WEST GERMANY: AFGHAN CRISIS PUTS SCHMIDT ON THE DEFENSIVE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000100330002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 9, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 7, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGEP~CY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
7 February 19?30
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CUNFIDENTI/1l_
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A Key Debate
The Bundestag debate last month occasioned by the Soviet invasion of
Afyllartistan provided an early look at how both sides are likely to treat
foreign policy in the campaign. The opposition sought in the debate to
challenge the government's lack of solidarity with the US. Schmidt's careful
presentation, however, a~hich declared solidarity with the l1S b;tt featured
a strong defense of the Ostoolitik, deprived the conservatives of a
.,, --- .
Strauss' performance was the most noteworthy aspect of the debate.
Contrary to his reputation for controversy, Strauss surprised everyone
by adopting a nonpartisan stance and avoiding the tough polemics government
politicians expect of him. Leaving that to Christian Democratic Union
chairrttan Kohl, Strauss disarmed the government by proposing that it
consult with the opposition on matters of "national responsibility"
arising from the Soviet military thrust. Phrased this way, Strauss'
ff
o
er was one the government could not refuse.
Fundamental differences about what constitutes a "realistic" Ostpolitik
will not be reduced by these consultations. The talks, however, are likely
to remove from the public arena at least one substantive issue raised by the
Afghan crisis: whether the purview of NATO should be extended to the petroleum
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NATO's Purview
Before the Bundestag debate, the opposition had urged publicly that the
"geographical limits" of NATO be removed so that a strategic concept adequate
to the new situation could be developed. Schmidt's Bundestag statement warned
against "thoughtless speeches aboutygeographical extension of the NATO commit-
ment," saying it would not help the Third lJorld but would create mistrust and
harm the alliance. This view was not endorsed by Foreign Minister Genscher,
however, who suggested that nonaligned states "even beyond Europe" consider
NATO an element of tllei r security. Although Gertscller stopped short of accet7ti ng
osition su
the o
esti
h
l
gg
pp
on,
e c
early found it worthy of examination.
The opposition speakers answered Schmidt's remarks about NATO by softly
reaffirming their concept. CUU leader Kohl said the alliance irtust be viewed as
having "worldwide significance," and Strauss observed that it might be
appropriate to ask whether the definition of strategy adopted in 1949
CONFIDENTIAL
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Save The_Ust old itik
Schmidt's main presentation 'in the debate amounted to a skilful, tactical
defense of government policy. In a carefully phrased declaration of solidarity
with the US, he said Bonn would cooperate on sanctions against the Soviet Union
approved by the European Community or COCOM. This was balanced by pleas for
renewed efforts tc improve "life together" for people in the "Gerrnan states"
and for continuation of arms control negotiations with the Soviets.
The opposition did not dispute Schmidt's points directly, nor question
the legitimacy of the Ostpolitik treaties that Strauss called "poor but
valid." Instead, Strauss and Kohl focused on tine assessment of Soviet purpose
perceived to underlie Ostpolitik, implying the government has misjudged the
degree to which Moscow can be trusted. In this way, the opposition so~a_c_d-rt ~o
appeal to resurgent German apprehensions about Soviet aggressiveness.
Stung by the implication it fails to grasp Soviet motives, the government
tried to justify its policy of the past decade. Schmidt listed travel improve-
ments between East and West Germany, asking, "Is this to be considered nothing?"
Former Chancellor tti'illy Brandt said the reproach that "~-~e fostered illusory hopes"
is unfounded. Genscher insisted the yovernr~ent's approach to detente has been
~'r"eaI1St1C."
Solidar_ity_ Wi_th_The_US
The opposition is seeking to make West German solidarity with the US
an i s~~ue, i n part because i t senses pressur;: on Schmidt from pro-Ost:pol i ti k
politicians and influential publicists who portray the US as incalculable
and threatening to detente. This pressure a~as reflected in Schmidt's Bundestag
speech, which endorsed the principle of solidarity with the US while stressing the
need for coordination with European partners.
Kohl delivered the main opposition answer. He wondered how Germans would
react if the US were to regard Soviet challenges to Berlin as "regional, involving
primarily Germans." He declared opposition support for US measures ayainst the
USSR, urged they be long-term in nature, and asserted West Germany must not fill
gaps resulting from American economic measures against Ploscow. Schmidt's stress
un Curopean solidarity led Kohl to accuse hire of having a "provincial" view
of the Afghan crisis. Kohl ridiculed a public announcement by Schmidt that
the Spanish Government shared his view of the Soviet military action and added,
with reference to S;;frmidt's practice of coordinating with French President Giscard:
Everybody knows that the superpowers confront each other in the middle of Germany,
whose partition differentiates us from states such as France, whose stance is
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l~Jhile Strauss' own statement implied a need for solidarity ~?~ith the US,
he also saw US inaction as a factor in the enhanced JOVIet strategic position.
In addition, Strauss reinforced an uns{Token government complaint by remarking
that US counterstrategy to the Soviet Union is short-winded, hectic, and
developed from one presidential election to the start of t:he next presidential
campaign.
The dispute about NATO's purview r^~as thc~ mo at. substantial point of
disagreement in the debate. I^Jhile this issue will presumably cease to
be a topic for public debate as a result of the consultations proposed
by Strauss, the issue is nonetheless important. It reflects the opposition's
desire, shared by the Schmidt government, to find a comprehensive, long-range
response to the Soviet action to southwest Asia. Qoth sides assume blest
Germans want reassurance that their security will not continue to depend on
improvised responses to unexpected Soviet moves. It is generally accepted in
West Germany that tine US responds that way, and the pro-Ostoolitik press is
playing provocatively on the theme of US inconstancy.
Influential ,journals like Oer_S1~ieyel claim that Bonn's mission of
rapprochement with Germans of the east is endangered by hasty cooperation with
the incalculable US--a view that complements current Soviet pressure on European
countries to defy Washington's "anti-detente" actions. The Schmidt government's
equity in Ostpolitik is such ttrat it cannot ignore these pressures. In the
present i~olitical climate, however, Lonn dares not accede to them. Schrrnidt's
interest is served by doing along quietly with US responses to the Afghan crisis
while avoidin the appearance of encouraging anti-Soviet sentiment in IJestern
Europe.
The popular reaction against Soviet aggression gives the opposition's
long-standing criticism of Ostpolitik greater resonance in West German politics.
At the same time, Strauss must not seem to exacerbate strains in East-6Jest
relations or to take heart from a deterioration of ties with East Germany. Yet
the opposition advantage that put the goverrunent: on t:he defensive in the [3undestag
debate depends, to a degree, on distant events th,.t b_ave-a