FRANCE: THE POLITICAL SCENE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000500380001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 17, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 3, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Memorandum for:
The attached paper, "France: The
Political Scene;" was prepared by
Associate Deputy Secretary
of Commerce Michael Bayer at his request.
EUR M 83-10023
3 February 1983
Distribution:
EURA
Office of European Analysis
Orig - Assoc. Deputy Sec. of Commerce
1 - ExDir
1 - NIO/WE
1 - OD/EURA
2 - EURA Prod Staff
4 - -IMC/ CB
1 - Division
1 - Branch
1 - Author
DDI/EURA/WE/CM 7Feb83)
ON-FILE COMMERCE
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Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
France: The Political Scene
Summary
Campaigning for the municipal elections in March is
shifting into high gear amid increasing indications that the
Socialists and their reluctant Communist allies will suffer
substantial losses. Despite opposition efforts to portray
the elections as a referendum on the Mitterrand government,
we believe it unlikely that even a serious leftist defeat
would lead President Mitterrand to dissolve parliament ---
where the Socialists enjoy an absolute majority -- and call
for a new legislative election. The municipal results will
help shape future Socialist domestic policies, however, and
could spark a serious confrontation between Mitterrand and
the Communists.
Political Background
Mitterrand's current political problems stem from his decision in 1981 to
stimulate the economy at a time when France's principal trading partners were
pursuing deflationary policies. When the expected general recovery did not
materialize, France was left with mounting trade deficits and a seriously
weakened franc. Last June the government abruptly shifted toward economic
austerity measures. These have had some success in bringing inflation down,
but at a cost in real income for workers, cutbacks in social and
political dissatisfaction among the leftist electorate.
Mitterrand's early optimism about his ability to restructure the economy
along Socialist lines has given away to a new sense of realism. In recent
public statements, for example, Mitterrand and Prime Minister Mauroy have
stressed that French domestic options are severely constrained by the
international environment. Indeed, references to "socialism" virtually have
disappeared from Mitterrand's public vocabulary. They have been replaced by
conciliatory language and some government actions designed to promote private
investment and a rebuilding of corporate balance sheets. In addition, some of
Mitterrand's top economic advisers, including Finance Minister Delors, have
hinted broadly that new belt-tightening moves might well be necessary after
the municipal elections. According to press reports, Mitterrand is braced to
accept the short-term political costs to lay the groundwork for long-term
recovery which could help Socialist candidates in parliamentary elections in
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Not surprisingly, the government's policy gyrations have sparked
criticism from nearly all of France's powerful interest groups, including the
Socialist Party and the generally supportive trade union federations.
Mitterrand's personal popularity also has suffered; his overall appro
rating has dropped from 60 percent to 48 percent over the past year.
Municipal Elections Stakes
The elections on 6 and 13 March to fill mayoral and city council posts in
France's 36,000 cities and villages will provide a measure of voter
reaction. Particular attention will be focused on the 232 cities with
populations over 30,000. The left, owing to its spectacular success in the
municipal elections in ow controls 159 of these largest cities, versus
73 for the opposition. 25X1
The Gaullists (RPR), Giscardians (UDF), and minor centrist parties who
form the opposition recently agreed to back common candidates in all but 5
major cities. Opposition spokesmen, including Gaullist leader (and Paris
Mayor) Jacques Chirac and former President Giscard, have tried to cast the
elections as a referendum on the Mitterrand government. They have hinted
publicly that the President should dissolve parliament and call new 25x1
legislative elections if the left is "rejected" in March.
Old enmities -- particularly between Giscard and Chirac -- continue to
cloud long-term prospects for the center-right. Moreover, polls indicate that
public disillusionment with the Socialists has not greatly benefitted the
opposition. 25X1
More Serious Problems for the Government Coalition
The left has internal quarrels of its own. The Socialists and Communists
have had markedly different reactions to the government's shift to anti-
inflationary policies. Most Socialists reluctantly acknowledge their
necessity, whommunists snipe at the government's alleged "gifts" to
big business
The Socialist-Communist electoral alliance appears shaky. The party
leaderships agreed in December to field common candidates in most of the
larger cities, but the Communists still face Socialist first-round challenges
in at least 11 other cities now run by Communist mayors. In addition, some
local Socialist federations are hostile to concessions made by their national
leadership and are threatening to withhold support from Communist mayors
unless some "corrections" are made in the apportionment of joint lists. Given
the past reluctance of many Socialists to back Communist candidates even when
the two parties were on warmer terms and the apparent continuing decline of
the Communists' own electorate, the stage seems to be set for an overall
leftist setback followed by a new round of mutual recriminations.
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 "confusing" and "demobilizing" the Communist electorate.
A leftist defeat in which Communist losses are particularly high could
lead to an open crisis in the government coalition. Communist leader
Marchais, for example, probably would face renewed attacks from other
Communist officials who have argued that participation in the government risks
Socialist moderate would likely be tapped as his successor.
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25X1
Outlook
The importance of local issues and personalities renders predictions
difficult at this stage in the campaign. But French political observers are
saying that.leftist losses probably will fall between the 10-15 cities
conceded b Socialist leader Jospin and the 60-70 predicted by opposition
spokesmen. 25X1
A substantial leftist setback would, at a minimum, increase chances for a
cabinet shuffle. Prime Minister Mauroy's position appears particularly
precarious, since he has been given explicit responsibility for both the
austerity program and the election campaign. If Mauroy goes. another 25X1
reject any Communist demand to "radicalize" his policies.
Perhaps more importantly, past Communist behavior strongly suggests that
their leadership will argue that a leftist setback at the polls reflects
leftist discontent with the government's "moderate" approach and that a return
to more "authentically socialist" policies is necessary. We believe, however,
based on our analysis of the constraints on French economic policy and on
public statements by Mitterrand and his top advisers, that Mitterrand would
If it goes into opposition, the PCF could cause trouble on the labor
front, but Mitterrand probably would not be seriously threatened. Mitterrand
would have to decide, however, whether to rely solely on the Socialist
parliamentary majority or to try to bring some centrists and leftwing
Gaullists into the government. The much-rumored possibility of an "opening"
to the center-left probably would hold substantial appeal for Mitterrand, in
part because of its potential for defusing some of the business community's
hostility.F 25X1
25X1
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