GREEK BASE NEGOTIATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000501290001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 10, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/18: CIA-RDP85T00287R000501290001-6
Memorandum for: RECORD
The attached was prepared by
Department conversations about the US-Greek
Base Negotiations.
Iberia-Aegean Branch, EURA/WE
for AlanLukens of INR for use in State
1 - NIO
Distribution:
1 - Orig
1 - OD/EURA
2 - EURA Production Staff
4 - OCO/IDCD/CD
1 - WE File
1 - WE IA File
1
DDI/EURA/WE/IA
(10May83)
EURA
Office of European Analysis
0 eC3_10j 3
4
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10 May 1983
MEMORANDUM
Greek Base Negotiations
Greek Firmness On Duration And Balance Issues
In our judgment, the duration question is secondary in the
Greeks' view and not one over which they would risk the success
of the negotiations. Athens' sudden resurrection of the duration
issue in the last round of the talks probably is a bargaining
ploy. seen
as the best way to obtain firm US
assurances on what for the Greeks is the far more important
matter of preserving the military balance in the Aegean.
We believe Papandreou will be tough to deal with on the
balance issue. Recent Greek governments have all placed great
emphasis on obtaining a US commitment to preserve the military
balance in the Aegean, and Papandreou would not want to be seen
as less determined on this issue than his predecessors. While
the Greeks are largely satisfied with the US-proposed language,
we believe they intend to hold out for still firmer
commitments. They probably will accept a further slackening in
the pace of negotiations, given the possibility of Congressional
action to codify the 7:10 ratio in US law. We believe the
importance to Athens of the security-related factors is reflected
in Papandreou's public remarks over the past week emphasizing the
military and economic aid issues and ignoring the duration
question.
Domestic Reactions
The government would be on firm ground with public opinion
if the talks broke down over the balance issue. Greeks across
the political spectrum, in our estimate, share the view that
Greek approval of US access to military facilities in turn
obligates Washington to give contractual assurances that it will
render multi-year security assistance. Papandreou would face
little opposition if he could convincingly demonstrate in
breaking off the talks that Washington was unwilling to meet this
requirement, or even move toward meeting it with some combination
of current-year aid, promises of "best efforts" in seeking
Congressional approval of aid in later years, and other
"sweeteners." 25X1
EUR M83-10136
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
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Papandreou probably would not receive much sympathy if he
were to break off the talks simply because of the duration
issue. Because this would imply a Socialist decision to limit
military cooperation with Washington, reactions would be
uniformly negative, except for those of the Communists and the
radical left wing of Papandreou's party. New Democracy leader
Averof has expressed support for most of the government's main
objectives in the negotiations with Washington, but he has
clearly stated his party's opposition to any actions that would
jeopardize long-term US-Greek military ties. Many military
officers would view such a development as a move on the part of
the already-suspect Socialists to sever Greek links to the
West. We would not anticipate any immediate political action by
the military, but the small group of rightwing coup plotters
would probably find active duty officers more receptive to their
ideas.
The
unenthusiastic public is response to recent Socialist and Communist
sponsored demonstrations on the base negotiations suggests that
Papandreou's positions do not automatically generate mass
support. Moreover, the President's concerns probably would lead
him to put his formidable campaigning skills at the disposal of
the opposition. At worst, a Papandreou miscalculation in the
talks and conflict with Karamanlis could lead to a full-blown
constitutional crisis and political instability. .
We believe that most Greeks would accept any agreement that
met their perceived national security interests with regard to
Turkey and offered some measure of oversight of US activities.
Opinion polls indicate that at most a third of the people are
opposed to the US military presence. Another third strongly
support retention of the US bases, and the rest are ambivalent
toward NATO and the US as long as the Alliance is responsive to
Greek security concerns.
Papandreou's Response To A Stalemate
Papandreou probably would like bilateral defense relations
to be settled before Greece assumes the EC presidency in July.
The government could well begin to restrict US activities if
there is no negotiating progress within the next month or so.
Papandreou probably would do so, however, only if he believed
that such actions could be defended domestically. We believe
Papandreou would rather let the negotiations drag on than sign an
unacceptable agreement -- one that looked worse than the 1981
draft accord.
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US Exploration Of Alternative Facilities
Few Greeks would view with comfort any US moves to relocate
its Greek bases to other points in the eastern Mediterranean.
The exploration of alternative sites in Turkey would create
profound anguish in Greece, and if Papandreou were seen as having
irresponsibly provoked a US departure from Greece, his government
would become untenable. Only in the event that such moves were
somehow seen to be a result of Washington's failure to satisfy
legitimate Greek security interests would the public react
harshly against the United States.
Other Issues
All of this said, we doubt that the duration or balance
issues are the final points of contention for the Greeks. Just
as Washington's efforts in March to satisfy Athens on the 7:10
issue led to the posing of new. obstacles, in our estimate there
is a strong possiblity that, if the two sides work out mutually
agreeable positions on duration and balance, the Greeks will then
dig in on defense industrial cooperation and US assistance in the
purchase of advanced fighter aircraft.
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