(UNTITLED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000502310001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: January 12, 2017
• Document Release Date: May 17, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 5, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Memorandum for:
This is an updated copy of Talking
Points for the DCI.
Distribution:
1 OD/EURA
2 Production
4 IMC/CB
1 - Diy. File
1 - Branch. File
1 - Author
EURA/WE /IA
EURA
Office of European Analysis
Directorate of Intelligence
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5 December 1983
Spain: Talking Points for the DCI
Felipe Gonzalez and his Socialist Party won a landslide victory in the
legislative elections in 1982 (202 of 350 seats) by campaigning on a centrist
platform that drew support from moderate constituents. After a year in power,
Gonzalez shows every sign of holding to the moderate course he charted shortly
after taking office. Many of the Socialists' domestic goals -- curbing
terrorism, strengthening public education, reorganizing the military, and
completing the regional autonomy process -- involve Iona term programs, and
Madrid is tackling them slowly and deliberately.
In dealing with Spain's economic problems, the Socialists are following
conservative policies aimed at lifting the economy out of a five-year slump.
Madrid reckons that if it can achieve an average rate of real GDP growth of
about 3 percent over the next three years, it can make some headway in
lowering its 17-percent unemployment rate. The high level of unemployment may
prompt calls by the Communists and some labor unions to reflate the economy,
but we think Gonzalez is strong enough to resist. Since exports must provide
most of the impetus for economic growth, Madrid has focused its export
promotion campaign on the US rather than Western Europe, where only an anemic
recovery is likely. US.protective measures against Spanish exports are thus
likely to draw more critical attention than in the past. Meanwhile, the
Minister of Economics and Finance has blamed US monetary policy for high
Spanish interest rates and sagging investment in order to deflect criticism
away from domestic policies. In fact, Madrid began to boost interest rates
last year as a means of stimulating capital inflows, promoting saving, and
reducing inflation.
Foreign policy is still in flux. Gonzalez emphasizes that Spain is in
the Western camp, but he also places somewhat more emphasis on independence
than previous Spanish leaders. The government is negotiating membership in
the EC, and wrestling with its status vis-a-vis NATO. Gonzalez acted on his
campaign pledge and froze NATO military integration pending a referendum on
the issue. He now appears inclined to remain in NATO, but faces the difficult
task of convincing the majority of Spaniards who remain wary of membership.
Gonzalez has made clear that failure to get into the EC would make it
extremely difficult to sell NATO in Spain. Latin America and the Middle East
are areas of special concern to the Socialists for historical and ideological
reasons. Gonzalez's analysis of the situation in Central America differs
somewhat from the US, but his public criticism is tempered by his strong
desire to maintain smooth relations with the United States. Although the
Spanish are pro-Arab, they are looking for a way to establish relations with
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I I
The Prime Minister still retains a relatively large base of support, but
there are signs that the honeymoon with his traditional rivals may be coming
to an end. Since September, the government has clashed with the Church over
abortion and education reform, heard grumblings from the military over
continuing terrorism and government meddling in military affairs, and faced
some unrest from farmers and workers (mostly Communist inspired). None of the
problems are insurmountable, but they signal increased trouble ahead for a
government that so far has led a charmed existence.
1. The Socialist government avoided comment on the INF issue until last
May, when Prime Minister Gonzalez visited Bonn and publicly supported
deployment.
-- Gonzalez's remarks were made in return for Kohl's agreement to
support Spanish entry into the EC.
-- In recent weeks both Gonzalez and Foreign Minister Moran have
reaffirmed their "understanding" of the decision to deploy new
missiles, with Moran adding that the current disequilibrium favors
Status of Relations with NATO
1. Despite the Socialists' opposition to NATO during the election
campaign, Gonzalez has slowly come to appreciate the political and military
benefits of membership and personally favors continued Spanish
participation. However, he must overcome substantial political obstacles
before the government can reaffirm Spanish membership in NATO. Participation
in NATO's integrated military command is a more remote prospect.
