INSTABILITY IN THE COMMUNIST BALKANS: CAUSES AND IMPLICATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000501610001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 15, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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centrallrI j A L
f9ma
WhshingEon. Q C 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
15 June 1983
Instability in the Communist Balkans:
Causes and Implications
Summary
Uncharacteristically calm for a generation, the Balkans
seem to be gradually reverting toward historical type.
Indeed, all the Communist countries of the area--Yugoslavia,
Albania, Romania, and Bulgaria--are heading into a period of
greater instabilitv bly in some cases prolonged and
serious.
Problems in the Balkans have deep roots. Economic
inadequacies, political tyranny and turmoil, and fierce
national and ethnic rivalries have strained the area's
social fabric for centuries. And the intervention of larger
outside powers--a tradition since the Middle Ages--has often
converted local disputes into crises an-European scope
and, once, into world war.~ :af~
Dim economic prospects and growing political troubles--
problems shared with the rest of Eastern Europe--could
combine with other factors specific to the Balkans--
including a reawakening of ethnic and regional animosities
and a heightening of tension between states--to make the
area more disruptive of the Eurnnean balance than at any
time since the 1940s
.
This memorandum was prepared by East
European Division, Office of European a
contribution from the Office of Soviet Analysis. It was
coordinated with the National Intelligence Officer for USSR-
EE. Comments and auestions r come and should be
addressed to Chief East European
Division, Office of European Analysis,
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--Romania is in deep economic trouble, popular
unrest is rising, and the regime is reluctant to
alter arbitrary and ineffective policies
responsible for both.
--Post-Tito Yugoslavia is struggling to avert
bankruptcy, and its overly decentralized political-
economic system is in disarray.
--Albania and Bulgaria, although not apparently
facing serious unrest in their tightly run police
states, face leadership successions soon; political
explosions are possible in the former, serious
factionalism and infighting at the top in the
latter.
Pervasive, emotional, and volatile nationalism, only
partially restrained by outside powers, promises to gain
momentum in the years ahead. A related problem, the
repression of ethnonational minorities--currently most
conspicuous in Yugoslavia and Romania-- helps to keep alive
irredentist sentiments and inflames relations among the
Balkan states and with other neighboring states. The
ability of the various regimes to control events and to
contend with--or, indeed, resist--the forces of nationalism
may increasingly be called into question as other pressing
developments--economic decline and political discord--divert
their energy, test their legitimacy and threaten their
authority.
For two decades or so, both East and West have by and
large identified their interests in the Balkans with the
preservation of the status quo. But turmoil in the area
might force a redefinition of both local and international
interests, promote new alignments, and alter the region's
balance of power. Thus serious instability on the Balkan
Peninsula would raise new risks of greater involvement there
by outside Dowers of direct East-West contention in the
area.
For the West, prospective gains include a further
loosening of the Soviet hold on Romania, a more troubled
Bulgarian-Soviet alliance, and closer Western relations
with, and influence on, Yugoslavia (and perhaps Albania as
well). But such gains are likely to be marginal, and the
West's basic interests are already reasonably well served by
existing relationships. The West's greatest interest, in
fact, may lie in inhibiting the Soviets' o reassert
their dominion in the Balkans.
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For the East, hopes of regaining lost ground in the
Balkans must be tempered by counter-vailing objectives on a
variety of fronts. Instability in Yugoslavia would most
tempt Moscow to resume active pursuit of its long-term goal
of restoring hegemony over the entire area. And the
potential gain of direct access to the Mediterranean through
Yugoslavia--or Albania--provides additional incentive. But
the Soviets are likely to be prudent in defending their
interests in the Balkans, as indeed they have for the past
30 years or so. Their broader policy interests in Western
Europe and their anxiety over stability in Eastern Europe as
a whole are likely to override the attraction of forceful
behavior vis-a-vis the Yugoslavs and Albanians. But while
the chances for military intervention in Yugoslavia appear
remote, Moscow might consider limited involvement in extreme
circumstances, such as civil war. Serious instability in
Romania or political turmoil in their only loyal client,
Bulgaria, on the other hand, particularly if they offer
opportunities for the West, would confront the Soviets with
potentially severe damage to their vital interests and would
be met in extremis by the use of military force.
The Balkan Powderkeg
Strategically situated on the crossroads between Europe and
the Middle East and fragmented by deep political and cultural
differences, the Balkans have for centuries been a testing ground
for great power ambitions. And even before the formation of the
first independent states in the late 19th century, the Balkans
were synonomous with violent conflict and political
instability. Two local wars (the First and Second Balkan Wars,
1912-14) and World War I have erupted there in this century
alone. Even during the "peaceful" interwar years the Balkan
states were wracked by internal crises and destabilizing
rivalries which facilitated their manipulation by various foreign
A variety of historical, political, and cultural factors
contribute to this chronic instability. But deep-seated
nationalistic antagonisms and economic and political weaknesses
have been most responsible for keeping the Balkan pot boiling.
Nationalism. Although the record is rife with examples, two
nationalistic rivalries in particular illustrate nationalism's
destructive influence in the region and within individual
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The bitter and longstanding dispute between Serbia (later
Yugoslavia) and Bulgaria over control of Macedonia--now divided
between Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Greece--derives largely from
conflicting historical claims and blurred ethnic identifications
(the Bulgarian and Macedonian languages are very close). The
issue has dominated Yugoslav-Bulgarian relations since the late
19th century and embroiled them in four wars in this century. It
also once dominated Bulgarian politics--the Internal Macedonian
Revolutionary Organization, one of the many terrorist
organizations spawned by this dispute, virtually ruled Bulgaria
for a number of years--and inflamed Balkan diplomacy during much
of the interwar period.
Nationalist rivalries have also retarded the process of
nation-building within the Balkans. After Yugoslavia was created
following World War I, tensions between the Serbs and Croats, the
two most numerous ethnic groups, polarized government and
society, inhibited serious treatment of severe economic and
social problems and, finally, hastened the end in 1929 of the
country's brief experiment in parliamentary democracy.
