PROSPECTS FOR ESCALATION OF IRAN-IRAQ CONFLICT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000102150001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 20, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 22, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R000102150001-4
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Iq
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R000102150001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R000102150001-4
22 September 1980
PROSPECTS FOR ESCALATION OF IRAN-IRAQ CONFLICT
Military Indicators
The military signs point toward further escalation of
the Iran-Iraq conflict. The surprise attacks on Iranian air-
fields obviously changed the scope of the conflict in a major
way. The attacks are an attempt to quickly and decisively
gain air superiority--an area in which Iraq feels Iran has an
edge--so that Iraq can take advantage of its superiority on
the ground. We do not believe that this or previous actions
reflect a preconceived plan with a precisely defined schedule
and objectives. Rather, Iraq appears to be making the most of
Iran's current weakness and its own initial tactical successes.
In the current context, then, the air strikes strongly suggest
that Iraq will now conduct a major ground offensive into
Iran.
We cannot define the limits of the probable offensive and
indeed, the Iraqis may not yet have a clear definition of its
objectives. Their goals will probably be influenced by the
effectiveness and extent of Iran's response. We anticipate
border crossings of battalion and even brigade-sized units,
primarily into Iran's Kuzhestan province, but look for the
deepest penetration in the central border area--Khanaqin,
Mandali, and Merhran.
We believe that the Iraqis will limit their objectives
to force Iran ultimately to recognize their border claims. We
do not expect Iraq to attack or occupy population centers or
This memorandum was prepared by analysts in the Office of
Political Analysis and the Office of Strategic Research. Infor-
mation as of 22 September 1980 was used in its preparation.
Questions and queries may be addressed to Deputy Chief, Southwest
Asia Analytic Center
PA M #80-10415J
Copy #
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R000102150001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R000102150001-4
industrial and economic facilities unless provoked by similar
attacks from Iran. There are large areas of Khuzhestan which
could be effectively occupied by Iraq without much ground
resistance from local Iranian forces.
Ground Forces--Balance
Iraq presently has a significant edge oVer Iranian ground
forces all along the border from Khanaquin to Basra.
We do not believe that Iraq would have any difficulty sus-
taining an occupation force of division size in Western Kuzhestan.
Even if the one Iranian and one Iraqi divisions were fully
engaged, we believe that logistics would not be a constraint on
Iraq. On the other hand, in the short run, Iraq probably
would have difficulty sustaining the multi-division operations
that would be required to seize and hold all of Kuzhestan.
Iran has virtually no capability to sustain military opera-
tions at a high level of intensity. F_
Iran's Air Force, although at less than 50 percent of its
pre-revolution level of combat capability, presents the greatest
threat to Iraqi forces. Even so, the Air Force probably could
not sustain combat operations for more than a week.
Iran's capability is also restricted by a shortage of
spare parts and a lack of access to a reliable foreign supplier.
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R000102150001-4
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R000102150001-4
The Iraqi Air Force, to a greater degree than the Army,
depends on Soviet support for major maintenance and parts.
The Iraqi Air Force could not maintain large-scale air opera-
tions of any duration without resupply from the USSR.
There seems little prospect for an early end to the Iraq-
Iran fighting unless Iraq scores a quick military victory.
Baghdad appears determined to use all necessary force to restore
its sovereignty over disputed border areas, including estab-
lishing buffer zones on Iranian territory in order to force
Iranian recognition of Iraqi border claims. Iran, for its
part, does not seem ready to submit to Iraqi bullying to redraw
the border, especially along the Shatt al-Arab.
Baghdad's immediate aim is to redress border
grievances. The Iraqis, however, appear to have miscalculated
Iran's will to resist and now find themselves in a situation
in which they are being forced to expand the conflict in order
to secure their original limited objectives. Fighting has now
spread to the Shatt al-Arab region, an area of great economic
significance. Iraq has already targeted Iranian oil installa-
tions in Khuzestan for retaliation in the event of an Iranian
strike on Iraqi oil facilities near Al Basrah.
Two other issues promise to keep tension high for some
time. Iraq seeks an early end to the current Tehran regime
and will continue its strong support for Khomeini's political
opponents as well as Iran's dissident ethnic minorities,
especially the Arabs of Khuzestan province. There is some
speculation that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's Arab leader-
ship aspirations might eventually lead him to back the creation
of an independent Arab state in Khuzestan with strong ties to
Iraq. Baghdad might also seem intent on forcing Iran to restore
to the UAE three small islands located near the Strait of Hormuz
occupied by Iran in 1971.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R000102150001-4
Political Indicators