(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000100550001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 28, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 6, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/28: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100550001-2
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
6 March 1980
Iraq's Pan-Arab Charter
The Pan-Arab chater proposed last month by Iraqi Presi-
dent Saddam Husayn is aimed at heading off increased super-
power involvement--especially military--in the Middle East
and at strengthening Arab nonalignment. The Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan. was the catalyst for Saddam's plan, but the
charter is also meant to oppose US attempts to increase
its military presence in the region. Although the charter
aims at both superpowers, Iraq's ideological leanings raise
the suspicion that it will be applied unevenly, focusing more
on US attempts to arrange a more substantial military
presence in the region than on the USSR's and Cuba's existing
1 -1
We caution, however, against prematurely reaching that
conclusion. Iraq's intensive pursuit of a nonaligned
image during the past year, its attempts to replace Egypt
as leader of the Arab world, and the credibility of its
Pan-Arab charter require Iraq genuinely to oppose Soviet
strong military role in South Yemen.
military intervention in the region and to criticize the
.
South Yemeni government for facilitating that presence
This memorandum was prepared byl Ithe
Near East South Asia Division, Office of Political Analysis,
and coordinated with the National Intelligence Officer for
Near East South Asia. Questions and comments may be addressed
to Chief, Near East South Asia Division
PA M 80-10111
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It would probably be a mistake to dismiss the Arab
charter as empty rhetoric devoid of long-term significance.
There is a good chance that Iraq will be able to mold a
formal Arab concensus on foreign military presence in much
the same way it helped shape the Arab concensus on the
Egyptian-Israeli treaty. The fears and uncertainties
generated by events in Iran and Afghanistan have so far
pushed most area governments to seek protection in Arab
concensus, rather than to seek external alliances. Iraq
intends to parlay that trend into support for its charter.
The charter, if adopted, would not by itself end current
military relationships with outsiders. But it would inhibit
such relationships and limit the maneuvering room of states
such as Oman. Because the US has determined that it is
in US national interest to enhance its military capability
and presence in the region, there is little to gain by
promoting broad Arab acceptance of the charter.- The only
apparent US advantage would be a propaganda edge over the
USSR to the extent that the US military presence was "over
the horizon", while that of the USSR was in country and
highly visible. The US could encourage friendly Arab govern-
ments to try to ensure that the rhetoric is not totally
focused on the US, and to underscore that it was the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan and its actions in South Yeme
and Ethiopia that stimulated the current competition.
The Charter and Arab Reaction
Saddam's plan resembles the Arab League pact in many
ways, but also breaks new ground. The key provision would
prohibit all foreign military facilities on Arab land and
calls for the political and economic isolation of any Arab
state that violates this provision. Arab states are also
asked to make a total commitment to nonalignment and the
stronger Arab states are to aid less well-off Arab countries
to help them resist foreign domination. The charter would
make more specific existing inter-Arab commitments on mutual
defense against foreign aggression and calls for a good
neighbor policy toward non-Arab regional states that respect
Arab sovereignty. The latter point was probably meant to
signal Iran that Baghdad wants to normalize relations.
Israel is specifically excluded from this good neighbor
policy.
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Baghdad hopes its proposal will counter the increasing
threat of Soviet and American interference in the Mideast,
especially in the Persian Gulf where Iraq wants to replace
Iran as the dominant power. Approval of the charter would
also strengthen Iraq's Arab and nonaligned leadership creden-
tials. Iraq has worked hard to pick up Egypt's Arab leader-
ship role in the wake of the Camp David Accords and to strike
a more genuine nonaligned posture as Baghdad prepares to
succeed Cuba in 1982 as leader of the Nonaligned Movement.
Initial Arab reaction to Saddam's proposal has been
favorable. The Iraqis have pushed for a summit meeting to
discuss the charter and so far thirteen Arab states plus the
PLO have agreed to attend. Saudi leaders are not enthusiastic
but have agreed to attend a summit. Of the seven Arab
governments that have remained silent, five have existing
or pending military arrangements with non-Arab states.
South Yemen and Syria have strong ties with the USSR,
Djibouti permits a large French military presende on its
territory, and Oman and Somalia are presently engaged in
military access talks with the US.
The absence of a Syrian endorsement of the Pan-Arab
charter reduces its usefulness for Iraq. Baghdad is
apprehensive about the growing Soviet role in Syria and
probably sees the charter as a tool to limit Soviet advances.
Iraq's concern may lead Baghdad to reopen direct high level
communications with Damascus. In 1978 Iraq submerged its
differences with Syria in order to achieve an Arab concensus
against the Camp David Accords. Now, an Iraqi source of the
US Interests Section in Baghdad reports that following
recent private signals of Syrian approval of the charter,
the Iraqis sent an envoy to Damascus to get further clarifi-
cation of the Syria position.
The Iraqis do not want a summit meeting on the Pan-Arab
charter to end in failure. They are probably prepared to
accept changes in order to achieve a unified Arab position
limiting foreign involvement in Arab affairs.
Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and
Tunisia will probably press for a less inclusive definition
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of foreign military facilities so as to permit them some
leeway in providing for their own defense. The Iraqis would
probably insist on including a minimum level of economic and
political sanctions against states in violation of the charter.
Even an abridged definition of foreign facilities would
have some restraining effect on host countries inclined to
grant access to foreign military forces. A charter limit
would also give Arab countries a convenient excuse to fend
off foreign pressure for military privileges.
Once approved, the charter would obviously be another
tool that Arab radicals could use against Oman's Sultan
Qabus if Qabus agrees to a more substantial US military
presence in his country. Iraq has already begun to criticize
Qabus for his receptivity to US overtures. Baghdad has so
far remained silent on possible US-Somalia military ties,
but President Siad is to visit Iraq, possibly this week, and
Iraq might press him hard on this issue.
Iraqi moves to isolate Oman under the rationale of
upholding the charter would probably be accompanied by
similar moves against South Yemen. Iraq's concern over
Soviet influence in South Yemen is genuine, but more
importantly, failure to act against Aden would harm Iraq's
status with moderate Arabs whose willingness to accept
Baghdad's legitimacy depends largely on Iraq distancing
itself from the USSR. It was no accident that the Pan-Arab
charter was unveiled at the end of a Saddam Husayn speech
in which he bitterly attacked the Iraqi Communists as tools
for foreign subversion.
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Distribution:
Orig & 1 - DCI (for Brzezinski)
1 - DDCI
1 - Executive Registry
1 - D/NFAC
1 - DD/NFAC
1 - NFAC/Registry
1 - PresBrfngCoord
1 - Senior Review Panel
1 - Executive Secretary/NFAC/PB
1 - NIO/NESA
3 - P&PG
1 - D/OPA
2 - OPA/PS
1 - OPA/NESA
1 - OPA/NESA/API
1 - Author
NFAC/OPA/NESA/API (6Mar80)
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