Animosities between the two groups stem from conflicting cultural
and historical traditions--the Catholic Croats being more
Western-oriented after centuries of Austrian and Hungarian rule
and the Orthodox Serbs more insular after 400-plus years of
Turkish domination--as well as from competing political
ambitions. The Croats sought autonomy within the new state,
while the Serbs sought, and gained, dominance. The pent-up
hostilities between the two peoples exploded into a civil war
with the collapse of Royalist Yugoslavia following the German
invasion in 1941
Economic Weakness. Wars and internal revolts, plus long
domination by the ottoman Empire, which ignored economic
development and bequeathed a tradition of maladministration and
corruption, left much of the among the most economically
backward regions in Europe.
From the founding of the new Balkan states, the leaderships
came mostly from a tiny group of large land owners and, later,
businessmen and professionals. They concentrated on self-
enrichment and short-sighted pursuit of national rivalries, while
neglecting their countries' awesome economic problems: rural
overpopulation, urban unemployment, and general poverty.
In concert with other effects of the Great Depression,.
living conditions declined for the majority of Balkan peoples
between the two world wars. This sapped the Balkan leaderships'
ability to build popular support and reinforced political
repression which, in turn, fostered extreme nationalism and
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radical political ideologies. The region's weak economies,
heavily dependent on foreign capital, also fell easy prey in the
late 1930s to the influences of more powerful Axis neighbors,
which presaged their military domination in World War II. By
1939, Germany accounted for over one-half of Romania's and
Yugoslavia's foreign trade and 75 percent of Bulgaria's, while
Italy monopolized Albania's commercial relations.
The Impacts and Limitations of External Interference.
Outside involvement has usually worked to perpetuate Balkan
rivalries and give them broader significance than they
intrinsically warrant. On occasion a dominant foreign influence
in the region has imposed a temporary stabilizing effect, but the
Balkans states' resistance to foreign dictates and their penchant
for switching alliances have made these periods of calm short in
duration. Created and delineated by the consequences of great
power competition, the Balkan states also have sought support in
their local quarrels through alliances with Europe's major powers
despite risks of being dragged into broader conflicts they might
Bulgaria, for instance, was created in 1878 as the result of
war between Russia and Turkey, precipitated by Russian support of
a rebellion by Turkey's Bulgarian subjects. Russia's sponsorship
of a "greater Bulgaria" that included most of Macedonia was
blocked by Austria and Britain out of fear that the new Bulgarian
state would become a Russian puppet and thereby upset the
European balance of power. Over the next seven decades, Bulgaria
fought two local wars and joined with the losing powers in both
world wars in a vain effort to restore those borders. Russia's
decision to shift its support from Bulgaria to Serbia as a means
of blocking Austrian expansion in the Balkans had even more
momentous--and disastrous--consequences for the region and for
Europe, helping to lead eventually to World War I.
In this century, the USSR's dominance in the region
following World War II brought a rare stability to the Balkans.
The triumph of Soviet-style Communist parties in the Balkan
states temporarily submerged traditional national rivalries under
the umbrella of "Communist solidarity." The Romanians, imitating
Soviet policy, awarded their disgruntled Hungarian minority an
"autonomous region" in Transylvania. The Yugoslavs also followed
the Soviet constitutional model in constructing a federal system
that allotted each of the main Slavic national groups a separate
republic. Frictions among the Balkan states were also
temporarily shelved, as national leaders even gave. serious
consideration to the creation of a "Balkan Confederation."
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However, even Soviet predominance could not keep the Balkans
free of rivalries for long. The territorial ambitions of the
headstrong Yugoslav Communists, led by Tito, clashed with
Stalin's plans for total control over the region and eventually
contributed to the break between Yugoslavia and the USSR in 1948-
-the first split in the Communist movement and the harbinger of
The break stemmed in part from Belgrade's apparent headway
in drawing Bulgaria, Yugoslav-dominated Albania, and possibly
even Romania into a new Balkan confederation, which clearly
threatened Soviet hegemony in the region and provoked the ire of
Stalin, who ordered Bulgarian leader Dimitrov to renounce his
earlier support for the plan. From 1945 onward, Tito's
independent and aggressive pursuit of Yugoslav claims against
Italy and Austria, and particularly his growing influence over
Communist guerrillas fighting in the Greek Civil War, also raised
fears in the Kremlin that these peripheral disputes with the West
were slipping from Soviet control. At a conference in Moscow in
February 1948, Stalin told the Yugoslavs to cease their support
of the Greek guerrillas and to consult the Soviets in the future
on all foreign policy questions. Tito and his partisan regime,
already unhappy with Soviet policies and arrogance, refused to
follow orders. One month later Moscow withdrew its civilian and
military advisers from Yugoslavia and in June expelled the
The Albanians, who took advantage of Belgrade's
excommunication to slip from Yugoslavia's grasp, later (in 1961)
took advantage of the Sino-Soviet split to break away from
Moscow's control and sided with Peking when it appeared that the
USSR and Yugoslavia were again on the verge of reconciliation.
Romania also exploited the Sino-Soviet dispute to defy
Soviet Party leader Khrushchev's drive to integrate the East
European economies, and won at least partial autonomy in foreign
policy. By 1964, when the Romanian Central Committee issued its
"declaration of independence," the Soviets could count on the
unqualified loyalty of only one Balkan country: Bulgaria.
*Western policy initiatives were a significant factor in these
developments. Not only did the US under the Truman doctrine
assist Greece in defeating the Communist insurrection but
subsequent US aid to Yugoslavia, including sizeable arms
deliveries, helped Tito consolidate his independence after his
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The 1980s: Return to Balkan Instability
During the 1960s and 1970s, three of the Communist regimes
successfully--though in different ways--consolidated their
independence from the USSR. Romania and Yugoslavia even began
informal consultations and policy coordination to strengthen
their position against Soviet pressure tactics. The
consolidation process was not without tension, but it became
relatively less painful as the atmosphere of detente spread in
Europe. For Yugoslavia and Romania, the 1970s were very
profitable in terms of new access to Western loans which allowed
their economic development to accelerate, and none of the Balkan
leaders faced serious internal challenges to his rule, once Tito
had quashed an outburst of Croatian nationalism early in the
decade by threatening to send in the army.
