PROSPECTS FOR CHILE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000402130001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 2, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
Z/3
2 September 1983
Prospects for Chile
Summary
This paper assesses the implications of the emergence over the past
eight months of a broad-based opposition movement in Chile. It
concludes that there is little prospect of a quick compromise between
the government and opposition that would head off scheduled national
protests around 8 September. Of three scenarios we envision between now
and the end of the year, the two that do not involve a negotiated
settlement both carry a strong risk that President Pinochet--by nature
reluctant to give ground--would eventually be removed by the military.
The extreme left is likely to be a peripheral actor and catalyst in all
three scenarios,. unless major opposition elements discredit themselves
in unsuccessful negotiations with Pinochet or there is complete
disorder, in which case radicals would be able to improve their
position. In examining the fundamental stability of the regime over the
next year or so, the paper concludes that only agreement on hastening
the democratic opening will avoid radicalization and polarization.
Thus, we judge that the military will eventually compel Pinochet to
reach such an agreement or remove him in an effort to preserve domestic
25X1
This memorandum was requested by the Deputy Director for 25X1
Intelligence. It was prepared by South America West
Branch, South America Division, Office of African and Latin American
Analysis with a contribution from the Political Psychology Division,
Office of Global Issues. It was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations. It contains information available as of 31 August 1983.
Questions and comments may be directed to Chief, South America Division,
R C 1
ALA-M-83-10142
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Background
A two-year economic recession and President Pinochet's
reluctance to accelerate the constitutional timetable for
returning Chile to civilian rule in 1989 have dramatically eroded
his popular support and spurred development of a strong
opposition movement this year. Moderate and broad-based
political and labor coalitions have sponsored "days of national
protest", which have gathered momentum. each month since May and
caused some moderates in Pinochet's cabinet and military junta to
urge him to grant concessions. The Democratic Alliance--which
includes conservative Republicans, centrist Christian and Social
Democrats, and non-Marxist Radical and Socialist leftists--
announced a platform on 21 August that called for political
reforms, Pinochet's resignation, and a return to full civilian
democracy within 18 months.
Government, and moderate opposition leaders recently opened a
dialogue in hopes of reversing political polarization. Sergio
Jarpa--a conservative civilian diplomat appointed Interior
Minister on 10 August--has met with opposition labor, human
rights, and political leaders during the past three weeks. As a
result, the government has announced some limited but
psychologically appealing concessions, fostering a more positive
atmosphere for dialogue and possible compromise. The
assassination this week of the capital's military governor has
not derailed negotiations. Because fundamental differences still
exist, however, various opposition groups still plan
demonstrations--aimed at inducing the military to force major
concessions from the President or to remove him--on several days
surrounding the tenth anniversary of the military coup on 11
September.
The perspectives of the key players in the coming weeks are
as follows:
-- The moderate opposition groups are faced with a
dilemma. They want to avoid extreme polarization, which
could deprive them of leadership of the opposition
movement, give the initiative to the radical left as
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well as the government, and reduce chances for a
democratic opening. At the same time, after years of
experience with Pinochet's authoritarian instincts and
ridicule of civilian politicians, they are extremely
suspicious that he will renege on concessions once they
agree to halt the protest movement. This would leave
them open to leftist charges of a sellout.
The military is still reported by all US mission
elements to support Pinochet's continuation as
President, but the services--especially the Air Force
and Navy--agree on the need for a democratic opening.
They wish to retain the military's unity and integrity,
which they fear would be jeopardized if they are
continually forced to take to the streets to control
protestors, as they did for the first time in August.
Jarpa has become Pinochet's "super minister" for
political issues. But Jarpa is a uniquely independent
figure. He apparently is beginning to establish his own
ties to the members of the junta, the church, the press,
and elements of the opposition. To retain his post, he
must begin to deflate the opposition movement, and to
accomplish this, he probably believes that he must
continue progress toward a democratic opening.
President Pinochet, whose chief objective is to stay in
office, has been forced to move toward an acceleration
of the democratization process to preserve his power
base in the military. His instinct is to crack down on
his opponents rather than make concessions, but he may
now realize that the opposition's momentum and the
military's sentiment have foreclosed this option.
