ALBANIA: NEW OPENINGS IN FOREIGN RELATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000502170001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 27, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intdl0ncc Agency
It has recently expressed a desire to
reopen discussions on old disputes with other West
European states as well.
Washirgpon. D. C 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
27 October 1983
Albania: New Openings in Foreign Relations
Summary
In a marked departure from its usual
xenophobia, Albania is beginning to expand its
economic and political contacts abroad. In the
past year, Tirana has made some solid gains,
concluding a trade pact with China and making
progress in its economic relations with Italy.
The increase in Albania's international
activity, in our opinion, is caused by:
-- An acute need for spare parts for Chinese-
built machines and an interest in new
technology to spur economic development.
-- An apparent desire to increase
international understanding for its point
of view in a deepening dispute with rival
Yugoslavia.
This memorandum was prepared by East European
Division, Office of European Analysis. was coordinated with
the Office of Soviet Analysis and the Office of East Asian
Analysis. Comments and questions are welcome and should be
addressed to Chief, East European
Division, Office of European Analysis
EURM 83-10251C
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the future.
We believe, however, that Tirana's new
foreign policy approach is fragile and rests on
tentative political stability at home. Ramiz
Alia, currently heir presumptive to Party leader
Hoxha, may be the spark behind Tirana's decision
to test its wings abroad. It is clear, at least,
that Albania's new activism is coincident with
Alia's more frequent public appearances and recent
authoritative pronouncements on foreign and
domestic policies. The propriety of foreign
contacts, however, has led to serious leadership
rivalry in the past. The current initiatives
could evaporate if Alia faces political trouble in
Tirana differentiates between trade ties and
political compromise, and we believe that its new
opening does not signal any relaxation in
Albania's Stalinist system. In all their
contacts, Albanian officials explicitly stress two
conditions on Tirana's initiative.
- It will continue its hostile policies
toward both superpowers.
- It will avoid what it perceives to be
Yugoslavia's error in becoming indebted to
Western bankers and will reject foreign
credits, insisting that all trade be
conducted on a barter or cash-and-carry
basis.
defense ministers.
Alia and the New Opening
Albania's diplomatic opening coincides with the rapid rise
of Ramiz Alia, member of the party Politburo and Secretariat and
Chairman of the People's Assembly. Alia today makes more
authoritative speeches and public appearances than does Hoxha.
He has visited virtually every province in the country this year,
and is regularly listed second only to Hoxha on important
official occasions. We believe that his rise has given the
country greater political stability than has been apparent since
purges in 1981-1982 claimed the life of his predecessor and led
to the disgrace and disappearance of the country's foreign and
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Alia has staked his prestige on the new foreign policy
initiatives. His willingness to embark on them indicates that he
feels confident that rivals are too weak to counter this dramatic
policy departure. The greatest danger, in our view, lies in the
possibility that Enver Hoxha--whose emulation of Stalin includes
a tendency periodically to destroy those closest to him--will
come to view Alia as a threat and eliminate him.
Foreign contacts may have contributed to the fall of his
predecessor, Mehmet Shehu. A more limited thaw with West Germany
and other West European states, following Albania's split with
China in 1978, ended abruptly after Shehu's death in December
1981. Some West European officials suggested that Shehu and his
followers were ousted because they supported improved economic
relations with the West. If true, the current revitalization of
diplomatic contacts could result from a cynical Alia decision--he
had attacked Italy and other Western powers as recently as
December 1982--to coopt the policies of leaders he helped
destroy. In any event, the freeze on new foreign contacts
appears now to have ended following a period of internal
repayment of some debts still owed under pre-1978 agreements.
East Asian Moves
Greek officials told US Embassy officers in Athens last
January that Albania had resumed trade relations with China.
