REMARKS OF MARVIN ZONIS, ACADEMIC SPECIALIST ON IRAN, ON CURRENT IRANIAN SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000102270002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 28, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

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28 September 1980 25X1
SUBJECT: Remarks ofl (Academic Specialist on
Iran, on Current Iranian Situation
'Summary
believes there is little possibility for mediation of the
Iran-Iraq conflict. The Europeans are in the strongest position to
mediate because Iran traditionally looks for a third power to balance
the two great powers. There is little possibility that the Iranians
wz:Zl "cat crow" on the hostage issue in order to gain spare parts.
believes it is too early to make any confident predictions about
the political prospects in Iran. He acknowledges that the need for
funds to rebuild the oil industry may contribute to moderation, but he
beZieves that factional infighting will continue.
Mediation of the Iran-Iraq Conflict
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sees little possibility for a successful mediation 25X1
of the conflict now. World community interest in the problem
makes it more difficult for the Iranians to contemplate
negotiation. The Iranians have cast themselves in the role
of the defenders of Islam. To submit to third party mediation
would ultimately mean to treat with theme "imperialists" and
their Iraqi "agents" and thereby undermine the moral position
they have taken. believes the best outcome to be hoped 25X1
s that the con is will come to an end by itself.
Quiet approaches by European states to the Iranians, in
view, are the only mediation option that might have
any effect. 0 noted that the Iranians are deeply cynical
and that they would understand an approach based on the
This mernorand m was prepared byl I Southwest Asia
Analytic Center, Near East South Asia Division, Office of Political
Analysis. Questions and comments may be addressed to Deputy Chief,
Southwest Asia Analytic Center
Duplicate of C05514108:
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mediator's self-interest rather than an appeal to principle.
A German approach based on the German's interest in eventually
selling new refinery equipment, for example, would he better
received than an appeal to the need to restore stability in
emphasized the possible strength of the Europeans'
position in dealing with Iran. The Iranians traditionally
have looked to a third power to play off against the two major
powers. The origins of US infuence in Iran, for example, are
in the US role as a balancing force to the Soviet-British
rivalry of the nineteenth and early twentieth century.
Iranian Response to the Iraqi Conflict
believes there is a gooc. possibility that the
Iranians will attempt to widen the conflict to include the
Saudis or the Gulf States. He noted the strong racist
element in Iranian thinking--their contempt and hatred for
Arabs--and the probability that the conflict is increasincily
perceived in Iran as a battle against all the Arabs. The
Iranians are most likely, however, to attempt to subvert the
Arab states by stirring up Shia dissidence rather than to
launch an open attack.
The Iranians' commitment to their land---their present
borders--is an emotionally compelling theme which militates
against compromise. They are likely to see their ability to
inflict damage on the Iraqis as a "great victory"--the Iraqi
invasion drags on whereas the British and Soviet invasion in
1941 took only three days. They may read the situation in
terms of the religious paradigm of the triumph of good or
evil through martyrdom, rather than to take an "objective"
Impact on the Hostages and Internal Politics
commented that there is very little chance the
Iranians will "eat crow" on the hostage issue in order to
gain spare parts and other supplies. There is little the
US can do to speed the process of releasing the hostages.
The Iranians will perceive US proposals as deceit and lies
and US concessions as weaknesses to be exploited. Internal
Iranian political dynamics will determine when the hostages
emphasized that it is too early to make confident
predictions about the outcome of the Iraqi conflict on Iranian
politics. The clerics' position may not necessarily be
weakened and Bani-Sadr may be vulnerable because he has taken
public responsibility for"defense. On the other hand the
increasing importance of the military may strengthen Bani-Sadr's
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was impressed by Bani-Sadr's ability to call. out
a. massive crowd in early September. He noted that Bani--Sadr
may Le able to establish his claim to embody the principles
of the revolution as opposed to a clerical leader like
Beheshti who is not widely trusted.
Food and fuel shortages this winter and Iran's great
need for money to rebuild the oil industry may contribute
to greater moderation. Khomeini's consciousness of his own
mortality may also add to moderation of factional squabbling;
as he intervenes to press for securing the progress of the
revolution. On the other hand, Khomeini's constituency is
capable of existing on a low economic level--denuding the
forests for fuel rather than relying on oil., for example--
and Iranians are just as likely to "hunker down" as to turn
against the clerical extremists. Iran has no tradition of
civil unrest because of economic deprivation.
believes that factional infighting will continue.
The cleric's concern to weaken their rivals increases as the
issue of succession to Khomeini comes closer. The strugole_
against the reformist moderates may now take the form of
looking for who is to blame for the losses of territory.
If Iranian losses mouht, the present regime coul6 coillapse.
There is some possibility that the military might move to
blame the defeats on the clergy's policies and take power in
Khomeini's name. The regime might be further weakened if the
fighting leads to greater unrest among the minority croups.
does not see any major gains for the left in this
situation. As the left moves closer to power the differences
that divide the leftist groups becomes greater.
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