-- The Spanish electorate is largely uninformed about NATO and Western
defense issues, and a substantial proportion of Socialist party
members oppose ties to the Alliance. We believe Gonzalez and Vice
Prime Minister Guerra are pursuing a policy of deliberate ambiguity
on relations with NATO, both to buy time and to enable the government
to conduct an educational campaign prior to the long-promised
referendum.
-- The first test of Gonzalez's ability to sway his party's opinion will
come in October 1984 with the Socialist Party congress. He expects
strong opposition from party members.
-- Next, the Prime Minister will face the.referendum on NATO, which will
not be held until at least mid-1985. There are signs that Gonzalez
may try to blur the issue by phrasing the referendum question in an
ambiguous way. In any event, he probably will not confront the issue
of military integration. Gonzalez has said the essential issue is
membership, and he apparently believes military integration can
evolve over time
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2. We think Gonzalez's ability to turn the public and his party around
on NATO will depend in part on where Spain's application to the EC stands at
the time of the referendum.
Talks have dragged on for four years and further negotiations have
become linked to EC efforts to reform Community spending on
agriculture and the EC budget in general.
The linkage of Spain's NATO membership to its drive for EC membership
presents problems for the US. For the past two years, some EC
members have maintained that because it is in the US interest to have
Spain in NATO and the EC, Washington should forego compensation
demands for any loss of trade incurred as a result of Spain's entry
into the EC.
-- The political will exists within the EC to bring Spain into the
Community, but even a prolonged delay could damage Spain's ties to
NATO. We believe that in the unlikely event Spain fails to get into
the EC, Gonzalez might consider withdrawing from NATO.
Gibraltar
3. The UK-Spanish dispute over the sovereignty of Gibraltar is also a
factor in the NATO and EC equation.
-- Gonzalez linked progress on Gibraltar with NATO membership early in
his tenure, trying to bring Allied pressure on Britain to resume
negotiations.
The Thatcher government says that Spain cannot join the EC unless it
removes all restrictions on movement between Spain and the Rock.
The Spanish are reluctant to lift restrictions either without a
guarantee that Britain will negotiate the issue of sovereignty, or
before Spain joins the Community. Once in the EC, the restrictions
will have to be removed.
Resolution of the sovereignty question is unlikely in the short term,
but the two governments appear to be on warmer terms recently and
have set up committees of experts to discuss the areas of
disagreement. The talks may provide a face-saving way for Spain to
open the border, thus removing one of the sticking points in the EC
Central America
1. Cultural, linguistic, and historical ties make Latin America an area
of special concern to Spaniards.
-- Both the right and left in Spain desire expanded cultural and
commercial links to the region.
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In addition, the Socialists' ideologically-rooted beliefs lead them
to also champion human rights and national liberation movements.
They believe that a more assertive Spanish-speaking bloc of nations
can help end bipolarity in international politics and ease East-West
2. Central America has proved a vexing problem for Gonzalez, who had
hoped to play a more active role in the region both to bolster support at home
for his government and to burnish his credentials as an international
statesman.
Most Spaniards believe the conflicts in the area stem more from
indigenous social and economic inequalities than from foreign
intervention.
The government's interest in the area stems largely from Gonzalez's
participation in the Socialist International. In addition to
numerous visits to the region, Gonzalez played an intermediary role
in 1981 between then Secretary of State Haig and various regional
leftist groups.
Gonzalez has called for the withdrawal of both US and Cuban military
advisers and has given strong support to the Contadora peace
initiative.
-- The government still formally supports the Sandinistas but Gonzalez
has a realistic appreciation of the situation in Nicaragua
-- Moreover, recent revelation of Basque terrorist links to the
Sandinistas has created public pressure in Spain for a weakening of
ties to Managua. Gonzalez reportedly may move in that direction, but
he will want to avoid the impression of being stampeded by foreign
and domestic pressure. We therefore doubt that he will move until
the current publicity dies down.
