(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000100720001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: June 29, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1980
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100720001-3
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100720001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100720001-3
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
January-February 1980
The domestic and international repercussions of the invasion of
Afghanistan have clearly preoccupied the Soviet leadership during the past
two months. The decision to invade appears to have been ill-received by
a surprisingly broad sprectrum of lower-level bureaucrats.
even some decisionmakers may be
having second thoughts on its wisdom and on appropriate next steps. Almost
all top leaders, however, have gone on record in support of the decision,
which reduces the possibility that it will provide the catalyst for a
challenge within the leadership or that it will figure importantly in
the succession to Brezhnev.
Grumbling in the Ranks
The invasion and subsequent Western reprisals produced both turmoil
and private expressions of dismay throughout the Soviet bureaucracy.
The US embargo on grain and advanced technology exports reportedly
disrupted preparation of the 1981-85 plan, causing consternation among
administrators in both the foreign trade and scientific establishments
In talks with a former US official, Foreign Trade Minister Nikolay
Patolichev confided that he and others considered the invasion a mistake,
adding that he had no enthusiasm for undoing the 11 years of work he had
invested in Soviet-US trade. Dzhermen Gvishiani, Premier Kosygin's son-
in-law and a deputy chairman of the State Committee for Science and
Technology (GKNT), was even more dismaye
is review is based on analysis and research work completed by
CIA's National Foreign Assessment Center through 11 March 1980. The
contributions have been reviewed by appropriate individuals within
NFAC but have not been formally coordinated. Comments are welcome and
may be addressed to Chief, Internal Branch, USSR-EE Division, Office of
Political Analysis, Room !6G22, CIA Headquarters
Copy of 4 7
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100720001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100720001-3
that the invasion simply "never should have happened." The resignation
of GKNT head and Deputy Premier Vladimir Kirillin, who reputedly was
personally close to Kosy 'in, probably was related to la policy disagree-
ment, but the connection to Afghanistan is unclear.
Credibility Problems
In their talks with Western officials, few Soviet officials made
any effort to justify the invasion,'and most seemed unconvinced by the
public explanations., Even Soviet propagandists were privately dehunkiny,
official accounts.
This apparent recognition of the weakness of their case probably
helped convince the Kremlin authorities of the necessity of silencing
dissident Andrey Sakharov, who was beginning publicly to question the
invasion. Sakharov's exile to Gorkiy in late January effectively isolated 25X1
the dissident movement's most effective and prestigious spokesman. It
remains uncertain whether, Jewish emigration was also affected, as the 25X1
rates had been in decline since last October. We tend to discount as
self-serving the warning pf a Soviet foreign trade official~-
I that emigration would soon "stop completely"
because "we also have our Senator Jacksons." 25X1
Misjudging the Reaction
In addition to their domestic credibility problems, the leadership
was faced with what apparently was an unexpectedly strong international
response to their action. Advisers from the Institute of the USA and
Canada were said to have predicted most of the US reprisal measures but
to have had their views rejected as "alarmist." Foreign Ministry
officials reportedly underestimated the reaction from Third World 25X1
countries and also dismissed the prospects of an Olympic boycott,
reasoning that Soviet troops could be withdrawn by May--an estimate
Private Misgivings, Public Support
By the end of January, the sharp international response, coupled
with the resistance Soviet troops were encountering in Afghanistan,
seemed to be causing some decision makers to have second thoughts about
Afghanistan.
25X1
25X1
25X1
la majority in the Central Committee had come
to recognize that the decision had been a mistake.~Ari officia-l o tie
Central Committee's International Information Department later reinforced
that impression, telling americans that the Soviet invasion had been
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100720001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100720001-3
based on "misinformation" and that Moscow wanted to extricate itself
from the situation as quickly as possible.
Misgivings at the Politburo level, if they reached that high, were
difficult to discern in the Supreme Soviet "election" speeches delivered
in February, when almost every member went on record as supporting the
action. (The most notable exceptions were Premier Kosygin, who made
only an oblique reference to Afghanistan, and Chernenko, who failed to
mention the subject.)
Despite dissension in the bureaucracy and possible misgivings among
the policymakers, the fact that virtually the entire Soviet leadership
has been tarred with the,same brush reduces the chance that the Afghan
issue will provide the catalyst for a future succession challenge.
a more likely impetus for such a challenge
neither Brezhnev, Kosygin,
nor us ov can work more than a few hours a day for any sustained nprinti-
Although their ailments do not appear to have prevented them from keeping
the ship of state afloat in this crisis period, the increasing likelihood
of the imminent, total incapacitation of one or more of this quartet
makes highly uncertain the leadership's ability to give close attention
to the pressing long-term economic and nilitnry is,-,upc; N-Inw
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100720001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100720001-3
Economic Affairs
Soviet leaders have not made progress in reviving their ailing
economy. Deteriorating economic performance over the past few years has
driven home to the leadership the fact that rising resource costs, impending
energy and labor shortages, and sluggish productivity cannot be overcome
easily or soon, and the events of the last two months have seriously
dampened any chance of a !major economic improvement in the next year or
25X1
The Effects of Afghanistan
25X1
The invasion of Afghanistan will increase logistical strains on an
25X1
already overburdened transportation sector and, if prolonged and accompany
by worsening East-West relations, will increase pressure for a further
rise in military spending.
