(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000100520002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 30, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: February 29, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/30: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100520002-4
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
29 February 1980
MEMORANDUM
Uganda: Internal Situation
Factional disputes within the Ugandan leadership
probably will continue to undermine President Binaisa's
fragile government despite the apparent resolution of a
"crisis" triggered by Binaisa's recent attempt to oust
Interior Minister Muwanga, one of his principal opponents.
The factionalism will come more into the open and
intensify if Tanzanian President Nyerere makes good on
his threat to withdraw his 20,000 troops, the only
effective security force in Uganda.
Binaisa, who has been concerned about the freewheeling
political activities of his Interior Minister, announced the
dismissal of Muwanga from his sensitive position in early
February. Binaisa subsequently accepted a decision by the
powerful National Consultative Council--Uganda's quasi-
legislature--to appoint Muwanga as Labor Minister. The
Council, which jealously protects the authority it has
gradually acquired, appeared to be irked by Binaisa's
failure to seek its approval for his move. Although Muwanga
may not be able to cause as much trouble in the less sensitive
Labor Ministry, he and others with strong factional support
remain a threat to the politically weak Binaisa.
The author of this paper is I (Africa
Division, Office of Political Analysis. It was coordinated
with the Directorate of Operations, the Office of Strategic
Research and the National Intelligence Officer for Africa.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be addressed to
Chief, Africa Division, Office of Political Analysi
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Following the announcement of Muwanga's dismissal, some
Council members tried to engineer a vote of no confidence in
the government over Binaisa's failure to consult the Council
and his alleged involvement in corruption. Although the
move failed when a majority in the Council apparently
concluded that voting Binaisa out of office would only lead
to increased instability, Binaisa still has little personal
support in the Council.
Several groups are continuing to maneuver against the
regime and are trying to position themselves for national
elections scheduled to be held next year. Some Council
members hope to bring an early end to instability by moving
up the election date to late 1980, but this probably would
cause even more frenzied political maneuvering.
Factions within the Ugandan leadership are based on
ethnic and personal rivalries and ideological differences. A
few leaders have recruited their tribal brethren into
personal militias, although the recruits ostensibly are part
of Uganda's fledgling army that is being formed to replace
Idi Amin's disbanded army. Old-line political parties
dating from before the Amin regime--including one that
supports Tanzanian-based former President Obote--are trying
to reestablish themselves through the Council. Although
Binaisa supports generally moderate pro-West policies, some
influential leftists favor closer ties with the USSR.
Nyerere also is concerned about the continuing instabi-
lity in Kampala. He wants to withdraw his troops as soon as
possible because Uganda has become a heavy economic and
political burden. After Binaisa's move against Muwanga,
Nyerere warned the Ugandans that all of Tanzania's troops
might be withdrawn soon if the factional disputes continued.
Nyerere apparently hoped his warning--which quickly
became public knowledge--would influence the Ugandans to
play down their differences, but Binaisa's domestic opponents
may be encouraged to take further action if they feel his
government has lost Tanzanian support. Binaisa himself now
fears that Nyerere would like to see Obote, who shares the
Tanzanaian leader's socialist views, back in power in Kampala,
and the Ugandan President has asked the US for support.
Violent incidents between undisciplined Tanzanian soldiers
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and Ugandans have increased the desire of Binaisa and most
Ugandans to see the Tanzanians depart as soon as possible.
Ugandan security forces will not be fully trained for some
time, however. Binaisa's suggestion that the Tanzanians be
replaced by a Commonwealth force has generated little
Because Binaisa and Nyerere realize they still need
each other, they probably will patch up their differences.
Having overthrown Amin and remained in Uganda this long,
Nyerere probably would not want to be responsible for a
return to chaos--the likely result of a precipitate with-
drawal of his troops. Nyerere, however, is clearly upset
with the way things have evolved in Uganda, and might stand
aside if a more ideologically corn:>atible Ugandan leader
staged a coup against Binais../
The ousted Amin is still in Libya and periodically
makes statements about returning to power, but he has no
significant support in Uganda. Remnants of his defeated
army, however, are in southern Sudan, and have clashed with
Tanzanian and Ugandan troops along the border from time to
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SUBJECT: UGANDA: INTERNAL SITUATION
Distribution:
NFAC/OPA/AF1
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DCI
NFAC
NIO/AF
D/OPA
OPA/AF
OPA/Production
P&PG
(29Feb80)
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