The current decade, however, presents new conditions which
pose a bleaker outlook. East-West relations have deteriorated
and the flow of foreign investment has dwindled. Indigenous
problems, long ignored or repressed by the ruling elites, are
hastening economic decline and fostering political tensions
within and between key states. There are risks of abrupt
leadership changes, due either to declining confidence levels or
to long postponed succession struggles, which could disrupt
current relationships among the Balkan states.
Economic Decline. All the Balkan countries are experiencing
economic difficu ties, but most severe are those facing the
region's major "independents," Romania and Yugoslavia, which
based their pment on Western financial credits and
imports.
Romania's economic performance, after nearly two decades of
strong growth, has been weakening steadily since the late
1970s. In 1982, the growth rate of national income declined to
the lowest level since the 1950s, and living conditions--already
low. even by East European standards--are still deteriorating.
The problems stem from accumulated planning errors,
including overemphasis on rapid industrialization to the
detriment of agriculture; excessive centralization; bureaucratic
rigidity; and mismanagement. The slowdown was exacerbated by
tightening balance-of-payments constraints brought on by the high
cost of crude oil imports, soft demand in Western markets for
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Romanian exports and increased banker wariness following the
Polish crisis.
Romania's financial crisis forced it to reschedule its hard
currency debt in 1982 and to enter into rescheduling negotiations
again this year. The cuts it made in imports to reduce its
current account deficits, in turn, forced a sharp slowing in the
growth of industrial production, while increased emphasis on
exports--especially food--lowered living standards to the point
of creating severe public morale problems.
We believe Romania's economic slide is likely to persist
well into mid-decade. President Ceausescu, who apparently still
believes his forced-industrialization policies will eventually
succeed, will probably rely on ad hoc measures, including
bureaucratic tinkering and further cuts in domestic consumption,
to overcome what he says are only temporary difficulties. The
economy's problems are deep-seated, however, and will not respond
to his piecemeal approach. Living standards will thus probably
continue to decline for the next several years, threatening to
intensify popular unrest and increasing Ceausescu's vulnerablity
to internal challenges and to Soviet pressure.
Yugoslavia faces a similar pattern of declining growth and a
financial crisis. The leadership's inability to tackle serious
problems inherited from the Tito era and to correct the
weaknesses of the decentralized self-management system has
weakened its prestige and the public's confidence in the
soundness of the economic system. Economic growth has slowed
sharply since Tito's death in May 1980, as the legacy of the .
rapid growth of the 1970s--inflation fluctuating between 30 to
over 40 percent in the past three years and growing difficulty in
repaying its $20 billion foreign debt--finally forced Belgrade to
impose domestic austeritl*Weasures in an effort to avoid a debt
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rescheduling or default.
Cuts in imports of energy and raw materials have contributed
substantially to stagnating industrial production and export
performance. And consumers--already grumbling over shortages of
staples like cooking oil, coffee and medicine--in October had to
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accept gasoline rationing and electricity shortages. The cycle
f
o
rising prices, growing unemployment, and consumer goods
shortages are taking their toll on living standards.
The Yugoslav leadership originally underestimated the need
for adjustments to the world recession in the late 1970s and has
continued to avoid necessary reforms in favor of belated, ad hoc
adjustments. We believe, however, major structural changes
cannot be avoided indefinitely: the decentralized system, in
which economic decisionmaking rests in competing regional
capitals, has all but precluded effective policymaking on the
national level.
Yugoslavia's economic problems, as its leaders now warn,
will last into at least the mid-1980s, and the conditions the
West will place on its aid promise to narrow the Yugoslav
leadership's range of choice in addressing them. Belgrade,
probably reluctantly, will have to alter radically its management
practices and restore certain federal controls to meet these
demands. It is doubtful the Titoist system can accomplish these
objectives without turmoil in the leadership over economic
reforms and over their implications for the distribilinn f
powers between Belgrade and the republics.
Bulgaria's economic difficulties are not nearly so severe,
but its prospects depend on continued preferential Soviet
treatment. The USSR meets most of Bulgaria's energy and raw
material needs on favorable terms and allows garians to
run sizable bilateral trade deficits. E
After more than a decade of impressive growth, the economy
began to slow in the late 1970s. Increasing scarcity of skilled
labor, sluggish productivity, and inefficiencies resulting from
overcentralization and a rigid bureaucracy have forced a slowing
of growth rates in nearly every economic sector. Increasing
Soviet reluctance to provide for Bulgaria's growing material and
energy needs (oil shipments, for instance, have not increased
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To combat these problems, Sofia has unveiled a modest reform
program emphasizing decentralization of decisionmaking, reduction
of administrative controls and closer linkage of pay to
productivity. It has introduced these measures cautiously and
they have yet to improve economic performance significantly.
And, although convinced of the need for reforms, Bulgarian leader
Zhivkov must weigh the potential for negative political reactions
at home and in Moscow before proc d' rapid pace or
in dramatically new directions,
Albania, the smallest and least developed of the Balkan
states, has also suffered an economic slowdown in recent years--
primarily as a result of China's decision to terminate all
assistance in 1978. China had been Albania's benefactor since
the break with Moscow in 1961.
During the nearly two decades of their alliance, Albania
relied almost completely on Chinese economic and technological
assistance, which amounted to nearly $1 billion. Relations began
to deteriorate in the early 1970s, however, as Albania's
Stalinist leaders grew increasingly alarmed by China's internal
relaxation, growing warmth toward Yugoslavia, and renewal of
contacts with the West. The Albanians, perhaps preparing for an
aid cutoff as early as 1975. cut arowth projections in the 1976-
80 plan fairly sharply.