US restrictions on the flow of machinery and technology to the USSR
will at a minimum disrupt Moscow's plans for upgrading its industrial
plant and, if supported by other Western countries for several years,
could severely impair Soviet economic progress, particularly in oil and
gas production and metallurgy. Although thus far there has been some
willingness on the part of our Western allies to support the US call
for tighter COCOM guidelines on the export of high-technology
and equipment, official country positions remain undefined.
machinery
Limits on Western credits would also retard Soviet growth by inter-
fering with plans to modernize the Soviet economy across the board with
the help of Western equipment and technology. Although no individual
ally has supported US requests for a cutoff of new credits, several key
countries slowed the pace of negotiations. The willingness of our
allies,to continue to hold back on new credits appears to be eroding,
however, now that France has agreed in principle to a new 5-year credit
pact and Germany has probably provided government-backed financing for
the sale of pipe.
25X1
25X1
Short of an outstanding harvest in 1980, the denial of 17 million
tons of US grain--even if nearly half offset by imports from other 25X1 25X1
countries--will result in at least a 2-3 percent decline in meat pro-
duction this year as well as damage to livestock herds that will have to
be recouped in future years.
Consumers Hardest Hit
As usual, the brunt of Soviet economic problems will hit the con-
sumer hardest. Improvements in living standards, which have been eroding,
will be even harder to achieve this year. The slowdown in growth of
industrial output is impinging on the supply of many household goods as
well as holding down construction of new housing. The output of consumer
nondurables in January 180 remained nearly 4 percent below the level
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100720001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100720001-3
produced in January 1978., Perhaps most irritating to Soviet consumers
is the regime's inability to meet the demand for quality foods. Per
capita meat production--4 key indicator of consumer welfare--declined by
nearly 1 percent in 1979? and a further drop this year will mean even
more belt tightening by consumers in the months ahead.
Energy Problems Continue to Mount
The regime's perceptions of its energy situation have become more
pessimistic in recent months, and Soviet leaders and bureaucrats alike
have become more candid in discussing their energy problems.
----Vladimir Dolgikh, the Central Committee secretary responsible
for supervising heavy industry, acknowledged in a recent
article that plans for oil production in the key West
Siberian region are unrealistic without major improvements
in technology and productivity. He admitted that with
existing technology and at current tempos, production
plans could only be achieved by increasing the number of
drillers by hundreds of thousands.
----Aleksandr Kryloly, a member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences
and a leading petroleum expert, noted in another recent
article that ifspresent Soviet exploitation methods are not
changed, production of oil will soon peak and then start to
fall.
Recent analysis indicates, in fact, that Soviet oil production is
likely to peak this year at less than 12 million barrels per day and
then begin to decline. Growth in Soviet oil output last year dropped to
half the 1978 rate. The increase of 280,000 barrels per day was the
smallest absolute gain since 1956. Production figures for January 1980
put oil output at the same level as last October (11.9 million barrels
per day). Coal production fell by S million tons in 1979, and the
energy content of coal output is falling even faster as the decline in
production of good quality coal is not being offset by increased output
of lignite. Gas output--!the one bright spot in the energy picture--
increased by more than 9 percent last year.
As energy stringencies worsen--especially oil--Moscow will almost
certainly be looking for opportunities to improve ties with the oil-rich
states in the Middle East. Soviet leaders will want to encourage the
emergence of regimes, particularly with a leftist, pro-Soviet orientation,
with which they can barter arms and development aid for oil. If the oil
gained by barter is insufficient for Soviet needs, Moscow might be
attracted toward an even more aggressive policy aimed at ac u
foreign oil--albeit in the face of powerful constraints.
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100720001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100720001-3
Military Issues
There is considerable evidence that Soviet military planners, along
with the policymakers they persuaded of the efficacy of armed intervention,
have been surprised and Embarrassed--but not deterred--by their miscalculation
in Afghanistan.
The Origins of the Decision
Brezhnev and 25X1
his Politburo colleagues, based their decision to invade on an assessment
from the military high command.
