LIKELY CONSEQUENCES IN EASTERN EUROPE OF THE POLISH EVENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000101980001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 5, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
5 September 1980
MEMORANDUM
LIKELY CONSEQUENCES IN EASTERN EUROPE OF THE POLISH EVENTS
SUMMARY
Over the short to medium term.(several months to
a year) the Polish regime's granting of political
concessions to striking workers will have a greater
effect on the regimes than on the populaces elsewhere
in Eastern Europe. The regimes will seek to head
off any developments similar to those that took place
in Poland by using persuasion, assuagement, and--if
necessary--intimidation. If Moscow does not force
wholesale retraction of the concessions the regime
in Warsaw has granted, workers elsewhere in Eastern
Europe eventually might raise demands similar to those
the Poles have. If the Soviets intervene to prevent
the implementation of the concessions, other East
Europeans are unlikely to take the risk of emulating
the Polish workers.
Impact on the Regimes
It is already quite apparent that the events in Poland
have had an impact on the leaders in Eastern Europe.
the
This memorandum was prepared b
Office of Political Analysis and the Office of
h the National Intelligence
Economic Research and coordinated with
Comments and queries are
Officer for the USSR-Eastern Europe.
welcome and may be directed to
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Over the short term, the regimes probably will be prepared
.to make limited concessions--such as increasing the availability
of consumer goods, offering limited wage increases to certain
workers, and perhaps delaying price increases. At the same time
they will increase the workload of party cadre who monitor and
seek to direct public opinions and will tighten security. They
may also revamp the party-controlled trade unions in an effort
to head off criticisms and demands for change. Nervous leaders,
however, might over-react to any signs that people are even
considering imitating the Polish workers. Harsh political :..
measures or the use of force could precipitate the?very thing
they wish to avoid--labor unrest and other forms of popular
East European leaders would become even more concerned if
the Polish regime proves unwilling or unable within the next
several months to retract some of its concessions. Internally
the regimes would most likely continue and intensify their
efforts to persuade, assuage, and intimidate. The economic
costs of assuaging the populace. might, however, soon present
a burden that the five countries would be unable and/or
unwilling to bear. They would therefore begin--or in the case of
the East Germans step up--pressure on the Polish regime to curb
the workers. At the same time the East Europeans would probably
ask the USSR to provide them with greater economic assistance.
The Soviets might comply but would demand a political price-more
tightening of internal security and greater allegiance to the
Soviet foreign policy line.
Impact on the Workers
We assume that the populaces in Eastern Europe have listened
to Western broadcasts and know of the outcome in Poland. We also
assume that many East Europeans were vicariously buoyed to learn
that a Communist regime was forced to make major concessions to
striking workers. It is unlikely, however, that any of the East
European populaces will react over the next several months by
emulating the Polish workers. In Romania, where there have been a
number of minor worker disturbances over this summer, significant
numbers of workers might go on strike, but they are likely to
press for strictly economic benefits--not for trade unions or
other political concessions--and the Ceausescu regime would be
able to contain such strikes.
Despite-the victory of the Polish strikers, workers else-
where in Eastern Europe will be reluctant to challenge regimes
that they perceive--probably correctly--as more likely than the
one in Poland-to reply with prompt and harsh repression. Even in
the near term, however, the events in Poland may give rise to
greater worker assertiveness within the framework of established
grievance procedures. In some cases, moreover, circumstances
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could precipitate localized strikes. Such strikes, however, are
not likely to reach anything like Polish proportions or to acquire
a comparable political content. There is a less glaring disparity
between popular expectations and standards of living in the rest
of Eastern Europe than in Poland. The workers in the other
countries also lack the leadership, self-discipline, and soli-
darity that their Polish counterparts developed during years of
strike--experience. Nor can they look for support from vocal and
organized political dissidents and an independent and politically
influential church.
Longer Term Implications
While the short term effects will be limited, over the next
several years the impact of the events of the past several weeks
could result in more substantial changes in Eastern Europe.- Most
regimes will be forced in any case to make adjustments that will
impede or rule out attempts to boost economic efficiency.
Efforts to provide more consumer goods and hesitancy in imple-
menting economically necessary austerity policies would further
exacerbate economic and financial problems and delay for years
the implementation of economic reform measures that would in-
evitably be painful. A prolonged period of economic stagnation--
of level or slowly declining living standards-seems in prospect,
as all the economies of Eastern Europe face austerity imposed by
energy problems, demographic developments, and the requirement of
improving external hard currency financial positions.
Politically, the deteriorating economic situation could lead
to disputes within the leadership and the populaces could gain
the impression that the regimes are not united and are indecisive.
This perception might tempt workers and political dissidents to
become more assertive and perhaps to cooperate with one another.
Under such conditions, the victory of the Polish workers could
become an example other East European work forces might seek to
emulate. They would still be taking a great risk, however, for
they would have less reason to believe that their regimes would
necessarily follow the Gierek regime's example or that Moscow
would tolerate another "Polish Summer."
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SUBJECT: Likely Consequences in Eastern Europe of the
Polish Events
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- NSC Staff (Brzezinski)
NSC Staff (Brzezinski).
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D/NFAC
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NIO/USSR-EE
- NIO/Warning
NSC Coordinators/PBS
NSC Coordinators/PBS
NSC Coordinators/PBS
- D/OPA
D/OER
OPA/PS
OPA/PS
- PPG
- PPG
- PPG
- OCO
- PDB Staff
- C/OPA/USSR-EE
C/USSR-EE/EE Branch/OPA
C/EE Branch /OER
NFAC/OPA/USSR-EE/EE~
(5Sept80)
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