CENTRAL AMERICAN MONTHLY REPORT #4

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000500180001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 23, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 1, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
November 1983
CENTRAL AMERICAN MONTHLY. REPORT #4
Summary
Sandinista concern over a possible invasion has reached a near panic
level in the aftermath of US actions in Grenada. As a result, the
Sandinistas reportedly have ordered the Salvadoran insurgents to leave
Nicaragua and set up their headquarters elsewhere. In Ei Salvador,
continued Army setbacks have prompted General Vides to make sweeping
changes in the military command structure,- including strengthening the
general staf f and appointing more competent field commanders. In
Guatemala, rightist violence has caused new problems in Mejia's relations
with the US and the Catholic Church The Suazo government continues to
strengthen its hand in Honduras. Costa Rica has issued a new proclamation
of neutrality to improve its intemationaI image. In Panama, General
Noriega has removed the leftist Vice President because of recent critical
foreign policy statements. Meanwhile, the Contadora negotiations are
making little progress, but another meeting is scheduled for early 1984 to
discuss dra f t treaties.
This memorandum was prepared by the Central America Branch, ALA. It was
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations. It contains information available as of 9
December 1983. Questions and comments are welcome and should be addressed to Chief,
Middle America-Caribbean Division, OALA
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Military
Fighting tapered off somewhat in late November amidst indications that the FDN
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is positioning to begin a major offensive in Nueva Segovia Department. I 25X1
the Sandinistas believe the FDN plans to seize and hold territory, 25X1
and government orces are being repositioned in the area. In the east, the Sandinistas
are continuing to strengthen defenses around the main coastal towns, while supply
problems are becoming chronic for their troops in the field. Eden Pastora's guerrillas
proclaimed the start of a major offensive in southern Nicaragua in mid-November but did
little damage. The only evidence of the offensive we have seen so far was their .attack
on the border town of Cardenas. 25X1
indicate the FDN has some 6,800 ..25X1
troops, of which 5,900 are armed and inside Nicaragua. The Misura claim to have 1,750
armed fighters in the country. These strength figures obtained from 25X1
field commanders-are somewhat lower than earlier claims and apparently reflect
previous exaggerations by the general staffs of the two movements. Combined with Eden
Pastora's claims of some 2 800 errillas in southern Nicaragua, total insurgent strength
is some 11,000 to 12,000. 25X1
Nicara a is continuing to strengthen its air defenses with substantial Cuban
assistance.
where observers have identified
Soviet-built early warning and height- finder radars. radar signals indicate
the equipment will soon be operational, and the facility probably. will provide warning
information to antiaircraft artillery sites in western Nicaragua. It also forms the nucleus
of a capability to provide ground-controlled intercept inf orm ation-essential to the
operations of MIGs or other jet fighters.
At month's end the Sandinistas were making preparations for an arms delivery at
El Bluff, where major shipments previously have occurred. The delivery ship, a Bulgarian
freighter, left the Black Sea at mid-month and transited the Atlantic in radio silence. It
apparently is carrying vehicles and construction equipment in addition to arms.
Bulgarian ships have made two similar deliveries, the first in December 1982 and the
second in May 1983.
Political
In the aftermath of the events in Grenada, Nicaraguan fears over a possible US-supported
invasion increased dramatically. The Sandinistas responded by adopting new defensive
measures, including stepped-up militia training, which further militarized society. They also
undertook a number of political and diplomatic initiatives to u est their flexibililt in regional
negotiations and their willingness to negotiate with the US. 25X1
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At the beginning of the month, Sandinista policies toward internal opposition
groups hardened. Harassment of the Catholic Church for its opposition to the military
conscription law provoked the most intense church-state dispute since the violent clashes
of August last year. Draft registration figures announced by the government were only
about half what the Sandinistas had predicted, thus indicating the un~oaularity of the law
and possibly contributing to the confrontation with the Church.
By mid-month, however, the Sandin
announced relaxation of press censorship,
expropriation, and initiated talks with opp
freed some 300 Miskito prisoners and proc
the Sandinistas announced t
file. Finally
istas were taking a different tack. They
offered to issue landowners guarantees against
osition political leaders. The government also
laimed an amnesty for all insurgent rank and
hat the electoral roeess would begin in January
,
1984 and elections would be held in 1985.