While these accounts
tend to whitewash the le dership's role in the affair, they gain credibility
from public statements by military officers since the invasion which
stress the threat that developments in Afghanistan supposedly had posed
Despite the gradual downhill slide of the Taraki regime during
1979, the Soviet General 'Staff's pessimistic assessment probably did not
crystallize until late October, when Army General Pavlovskiy returned
from his two-month fact-finding mission in Afghanistan.
By early
December, in any case, the first elements of what was to become the
"Soviet expeditionary force" had moved into Afghanistan.
The High Command's Miscalculation
We do not know precisely when and how the military planners think
the Afghan operation should be brought to its conclusion.
e initia course o
the intervention suggestsIt at t e General Staff assigned a major role
to the Afghan army in countering the insurgency, with day-to-day adminis-
tration and control left to Kabul authorities. Soviet troops were
mainly positioned to defend principal cities and lines of communication
against insurgent attacks'.
The limited nature of the Soviet military role in Afghanistan
implicit in these initial moves suggests that the high command did not
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100720001-3
 25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100720001-3
anticipate the difficult situation in which it later found itself, and
thus seriously miscalculated. The miscalculation caused consternation
in several quarters.
The Reaction: "Be Ruuthless" But Assuage Public Opinion
In approving the military's preferred course of action, the Politburo
placed a heavy responsibility and considerable pressure on Ustinov and
his subordinates for a favorable outcome. The direct involvement of
senior officers in the Afghan operation is testimony to their commitment
At the same time, the Soviet leadership has sought to conceal from
the public the problems encountered by the military in Afghanistan and
has begun an all-out propaganda campaign to portray a peaceful "revolutionary"
situation developing in the country. Party Secretary Ponomarev, in
delivering his "election speech in early February, began this effort
with the blatantly false claim that there had been "no clashes" between
Soviet troops and the Afghan authorities and populace, who were said to
have a "friendly attitudes' toward the troops.
25X1
25X1
25X1 25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100720001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100720001-3
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100720001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100720001-3
NFAC/OPA/USSR-EE/II (12Mar80)
Copy # 1 - DCI
2 - DDCI
3 - Executive Registry
4 - D/NFAC
5 - DD/NFAC
6 - NFAC/Registry
7 - Executive Secretary, NFAC Production Board
8 - Senior Review Panel
9 - NFAC/Foreign Liaison Staff
10 - Chairman/National Intelligence Council
11 - NIO/USSR-~EE
12 - NIO/Political-Economics
13 - Arms Control Intelligence Staff
14 - DDO/SE
15 - DDO/SE
16 - OER/U/SE!
17 - OSI/LSD
18 - D/OSR
19 - PPG
20 - PPG
21 - PPG
22 - D/OPA
23 - DD/OPA
24 - OPA/Production Staff
25 - OPA/Prodiction Staff
26 - OPA/USSR-EE
27 - OPA/USSR-!EE/SRI
28 - OPA/USSR-'IEE/SRM
29 - OPA/USSR-,EE/SRE
30 - OPA/USSR-EE/EE
31 - A. Denis Clift
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs
Office of'the Vice President
Room 298
Old Executive Office Building
32 - Les Denend
National Security Council Staff
The White House
33 - Marshall Shulman
Special Adviser to the Secretary of State
Room 7246,
Department of State
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100720001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100720001-3
34 - William Shinn
Director,i Office of Soviet Union Affairs
Room 4217
Department of State
35 - Reginald 'Bartholomew
Director,' Politico-Military Affairs
Room 7317'
Department of State
36 - Anthony Lake
Director' Policy Planning Staff
Room 7311
Department of State
37 - Dr. Roger Molander
National',Security Council Staff
Room 373'
Old Executive Office Building
38 - Fritz Ermarth
Director,, Strategic Planning
National, Security Council Staff
Room 365
Old Executive Office Building
39 - Marshall Brement
USSR/Eurdpe
National, Security Council Staff
Room 368
Old Executive Office Building
40 - Steven Larabee
USSR/Eurdpe
National' Security Council Staff
Room 368
Old Executive Office Building
41 - Gen. Jasper Welch
Director, Office of Policy Analysis
NationallSecurity Council Staff
Room 375,
Old Executive Office Building
42 - Colonel William Odom
MilitaryAssistant to Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
National; Security Council Staff
International Situation Room
The White House
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100720001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100720001-3
43 - David Aaron
Deputy Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House
44 - Ambassador Henry Owen
Economic Affairs
National' Security Council Staff
Room 351
Old Executive Office Building
45 - Walter Slocombe
Principa Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense (ISA)
Room 4E813
Department of Defense
Pentagon'
46 - The Honorable George S. West
Assistant Secretary of State, European Affairs
Room 6220
Department of State
47 - Robert Barry
Deputy Assistant for European Affairs
Room 6219
Department of State
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/29: CIA-RDP85T00287R000100720001-3