Since Albania's break with China in 1978 and embarkation on
a "go-it-alone" policy--foreign loans are now unconstitutional--
economic growth has slowed even further. But because we lack
good data, we have difficulty measuring the extent of Albania's
economic problems. No major dislocations are apparent and,
judging from occasional visitors' observations, living
conditions--already the lowest in Eastern Europe--seem to have
Polit'jal Instability. The economic decline in Romania* and
Yugoslavia- has damaged the prestige of, and eroded public
confidence in, their political leaderships. Although only
Romania has so far experienced politically significant unrest,
Yugoslavia may not be far behind. Other weaknesses endemic to
Communist systems--resentment over arbitrary power in the hands
of the ruling elite, a failure to provide for continuity of
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effective political leadership, and factionalism within the
elite--are at work in all the regimes. Albania and Bulgaria,
although dodging the bullet of economic unrest, will be
particularly vulnerable to succession struggles when their aging
leaders pass from the scene.
In Romania, public acclaim for Ceausescu's defiance of the
Soviets and relaxation of internal controls in the late 1960s
faded into cynicism in the 1970s, and then into despair early in
this decade, as the Romanian leader stepped up the pace of
industrialization, restricted improvements in consumer welfare,
and steadily tightened political repression. As living
conditions have eroded, the populace has responded with
intermittent strikes and protests. Morale has plummeted so low
.as to hinder the functioning of the economy.
The Romanian problem is too much arbitrary power in the
hands of a single leader who has not adapted his original
strategy to changed conditions. Over the course of his 18-year
tenure as party leader, Nicolae Ceausescu has so accumulated
power over political and economic decisionmaking that he now
rules by fiat--reminiscent of Romania's medieval kings with whom
he so clearly identifies. Although a daring actor on the
international scene, Ceausescu is a traditional Stalinist in
domestic--and particularly economic--policy. The stultifying
authoritarian system he has imposed on the country has quashed
incentive--from government ministers down to f4ctory and farm
workers--and bred inefficiency and corruption.
Ceausescu's arbitrary and inflexible leadership has long
been a subject of private complaint by middle and lower level
bureaucrats. As the problems accumulated--financial crisis,
economic decline, and popular unrest--dissatisfaction with
Ceausescu's policies became widespread, even within the upper
leadership. In his effort to ensure the loyalty of the
apparatus, as well as to provide scapegoats for his policy
failures, Ceausescu has purged the bureaucracy repeatedly in
recent months. Through such "cadre rotations" and increased
reliance on the security network and the military, Ceausescu has
intimidated potential challengers and prevented the emergence of
an organized political opposition. The reservoir of those who
resent his rule continues to grow, however, and we believe a
threat to hisDosition, when it comes, could develop very
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Yugoslavia's potentially severe morale difficulties have so
far reflected only general grumbling and criticism of the post-
Tito leadership. But there is a broadening conviction among the
people, judging by the critical Yugoslav Dress, that the Titoist
system is on the verge of crisis.
In the 1970s the Yugoslavs became the most affluent people
in the Communist Balkans, but falling living standards are
dimming popular confidence that they will remain so. The
cumbersome system of collective political rule that Tito hoped
would prevent power struggles and defuse ethnic and regional
rivalries has come under increasing public criticism as the
people begin to appreciate the depth of their unresolved economic
problems. But, even under the abnormal pressure of economic
crisis, decisions at the federal level are reached only after
prolonged and often inconclusive consensus-seeking among regional
Yugoslavia's problems go much deeper than mere weaknesses in
the mechanics of the collective system. Even during Tito's
lifetime, the republican and provincial power centers tended to
go their own way, except under the whip of his direct
intervention. Since his death in May 1980, federal authority has
considerably diminished vis-a-vis that of the republics. In
essence, Yugoslavia has become a confederation of eight power
centers. Today, no leader or political institution--even the
Communist party--has the authority necessary to exactdiscioline
from parochial-minded local and regional authorities.
The Yugoslavs, in our view, can move in two directions to
permit their system to perform more effectively. One would be
toward recentralizing power at the federal level, the other
toward liberalizing the economic system to permit free-market
forces greater play. If Belgrade fails to follow either course,
we believe popular restiveness will grow as economic conditions
deteriorate and as partially effective austerity measures take
their toll on the standard of living. And whatever road the
Yugoslavs take, tension between the ethnonational groups will
grow as they fight to defend parochial interests. The prognosis
for Yugoslavia, we therefore believe, is a period of heightened
internal tensions with the possibility of unDredictable political
challenges to the current system.
Albania--a regimented totalitarian state--could experience a
leadership crisis in the near future. Party leader Enver Hoxha
has ruled-Albania with an iron fist for most of the post-war
period and his position demonstrably remains unassailable. He
has purged all subordinates who had the credentials to succeed
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him--including the allies of his longtime partner, former Prime
Minister Mehmet Shehu, whose violent death in January 1981 is
still unexplained. And therein lies the problem, for Hoxha, now
in his seventy-fourth year and in poor health, could depart the
We know little about the likely players in the sucession
sweepstakes, other than that most of them are relatively young,
former provincial functionaries who were elevated into the
central leadership by Hoxha on the basis of their performance and
loyalty to him. Judging from their backgrounds, they are likely
to be less inflexible than Hoxha, but they may also be less adept
at fending off challengers at home or pressures from abroad. The
key to the succession struggle is likely to be the strength of
various Albanian family groupings--the clan system has remained
strong despite the Communist revolution. A major issue they will
use to compete with one another will be Hoxha's policy of
isolation--particularly from major powers such as the USSR.
The succession in Bulgaria probably is neither as imminent
nor as overtly dramatic as in Albania, but it could also prove
destabilizing. Over the past two decades, Zhivkov also has
neutralized or purged those leaders who became powerful enough to
threaten his domination of Bulgarian political life. In the
process, he has blocked the emergence of a clear-cut heir
apparent. The likely contenders to succeed the 71-year-old
Zhivkov will, we believe, probably come from two groups whose
competition for influence is just becoming evident to Western
One group, composed of pragmatic economic experts and more
liberal cultural functionaries, emerged in the late 1970s.
Zhivkov brought them into the leadership to reform economic
management, as well as to implement a more relaxed, Western-
oriented, and somewhat nationalistic cultural policy introduced
by his late daughter, Lyudmila Zhivkova. Their influence, which
peaked during 1979-80, has come under increasing conservative
challenge since the onset of the Polish crisis and particularly
'
since Zhivkova
s death in August 1981.
