CHINA: REORGANIZATION OF SECURITY ORGANS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000401310001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 11, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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I I
Central Intelligence Agency
flIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
1 August 1983
China: Reorganization of Security Organs
Summary
At Zast month's National People's Congress Premier Zhao
Ziyang made public the creation of a new security organ, the
Ministry of State Security. The new ministry, headed by security
professional Linq Yun, is part of a package of reforms intende d
to tighten control over security and intelligence bureaucracies,
professionalize the security apparatus, and crack down on Zax
internal security procedures and foreign espionage. The moves
were prompted by increasing Chinese concern over crime,
espionage, numerous recent .hijack attempts, and several 25X1
defections. We believe the reorganization is also intended to
increase Deng Xiaoping's control over the security apparatus
prevent it from assuming too much influence over policy.
The reorganizaton apparently leaves China with four major
intelligence and security bodies--the Ministry of State Security,
the Ministry of Public Security, the People's Armed Police (a
revival of a pre-Cultural R evolution unit), and the Discipline
Inspection Committee of the party. The Ministry of Justice will
continue to oversee the courts and assume control of the prison
system.
The Institutional Lineup
The Ministry of State Security was formed from parts of the
Ministry of Public Security and the Investigation Department of
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This memorandum was prepared by the Domestic
Policy Branch of the China Division of the Office of East Asian 25X1
Analysis, Directorate of Intelligence. Questions and comments
are welcome and may .be directed to the Chief, Domestic Policy ~cv~
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the party. Its publicly announced responsibilities are to combat 25X1
espionage and subversion by foreign powers prevent sabota a and
deal with internal threats to securit .
The Ministry of Public Security's functions, which formerly 25X1
included a broad range of security and intelligence duties, have
been cut back. The MPS is now in charge of combatting general--
i.e., nonpolitical--crime and maintaining public order.. It is
headed b.y Liu Fuzhi,:who like Ling Yun is a longtime security
cadre. The Ministry of Justice will supervise the court system
and also will take over the prison system, formerly overseen by
the MPS. 25X1
The People's Armed Police Force is composed of personnel
from four units: the internal security troops of the People's
Liberation Army, some border defense troops, municipal
firefighters, and some regular PLA garrison troops. Though the
Chinese press does not allude to it, an organization with the
same name and similar functions existed in the 1950s and 1960s,
until its duties and many of its personnel were assigned to the
PLA. The People's Armed Police will now handle guard duty at
foreign embassies, government buildings and sites such as the
flag in Tiananmen Square, and probably party headquarters. It
will also be used to control smuggling, patrol coasts and
borders--responsibilities shared with the military--fight fires,
deal with civil disturbances, and solve crimes. Its charter also
includes prevention of espionage and sabotage, a standard part of
the litany in official Chinese statements on security. We
believe its anti-espionage duties will be confined to guard duty
at sensitive installations. According to statements in the
Chinese media, it reports to the Ministry of Public Security,
although its units seem to have ties to the regional PLA command
structures as well.
The party's Discipline Inspection Committee is not usually
numbered among security organization by the Chinese, but some of
its responsibilities fall into that area. It has authority to
investigate and punish corruption, abuse of office, and political
misconduct by party cadre. It has been heavily involved in the
crackdown on economic crimes and also in the .campaign against
Cultural Revolution remnants.
Reasons for the Reorganization
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In our opinion, Beijing also intends the reorganization to
prevent the new security organs from gaining too much influence
over policy. Before and during the Cultural Revolution, some top
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officials engaged in internal security work 125X1
were able to compile 25X1
dossiers on leaders which they used as weapons in disputes and
factional infighting. By dividing security and intelligence
powers among several ministries, the leadershi has indicated its
determination forestall such a possibility. 25X1
The revival of the People's Armed Police also owes something
to Cultural Revolution events. After the Army assumed internal
security responsibilites, local units of the PLA frequently
intervened in the fighting between factions of that era, and
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ultimately the Army was used to bring. the Red: Guards' activities
to a halt. We believe the new force is intended to prevent the
PLA from playing such a role by removing its internal security
functions. This new force also advances streamlining of the PLA,
a major reform goal, b.y reducing the number of people on active
military duty.
Tighter Control
The division of responsibilities and appointment of new
leadership will probably improve both the performance. and
political reliability of the security apparatus.. We believe it
will have less impact on China's intelligence-gathering
activities than on internal security--which in our view is of
much greater concern to the leadership. Certainly the
reorganization measures focused, as far as we can tell on
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internal security, not on foreign intelligence. 25X1
The People's Armed Police, however, may be a less effective
force than the leadership hopes. The PAP was created essentially
b,y separating PLA security personnel from the Arm and
redesignating them as PAP. (they are 25X1
not happy with their change of status. In addition they have
been assigned some extremely unpopular tasks--such as guarding
rich peasants, farmers who prosper under the new system.
Recruiting and morale are likely to be headaches for the
leadership, but they probably regard these problems a nable
tradeoff for moving toward their other goals. 25X1
The Ministry of State Security, though powerful, does not
seem to us to be a "Chinese KGB" despite the similarity in
name. It lacks the KGB's sweeping authority in matters of
internal security and does not command a large body of troops as
the Soviet organization does.
The restructuring and the accompanying campaign stressing
security concerns are likel to have a chillin effect
domesticall .
Contacts
e ween inese an oreigners, already tight, will be even more
closely watched. We expect that Chinese officials will be more
guarded in their conversations with foreigners, official and
unofficial. It will probably be increasingly difficult to gather
certain information for business and trade purposes from Chinese
fearful of giving away too much economic information and bein
charged under China's vague and inclusive espionage laws
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Distribution
China: Reorganization of Security Organs
Department of State
1 - Director, INR
1 - Director of Research, INR
1 - Chief, Northeast Asia Division Office of Analysis for East
Asia and Pacific (INR)
1 - INR/EC/RE
1 - Director, Office of Chinese Affairs, Bureau of East. Asia and
Pacific Affairs
1 - Chief, Economic Section, Office of Chinese Affairs
Defense Intelli ence Agency
- DIO for East Asia and Pacific
I - Chief, DE3
Central Intelligence Agency
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1 -
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D/OCR
C/OEA/CH
C/OEA/CH/DOM
C/OEA/CH/FOR
C/OEA/CH/DEF
C/OEA/CH/DEV
D/OEAA
D/PJIC
OCO/IMB/CB
PDB
D/DDI
OEA/NA
OEA/SE
C/FLS
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