CHINA: FIRST THOUGHTS ON THE STATE MILITARY COMMISSION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000401190001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 20, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 1, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency /17
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
1 July 1983
CHINA: FIRST THOUGHTS ON THE STATE MILITARY COMMISSION
Summary
We believe Deng Xiaoping intends the new Central Military
Commission, formally inaugurated at the National People's
Congress last week, to assume the principal role in day-to-day
military administration and operations. A compact, predominantly
reform-oriented leadership group, the Commission in our view
marks a step toward a rationalized, more efficient higher command
structure. We believe the new commission is also part of an
effort to circumvent conservative opposition to Deng's military
reforms from the party military commission, promote the image of
a newly professionalized military, and impose an institutional
barrier against the possibility of Cultural Revolution-type
abuses of military authority.
Constitutional Mandate
The Central Military Commission (zhongyang junshi
weiyuanhui) was established by Article 93 of the national
constitution adopted last December. In the briefest of seven
sections on the state structure, the document states that "the
Central Military Commission of the People's Republic of China
directs the armed forces of the country." Significantly, the
constitution clearly subordinates the Commission to the National
People's Congress, not to the party. Also, the council of
ministers, headed by the premier, is given an as yet undefined
degree of control over "the building of national defense." This
almost certainly involves budgetary matters, as a Chinese
This memorandum was prepared byl lof the
Domestic Policy Branch, China Division, Office of East Asian
Analysis, Deputy Directorate of Intelligence. Questions and
comments are welcome and may be directed to the author
EA M 83-10120
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economic official recently affirmed to a foreign visitor, as well
as principal responsibility for China's military industries and
research establishment.
As had been expected, Deng Xiaoping was named to head the
new Commission, whose membership overlaps with its party
counterpart, similarly called the Military Commission (junshi
weiyuanhui). In fact, the state commission incorporates the core
leadership of the party body. Besides Chairman Deng, who heads
both, each commission includes as vice chairmen the three most
prominent representatives of the old guard--marshals Ye Jianying,
Xu Xiangqiang, and Nie Rongzhen--all of whom are increasingly
incapacitated by age and infirmity. China's closest
approximation to a joint chiefs of staff also sit on the new
commission: the Secretary General of the party commission, the
Chief of the General Staff, the Directors of the General
Political and General Logistic Departments, and the Minister of
Dressed for Action?
Although the state commission has been invested with the
same prestigious personnel as the party body, it differs in an
important aspect. It appears to be outfitted for action; the
nine officials named at the Congress seem to comprise the
commission's entire membership, and, by virtue of their other
posts, these men d~jly preside over China's most important
military business.
In contrast, the full membership of the party commission
almost certainly includes the commanders of China's 11 military
regions, their senior political commissars, and the chiefs of the
PLA's main service arms as well as other senior military figures
with no formal command responsibilities--a body so geographically
dispersed that it could not easily meet routinely. Perhaps more
important, the party commission seems to us a far more
*Yang Shangkun, Yang Dezhi, Yu Qiuli, Hong Xuezhi, and Zhang
Aiping, respectively.
**The new commission is therefore markedly unlike its
putative predecessor, the National Defense Council, a sprawli_
honorary board that existed before the Cultural Revolution.
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conservative body that almost certainly includes several of the
senior olt,cers who have resisted many of Deng's military
The active nucleus of the state commission--Yang Shangkun,
the general department chiefs, and the defense minister--are
vigorous supporters of Deng's effort to modernize the army and
regulate its political influence. We believe that Deng will task
the state military commission with implementing his military
reforms. The fact that its members are all based in Beijing and
have responsibility for much of the routine administration of
military affairs may enable Deng to circumvent political
obstructions from within the larger party organization. Deng
employed a similar strategy in 1980 when he reestablished the
party Secretariat to shift the day-to-day control over party
affairs away from the aging and more conservative Politburo to a
smaller, more dynamic, and sympathetic body.
Other Purposes
The principle of party leadership will of course be
maintained under any institutional arrangement; the system of
political commissars and unit party committees will continue to
function. We believe, however, that shifting routine command
responsibilities to a state organization marks an advance toward
several interrelated objectives.
Aside from overcoming interference from members of the
larger party commission, the creation of a state organ
institutionalizes a new command relationship, which, according to
the Chinese media, "is unprecedented in the history of the
People's Republic;" it places the military within the state
structure. This can be seen as part of a larger program of Deng
and his allies: to distinguish clearly between party
(policymaking) and state (executive) organizations, with both
functioning more efficiently in the process. In practical terms,
Deng seeks to allow professionals--including military men--the
run of their technical domains, benefiting the immediate unit as
well as the state, and thus reducing the interference of party
hacks who under Mao had broad authority but slight professional
competence.
***We presume that most ex officio members of the party
Commission--regional commanders, service arm chiefs, and the
like--share Deng's reform ideas, but since the 12th Party
Congress the Chinese have announced no Commission members aside
from the nine named above. Consequently, we cannot precisely
define the composition of Deng's opposition on the party
Commission. Media commentary, State Department reporting,
consistently support the probability of
high level opposition within the military.
