PERU: PRESIDENT BELAUNDE'S PROSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000500170001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 13, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 2, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/09: CIA-RDP85T00287R000500170001-0
Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
2 December 1983
PERU: PRESIDENT BELAUNDE'S PROSPECTS
Summary
A deteriorating economy, persistent insurgency, and massive electoral
setbacks have badly eroded Peruvian President Belaunde's popular standing and
political base. Although the US Embassy reports he is in no imminent danger
of being removed from office, a continued downward spiral in his performance
over the next 6-12 months, in our view, w'11 raise a serious danger of
military intervention in the government.
The economic crisis, which has been well-chronicled by the
US mission in Lima, is at the root of many of Belaunde's
problems.
-- Unparalleled climatic disasters this year have aggravated
two years of stagnation by destroying infrastructure,
causing food shortages, contributing to inflation, and
curbing needed export earnings.
-- Economic contraction and high inflation are sparking
consumer protests and intensifying labor agitation.
-- Strong public reaction to the IMF-mandated economic
program is increasing pressure on Belaunde to scrap some
This memorandum was requested by the Deputy Secretary of Treasury. It was
prepared by South America Division, Office of African and Latin
American Analysis coordinated with the Directorate of Operations. It
contains information available as of 1 December 1983. Questions and comments
may be directed to the Chief, South America Division, OALA,
(::ALA- M-83-10188
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austerity measures in favor of more populist economic
policies.
Although not a direct threat to the government, the ability
of the Maoist Sendero Luminoso (SL) insurgent group to continue
attacks, despite heavy losses inflicted by government security
forces, has damaged Belaunde's popular standing and relations
with the military, in our judgment.
-- The President's decision in December 1982 to yield to the
armed forces' desire to enter the fight against the 1,000
to 1,500 insurgents has led to heavy fighting in the
southeastern highlands Emergency zone and caused
significant guerrilla, and probably civilian, casualties.
-- The police in Lima have scored substantial successes
against urban SL cells, which have reduced terrorist
capabilities there.
-- The SL's failure to disrupt the national municipal
elections on 13 November (except for eight provinces of
the highlands Emergency Zone) demonstrates its largely
localized appeal.
-- To date, however, the military's efforts have not
significantly damaged the insurgents' leadership
structure, terrorist capabilities, or popularity in their
highlands stronghold.
Political and Popular Standing
Since he assumed office in July 1980, Belaunde's political
fortunes and popularity have declined substantially because of
economic and insurgency problems. His standing in the polls has
plummeted from a satisfactory rating of over 60 percent in 1980
to a low of 18 percent in August 1983, a decline that in the view
of the US Embassy has caused the rightist Popular Christian Party
of the governing coalition to distance itself from the
administration and Belaunde's Popular Action Party. This, in
turn, has undermined the President's ability to dominate the
Congress, in our judgment. At the same time, growing
factionalism within the governing Popular Action Party
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Similar perceptions contributed to
Be aun e s ouster by e military in 1968.
Opposition political parties successfully capitalized on
widespread public discontent to convert the traditionally
parochial municipal elections in November into a mid-term
referendum on the Belaunde administration. The governing party
suffered record losses, capturing about 15 percent of the total
vote and carrying only a few insignificant municipalities. The
reinvigorated major opposition party, the center-left American
Popular Revolutionary Alliance, was the principal beneficiary,
winning about 38 percent of the total votes and most major
provincial municipalities. The Marxist United Left coalition
gained about a third of the vote nationwide and won the important
Lima mayoralty.
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Outlook
As the US Embassy points out, President Belaunde is a
skillful politician who retains some advantages.
-- Despite public discontent with the administration, recent
polls indicate that Peruvians still prefer democratic
government to military rule.
-- Moderate opposition parties are likely to be cautious in
their criticism of the government for fear that completely
discrediting Belaunde would provoke military intervention
and destroy their own political futures.
-- While dissatisfied with Belaunde's counterinsurgency
policy, the armed forces are generally pleased with the
administration's support on arms procurement and other
military matters.
Thus the President may attempt to use a few highly visible
measures--such as cabinet shifts, moderately populist economic
measures, more armed forces autonomy in dealing with the SL--to
regain some political initiative and relieve some military
pressure.
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Subject: PERU: PRESIDENT BELAUNDE'S PROSPECTS
Requestor
DDI
Executive Director
NIO/LA
NIC/AG
PDB Staff
C/DDI/PES
DDI/CPAS/ILS
D/ALA
ALA/PS
ALA Research Director
CPAS/IMC/CB
SAD files
DDI/ALA/SAD/SW,.
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