Nonetheless, he will only reluctantly agree to political
reforms, and he will remain suspicious of moderate
opponents and alert to any opportunity to divide them.
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Strategies/Prospects for September
In September, moderate opposition leaders probably will:
-- Continue efforts to control violence (believing that it
only discredits them and provokes the military into
adopting a harder line).
-- Try to make the protests more extensive (to increase
pressure on the military and Pinochet for substantive
concessions).
-- Attempt to maintain their unity by centering protests
around a specific set of demands (the Democratic
Alliance platform).
-- Time the return of exiled Christian Democratic leader
Andres Zaldivar to maximize its political impact.
The government will probably continue negotiating with
moderate opposition figures to end the protests or, failing that,
to buy. time and attempt to splinter the opposition. At the same
time, concern over communist plans to foment violence probably
will result in a significant troop presence in the capital for
the largest scheduled protest on 8 September. Security forces
will react firmly to demonstrations by Communists and may pre-
emptively arrest leftist opposition figures.
We believe the chances for a compromise before 8 September
that would halt the national day of protest are remote because
of: 1) the shortness of time, 2) the opposition's sense that it
must capitalize on its momentum before Christmas and the Southern
Hemisphere "summer" vacation, 3) the opposition's belief that it
cannot risk its current momentum on a compromise that might be
criticized by the left as a sellout, 4) the determination of
Pinochet and the military to maintain social order, and 5)
radicals' efforts to impede dialogue by sparking violence.
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Short-Range Scenarios
We see three possible scenarios through the end of this
year. In what we regard as the most likely, there is no
negotiated settlement of differences, and protests continue
through December at no greater level than those in August.
Pinochet probably would offer some concessions on political party
laws and congressional elections, but would drag out the
processes in hopes of dividing the opposition. He would still
face increasing pressure from both inside and outside the
government to speed up the transition to civilian rule. He would
attempt to maintain his position by persuading conservatives and
the military that he was making a reasonable effort to meet
opposition demands. This argument would not be compelling in the
face of further protests by moderates, efforts by leftist
terrorists to radicalize the atmosphere, continuing economic
stagnation, and rising international pressure. This probably
will set in motion a process of building pressure within the
military to replace Pinochet. At some point--possibly by
December but more likely in 1984--Pinochet would be removed by
the military.
The second most likely scenario is that--regardless of the
magnitude of protests and whether Pinochet retains office--Jarpa
negotiates a compromise settlement before the end of the year
that satisfies the bulk of the opposition. This would require
announcement of immediate political liberalization, election of a
congress well before 1989, and major changes in current exile,
civil liberty, and economic reactivation policies. This
scenario would reduce internal and international pressures on the
regime, maximize the meager chance for economic recovery over the
next year, and satisfy the majority of moderate opponents. The
* Any negotiated long-term transition to civilian rule would
ultimately also have to deal with: a dignified departure for
Pinochet and timely presidential elections, such questions as the
"disappeared" persons and the military's political role, and
opposition promises to honor debt rescheduling agreements and
free market economic principles.
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radical left would stage violent activites in an attempt to
provoke a government crackdown and undermine compromise. We do
not believe the government would fall for this ploy. Even so, a
real compromise would demand of both parties a good faith effort
and high levels of patience and skill--qualities which neither
side has demonstrated in abundance to date.
The third most likely scenario is that protests in September
or thereafter are more massive and violent than those in August,
and Jarpa is unable to arrange a negotiated settlement. This
would substantially increase the pressure inside and outside the
government for Pinochet to make major concessions, leading in one
of two directions. First, Pinochet might propose a harsh
crackdown to restore public order and preserve national
security. He would appeal to the military and nervous Chileans
who remember the chaos under Allende and fear it might occur
again if a transition proceeds too rapidly. He would point out
that he had initially met reasonable demands and made an honest
effort to compromise, but that to deliver the country immediately
to the opposition--particularly the Christian Democrats whom the
military distrusts--would be to pave the way for Marxists to come
to power again. The probability of heightened radical activity
during this period would help Pinochet's case and buy him a
little time, but only in,the very short term. Within weeks,
increased repression would engender immense internal and
international criticism, and moderate groups within the military
probably would eventually rally the armed forces to remove h;im.