3. We doubt that Spain's involvement in Central American affairs will go
much beyond the rhetorical level.
-- Gonzalez recognizes that an overly ambitious diplomacy could invite
embarrassment. For example, he will not offer to serve as a mediator
unless all the parties involved in the conflicts agree.
-- He also does not want to damage Spain's carefully cultivated
relations with the US. After publicly criticizing US policy during a
visit to Latin America this spring, Gonzalez suggested publicly and
privately that he would avoid getting in Washington's way in the
region.
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Terrorism
1. Many observers in Spain thought that the new Socialist government
would be better qualified than its predecessors to resolve the country's
terrorist problem, which revolves largely around the Basque terrorists' (ETA)
24-year-old campaign for independence from.Spain.
-- The assumption was that only the Socialists, who sympathized with the
anti-Franco motives of the pre-1975 ETA, could successfully negotiate
with the terrorists.
Gonzalez fed these hopes indirectly by citing resolution of the
Basque problem as one of his government's top priorities.
2. The optimism was soon shattered by stepped up terrorist violence that
led the Socialist government to launch an all out offensive against ETA.
-- Basque Regional President Carlos Garaicoechea's attempt to bring all
parties together -- the Socialists, the. Basque Regional Party (PNV),
and terrorist-linked Herri Batasuna (HB) -- failed when HB refused to
participate unless there was live press coverage of the
proceedings.
Garaicoechea tried to revive the discussions, but the Socialists
demanded a cease fire by with ETA before talking.
ETA responded with more violence, and Garaicoechea -- lambasting both
the Socialists' alleged intransigence and ETA's provocations --
3. The government in the meantime has enjoyed some notable successes
against ETA, but the recent killing of a kidnapped Army captain, following the
murders of three civilians, has raised new questions about the effectiveness
of the government's program.
Massive demonstrations were held throughout Spain opposing terrorism
and calling for tougher government action.
Tension in the military was reportedly high over the incident. The
military has been grumbling louder recently about the ineffectivness
of the government's program but, when pressed, admits the government
is doing about as much as it can. The government is hampered by
legal restrictions and lack of support from the Basque regional
government (which faces regional elections next year and France
which is a safehaven for the terrorists).
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4. Recognizing that repeated terrorist attacks against the military
could spur some officers to take matters into their own hands, the government
has just announced some stiffer measures.
Interior Minister Barronuevo asked the courts to be more aggressive
in prosecuting terrorist-related offenses, including harboring,
protecting, defending, or in any way showing favoritism toward
terrorist organizations.
-- The government has beefed up security at prisons where terrorists are
held.
-- Security has been improved for armed forces personnel and
installations.
-- Madrid is also likely to renew efforts to tighten movement across the
French border to prevent Basque terrorists from taking sanctuary so
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Memorandum for:
This memorandum was prepared
in preparation for Prime
Minister Trudeau's visit to
Washington on 15 December 1983.
EURA
Office of European Analysis
Directorate of intelligence
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Canada: Trudeau's Peace Initiative
Summary
Prime Minister Trudeau says his peace initiative is designed
to give a "jolt of political energy" to disarmament negotiations
between the United States and the Soviet Union. Trudeau's plan
includes a Five-Power Disarmament Conference, a new Western
proposal at the Mutual and Balanced'Force Reduction talks,
revitalization of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, emphasis
on high level attendance at the Conference on Disarmament in
Europe in January, and several confidence building measures. All
these measures are directed toward improving channels of
communication between Washington and Moscow, but Trudeau is
seeking to involve other countries, especially Canada's smaller
NATO allies and Third World nations and organizations, in the
disarmament process.
Since beginning his peace campaign in late October, Trudeau
has presented his proposals to the leaders of France, Belgium,
the Netherlands, the Vatican, Italy, West Germany, Great Britain,
Japan, China, as well as to a Commonwealth Conference. His
personal envoy has briefed Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on the
plan in Moscow. Trudeau's initiative has elicited a sympathetic
hearing from all quarters but has won no specific commitments.