The conservatives, possibly with encouragement from Moscow,
recently have called for tighter controls on Bulgarian cultural
life. Judging from speeches at the party's last Central
Committee plenums, they have apparently also tried to slow
implementation of the economic reform. Zhivkov has avoided
taking a clear-cut position, a stand that could result trouble
during the transition following his departure.
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Nationalism, The Tinder
On the surface, the economic and political problems facing
the Balkan Communist regimes are not all that much worse than
those troubling other Communist regimes in East Europe. But
another major factor--pervasive, emotional nationalism only
partially restrained by power outside the region--makes the
From the outset, the 1980s have seen ethnic nationalism
increase gradually--pitting Belgrade and Tirane against each
other over Yugoslavia's Albanian minority, weakening the cohesion
of post-Tito Yugoslavia, and adding concerns about the Hungarian
minority in Romania to Ceausescu's lengthening list of
problems. Other intractable issues, such as the muted but still
unresolved Bulgarian-Yugoslav rivalry over Macedonia, are sure to
arise again in a period of heightened regional tension. Under
the conditions of increased economic hardships and political
uncertainty that we project, nationalism promises to gain
momentum, and the chances will rise for violence within and
between the Balkan Communist states.
Yugoslavia's Albanian Problem. Belgrade's difficulties in
blending a relatively small, 1.7 million Albanian minority into
the mainstream of its political and economic life illustrate how
essentially modest ethnic difficulties can take on major
proportions. At once an international problem--because of
neighboring Albania's active involvement--the Albanian question
is also eroding Yugoslav internal stability because it is a
catalyst for increased antagonisms between Yugoslavia's other.
ethnic groups
In the wake of an insurrection in March-April 1981 by ethnic
Albanians in Yugoslavia's Kosovo Province, polemics between
Yugoslavia and Albania escalated sharply with Belgrade accusing
Tirane of instigating the disturbances and Albania vocally
supporting the Kosovars' political and economic demands. But
Tirane's hostility toward Belgrade stems from two other factors
as well: the ideological conflict represented by Hoxha's avowed
Stalinism and Yugoslavia's "revisionism," and suspicions that
Belgrade harbors hegemonistic ambitions toward Albania, which
emerged from World War II as a Yugoslav client state. In calmer
moments, these concerns are offset somewhat by Tirane's
realization that an independent Yugoslavia provides an important
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barrier to Soviet dominion in the region and constituters a
valuable--in fact, Albania's largest--trading partner.
The threat to stability inherent in this situation is
twofold. On the one hand, Albania has become a "magnet" for some
ethnic Albanian separatists in Yugoslavia--many of whom also
profess neo Stalinist beliefs--and this provides Tirane an
opportunity to meddle in Yugoslavia's internal affairs. On the
other hand, Tirane, by supporting the Albanian minority's
aspirations at a time of internal stress in Yugoslavia, could
provoke an overreaction by Belgrade (as it almost did after the
1981 riots in Kosovo) leading to an armed conflict between the
two.
Albanian restiveness in Yugoslavia exacerbates other deep
ethnic and regional divisions which, despite Belgrade's
relatively enlightened efforts at national reconciliation, often
take precedence over a concern for the larger Yugoslav
confederation. Serb-Albanian enmity, built up during centuries
of feuds and blood letting, escalated after the riots because of
demands by the demonstrators that Kosovo's status be changed from
an "autonomous province" of the Serbian Republic to a full-
fledged republic separate from and equal to Serbia. Albanian
violence against Serbs resident in Kosovo contributed to a
backlash of Serbian nationalism. Serbian leaders demanded
harsher treatment of Albanian "nationalists" and greater Serbian
control over its Kosovo and Vojvodina provinces, which in turn
has caused uneasiness among Yugoslavia's other national groups.
How portentous this uneasiness becomes will depend largely
on the Croats, the major Yugoslav rival of the Serbs. During
World War II the Croats established their own state under Axis
protection and their sense of nationalism remains a potent
force. In the aftermath of the Yugoslavs' liberalizing reforms
of the mid-1960s, expressions of Croatian nationalism built to
the point that Tito had to intervene personally--and threaten to
use the army--to bring the Croats back in line. The combination
of a new Serbian aggressiveness and disputes over sharing the
burden of Yugoslavia's economic hardships could once again make
the Croats assertively anti-Serbian.
The factors that led to the disturbances in Kosovo
illustrate the close interrelation between ethnic hostilities,
political rivalries, and regional economic disparities in
Yugoslavia. As the regional interests have grown more dominant,
the peoples in the north have become more vociferous in opposing
the federal government's redistribution of their income for
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development of the poorer south. The Kosovo disturbances further
eroded support for this program, especially in Croatia and
Slovenia. Recently the federal aid program for the south--even
though constitutionally mandated--temporarily came to a halt when
most of the northern republics failed to pay taxes into the
development fund. This issue could become explosive in the
future if the continued slowing of economic growth brings about a
widening of disparities between north and south.
The Macedonian Problem. While Belgrade's main regional
concern at the moment is its problems with Tirane, a potentially
serious rivalry exists with Bulgaria, which has jhown some
greater nationalistic stirrings in recent years. Bulgarian
scholars and occasionally a party functionary periodically
question Yugoslavia's historical claim to Vardar Macedonia and
the existence of a Macedonian nation in Yugoslavia separate from
Bulgaria. And over the past several years Belgrade has twice
protested to Sofia because it hosted visits by a Croat emigre who
leads an organization aimed at separating Croatia from
Such activities, plus Sofia's refusal to recognize the
existence of a Macedonian ethnic minority within Bulgaria's Pirin
Macedonia, in Yugoslav eyes belie Sofia's official protestions
that it has no designs on Yugoslav territory. Yugoslav
sensitivity also stems from an awareness that Tirane, which
regularly notes the "plight" of Albanians in eastern Macedonia,
might seek common cause with Sofia. And ultimately, the
Yugoslavs fear that, since Moscow has overriding influence on its
Bulgarian ally, the dispute over Macedonia hives the USSR
leverage against Yugoslavia.