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We believe Deng probably perceives a special urgency in the
case of the military. During the Cultural Revolution, the direct
command relationship of the party to the army allowed a small
group within the party--principally Chairman Mao and Defense
Minister Lin Biao--to advance their own political ends using the
- military's coercive force. We believe Deng sees formal
subordination of the military to the government as creating an
institutional barrier that diminishes the possibility of this
happening again
Creation of a state commission also reinforces other actions
Beijing has taken to neutralize the military factor in Chinese
politics, such as reducing the quota of party members in the
army, shrinking its representation on national level political
bodies, and replacing officers and men cast in the orthodox
Maoist mold with newly indoctrinated recruits of greater
educational achievement and technical competence. Beijing also
seeks to create a different perception of the PLA, both within
the army and among the Chinese populace. Rather than thinking of
the PLA as the party's army, propaganda encourages soldiers and
citizens to regard it as a national army or a people's army.
What to Watch
We expect that policies affecting the military increasingly
will be promulgated in the name of the state commission, that the
commission will be a tool of military reform, and that the party
body will assume a lower profile. The party's military
commission, however, will remain the highest authority on broad
policy guidelines, much as the Politburo is formally superior to
the party Secretariat. The creation of a military leadership
body under the state was controversial and, we believe, may not
be fully acceptable to members of the old guard. We expect that,
for a time, Deng will have to referee the jurisdictional contest
between the two commissions.
A key indicator of the state commission's strength in the
battle will be its staffing arrangements. For the state
commission to have teeth, it must also have a staff, and that
staff presumably must be drawn from the party commission
bureaucracy if a transfer of functions is to work. We will look
for signs that the top staff departments are being integrated
The role China's political commissars play will also be an
indicator of progress. We expect to see changes under the new
arrangements. The wording on the General Political Department in
the party constitution is vague but basically confines the
department to political work. To date, unit political commissars
have functioned as co-commanders who countersign all orders.
Under a professionalized military, the need for quick decisions
and an unambiguous chain of command assumes priority over
political concerns. Although the head of the Department will sit
on the state commission and the system of political commissars
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will usefully continue to serve Beijing's interests, we believe
it likely that the reach of unit commissars will gradually be
restricted to largely political matters, such as morale,
indoctrination, and education.
Finally, Deng Xiaoping eventually will have to surrender his
leadership of both party and state military commissions. In our
view, he is the only leader currently assured of the broad
political acceptability needed to make a new arrangement work and
consequently felt compelled to assume both chairmanships. His
voluntary withdrawal in favor of a political ally will suggest
that plans are successfully unfolding.
Deng's eventual resignation bears implications for the party
General Secretary, Hu Yaobang. Hu's political base within the
military is shallow, and he cannot expect to command the
political suppport enjoyed by Deng. In our opinion the
activation of the state military commission does not ostensibly
enhance Hu's immediate position. His best prospects for support
within the Chinese military remain among the rising generation of
commanders who presumably stand to gain from reforms he has
espoused in unison with Deng. As the shifting of daily
operational command should redound to the advantage of young
military professionals, Hu by virtue of his strong identification
with reform may eventually benefit.
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uuii r1Utii IIAL
Distribution: China: First Thoughts on the State Military
Commission EA M 83-10120
Department of State
1 - Director, INR
1 - Director of Research, INR
1 - Chief, Northeast Asia Division Office of Analysis for East
Asia and Pacific (INR)
1 - INR/EC/RE
1 - Director, Office of Chinese Affairs, Bureau of East Asia and
Pacific Affairs
1 - Chief, Economic Section, Office of Chinese Affairs
National Security Council
1 - Senior Staff Assistant for China, Taiwan and Hong Kong
United States Information Agency
1- Office of East Asia and Pacific Affairs
Defense Intelligence Agency
- DIO for East Asia and Pacific.)
1 - Chief, DE3
Central Intelligence Agency
1 - NIO/EA
1 - C/China Reports
1 - OCR/EA
1 - OCR/ISG
2 - C/OEA/CH
1 - C/OEA/CH/DOM
1 - C/OEA/CH/FOR
1 - C/OEA/CH/DEF
1 - C/OEA/CH/DEV
1 - D/OEAA
1 - D/NIC
5 - OCO/IMB/CB
1 - PDB
2 - D/DDI
1 - OEA/NA
1 - OEA/SE
1 - FBIS China
1 - C/PES/DDI
1 - FR
1 - ILS/OCPAS
CONFIDENTIAL
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China: First Thou hts on the State Military Commission
(EA M 83-10120)
DDI Reps
CINCPAC (1) S015
CINCSAC (1) S021
C/IMC (Joyce) (1) S022
ILS File Copy (1) S033
SA DA File Copy (1) S034
(4) S035-5038
RELEASED:24 August 1983
14 Sept. 1983
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