KIM CHONG-IL'S VISIT TO CHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000401290001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 11, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 29, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/11: CIA-RDP85T00287R000401290001-7
Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
29 July 1983
Kim Chong-ills Visit to China
Both Pyongyang and Beijing appear to have largely achieved
their objectives with the early June visit to China of Kim Il-
song's son and heir apparent--Kim Chong-il. The visit provided
the most explicit Chinese endorsement yet of Kim Chong-ills
special status in North Korea. P'yongyang's media treatment has
exploited the visit to burnish the younger Kim's image at home
and has emphasized that close Sino-North Korean solidarity is
assured "generation after generation." The Chinese, who are
uncertain over Kim Chong-ills longer term prospects and have a
distaste for personality cults, probably saw the visit as another
in a series of gestures toward Pyongyang necessary mainly to
preempt any Soviet inroads in the North. The Chinese also may
believe that they now can afford some flexibility in their
approach to Seoul. Beijing had delayed acknowledging Kim Chong-
il and still maintains a measure of reserve toward the succession
scheme by referring to Kim as "one of the principal leaders" of
the North--a formulation less sweeping than the honorifics used
by Pyongyang.
Visit Confirmed
Secretary General of the Chinese Communist Party Hu Yaobang
on 7 July belatedly confirmed widespread speculation that Kim
Chong-il had made an unpublicized visit to China in early June.
This memorandum was prepared by
Korea B
ranch, Northeast Asia
25X1
Division, with contributions by For
eign Policy Branch, Chin
a
25X1
Division, Office of East Asian Analysis. Comments an
d queries are welcome an
d
may be directed to
the Chief, Korea Branch,
25X1
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Beijing and Pyongyang have characterized the visit as
"unofficial," but both sides have noted that Kim came at Hu's
personal invitation and that he had "very cordial and warm
exchanges" with Chinese leaders. The invitation most likely was
conveyed by Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian when he visited
North Korea 20-25 May.
The Foreign Minister's trip may have been prompted by North
Korean protests over Beijing's unprecedented direct negotiations
with Seoul following the hijacking of a Chinese airliner to South
Korea on 5 May. Beijing denies any connection between the
hijacking and Wu's visit, but the steady stream of party,
economic, and cultural delegations that have shuttled between
China and North Korea in recent weeks is clearly intended to
underscore Sino-North Korean friendship.
The desire to placate Pyongyang may also have influenced
the timing of the Chinese invitation to the younger Kim. It is
also possible, however, that the trip was agreed upon as early as
F_ I
Kim I1-song's visit to China last September.
According to North Korean reports, Kim met with Hu,.Deng
Xiaoping, President Li Xiannian, Premier Zhao Ziyang, and other
top officials. However, neither Beijing nor Pyongyang has
provided many details of Kim Chong-ills itinerary or his meetings
with Chinese leaders. Kim appears to have arrived in Beijing by
train on 2 June and to have toured east-central China with stops
in Nanjing (5 June), Hangzhou, and Shanghai (8 June). Kim
reportedly returned to Pyongyang from Beijing on the 12th. In
our view, the chief purpose of the trip was for Kim to meet a
wide range of Chinese leaders and to acquaint him with Deng's
economic reforms. We doubt that either side viewed the visit as
an opportunity for definitive talks on pending bilateral
issues.
Pyongyang Pleased With Results
The visit clearly went a long way toward satisfying
P'yongyang's desire for Chinese acknowledgment of Kim Chong-ills
special status in North Korea. The initial Xinhua report that
carried Hu Yaobang's reference to the visit also quoted visiting
North Korean assembly chairman Yang Hyong-sop as conveying Kim's
"great satisfaction" with the trip. Yang observed that Kim had
briefed a plenary session of the Korean Workers Party Central
Committee--presumably the Seventh Plenum 15-17 June--concerning
the visit.
In our view, the North Koreans were particularly pleased
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that Kim was invited as the personal guest of Hu Yaobang--which
Pyongyang is likely to view as symbolizing Beijing's desire for
close ties between the next generation of Chinese and North
Korean leaders. For example, P'yongyang's handling of the visit
has emphasized the solidarity of Sino-North Korean friendship
"generation after generation." The visit probably diminished
whatever concerns may have existed in P'yongyang that China's
hesitancy to acknowledge Kim Chong-ills status might encourage
domestic opposition to the succession scenario.