The Yugoslavs' typical manner of addressing the Macedonian
problem is to dramatize every Bulgarian needling, no matter how
inconsequential, and on occasion, to imply that the Soviets are
trying to increase tensions in the region. For example, last
summer the Yugoslav press reacted strongly to the Warsaw Pact
exercise "Shield 82"--the largest Pact exercise ever held in the
Balkans. And, in the past, Tito often used the "foreign threat"
to distract the population from other problems. If Yugoslavia's
new leaders find their internal problems unmanageable, they could
well heat up the Macedonian dispute again to divert popular
attention from growing domestic economic difficulties.
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Romanian Nationalism. Ethnic problems in Romania, the
Balkans' other multinational state, contribute to internal
instability and complicate Romania's relations with its
neighbors. The primary problem is Romania's sizable Hungarian
minority--today about 8 percent of the population--in the former
Hungarian province of Transylvania, which Romania acquired after
World War I. Ethnic hostilities sharpened during the interwar
period as the Romanian majority turned the tables on the
Hungarians who had had the upper hand for centuries. Hostility
became outright hatred during World War II, when Hitler forced
Romania to cede northern Transylvania to Hungary and Hungarian
and Romanian minorities on both sides of the new border suffered
severe persecution.
The Soviets returned all of Transylvania to Romania after
the war, at least partly as compensation for Romania's military
collaboration against German forces in Hungary and Czechoslovakia
after the coup against the pro-Axis Antonescu government in
August 1944. Moscow saw to it, however, that the new Communist
regime in Bucharest accorded the Hungarian minority a modicum of
cultural and political autonomy. The ethnic Hungarians, however,
were subjected to increased assimilationist pressures after the
USSR withdrew its military forces from Romania in 1958 and the
Ceausescu regime subsequently began to reemphasize Romanian
nationalism. The Hungarians, growing increasingly disgruntled
with their lot, became particularly restive in the late 1970s
after a former high party official, himself an ethnic Hungarian,
accused the regime of carrying out cultural "genocide" against
the Hungarian minority.
The revival of Romanian nationalism, combined with the
Hungarian minority issue and Bucharest's maverick foreign
policies, has kept Romania at odds with its non-Balkan neighbors-
-Hungary and the USSR. The Kadar regime in Budapest is overtly
concerned by the plight of its conationals in Romania, and the
general populace resents what it perceives as Romanian
mistreatment of its Hungarian minority. Romania, in turn,
suspects Hungarian irredentism exists still and sees a Hungarian-
-and Soviet--hand behind any manifestation of ethnic Hungarian
unrest in Transylvania
Romania also still mourns the loss to the Soviets of
Bessarabia (now the Moldovian Soviet Socialist Republic), a land
of mixed Romanian, Ukranian, and Russian population, and resents
Soviet claims of a distinct "Moldavian" nationality. This
territorial issue is officially dead, like the Transylvanian, but
it still occasionally causes friction when a historical tract is
published and it is ready to be resurrected in times of
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Implications for East and West
The international orientations of the Balkan Communist
regimes have not changed much since Romania's "declaration of
independence" from the USSR in 1964. The existence of two
aggressively independent regimes, Yugoslavia and Albania; a
totally loyal Warsaw Pact member, Bulgaria; and a reluctant and
troublesome Pact member, Romania; has over time been accepted by
the major blocs as an uneasy balance which does not threaten
either's vital interests in Europe. But as Communist Balkan
security could be shaken by a variety of serious internal or
bilateral disputes, there is danger that the chain reaction could
force outside powers, even reluctantly, to view the region once
again in its traditional context as a zone of competition.
The Existing Balance of Power. In concert with the growth
of detente in Europe in the 1960s and 1970s and the shift of
East-West competition from Europe to the Third World, the
Communist Balkans declined proportionately in relative importance
for both East and West, with the possible exception of
Yugoslavia, which became a leading member of the Non-Aligned
Movement. Neither side has expended significant resources or
taken major risks to strengthen its position there.
One factor in this decline in interest was the Communist
Balkans' dwindling value as markets or as sources of raw
materials. Romania's once-valued oil fields are nearly depleted,
and none of the countries is any longer a major agricultural
exporter. Due to their economic problems, the Balkan states
constitute more of an economic drain to an outside "sponsor" than
Politically, the Balkan Communists--excepting Bulgaria--have
generally shown themselves to be undependable and unmanageable
allies, truculent in defending their independence and narrowly
preoccupied with intramural rivalries. Moreover, the
concentrated personal power of political leaders often results in
erratic and arbitrary decisions, which adds to the region's
For the East, furthermore, the area continues to serve as a
buffer zone. With two Warsaw Pact member states in the region,
the Soviets can feel comforted that their reduced position there
is still strong. The Soviets also benefit in that none of the
independent states in what they must view as their own "backyard"
are considered attractive models by the other regimes in Eastern
Europe or are allied with any antagonistic outside power, such as
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The West also derives strategic advantages from the existing
situation. No Soviet troops are stationed in the region, and the
continuing estrangement of three of the Balkan regimes from the
USSR deprives Moscow of direct access to the Mediterranean--and
the Middle East--and eases pressure on NATO's southern flank.
Both East and West, moreover, have reason to appreciate that
stability in the Balkans--however uneasy--has served to maintain
the general peace in Europe.
Soviet Attitudes. Moscow's principal long-term goal in the
Balkans, we believe, remains the reassertion of its hegemony over
Yugoslavia, Albania and Romania, but stasis in the region has
precluded major movement toward it. Soviet pursuit of this goal
is tempered by at least three major countervailing objectives:
to avoid disturbing the overall stability of the region because
of the unpredictable consequences that might ensue; to avoid
provoking a direct clash of interests with the United States and
NATO, which could require considerable expenditure of Soviet
economic and political assets and even risk a military
confrontation; and to avoid jeopardizing Moscow's broader
European policy of seeking to widen the differences between the
United States and its allies--a goal currently pursued with an
eye to blocking planned deployment of additional NATO nuclear
missiles in Western Europe. At the same time, because the
Balkans have not demanded painful decisions or posed serious
dangers, the Soviets can be said to have a stake in the status
quo .