Trudeau professes to be satisfied with the results, but admits
that the only consensus he has discovered is a general belief
that the superpowers must take the first steps toward
disarmament.
Despite the lackluster response, we believe that Trudeau
will press forward with his initiative. He has been an outspoken
advocate of disarmament for more than 20 years, and his present
campaign reflects a personal commitment to arms control. He may
also be interested in boosting the popularity of his government
and party, but we believe he will persist even if polls show no
improvement in the Liberal Party's electoral prospects.
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Trudeau believes that Washington and Moscow each have some
responsibility for the recent breakdown of the Geneva talks and
thinks that both will have to alter their bargaining position
before arms control negotiations can be resumed. We expect,
therefore, that in the period before the CDE convenes, Trudeau
will try to orchestrate "an elaborate exercise in global public
pressure" on Moscow and Washington in an effort to get arms
control talks started again.
Background
Trudeau's current peace initiative probably had its
beginnings at the Williamsburg Summit last Ma
Following the KAL shootdown on
1 September, Trudeau created a high-level government task force
to review existing peace plans and draft a disarmament scheme
that he could present when he felt the time was right. The task
force apparently finished its work in early October and Trudeau
sketched out the resulting plan in a speech on 27 October.
Major Aspects of Trudeau's Peace Plan
1. Five Power Conference on Limiting Nuclear Weapons -
Trudeau believes, according to US Embassy officials, that a
conference involving the United States, the Soviet Union, France,
Great Britain, and the People's Republic of China should be held
to establish fixed ratios -- similar to those created by the
Washington Naval Conference of 1921-22 -- for national strategic
forces. Fixed ratios, he argues, would lend overall
predictibility to the international strategic balance, make it
easier to set quantitative ceilings and increase chances for arms
reductions. Trudeau views a Five-Power Conference as a
complement to INF and START talks. Such a conference would
include the following specifics:
A. Procedural
-- The conference would be preceded by working group
consultations to set an agenda, terms of reference,
and guidelines.
-- Working group meetings would be convened without
substantive preconditions.
-- The conference would be conducted on a state-to-
state and not a bloc-to-bloc basis with each nation
retaining a veto over any substantive matter.
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B. Substantive
-- The conference's overall goal would be to establish
"fixed ratios" for the national strategic forces of
the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain,
France, and China. To accommodate ongoing arms
control efforts, the creation of "precise ratios"
may have to await the outcome of the INF and START
talks.
-- To secure superpower agreement, the ratios
established by the conference must reflect "de jure
equality" of the strategic forces of the US and the
USSR.
-- The "unit of account" for the conference probably
would be "warheads and strategic nuclear
vehicles." This would:
Correspond to Western and Soviet practice in
START and INF.
- Encourage a move to single warhead systems and
prevent countries from placing larger numbers
of warheads on launchers to circumvent the
agreement.
Avoid handicapping the British, French, and
Chinese strategic forces which currently have
less MIRV potential.
-- All parties would be entitled to withdraw from the
agreement given adequate notification in situations
of perceived threat to their national security .
-- Qualitative modernization would be allowed if it did
not violate the negotiated ratios or subsequent arms
control agreements coming out of the START or INF
talks.
-- Specific numerical totals probably would be attached
to the agreed ratios to preclude quantitative
increases.
-- All land, sea, and air-based systems deemed by the.
negotiators to be strategic in nature should be
included.
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Forces of less than intercontinental range
could be deployed wherever the parties
desired, subject to restrictions imposed by
other arms control agreements. Such an
arrangement would force a tradeoff between
intercontinental and theater forces. In
Trudeau's view, this might dampen incentives
for an arms race in the European Theater,
while allowing some asymmetries in theater
deployments.
