify
the type of activity that should be exempted from protection from
ASAT techniques. Neith6r the lower limit of outer space (where
the 1967 Outer Space Treaty applies) nor the upper limit of air
space (where a nation has sovereignty) have been defined, however,
although the need to define or delimit outer space is a problem
that has been on agendas of the UN Outer Space subcommittees
since their inception. This question, of course, relates directly
to the military and defense activities of individual nations. It
also has a direct bearing on the claims made by equatorial
countries to sovereignty over segments of the geostationary orbit
that lie approximately 36,000 kilometers above their territory.
Moscow proposed at the 1979 meeting of the Legal Subcommittee
to define outer space as beginning 100 to 110 kilometers above
sea level, while leaving undefined the upper limit of air space.
Thus the Soviets are preserving a basis for a claim that
satellites in orbits below the 100-110 kilometer line violate
Soviet national air space.
Even if the upper limit of national air space is not defined,
international agreement on the lower limit of outer space has
significance for military activities regulated by several existing
treaties. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty forbids the sending of
nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction into outer space
or into orbit. It does not ban conventional weapons, inter-
continental missiles, or weapons that complete less than one
orbital revolution. Also involved is the provision of the
ABM Treaty stating that each party undertakes not to develop,
test, or deploy ABM systems or components that are space
based.
Moscow has given no reason for its choice of a 100 to 110
kilometers as the lower limit of outer space and has been unable
to point out what advantages this definition bestows on space
nations or what problems would be resolved by its use. Although
the Soviet definition provides for the right of free passage
below 100 to 110 kilometers for satellites being launched into
orbit and for those returning to the launching state, the Soviets
indicated at the June 1979 meeting of the Outer Space Committee
that it is time to have the Legal Subcommittee consider the
necessity for "developing rules for flights of shuttle systems on
their first orbit after take-offs because such systems pass over
other states during first orbit." In addition, the Soviet defi-
nition would establish an arbitrary boundary that takes into
account neither future developments in spacecraft nor the ever lower
perigees at which salellites function.
The Soviet Union sees its proposed definition of outer space
as a way to undercut the claims of equatorial countries to the
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portions of the geostationary orbit over their territory and
Third World demands for reserving parts of the orbit for their
use when they have achieved the necessary technical ability.
(The 1967 Outer Space Treaty declares outer space to be the
province of all mankind and not subject to claims of sovereignty.)
These demands provide the Soviets with incentive to press for
adoption of their definition of the lower limit of outer space
prior to the proposed 1984 and 1986 ITU-sponsored conferences on
planning space services (which were recommended by the 1979 World
Administrative Radio Conference).
Space Transportation Systems
The Soviets will probably introduce and pursue in the UN
committees this year measures to control space transportation
systems. They are concerned over the capabilities of the US
shuttle system to maneuver close to Soviet satellites in order to
alter their position or remove them from orbit. Acute Soviet
')) interest in the antisatellite capabilities of the US shuttle
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discussions on provisions for a test ban of antisatellite systems.
pointed out that it meant to include in the proposed ban tests in
The Soviets: assertedi.that_.!kince:.both sides were agreed that anti-
satellite activity includes destroying, damaging, or displacing a
satellite from its orbit or trajectory, they would not agree to
suspend testing of the Soviet orbital interceptor unless the
development of all other means of damaging, destroying, or changing
the trajectory or orbit of a satellite is also halted. Moscow
space of reusable space craft.*
At the June 1979 meeting of the Outer Space Committee the
Soviets indicated that it is time to have the Legal Subcommittee
consider "forbidding the use of shuttle systems to remove objects
of other states from outer space without the state's consent,"
and "the necessity to develop rules for flights of shuttle systems
on take-off because such systems pass over other states during
had serious doubts about eliminating systems built specifically
as an antisatellite weapon without also banning those systems with
*During discussions on the test ban the Soviets asserted that they
potential possibilities for use as an antisatellite weapon.
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Distribution: "Soviet Policy on Outer Space"
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