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Unidentified Sandinista officials recently told the press that 1,200 Cuban teachers
and technicians reeentl left Nicaragua and that 1,000 military advisers would leave
soon. indicate that some Cuban civilian advisers
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have been sent home-pro a y or eir sa ety-but the Sandinistas apparently are
taking advantage of the annual rotation of 2,000 teachers to suggest a much larger
reduction in the Cuban presence. We doubt that any military ersonnel have left and
~suaeests that the Cuban military role is increasing. for
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Concurrently, the Sandinistas are ostensibly distancing themselves from regional
revolutionaries. Some leadi Salvadoran leftist olitical leaders left Managua in
mid-November, and the Sandinistas are also
requiring the insurgents to leave or be integrated into the Nicaraguan Army. We have
seen no evidence yet that the Sandinistas have closed the Salvadoran command and
control center in Managua or that they have ceased arms shipments to the insurgents, but
the guerrillas are preparing for a significant reduction in
uture Sandm~sta suppor , inc uding arms and ammunition.
Economic
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Libya has boosted its aid to Managua recently, 25X1
1984 and defer rescheduling the remaining X112.5 million until later. 25X1
to recommend that Nicaragua pay $17.5 million of the interest payments it owes b June
including a X40 million cash grant in October and a possible X50 million line of credit. If
true, this would be the most substantial disbursement of Lib an aid to the Sandinistas
since Qadhafi extended a $100 million loan in 1981 hat. 25X1
Nicaragua is continuing to have difficulties repaying Mexican loans. 25X1
The Sandinistas are making progress in their negotiations with foreign commercial
lenders and the terms ma fall onl a little short of the one-year moratorium they had
sought. the banks' negotiating committee recently agreed 25X1
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to replace one that washed out in 1982.
disruptions, and they have begun construction of a road and railroad causeway at Corinto
ae i y a asachapa to reduce the vulnerability of their oil stocks to insurgent
ineffective in combat and pose no serious threat to the insurgents.
Salvadoran units trained at the Regional Military Training Center in Honduras are
Militar
The guerrillas were able to maintain the pace of their military attacks in eastern
and central El Salvador throughout November. On three separate occasions, insurgent
units routed newly-trained government battalions, two of which recently had received
training from US personnel. the insurgents believe
Representatives from the two largest guerrilla factions-the People's
Revolutionary Army and the Popular Liberation Forces-met in late October to plan
further coordinated military operations The
Popular Liberation Forces reportedly agreed to launch attacks in Chalatenango
Department after other groups mounted diversionary operations in Morazan and
Usulutan. More recently, the guerrillas reportedly were preparing to launch a nationwide
offensive in mid-December. Their pl t b ek however b the rospective
loss of Nicaraguan logistical support.
In an effort to bolster the government's sagging war effort, Defense Minister
Vides announced sweeping changes in the Salvadoran high command. Colonel Adolfo
Blandon was appointed Chief of Staff, Lieutenant Colonel Miguel Mendez was named
head of operations, and Lieutenant Colonel Domingo Monterrosa received command of
the 3rd Brigade. At least nine other major field commands-including three of the four
US-trained immediate-reaction battalions-received new commanders. In addition, the
Army's six military zones were realigned, placing the easternmost departments of San
Miguel, Morazan, and La Union under command of the 3rd Brigade.
Blandon and Mendez are competent and respected commanders, and their
appointments almost certainly presage a substantial increase in the command and control
authority of the general staff. Monterrosa is considered the Army's most effective
combat commander, and the reorganization of the eastern departments-where fighting
has been most intense over the past few months-underscores the government's concern
about recent guerrilla successes there.
