YUGOSLAVIA: TRENDS IN THE LEADERSHIP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000501440001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 13, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 27, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
27 May 1983
Yugoslavia: Trends in the Leadership
Summary
In our judgment, Yugoslavia's leaders operating under
the limitations imposed by the post-Tito political structure
are increasingly unable to solve the country's severe
political and economic problems. Judging from
their own political behavior, te
leaders rarely rise above their own parochial regional or
ethnic interests, and the slight momentum for economic
reform that grew out of the party congress last year has, we
believe, largely dissipated.
In our view, both public and official criticism of the
collective leadership will intensify, and the push for major
changes in Tito's institutional legacy will increase.
Collectively, leaders of the present institutions--including
the party--are demonstrating that they are too divided to
reform themselves. Some individual officials might, however,
be able to work out political deals that would increase
Belgrade's ability to make economic decisions, especially
Interior Minister Dolanc, who has been more active
politically in recent months.
This memorandum is for the exclusive use of Under Secretary of State, Lawrence
Eagleburger. This memorandum was prepared by
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The military's leadership, too, has probably gained in
political clout in recent months
Any reshaping of the leadership could have an impact on
US interests. The West would applaud economic policies that
are more effective and market-oriented, but the more
authoritarian polices required to strengthen federal
authority might be objectionable to the West. Moreover, if
the currently dominant moderate coalition loses out to
hardliners waiting in the wings, there could be other
strains with the West and a new Yugoslav "tilt" back toward
The Trends
Since our last assessment the
Yugoslav political system has continued to drift. Three
consecutive central committee plenums this year have failed to
forge unified approaches toward the media, cultural institutions
and--most im ortantl --economic policy. More 7 er, the
leadership, is still at a loss
in dealing wi Serbian-Albanian antipathy in Kosovo. The
federal party presidium and state presidency are demonstrating by
their inaction that they are preoccupied by petty negotiations
between their members--who act more like local barons than
federal decisionmakers--and inconclusive debates over the
country's financial woes and ethnic disputes. The Federal
Executive Council and Prime Minister Planinc, in our judgment,
are still struggling to stay ahead of day-to-day economic
problems. The Federal Assembly's growing involvement in intra-
Yugoslav affairs is making it a forum for squabbling regional
F__ I
Yugoslav leaders are aware that popular confidence is
declining as this stalemate continues. Opinion polls reveal
widespread unease with the country's situation. Many impatient
politicians and journalists have devoted articles and speeches to
assigning blame to officials who are perceived as not performing
well. The leadership so far has tried to deal with the problem
by threats to muzzle critics, a policy we believe will be both
ineffective and counterproductive in reestablishing its
authority.
In our view, the leadership has little chance to improve its
effectiveness as long as the present structure--especially the
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collective leadership--remains unchanged. Long-standing, but
recently intensifying, ethnic and economic differences among the
regions reinforce regional authority at Belgrade's expense. But,
as the politicians frequently remind the public, the system's
legitimacy derives from Tito, who accelerated the devolution of
power to local political bosses before his death. We believe
that any major change in the country's political system would
involve at least some explicit "de-Titoization"--a risky
political act which no leader yet appears willing to undertake.
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State of Play in the Leadership
The leadership has not yet taken steps to amend the rigid
rules of collectivity and rotational leadership. Raif
Dizdarevic, a Bosnian Muslim and outgoing President of the
Federal Assembly, recently spoke out against the short term of
federal office holders, but the rotation principle continues
intact at the federal level. Croatia's Mika Spiljak has become
president of the federal presidency for 1983-1984 and, according
to a US Embassy official, Serbia's Dragoslav Markovic and his
rival Nikola Ljubicic recently agreed to allow Markovic next year
to become federal party president, in turn for backing Ljubicic
as replacement for Petar Stambolic in 1984 on the federal state
presidency.
There is limited evidence, however, that leaders may be
departing from at least some long-time political practices--in
particular, the unwritten rule that leaders from one region do
not attack those from another. According to the US Embassy in
Belgrade, Branko Mikulic, President of Bosnia-Hercegovina, is
under attack by opponents in Belgrade. He was embarrassed by the
recent arrest of eleven Muslim nationalists by federal security
officials and by the first formal rehabilitation in postwar
Yugoslav history--the recent reinstatement to party ranks of
Osman Karabegovic, a Bosnian Muslim and key Mikulic rival.
There also is some evidence that a one-time contender for
Tito's power, Interior Minister Stane Dolanc is beginning to
assert himself. During Chinese party leader Hu Yao-bang's visit
to Yugoslavia this month, he held an unusual private meeting with
the Interior Minister, demonstrating that Dolanc still enjoys
special prestige. Dolanc, moreover, is leading a crackdown on
potential terrorists from the Middle East who previously
transitted Yugoslavia with impunity. According to US Embassy
officials who have talked with the Interior Minister and others,
Dolanc played a leading role in the recent crackdown on Muslim
nationalists in Bosnia-Hercegovina. The Embassy reports that
Dolanc acted in concert with Dragoslav Markovic to embarrass
Mikulic, a Dolanc rival.
We also suspect that the political stature of the military
has also increased, if only because the military is now prepared
to act forcefully in a crisis.
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Prospects and Implications for US Policy
We believe that, as long as the present political gridlock
continues, the political leadership in Yugoslavia will be
vulnerable to upsets caused by ethnic and economic
The leadership could, on the basis of past form, cauterize
any renewed rioting in Kosovo but more bloodshed would lead to
increased bickering in Belgrade and further reduction in public
confidence. If increasing ethnic tensions elsewhere, say in
Bosnia-Hercegovina, lead to open disturbances, the shock effect
might sweep away many current leaders.
The financial problem, which we expect to become serious in
early 1984, will increase strains on the leadership. If, as we
expect, the West is seen to be reluctant to extend more aid,
those who favor increased economic autarchy and reorientation of
Yugoslavia toward the East might attempt to embarrass the
currently dominant moderate coalition.
Significant shifts in the balance in Yugoslavia's political
leadership could have mixed implications for US interests. If a
new, more assertive regime comes to the fore, it would probably
be better able to initiate new federal economic policies and
garner confidence from international banks as long as the economy
seemed to be stabilizing. But we believe the tougher political
leadership also would seek a more authoritarian structure than
the present, decentralized, relatively open system which has
avoided severe crackdowns on dissidents, the press, and religious
leaders. Yugoslavia could in such a situation be assailed for
its human rights policies. If on the other hand, the "moderates"
fail to make their program more effective, or if events like the
financial crisis in early 1984 undermine them, an even more
conservative and Eastward-leaning line might emerge.
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