The Soviets' currently most potent lever for increasing
their influence in the Balkans, while reducing that of the West,
is their economic relations with these states. Bulgaria and
Yugoslavia in particular are heavily dependent on the USSR for
energy and raw materials and for markets for their exports.
Soviet propaganda, for whatever impact it has, emphasizes that
the long-term well-being of the Balkan countries lies in close
economic ties with the USSR and the rest of Eastern Europe, and
the Soviets doubtless do believe that over time such ties will
lead to a closer political relationship. Experiences, such as
Tito's successful defiance of a total Soviet economic boycott in
1948 and Albania's similar cancellation of economic and political
ties with Moscow in 1961, have taught the Soviets, however, that
converting economic links into political leverage can be an
elusive goal.
We believe that, given the choice, the Soviets are likely to
continue to prefer low-key policy approaches. It may be,
however, that as circumstances in the Balkans change the Soviets
may not have a choice, especially if they come to believe a major
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setback lurks ahead. Political disarray in Romania, for example,
or a major turn toward the West by Yugoslavia, or the collapse of
Communist authority in any of these states, could alter the shape
of Soviet policy, invite the application of strong Soviet
pressure and, in an extreme case, tempt Moscow to intervene
militarily. Moscow's options, and the limitations inherent in
each, include the following:
-- Economic Pressure. Although economic ties, used as a
carrot or stick, are Moscow's strongest lever of
influence, their effectiveness is limited. If the USSR
sought to apply economic pressure on issues the Balkan
leaders considered vital, the political costs would be
considerable and the effect probably
counterproductive. It would arouse official and popular
resentment of the Soviets, it could lead to the
instability Moscow wishes to avoid, and it could be
countered by Western assistance.
- Political Subversion. If conventional political
pressure, such as diplomacy, propaganda, and high-level
visits, proved ineffective, the Soviets in a crisis
would use whatever covert supporters they have
developed, particularly in the military and security
apparatuses. To our knowledge, however, the USSR has
few such assets in Albania, Yugoslavia, or Romania,
which have assiduously purged suspected Soviet
sympathizers. Only in Bulgaria, where it is least
likely to be needed, would a power play by Soviet
sympath' ear likely to swing events in Moscow's
favor.
Another form of political subversion, to which
Yugoslavia is particularly vulnerable, would be the
exploitation of ethnic hostilities, either within one of
the Balkan Communist states or between it and
neighboring countries. This tactic, however, would
entail some of the same costs as economic pressure:
heightened resentment of the Soviets and the danger of
instability spreading within the country and perhaps to
its neighbors. If the phenomenon of inflamed
nationalism proved contagious, it could become a serious
problem for all the Warsaw Pact states, including the
Military Pressure. The USSR could exert several forms
of military pressure. A threat to curtail arms sales
would convey a clear signal of Soviet displeasure at
little cost, but only Bulgaria is heavily dependent.
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Yugoslavia and Romania rely on the Soviets only for some
advanced military eauipment, while Albania receives no
arms at all.
A more dramatic option, involving considerably
higher stakes, would involve troop movements, increased
deployments, or major exercises in Soviet or East
European territory bordering on the region. In an
extreme case, the USSR might insist on the deployment of
Soviet troops in Bulgaria, or even Romania. Such moves
would demonstrate the gravity with which Moscow viewed
the situation and imply that the Soviets were prepared
to use extreme measures if their wishes went unheeded.
In a crisis when a country's leaders were undecided
among several courses of action or divided among
themselves, such a display might tip the balance in
favor of a course acceptable to Moscow.
The risks, however, would be considerable. Even
more than economic and political pressure, military
intimidation would spark anti-Soviet sentiment and
perhaps defiance. The Yugoslavs have repeatedly shown
sensitivity on this score, most recently during the
"Shield-82" exercise in Bulgaria last September.
Western reaction, particulary if a non-Warsaw Pact
country were the target, would be sharp. Moreover, if
the demonstration failed to achieve its goal quickly,
the Soviets would have to decide whether to back down
with considerable loss of prestige or advance to an even
riskier level of confrontation. These considerations.
make it unlikely that the USSR would resort to military
intimidation of a non-Warsaw Pact Balkan country except
in a situation where the threat to Soviet interests was
critical.
Moscow's ultimate military option, intervention,
would be likely only if the USSR confronted a situation
in Romania or Bulgaria that threatened to result in that
country's departure from the Warsaw Pact or in the
elimination of a Communist regime in either country.
The chances for intervention in Yugoslavia are more
limited, and even more remote in Albania which has no
common border with the Warsaw Pact countries. A move
into either of those countries would have enormous
strategic implications for NATO's southern flank, the
Eastern Mediterranean, and the Middle East. The Soviets
would have to anticipate local resistance, a vigorous
Western political response, and a heightened possibility
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of East-West confrontation, especially in the case of
Yugoslavia. These prospects probably would dissuade
Moscow from military intervention even in the event of a
Yugoslav swing to the West. In case of a civil war in
which one side sought Soviet help, however, the USSR
might send aid even involving some combat units. But
the Soviets most likely would use graduated doses of its
limited leverage--political pressure including active
subversion, strong economic influence, and the threat of
military force--to inhibit developments which threaten
their interests in Yugoslavia.
The Andropov Era. Yuri Andropov's background as Soviet
Ambassador to Hungary, party secretary responsible for relations
with East Europe, and KGB chief probably arms him with greater
understanding of this region and its leaders than any previous
Soviet party chairman had when he came to power. He has moved
quickly to impose his own, more vigorous style on the conduct of
Soviet policy toward the region, although there has been no
indication of a change in basic goals.
In meetings late last year with Yugoslav, Bulgarian, and
Romanian leaders, Andropov displayed a tendency to air
differences. more openly than his predecessor. At the same time,
like his predecessor, he has shown tactical flexibility. He
reportedly accepted some revisions sought by Ceausescu in the
political declaration of the Warsaw Pact summit in January, while
holding firm on key issues. He appears to accord a higher
priority than Brezhnev to improving relations with Albania. He
has expressed dissatisfaction with Yugoslav media treatment of
the USSR and other aspects of Belgrade's policies, but Premier
Tikhonov recently agreed to consider increased oil sales to
Yugoslavia this year and reaffirmed Soviet acceptance of
Yugoslavia's independent course.