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The Sandinistas have been successful in lining up tanker transport for their oil
imports, thus far without employing ships from Communist countries. They a arentl
have enough deliveries scheduled to meet their needs for the rest of the year.~p
investigating reactivation of a mothballed oil offloading and storage
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Government forces remain largely on the defensive, although local offensives
were conducted in western Cabanas and northern San Vicente. Vides canceled all
militar leaves in mid-November due to the military situation in the east. 25X1
the Army commander in Morazan believes the security situation n 25X1
is comman as a eriorated steadily over the past two months and that the uerrillas
could attack the departmental capital of San Francisco Gotera at any time. :25X1
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Political
The selective use of violence by far right terrorist groups continued through
November and likely will be a significant factor during the upcoming presidential
campaign. Extreme rightists are frustrated by their failure to reverse reforms,
concerned with recent gains by the guerrillas on the battlefield, and fearful that
moderate overnment leaders may seek reconciliation with the insurgent left.
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efense Minister Vides is considering ways to 25X1
investigate an neutra ze a squad activity. Nevertheless, efforts to curb rightwing
terrorism will continue to be hampered by the organizational independence of death
squads and vigilante groups, as well as by the weak resolve of many government and
military authorities.
The election process appears to be on track with the Assembly's recent passage of
a temporary electoral decree. The presidential election will be held on 25 March 1984,
and the new President will be inaugurated on 1 June for afive-year term. Military
personnel who request retirement will be eligible to run for public office, but thus far no
active military officers have shown interest in contesting the election. Although a
formal voter registration effort began this month, we believe it is unlikely to be ready
for use in the presidential balloting. Nevertheless, many politicians are requesting that
municipal elections be held on 25 March, which would require a comprehensive registry.
We believe such a registry could be counterproductive--at least in the March
election-because it would force hundreds of thousands to return to home districts, many
of which are in guerrilla-controlled territorv. This would probably reduce voter
participation substantially.
Political
Chief of State Mejia retains the backing of most senior commanders, but growing
political violence is increasin o osition from olitical party leaders and Catholic
Church officials. Mejia's personnel changes in the armed
forces have been widely supported, primarily because they have helped restore the
normal chain of command. Most in the military also appear to approve of Mejia's
commitment to holding constituent assembl elections next July and to returning the
country to civilian rule in 1985
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Mejia underscored his desire for legitimate
elections by reject ng his senior commanders' su estion that he remain as Minister of
Defense under any new civilian government.
Nevertheless, Mejia's failure to obtain such assistance, as well as the
recent cut in US economic aid to Guatemala, may cause some officers to question their
.continuing support for him.
A more serious threat to Mejia's initiatives and survival is the rise in insurgent
terrorism and abuses by security forces and ultrarightist extremists. Mejia may decide
to move up the official convocation of the electoral campaign to this month, but already
at least six party organizers from new leftist political groups apparently have been
kidnapped. Such intimidation of moderate and leftist parties is likely to increase as
elections approach and, if some groups decide not to participate, the field maybe
restricted to mostly rightwing parties. This might prom t militar intervention b
reformist officers opposed to a victory by the far right.
The Catholic Church stepped up its denunciations of the violence following the
murder of a priest after Mejia publicly accused some in the clergy of supporting the
insurgents. Although responsibility for the murder has not been established, Church
officials and the media are blaming the government. In addition, neither the press nor
the diplomatic corps accepts the government's claim that the deaths of three of the
Guatemalan employees of the US Agency for International Development kidnapped in
M ilita
The insurgents are increasing urban terrorism and rural attacks, and recently
scored a notable success by killing one of the Army's top field commanders in an
ambush. The military believes the guerrillas are planning an offensive for January, which
could stall progress toward elections while generating an atmosphere of uncontrolled
violence. Nevertheless, the government forces still retain the tactical advantage, and
have returned to a high level of patrolling in major areas of conflict.
the Army is recruiting and outfitting 11 new in entry battalions
to dealov to the contested areas to pressure the guerrillas' remaining strongholds.
HONDDRAS
Political
Infighting in both major political parties continues and apparently is strengthening
President Suazo's hand. The ruling Liberal Party is purging supporters of dissident
former minister Jose Azcona del Hoyo in an attempt to weaken his chances fora 1985
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presidential bid. In the opposition National Party, longtime leader Ricardo Zuniga was
ousted from power by the installation of a factious anti-Zuniga party bloc. Apparently
Liberals and anti-Zuniga Nationalists in the Congress have concluded an informal pact to
support the Suazo Government as part of their efforts to weaken both Azeona's and
Zuniga's influence.
