SOVIET REACTIONS TO IRAQ-IRAN HOSTILITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000102140001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 20, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 22, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R000102140001-5
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER
22 September 1980
MEMORAND'I
SUBJECT: Soviet Reactions to Iraq-Iran Hostilities
The Soviets have long been concerned that a military clash between
Iran and Iraq would damage their relations with both countries, and are
worried that such a clash might lead Tehran to reduce its hostility to
the US. Consequently, they probably believe their interests are best
served by an early cessation of the conflict. Thus far, however,
they have tried to maintain a balanced position in order to avoid
alienating either Baghdad or Tehran. The major escalation in the fight-
ing now underway, however, could make it difficult for the Soviets to
maintain this balance and lead them to adopt more active policies
designed to bring about a resolution of the conflict and to enhance the
Soviet position in the process.
Moscow's first response to such an escalation in the fighting
may be to offer its "good offices" as mediator as it did between India
and Pakistan in 1965. The USSR would hope that a successful Soviet
mediation effort would enhance its position in both Tehran and Baghdad
and facilitate the USSR's emergence as a key regional security player.
The Soviets probably would also see a mediatory role as an opportunity
to exploit the lack of US diplomatic ties with either Tehran or Baghdad.
Should Iraq move to permanently occupy Iranian territory, the
Soviets miic t attempt to manipulate their arms supply relationship with
Iraq to induce it to desist. It is doubtful, however, that the Soviets
his memorandum was prepared byl USSR-Eastern Europe
Division, Office of Political Analysis. It was coordinated with the
National Intelligence Officer for the USSR-Eastern Europe. Comments
should be addressed to Chief, Soviet Foreign Policy Branch, OPA/USSR-EE
PA M 80-10415
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R000102140001-5
 crrnr-r
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R000102140001-5
would actually threaten a cut-off. They are anxious to avoid damaging
their ties with Baghdad and forcing it to look to the West for arms.
The Soviets are more likely to send a subtle message to the Iraqis,
perhaps by slowing the delivery of arms already promised, in order to
warn Iraq of the risks of future military actions.
It is very unlikely the Soviets would undertake any major air
resupply effort to Iraq.
The Soviets would fear that an airlift almost certainly would
alienate Tehran and could induce the Iranians to look to Western sources
for spare parts for its US-manufactured military hardware. In addition,
a Soviet rapid resupply effort would enable Iraq to prolong the fight-
ing--something the Soviets want to-prevent.
The Soviets might also hope that Iran's weakened position vis-a-vis
Iraq would create an opportunity for the USSR to enter into a substan-
tial arms supply program with Iran. It is unlikely, however, that
Moscow thinks such an opportunity will develop during the heat of an
Iraqi-Iranian conflict nor if Iran is humiliated by Soviet-supplied
Iraqi arms.
If the Soviets think Iraq is seeking to control substantial por-
tions of Iran--such as the oil fields--pressure on them to act more
strongly will increase and their actions will be more unpredictable.
The Soviets have little interest in seeing Iraq emerge as an even
stronger power in the Persian Gulf. Their influence and leverage in
Baghdad is already limited. Even more compelling to Moscow will be
concern that a major Iraqi invasion will lead to an Iranian-US rapproche-
ment. The USSR may also fear that such a move could lead to the frag-
mentation-of Iran and US exploitation of the resulting chaos. In order
to deter a major Iraqi move into Iran, the Soviets may, therefore, warn
Baghdad that the USSR would intervene in Iran to protect its interests
along its southern border. Should such a warning fail to sway Iraq, the
Soviets ri ht move into bordering areas of Iran or seek to ensure that
any new regime in Tehran is pro-Soviet. It is also conceivable that
the Soviets could see the new situation as a major opportunity to
develop a close relationship with Tehran and--in a reversal of alliances
similar to that which took place in the Horn of Africa in 1977-78--back
Iran openly.
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R000102140001-5
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R000102140001-5
SUBJECT: Soviet Reactions to Iraq-Iran Hostilities
Distribution:
Orig&4-
1-
1-
1-
1-
1-
1-
2-
2-
3-
1-
2-
DCI for NSC
PDB Staff
D/NFAC
DD/NFAC
NFAC Registry
NIO/USSR-EE
NI0/NESA
NIC
D/OPA
OPA/NESA
OPA/PS
PPG
OPA/USSR-EE Chrono
OPA/USSR-EE/E
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R000102140001-5