Chinese officials told a Canadian official last spring that
Albania had requested a $300 million trade agreement, but that
Beijing had scaled down the terms to a $10 million exchange of
Albanian chrome, ferrochrome, and copper for Chinese rice,
cotton, and spare parts. Western press reports in October put
the agreement's actual value in the $5 to 7 million range, and
alleged that China granted an Albanian request to make early
Trade relations had been broken off in 1978 when Albania
suspended party-to-party contacts because of differences over
Peking's more pragmatic foreign policy. China had been Albania's
economic prop since Tirana bolted from the Soviet bloc in 1961,
and its reluctance to seek trading partners to replace China
imposed great economic hardships. We believe that Tirana's need
for spare parts for agricultural machinery was a major spur to
its decision to reestablish economic relations with Beijing.
Western journalists who visited Albania recently reported that
The renewal of Sino-Albanian economic ties prob a y does not
signal a parallel improvement in political relations. Close on
few tractors appear to be in working order.
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Yugoslavia in May.
the heels of the agreement with Beijing, Albania established
diplomatic relations with the Vietnamese-supported Heng Samrin
regime in Kampuchea. US officials in Hong Kong reported recently
that China did not protest Tirana's recognition of Heng Samrin,
but probably was embarrassed by the coincidence of apparently
contradictory economic and diplomatic developments. The US
officials, who doubted that Beijing was aware in advance of
discussions between Tirana and Phnom Penh, noted that the Chinese
press has described Sino-Albanian relations as developing
"gradually." Tirana's recognition of Heng Samrin, moreover,
followed a well-publicized warming of Tirana's ties with
Beijing's Vietamese adversaries, probably spurred by Albanian
annoyance with Chinese Party leader Hu Yaobang's visit to
Opening to The West
The opening to the West, like those to China and
Vietnam/Kampuchea, has been building momentum for several months
and is aimed at developing economic ties. By opening up to
Western Europe as well as China, Albania can seek access to hard
currency markets and technologically superior goods and
services.
Deputy Foreign Minister Plaka--formerly Ambassador to
Belgrade--traveled to Turkey in February, where he proposed more
bilateral trade. Plaka and Alia, among others, subsequently
expressed satisfaction with relations with Turkey and all
bordering states except Yugoslavia. Since then, the Albanians
have signed a cultural agreement with Sweden, sent their foreign
trade minister to Vienna for talks, and invited ambassadors from
Argentina, Switzerland, Austria, and Australia--accredited to
Tirana but resident in Belgrade--to visit Albania more often.
another round of talks on economic cooperation.
In reopening dialogues with the West, Albania has made the
strongest gestures to Italy. Foreign Minister Malile met with
Italian Foreign Minister Andreotti on 26 September at the UN
General Assembly in New York. Italian officials later told the
US Embassy in Rome that the Albanians pushed for more bilateral
trade. Malile expressed satisfaction with relations with Greece
and Turkey as well as Italy, and said Albania hopes for more
Western tourists. He rejected any offer of credits, reflecting
Albania's often-expressed fear of mortgaging itself to hostile
foreign creditors. In mid-October, Malile went to Rome for yet
Tirana's primary gain in its escalated contacts with Italy
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appears to be an agreement, signed 22 October, to open a truck
ferry between Trieste and the port of Durres. Albania began to
pursue this project in the spring of 1981 when strains with
neighboring Yugoslavia temporaril interrupted Albania's only
land link with Western Europe.
Albania also has indicated willingness to reopen talks on
the dispute with the US, UK, France, and Italy over Albanian gold
confiscated during World War II. Tirana, however, still insists
that the gold settlement be tied to its reparations claims
against Italy and refuses to compensate the UK for the 44 lives
lost when two British destroyers struck mines in the Corfu
h
l
c
anne
in 1946. The West Europeans recently agreed among
thems
l
e
ves to separate the gold and claims issues.
Judging by its actions to date, Albania's diplomatic
offensive does not extend to playing a role in regional European
security forums. In New York, Malile rejected Andreotti's
suggestion that Albania send observers to the CDE meeting in
Stockholm. The Albanians reject the entire CSCE process because
it started as a Soviet suggestion and failed to stop the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan. Malile's dismissal of CSCE closes a
potentially rich point of contact with all European countries and
the superpowers but also reflects a consistent Albanian
preference for bilateral over multilateral diplomacy.