_ I The party's association with the
Salvadorans may indicate an increased effort by the Salvadoran guerrillas to encourage
outside groups to foment violence on their behalf. To date, however, the Communists
have been generally unable to carry out major disruptive actions largely due to their own
disunity and extensive government surveillance.
Economic
Assisted by the informal Congressional pact between the two major parties, the
Suazo government achieved swift approval for the 1984 central government budget in
late October. Although its overall level is X76 million less than in 1983, the budget slates
an almost 20-percent increase in funds for public debt servicing. Moreover, continued
heavy payments on publicly guaranteed private debt probably will push Honduras out of
compliance with its IMF standby agreement thus ieopardizing disbursement of the last
1983 tranche of $16 million.
Responding to recent private sector pressures, the Suazo government rammed an
economic emergency decree through the Congress in late November. The measure gives
the executive broad powers to .enact new-but as yet unspecified--solutions to current
economic problems. Moreover, the US Embassy reports that a restructuring of .the
President's economic cabinet appears imminent as an additional gesture to the private
sector.
Mililtary
an it was a year ago. Senior Honduran o ficers are
concerned about this and recently deployed three companies of troops to augment the
two already there. This development is not likely to have much impact on the arms flow
across the border, however, nor will it curb the occasional movements of Salvadoran
insurgents across the border to take temporary refuge in Honduras..
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COSTA RICA
increasing by 150 per week.
Despite the restoration of normal diplomatic ties in early November, relations
between San Jose and Managua worsened at mid-month following another border skirmish
between Sandinista troops and Costa Rican-based insurgent forces. In addition, the
increasing flow of Nicaraguan refugees into Costa Rica has heightened government
concern over the refugee camp population, which now numbers some 2,000 and is
sign of the more neutral direction of the country's foreign policy.
Political
The resignation of Foreign Minister Volio--the government's leading anti-
Sandinista hardliner-has raised fears in San Jose and in the region that left-of-center
elements in the government are gaining influence. For some critics, this view was
reinforced by President Mongers formal proclamation of Costa Rican neutrality at mid-
month. Nevertheless, Monge sought to appease hardliners by the insertion of language
reaffirming San Jose's commitments to regional security arrangements. The
government's recent indecision about whether to proceed with a development project
near the Nicaraguan border region involving up to 1,000 US Army ,engineers is a further
Economic
San Jose narrowly averted a cutoff of IMF funds this past month by unifying and
adjusting its two-tiered exchange rate, as required by last year's standby agreement, in
time to comply with the IMF's December 1983 performance targets. Negotiations to
conclude a new standby agreement for 19$4, however, have stalled over next year's
proposed ~3-billion budget and IMF concern about some reforms that have not yet been
enacted. It now appears that a new accord, or' a concluded this
month, may be several more weeks in coming.
Although the government tolerated earlier indiscretions by Illueca as a concession
to the left and as a means of promoting its Third World credentials, Noriega probably
believes the removal of the leftist-leaning Vice President will help .assure a more unified
expires next September.
The temporary replacement of Vice President Illueca apparently was prompted by
his criticism of Panamars involvement in the Central American Defense Council,
according to the US Embassy. Defense Forces Commander Noriega had openly supported
the Council's revival and reportedly was angered by Illueca's speech to the National
Assembly in November disavowing Panamars participation in the regional military
organization. Minister of Government and Justice Ozores has been appointed Acting
Vice President, ostensibly until Illueca's term as President of the UN General Assembly
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approach in foreign policy matters. Moreover, IIlueca's tendency to make foreign policy
statements independent of official policy lines is likely to prevent his return to the
vice-presidency. It is unclear to us whether Illueea's chastisement by the Panamanian
leadership will cause him to take a more favorable posture towards Washington in the
UN, where he may still exert influence independently in the General Assembly.