Even if, in the event of violent and massive protests
between now and December, Pinochet did not revert to repressive
tactics, the military would continue to debate the best course of
action. The Chilean armed forces are highly disciplined and
unified and, although they take time to reach a consensus, would
probably act together and would insist that Pinochet make
substantial concessions. Tense months would follow as suspicious
opposition leaders sought to wring as much from the government as
possible. If Pinochet refused and insisted on keeping the
presidency, the officers would agree to remove him and install
another general, a conservative civilian, or--least likely--a
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moderate opposition leader. They would legalize parties and
schedule elections well before 1989. We do not believe the
military would splinter over the issue, but if they did, the
country would experience chaos and rapid economic
deterioration.
The Radical Left
The strategy of the Marxist left varies--primarily in
degree--under the three scenarios, with its likely role that of a
catalyst. Its violent activities, like those of some far right
elements, would be designed to sabotage compromise. The left
also would seek further to radicalize the protest movement and/or
seize some degree of leadership. Significantly, some elements of
the Communist and Socialist Parties have recently counseled non-
violent activity to try to take advantage of the mainstream
opposition movement. Christian Democrats and other moderates
probably can afford to hold the Communists at arms length as long
as they can maintain the opposition's momentum. Blocking the
Marxist minority from assuming power is perhaps the only common
ground shared by the military, civilian conservatives, and the
Christian Democrats, and we believe they would all act to head
off such a move. In the short term, the extreme left would be
able to improve its position significantly only if principal
opposition elements were discredited by appearing too flexible in
early negotiations with Pinochet that eventually fail, or if
there were complete disorder and extreme polarization. Under
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these conditions, elements of the left might be able to become
formal partners in the opposition coalition, and radical demands
for more extreme solutions could gain wider acceptance.
Longer Range Stability
With civilian political processes sidelined for years, the
fundamental strength and stability of the Chilean political
system has depended on three elements:
-- the capability of the armed forces to determine the
political direction by force.
-- the national consensus against a return to the chaos of
Marxist government.
-- the success of the government's economic program.
The severe economic downturn eliminated one of these
supports. Over the next year or so, Pinochet's actions could
undermine the other two factors for stability, unless he agrees
to an accelerated transition to civilian rule. Resistance to
democratization will fuel continued opposition protests and
further polarization, increasing the pressure on military
unity. At the same time, society will become more radicalized,
weakening the moderates and undermining the consensus against
leftist alternatives.
Because the Chilean military recognizes this, we believe it
will not allow Pinochet's potential intransigence to jeopardize
its unity or place the nation's stability at risk. Armed Forces
leaders will instead rally together and press him to grant the
reforms necessary to reverse spiraling political polarization.
If he refuses, the military will replace him with a transition
government capable of maintaining order while satisfying moderate
opposition demands for an accelerated transition to democratic
rule. Thus, although we expect an extremely unsettled atmosphere
over the next year or so, we do not expect collapse of the
political system, a leftist takeover, or civil war.
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External Factors That Could Affect the Scenarios
-- An increase in tension in the Beagle Channel dispute
with Argentina would help Pinochet by diverting public
attention and rallying the populace against the foreign
threat.
- The release of information linking the government to the
murder or coverup of the assassination of labor leader
Tucapel Jimenez in 1982 would increase antigovernment
protests.
-- Any significant deterioration in Pinochet's health could
create a power scramble in the military, since he has
not designated a successor from among his constituency.
-- Any dramatic increase in external (primarily
Soviet/Cuban) support for Communist or terrorist
activities in Chile could encourage a government
crackdown.
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SUBJECT: Prospects for Chile
Distribution:
Original - Requestor
1 - ADDI
1 - DDI Registry
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American
Affairs
2 - NSC
1 - Director, International Security Affairs, Department
1
of Defense
- Director, INR, Department of State
1
- Executive Director
1
- NIO/LA
1
- NIC/AG
1
- PDB Staff
1
- C/DDI/PES
.1
- DDI/CPAS/ILS
1
- D/ALA
2
- ALA/PS
1
- ALA Research Director
4
- CPAS/IMC/CB
1
- SAD Files
DDI/ALA/SAD/SW~ I(2 September 1983)
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