IRAQ: SADDAM HUSSEIN'S RULE AND PROTRACTED WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000102360002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 10, 1980
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/21: CIA-RDP85T00287R000102360002-0
SECRET
MEMORANDUM
IRAQ: Saddam Hussein's Rule and Protracted War
Summary
A protracted war of attrition between Iran and Iraq--
contrary to Iraq's initial strategy--will undermine impor-
tant political gains achieved by Iraqi President Saddam
Hussein, probably weaken his hold on power, and lead to even
heavier internal repression. Saddam continues to hold power-
ful cards and a protracted war need not be fatal; it is likely,
however, to provoke serious disagreements among regime leaders
over war strategy and disaffection within the military.
Saddam's Rule Before the War
Iraqi ambitions to play a more decisive role in Arab
and Persian Gulf politics have over the years been undermined
by the regime's insecurity over domestic ethnic and religious
differences, its image abroad of rule by repression, and its
radical socialist ideology. Saddam Hussein, in the nearly
10 years he has been the regime's strongman, has reduced
Iraq's vulnerability to all three weaknesses. He has contained
domestic threats, held the country's first election in nearly
a quarter century, and so muted Iraq's radical reputation
that two conservative monarchies--Jordan and Morocco--are
his most outspoken supporters in the fight against Iran.
The War
Saddam now risks this progress in a war that he probably
cannot win in any decisive military way. The conflict threatens
Iraq's economic future, tests the still fragile unity of its
This memorandum was prepared byl (Southwest
Asia Analytic Center, Near East South Asia Division, Office
of Political Analysis. Questions and comments may be addressed
to Deputy Chief, Southwest Asia Analytic Center
Duplicate of C05514123:
RIP
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/21 : CIA-RDP85T00287R000102360002-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/21: CIA-RDP85T00287R000102360002-0
people, and ultimately risks Saddam's own position. His most
immediate problems are likely to be tensions between himself
and the military, and major damage to Iraq's incipient image
as the coming power center of the Arab world.
Saddam is a Baath Party functionary; unlike former Presi-
dent Bakr, who was eased out of office last year, Saddam was
never in the military and his assumption of military rank
several years ago was resented by the professionals. Saddam
has dealt with this by seeking to indoctrinate the officer
corps with party ideology and by sating the military's appetite
for modern weaponry. A military failure, or even a stalemate,
will touch off acrimonious attempts by both party and military
to fix the blame on the other.
Before the war, Iraq projected an image abroad of power,
both economic and military. That image already is badly
damaged. Doubts about Iraq as a credible protector of Arab
interests and about its long-term political stability seem
certain to grow as the war continues. Iraq's relations with
its Arab neighbors in the Persian Gulf will remain problematic.
Those states' desire to avoid Iranian attack and their fear
of Iranian-inspired Shia unrest in their own countries have
caused them to give Baghdad only limited help.
At home, Iraqi enthusiasm for the war may already be
declining in the face of air raids on Baghdad and other Iraqi
cities. Heavy losses in the largely Shia military would
erode morale further and could inspire antigovernment activity
among Iraqs' Shia majority. Port closures will eventually
cause supply and distribution problems. The long-term economic
damage could be substantial.
We have no evidence to suggest any antiregime move is
under active consideration at present. The mere hint of
plotting, or an increase in Shia or Kurdish activity, would
probably set off a new round of government repression. Even
without such activity, the regime is likely to become more
restrictive and paranoid as the war lengthens.
Saddam Hussein, however, has survived more than a
decade at the summit of a country whose politics are often
bloody. His ability to maneuver and the levers of power he
controls should not be underestimated. He has placed close
associates in key positions throughout the government, party,
and military. His exhaustive network of informers and his
unflinching reputation to do away with any suspected opponents
serve as major deterrents'to the development of an organized
opposition.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/21: CIA-RDP85T00287R000102360002-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/21: CIA-RDP85T00287R000102360002-0
Distribution: IRAQ: Saddam Hussein's Rule and Protracted War
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - Executive Registry
1 - D/NFAC
1 - DD/NFAC
1 - NFAC Registry
1 - PB/NSC Coord
1 - Senior Reveiw Panel
1 - C/NIC
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - PDB Staff
1 - D/OSR
1 - OSR/RAD
1 - C/DDO/NE
- C/DDO/NE
4 - OCO/IDCD/CB
1 - D/OPA
2 - OPA/PS
1 - C/OPA/NESA
1 - OPA/NESA/API
1 - OPA/NESA/SAAC-Iran
1 - Author
NFAC/OPA/NESA
(10Oct80)
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/21: CIA-RDP85T00287R000102360002-0