Economic
The potentially explosive labor situation created by striking banana workers was
averted when they returned to work after reaching settlement with the US-owned
company. In addition, the labor union's Communist legal adviser-considered a source of
disruption during the negotiations-probably will leave his post as a result of the new
contract. Although some problems still confront the banana industry in Panama, the US
Embassy believes the current agreement will pave the way for smoother relations in the
future.
REGIONAL PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
The Contadora and Central American Foreign Ministers met informally at the
OAS General Assembly in mid-November. According to Panamanian Foreign Minister
Ortega, the sponsoring nations accepted arguments that the Central Americans should be
negotiating the language of peace treaties. d ed for January,
1984 in Panama to discuss new treaty drafts.
Nicaragua continued to show indications of flexibility, but its active diplomacy
probably reflects its fear that the Contadora deck is stacked against it. Junta
coordinator Daniel Ortega toured all the Contadora capitals at mid-month to present
"evidence" of an imminent invasion by the US. A second purpose of the trip was to
attempt to convince the Contadora countries to delay work on comprehensive treaty
drafts and to persuade them to respond to Nicaragua's October peace proposals, which
include bilateral treaties with the. US and Honduras as well as a broad Central American
security treaty.
The Sandinistas probably damaged their standing with three of the Contadora
countries through their pursuit of a one-sided resolution during debate on Central
America at the UN General Assembly. Only Mexico firmly supported Nicaragua--despite
s few attempts to moderate the resolution--and as a result was later publicly accused of
bias by Honduras. The text of the resolution, which was finally approved by consensus,
contains some minor victories for the Nicaraguans. Nevertheless, it was a far cry from
what the Sandinistas sought and probably hoped they could get, and was widely regarded
at the UN as a setback for Nicaragua.
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SUBJECT: Central American Report #4
Copy # 1- Mr. Richard C. McFarlane
2 - Mr. Donald Gregg
3 -Ambassador Shlaudeman for the Kissinger Commission
4 -The Honorable Richard B. Stone
5 -General Paul Gorman
6 - HPSCI
7 - SSCI
8 - Lt. Gen. James A. Williams
9 - Mr. Nestor D. Sanchez
10 - Mr. Constantine Menges
11- Lt. Gen. Lincoln D. Faurer, USAF
12 -Vice Admiral Arthur S. Moreau
13 - Mr. Hugh Montgomery
14 -Ambassador Langhorne A. Motley
15 -Doug Mulholland
16 -Roger Fontaine, NSC
17 - DCI - 7D60
18 - DDCI - 7D6011
19 -Executive Director - 7D44
20 - SA/DCI/IC - 71)60
21 -Executive Registry - 7E12
22 -DDI - 7E44
23 - DDO - 7E26
24 - IAD/SAG/SOIC -1E4846
25 - NIO/LA - ?E62
26 - NIC/AG - 2E49
27 - C/DDI/PES - 7F24
28 - D/OIA - Rm. 3N 100, Bld. 213
29 -Director, Legislative Liaiso -
30 - Legistlative Liaison - 7B04
31-DDI Rep CINCLANT
32 - PDB Staff - 7F30
33 do 34 - D/ALA - 3F45
35 - C/DDO/LA - 3C3203
36 - DDO/LA
37 - C/DDO/LA
38 - C/DDO/LA
39 - C/LA/CATh = 3B44
40 do 41- ALA/PS - 3F38
42 -ALA Research Director - 3F44
43, 44, 45, dt 46 - CPAS/IMC/CB - 7G07
47 -DDI/CPAS/II.S - 7G40
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48 - C/MCD
49 - DC/MCD
50 - C/CA
51 - DC/CA
52 - C/MX
53 - C/R
54 - C/CC
55
56
57
58 -
59 -
60 -
61-
62 -
64 -
65 -MCD Files
66 - CA Files
6? - ?0 - CA Files
DDI/ALA/MCD/CA
(5 December 1983)
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General Operating Areas of Insurgent Groups
North-
Pacific
Ocean
Lago de
Nicara~tra
Democratic Revolutionary Alliance
Nicaraguan Democratic Force
Misura Revolutionary Front
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North Pacific ocean
North MANAG
Pacific Ocean
San-: i
Miguet~;
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