2. Conventional Forces - Trudeau proposes a positive and
innovative response to the MBFR proposal put forth by the Soviets
in June. The West's response, he believes, should be followed by
ministerial level talks in Vienna, Trudeau has been vague about
the content of the response, but he has expressed interest in the
ideas for tradeoffs (data versus verification) recently developed
by the West Germans. The Prime Minister apparently does not
accept the argument that conventional capabilities will increase
as progress is made toward nuclear disarmament. Trudeau recently
said in the Canadian Parliament, for example, that the purpose of
nuclear disarmament "is not to make the world safe for
conventional warfare."
3. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) - Trudeau is
seeking to add additional signatories to the NPT by creating a
strong link between disarmament and development aid to the Third
World. This follows the lead taken earlier this year by French
President Mitterrand who suggested that the resources saved
through disarmament should be directed toward providing economic
aid to the Third World.
4. Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) - Trudeau
views the CDE scheduled to begin in January in Stockholm as an
important first step in creating an atmosphere conducive to
disarmament in Europe. The Canadian position at the CDE probably
will focus on promoting the full implementation of the confidence
building measures NATO has agreed to sponsor.
5. Confidence Building Measures - Trudeau is advocating a
ban on high altitude anti-satellite systems because they could be
used to attack global communications essential for crisis
management. He also is seeking an agreement to improve
verifiability by limiting the mobility of present ICBMs and
requiring all future weapons systems to be fully verifiable by
national technical means.
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International Reactions to Trudeau's Initiative
Since his speech in October, Trudeau has carried this plan
to the leaders of six West European nations, Pope John Paul II,
the Commonwealth Conference in New Dehli, and top Chinese leaders
in Beijing. In addition, Trudeau's personal disarmament envoy,
Geoffrey Pearson, has discussed the plan with Soviet Foreign
Minister Gromyko in Moscow.
Although Trudeau has attempted to put the best face possible
on the reactions, he and his aides have been extremely closed-
mouthed about the details of discussions to date. US Embassy and
media reporting from the various capitals indicates that, in
general, Trudeau was politely received but the leaders avoided a
commitment to his plan.
France President Mitterrand and Foreign Minister
Cheysson, although critical of the initiative's
timing, volunteered moral support for Trudeau's
plan but did not endorse any of its
specifics. The French did indicate they might
consider attending Five-Power "discussions" to
explore the idea of a formal conference.
Mitterrand also repeated his previously stated
conditions for French attendance at a formal
conference.
Netherlands Prime Minister Lubbers supported the thrust of
Trudeau's plan, but urged him not to
concentrate on the Five-Power Conference
idea. Lubbers advised Trudeau to focus instead
on "improving the climate in the conventional
arms field" by stressing the importance of a
new MBFR proposal.
Belgium The Belgians were the most enthusiastic West
European supporters of Trudeau's initiative.
Belgian Foreign Minister Tindemans said his
.government was "extremely pleased" by the
effort and described Trudeau's plan as "the
best means" the West now has for reopening a
serious dialogue with Moscow.
Italy and Prime Minister Craxi apparently was the least
the Vatican forthcoming of the West Europeans and did
little more than listen politely. According to
US officials, Craxi and Foreign Minister
Andreotti regarded the Canadian proposals as
"unrealistic" but welcomed Trudeau's effort to
reestablish dialogue between the superpowers.
Pope John Paul II, on the other hand,
wholeheartedly endorsed Trudeau's effort.
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West Germany Chancellor Kohl reportedly showed considerable
interest in Trudeau's ideas. Canadian Defense
Minister Blais recently told US officials that
Trudeau was pleased by Kohl's receptiveness,
and the New York Times reported that the
Chancellor's security advisers are actively
studying the plan.
Great Britain Prime Minister Thatcher gave Trudeau's plan a
lukewarm reception and told him the idea of a
Five-Power Conference was premature. Foreign
and Commonwealth office officials apparently
were more receptive and Mrs. Thatcher also
seemed a bit more supportive of the Canadian
initiative at the Commonwealth Conference.
