ZIA-UL-HAQ: A POLITICAL PORTRAIT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000102250002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 27, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/21: CIA-RDP85T00287R000102250002-2
SECRET
27 September 1980
Zia has ruled Pakistan for more than three years, despite
his declining popular support, his inability to reach a lasting
accommodation with any political party, and continued auestioninq
of his ability and goals.
His position at the moment appears secure. No single civilian
leader has enough popular support to challenge Zia, and his many
opponents are badly divided. Grumbling continues in the military,
but senior officers seem to have no desire to assume Zia's
responsibilities or to believe that things would be much better
were he replaced.
In the past three years, Zia has demonstrated political skill
in a few crucial areas.
-- He has kept martial law lenient enough to be tolerable
for most Pakistanis and has clamped down only at times--
such as Bhutto's execution--when there was a clear threat
of civil disorder.
-- He has handled military politics well, making sure that
most senior officers acquiesce in major decisions includ-
ing two major shifts in senior personnel that have weakened
his potential rivals and strengthened his friends.
-- His foreign policy has met with general approval in
Pakistan. Pakistanis are proud of the leading
role in the Islamic world he has obtained for
Pakistan, and his handling of the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan has been an asset domestically.
This memorandum was prepared byl (Southwest
Asia Analytic Center, Near East South Asia Division, Office of
Political Analysis. Questions and comments may be addressed
to Deputy Chief, Southwest Asia Analytic Center
PAM #80-10428
Duplicate of C05514106:
RIP
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/21: CIA-RDP85T00287R000102250002-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/21: CIA-RDP85T00287R000102250002-2
SECRET
Zia probably sees himself as a man with a mission imposed by
God to make Pakistan into a stable, Islamic nation. He would still
prefer an elected civilian government--albeit with Zia as Presi-
dent--to military rule. He was likely sincere when he promised
elections in 1977 and again in 1979, but later concluded that the
probable results--a victory by Bhutto's party--would not only set
back the process of political reform and Islamization, but lead to
further instability.
His restrictions on political activity reflect his frustration
in trying to deal with politicians who in his view have acted
irresponsibly and are more interested in personal power than in the
goals Zia has for Pakistan. Contrary to the charges of his poli-
tical enemies, the dangers political activity posed to Zia's
personal position were probably only secondary consideration for
him.
Zia may believe the Islamic reforms he is trying to make are
the most important part of his mission. Although he presumably
hopes they will increase his domestic support and improve Pak-
istan's position with Islamic oil producers, Zia's own deep faith
provides the impetus.
Despite Zia's current problems with Washington, he remains
basically pro-Western. He and most of his senior advisers still
see the US as the ultimate guarantor of Pakistani independence.
Zia is, however, deeply disappointed by what he sees as Washing-
ton's failure to understand Pakistan's needs--particularly the need
to have nuclear weapons, our unwillingness to give Pakistan the
military support Zia believes is necessary in the face of Soviet
expansion, and a US policy toward the subcontinent perceived in
Islamabad as pro-Indian. Even so, he has resisted the recommen-
dations of some of his advisers that Pakistan should seek an
accommodation with the USSR.
Zia, a professional Army officer, was made Chief of Army staff
by Bhutto in 1976. Although Bhutto promoted him over several other
officers on the assumption he could be controlled easily, in 1977
Zia seized power and made himself Chief Martial Law Administrator
because he feared further civil disorder and was under pressure
from his subordinates. When the President resigned in 1978, Zia
assumed that position as well. He is currently in the US to
address the UN General Assembly as the spokesman for the Islamic
Conference--in effect as representative of the Muslim World.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/21: CIA-RDP85T00287R000102250002-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/21: CIA-RDP85T00287R000102250002-2
SECRET
SUBJECT: Zia-ul-Haq: A Political Portrait
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
D/NFAC
NIO/NESA
D/OPA
C/OPA/NESA
C/SAAC
PPG
OPA/PS
SAAC/Afghan
NFAC/OPA/SAAC/Afghan
27Sept80)
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/21: CIA-RDP85T00287R000102250002-2