The Yugoslav Factor
We believe that Albania's foreign policy overtures also
result from Tirana's search for international support in its
rivalry with Yugoslavia. Albania, in our opinion, is concerned
that the West--which it realizes values Yugoslavia as a barrier
against Soviet expansion in the Balkans--may support Belgrade if
the current tension degenerates into open hostilities. Both
Plaka and Malile used their discussions with West European
officials to stress the poor state of relations between Tirana
and Belgrade. They also expressed willingness to try to improve
relations, but only if Yugoslavia grants "equal political status"
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to its 1.7 million Albanians--40 percent of all Albanians--and
re
i
nounces any
ntention to absorb Albania.
Yugoslav-Albanian relations have deteriorated over the past
year. Hoxha's 1982 book The Titoites and his virulent attack
against Belgrade during an election speech last November led to a
sharp Yugoslav demarche in January. Polemics abated for a few
months, but resumed when Alia made several anti-Yugoslav speeches
during a spring tour of northern provinces. Albania answered a
Yugoslav invitation to send observers to last month's military
maneuvers in Macedonia with insults and charges that Belgrade was
staging a military provocation against Albania and "other
countries"--probably meaning Bulgaria. The US Embassy in
Belgrade believes that this reference will fuel Yugoslav
suspicions--expressed to Vice-President ush--of Bulgaro-Albanian
collusion against Yugoslavia.
Both Tirana and Belgrade have expressed concern about
deepening animosity to foreign observers. Yugoslav Foreign
Minister Mojsov told the Vice-President that he expects a p
Soviet group inside Albania to create "an upheaval" after H
dies. Mojsov noted that Albania never officially left the
Pact and could easily rejoin it. Plaka, on the other hand,
Turkish officials in February that Albania wants Yugoslavia
remain intact, albeit with a Kosovo republic as a component
of the federation. Malile repeated this position in his to
Implications for the Superpowers
We expect Tirana to persevere in its international
initiatives unless a rival successfully challenges Alia's
authority or Hoxha decides to purge his heir apparent. Alb
need for foreign markets, machinery, and technology is like
override the ideological impulse to go it alone. Neverthel
Tirana probably will refuse on principle to accept foreign
credits, and deal only on a barter or cash-and-carry basis.
The breadth of Albania's current initiative almost cer
reflects Albania's desire to avoid the dependence on one pa
that caused economic difficulties following the breaks with
Moscow and Beijing. We also believe that Tirana's current
*Albania supports underground movements for a separate Koso
republic within the Yugoslav federation, provoking Yugoslav
of Albanian irridentism. Tirana denies Yugoslav charges th
wants to absorb the largely--77 percent--Albanian province.
ro-
oxha
Warsaw
told
to
part
lks
ly to
tainly
fears
25X1 25X1
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Nevertheless, having failed with tentative attempts at
better political relations, Moscow may next attempt to offer
better economic ties. A Soviet Foreign ministry official
responsible for relations with Albania told US Embassy officers
in Moscow that he considers trade offers to be the only way to
gain influence in Tirana
leaders will continue the diplomatic dialogue as a hedge against
deepening hostility with its Yugoslav neighbors.
The current Albanian opening to Western Europe, China, and
Vietnam/Kampuchea, in our view, does not augur better relations
with the superpowers in the near future. In particular, the
improvement in Albanian relations with Vietnam and its Kampuchean
client probably is not now a first step toward better relations
with the Soviet Union. The Albanians firmly rejected
Soviet feelers for better relations shortly after Brezhnev's
funeral, and have continued to vilify both superpowers in
familiar and brutal terms. While Albania is willing to discuss
specific bilateral disputes, we doubt that such negotiations will
lead to any major improvement in relati with either the US or
USSR as long as Hoxha is alive. ~ 7
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