Renewed Area of Competition? The West's views of its stake
in the Balkans, like the Soviets, have gradually shifted over the
past two decades. Any early hopes that the Balkan Communists'
pursuit of independence from the USSR could be repeated elsewhere
in the Soviets' East European empire have been largely dashed.
Nor did the independence of some of the Balkan Communists lead to
clear, positive gains for the West, such as consistent support
for the West on key issues at dispute with the Soviets. Still,
the maintenance of the status quo does inhibit Moscow from
retaking lost ground and, over time, holds out the possibility of
more evolution toward stronger Western ties. Another benefit is
that the lack of serious crises in these states has inhibited
tensions in a region where the Balkan Communist states abut three
NATO allies--Italy, Greece and Turkey--and neutral Austria.
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Destabilizing trends now evident in the region--faltering
economies, leadership problems, and resurgent nationalistic
rivalries--have arisen without outside meddling and, despite
Western efforts to help avert crisis, may worsen to the point
that the Balkan balance of power is at risk. If that occurs,
both the Soviets and the West could face challenges to their
interests in the region and might find themselves tempted to
become more deeDly involved there than they originally
The situation in Yugoslavia poses the greatest danger to US
interests in the Balkans. The Yugoslavs, we believe, face a long
period of increasing economic and political instability. Due to
their central role in Balkan politics, a deteriorating situation
in Yugoslavia could affect the entire region. Because Yugoslavia
is situated between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, any major shift
politically to the East or West by Yugoslavia would by definition
upset the European balance of power by automat roving
the position of one side or the other.
The looming struggle to succeed aging party leader Hoxha
could subject Albania to a lengthy period of uncertain leadership
and weaken its isolationist resolve, which could also effect the
balance of power, if on a modest scale. A post-Hoxha leadership,
should a presumably more pragmatic leader emerge victorious,
might be willing to deal with one or more of Albania's
adversaries. Because of Albania's strategic location at the
mouth of the Adriatic and because manipulation of Yugoslavia's
Albanian minority gives Tirane some leverage over Belgrade, an
uncommitted successor regime could become the object of fiercely
competitive bidding from both East and West. The Soviets have
little to lose in such a contest, and much to gain. They had
only a small submarine force in the Mediterranean when they last
had a naval base in Albania in 1961, but now, pressed to maintain
a larger naval presence in the Mediterranean, they would welcome
an opportunity to regain access to Albanian ports. We doubt,
however, that they would employ extreme measures vis-a-vis
Albania, even in the remote event of a sharp turn westward by
Tirane. The reverse is true of the West, which has little to
gain beyond denying Albania to the bloc but much to lose should
Albania turn East.
While a serious crisis in Romania would have a lesser effect
on other Balkan states or the East-West balance, it would pose
risks for neighboring Hungary, Bulgaria and the USSR. We believe
that Moscow would, if the Romanian party's control.comes into
question, do what is necessary, including military intervention,
to preserve some type of Communist regime and the country's
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membership in the Warsaw Pact. That would, in turn, affect US
interests in the Balkans, for Soviet domination of Romania would
generally be seen as something of a loss for the West and,
particularly if it involved a Soviet military presence, would
unsettle an already sensitive Yugoslav leadership and seriously
concern our nearby allies.
Serious disarray in the Bulgarian leadership would pose the
greatest risk for the Soviets. It is hard for us to imagine,
given that Bulgaria's traditional enemies in the Balkans are
either allied with the West or neutral, that a post-Zhivkov
Bulgarian leadership might attempt to slip the Soviet leash. Yet
alliance with Moscow in future years could come to be less and
less rewarding in terms of economic support and more and more
limiting in terms of pursuing Bulgarian national objectives with
the non-Communist world. And if the policies of the new Andropov
leadership toward the region take a turn Sofia does not approve
of--say, outright courtship of the Yugoslavs or consigning the
Bulgarians in CEMA integration plans to the role of truck
farmers--Sofia could come to see its pro-Soviet sycophancy as a
decided liability. Should the Bulgarians ever wish to modify
their orientation, they would face long odds in overcoming
Moscow's economic and political leverage but they also have
advantages in not sharing a border with the USSR or having Soviet
forces stationed on their soil. And should the Bulgarians ever
decide to reduce their subservience to Moscow, the West's
economic attraction could lead to heightened influence with them
even though allied and neutral states in the regime might view
the development with suspicion.
A major flare-up of one or more of the disputes that divide
the states of the region could be the most difficult situation
for the West, both in the sense of whether to get involved and of
determining where the West's real interests lie. Should
Yugoslav-Albanian antagonisms over the Kosovo, for example,
escalate beyond the point they reached in 1981, when the
Yugoslavs interrupted for a time transit of Albania's trade
goods, might not a post-Hoxha Albanian leadership appeal for
help? And if the West did not respond, out of deference to
Yugoslav sensitivities, might not the Soviets? Where lie the
West's interests in seriously heightened tensions over
Transylvania between oppressive, but independent, Romania and
permissive, but Soviet foreign-policy-aligned, Hungary? Or in a
revival of the Macedonian issue between an ally, Greece, a
neutral but fragile Yugoslavia, and a newly nationalistic, but
still Soviet-allied, Bulgaria?
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In sum, the trends at work in the Balkans, in our opinion,
offer some real prospect of returning the region to an era of
flux and crisis more characteristic of the pre-1950s. If that,
indeed, does occur, both the East and West will come to find new
threats to their interests. And in their process of advancing or
defending these interests, the Balkans could reassume their
earlier status as a prime locale for competition by outside
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- Paula Dobriansky
- Asst. NIO for USSR/EE
- mooer ar ow (INR/SEE)
- Steven Sestanovich (S/P)
- Jack Sulser (OSD/ISP/EUR)
- D/EURA
- EURA Prod. Staff
- IMC/CB
- CE Branch Chrono
w (turc/ttr)
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