"Increased contact," Thatcher said regarding
Trudeau's plan, "does not of itself guarantee
results, much less quick results. But it can
ward off the worst dangers and for that reason
alone is worth pursuing."
Japan Prime Minister Nakasone welcomed Trudeau's
efforts and said that Japan would unequivocally
support his ideas regarding the NPT. Nakasone
was non-committal on the other aspects of the
Canadian plan.
Commonwealth The Conference's final communique gave
Conference general support to Trudeau's plan but refrained
from endorsing the specifics. Prime Minister
Gandhi of India led those Commonwealth nations
opposing Trudeau's plan to expand the number of
NPT signatories.
China Trudeau received a polite reception in Beijing
but little specific support from the top
leaders.
USSR Trudeau's personal envoy received some limited
encouragement from Gromyko, Korniyenko, and
Arbatov. He told the Soviets that Trudeau
would discuss the plan only with Andropov, and
Gromyko hinted that a.response regarding such a
meeting might be forthcoming by 20 December.
Subsequently, Izvestiya political commentator
Aleksandr Bovin wrote in the Toronto Star that
Moscow supports Trudeau's plan and is "ready
for an exchange of opinion at the forum of the
five."
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Canadian Domestic Reaction
At home, Trudeau has received substantial approval for his
initiative. Some press articles have accused him of using the
peace plan as a ploy to revive the Liberal Party's flagging
political fortunes -- the Liberals trailed the Progressive
Conservatives by 29 percentage points in a Gallup Poll in
October. On the whole, however, Trudeau's recent efforts have
been applauded by the public, the media, and the leaders of both
opposition parties. According to US officials, Trudeau
apparently has struck a responsive chord among Canadians by
reminding them of the "golden age" of Canadian diplomacy, the
period during the 1950s and 1960s when Canada, as a leading
middle power, played the role of "helpful fixer" in such
international disputes as the Suez Crisis.
Trudeau's initiative apparently also reflects the concerns
of a substantial portion of the Canadian electorate. The
Progressive Conservative Party's pollster, Allan Gregg, said
recent polls show that an unprecedented proportion of the
Canadian population has put the status of international affairs
at the top of their list of worries. Gregg estimates that in his
next poll 20 to 25 percent of Canadians will list international
relations as their top concern; the previous Canadian peak in
this category was 11 percent in December 1980 after the invasion
of Afghanistan. In addition, the Toronto Globe and Mail has
quoted polls showing that among citizens of all the Western
countries Canadians are the most fearful about world peace and
that their confidence in Washington's ability to deal with world
affairs has declined in recent years. Paradoxically, however, a
recent poll conducted by the Canadian Institute of International
Relations showed that while a majority of Canadians supported the
current thrust of the Liberal government's external policy, they
still intend to vote for the Progressive Conservatives in the
next election.
We believe that Trudeau's initiative is not primarily an
attempt to find a way to remain party leader and prime
minister. Trudeau has been an outspoken advocate of disarmament
for more than 20 years and, in our judgment, his present effort
is inspired predominantly by intellectual commitment rather than
political pragmatism. Some slow, or even sporadic, progress
toward the reopening of a positive US-USSR arms control dialogue
may, however, encourage Trudeau to seek reelection in the general
election now expected in the fall of 1984. Trudeau pledged, in'
1980, to retire before the next election.
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Next Steps in the Initiative
In our opinion, Trudeau will in the near future seek to put
increased public pressure on Washington and Moscow to renew and
expand arms control negotiations. Such pressure might include
the following specific moves:
Take an activist position within the NATO caucus at the
CDE in Stockholm. We believe that the Canadians will be
very active within the NATO causus and most unwilling to
back away from any of the confidence building measures
it now plans to introduce. Both Trudeau and External
Affairs Minister MacEachen have stressed the importance
they attach to the CDE and we cannot rule out the
possibility that the Canadians may urge the caucus to
make additional substantive recommendations should the
conference appear headed for a stalemate
Seek to restart the MBFR talks. We believe that Canada
may suggest that a ministerial level meeting be held in
Vienna as a means of getting MBFR talks started again.