The visit also marked an enhanced role for Kim Chong-il in
North Korean foreign affairs. To date, Kim Chong-il has only
rarely been reported as meeting with foreign delegations, and
never in a prominent role. Since late May, however, foreign
media reporting on Kim Chong-il appears to have increased.
Laotian, Cuban, East German, and Yugoslav media--in addition to
Chinese--have all carried reports on Kim Chong-ills writings and
his emerging position in North Korea. We believe that Pyongyang
may be laying the groundwork for Kim to have more contact with
forei n dele ations now that an inaugural trip to China is behind
him.
There has been press speculation--for example in Tokyo--that
Kim Chong-il is now in charge of party and state operations in
North Korea and that his father provides overall guidance but has
little involvement in day-to-day affairs. We believe a large and
increasing share of administrative responsibilities has been
taken over by Kim Chong-il, but rumors of Kim Il-song's semi-
retirement are almost certainly exaggerated.
Chinese Exercise Caution
Beijing's handling of the visit appears to have been guided
by its desire to placate Pyongyang but to avoid full endorsement
of the North Korean succession plan. 25X1
The North Korean succession poses a dilemma for the Chinese:
-- For strategic reasons, Beijing believes it must actively
cultivate continuing close relations with P'yongyang to
prevent the emergence of another pro-Soviet state on
China's borders.
-- Nevertheless, they probably want to avoid becoming too
closely identified with Kim Chong-il in case the
succession gets off track.
-- The Chinese leadership may also be chary of too close an
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association with the unfolding Kim Chong-il personality
cult.
Chinese observers no doubt have recognized the steady
increase in Kim's personal authority since his elevation to party
secretary in October 1980 and the apparent absence of effective
opposition to the succession plan. Beijing apparently decided as
early as last year to begin recognizing Kim's special status.
China's belated televising of Deng and Hu greeting Kim Chong-il
during their "secret visit" to Pyongyang last spring was the
first clear Chinese acknowledgment of the younger Kim. The
hijacking incident may have accelerated this process.
The Chinese treatment of Kim's visit maintained a measure of
reserve, however. For example, Hu's unusual invitation to Kim as
his "personal guest" constituted recognition of Kim's important
role in the North Korean Workers Party but enabled the Chinese to
avoid the ceremonial trappings normally associated with visits by
high North Korean officials. The Chinese media also failed to
report remarks by North Korean officials that the visit would
help ensure Sino-North Korean friendship "forever through
generations."
As is usually the case in Sino-North Korean dealings, the
treatment given the visit by Beijing's Korean language broadcasts
to Korea was more elaborate and less reserved. Nevertheless, the
Chinese avoided using North Korean honorifics that clearly place
Kim second only to his father.
The trip almost certainly gave the Chinese leadership its
best opportunity to date to assess the younger Kim's personality,
attitudes, and intellect. Chinese leaders are probably fairly
confident that Kim Il-song would not allow Moscow to gain a
predominant influence over North Korean policies in exchange for
economic or military assistance. But the Chinese may still view
Kim Chong-il with some uncertainty.
The Chinese also may believe that Kim's visit has gained
them some leeway to broaden contacts with the South Koreans,
aimed at least in part at ensuring strict treatment by Seoul of
the Chinese hijackers now on trial. For example, last week
Beijing agreed for the first time to permit a South Korean
official to visit China. The decision to admit the official--who
is participating in a UN agricultural training program--
apparently reflects new flexibility in Beijing's policy toward
South Korea, at least within the framework of international
organizations.
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SUBJECT: Kim Chong-ills Visit to China
Distribution:
2 - DDI
1 - Dave Lambertson, State/EA/Korea
1 - Donald Anderson, State/EA/China
1 - William McPherson, State/INR/EAP
1 - Jack Sonta State/INR/China
1 - DIA/DIO
1 - Wallace Knowles, DOD/ISA/EAPR
1 - D/PDB (7F30)
1 - NIO/EA
1 - SOYA/CS/C
1 - OEA/NA/Korea Branch
1 - OEA/NA Division
1 - OEA/CH/For Branch
1 - OEA/CH Division
1 - OEA/Southeast Asia
1 - D/OEA
1 - C/Production/OEA
1 - C/PES (Boatner) (7F24)
1 - OCR ISG 1H19)
1 - DDI
1 - DDI
1 - DDI
1 - ExDir
1 - OCO/IMD/CB (7G07)
1 - C/DDO/EA
1 - DDO/E
1 - DDO/E
DDI/OEA/NA/K
(22 July 83)
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