Trudeau believes that a high-level "political impulse"
is needed to improve the prospects for an MBFR
agreement; he has described those talks to date as "a
silent exercise in which the technocrats were in
control."
"Fundamental debate" in the North Atlantic Council (NAC)
on NATO's dual track policy and force structure. During
his recent visit to Japan, Trudeau told Nakasone that,
while Canada remained commited to NATO's dual track
policy, INF "had failed" and that the alliance had
"crossed a dangerous threshhold" with deployment.
Trudeau also told the Dutch that he is skeptical, even
cynical, about the ability of the other NATO allies to
influence US policy and that he believes the deterrent
side of the dual track policy now far overshadows the
negotiating. We believe he may seek common ground with
the smaller NATO allies before urging debate in the NAC.
Seek additional moral support for his initiative from
Third World nations. Trudeau has indicated that he may
seek the support of the G-77 group of non-aligned
nations in the United Nations to complement the general
support he received at the Commonwealth Conference. He
also will continue to urge the-LDCs who have not signed
the NPT to do so.
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Increased public emphasis on confidence building
measures, especially a ban on ASAT. In a speech in
1978, Trudeau called for the "suffocation" of the
nuclear arms race through the halting of "the
technological momentum ... freezing at the initial,
testing stage the development of any new weapons
system." We believe that Trudeau's call for a ban on
high altitude anti-satellite systems, for limits on ICF3M
mobility, and for verifiable weapons systems fits within
the framework of his "suffocation" plan and that he will
push hard for their adoption.
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Chronology of Trudeau's Peace Initiative, September-December 1983
Early Sep 83 - Trudeau establishes a government task force on
disarmament with members drawn from the Prime
Minister's Office, the Department of External
Affairs, and the Department of National Defense.
1 Oct 83 - The Prime Minister briefs UN Secretary General
Perez de Cuellar on his intention to begin a peace
initiative.
17 Oct 83 - Canadian External Affairs Minister MacEachen
outlines Trudeau's initiative to the US Secretary
of State during a bilateral meeting in Halifax,
Nova Scotia.
20 Oct 83 - Canadian Government allocates increased funding
for research and development of weapons
verification technology and creates an Arms
Control and Disarmament Verification Program in
the Department of External Affairs.
- MacEachen's statement for UN Disarmament Week
announces Canada's intention to become more fully
involved in the international disarmament process.
23 Oct 83 - Trudeau holds private discussions with former US
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in Ottawa.
24 Oct 83 - In Parliament, Trudeau rejects inclusion of
British and French strategic systems in the INF
talks in Geneva, but reasserts his belief that
both systems must be included eventually in an
overall arms agreement.
25 Oct 83 - Trudeau sends a letter to President Reagan
describing his intention to begin a disarmament
initiative and outlining its objectives.
Trudeau circulates a letter to all NATO heads of
government broadly outlining his intentions.
27 Oct 83 - The Prime minister officially launches his
initiative in a speech to a Disarmament Conference
at Guelph University in Ontario. He recommends a
Five-Power Disarmament Conference, a Conference on
Disarmament in Europe in January 1984, a ban on
anti-satellite systems, limits on ICBM mobility, a
campaign to add signatories to the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty (NPT), and a new Western
proposal at the the MBFR talks.
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I I
28 Oct 83 - Trudeau delivers a speech at Dalhousie
University's fall convocation in which he
describes his initiative as an exercise in
"creative radicalism."
29 Oct 83 - Trudeau meets with heads of the Harvard University
Nuclear Study Group in New York. His effort is
reported to have been prompted, in part, by the
conclusions of the Study Group's book Living with
Nuclear Weapons.
6 Nov 83 - Trudeau sends a letter to Soviet leader Andropov
outlining his initiative.
8 Nov 83 - Trudeau discusses his plans with President
Mitterrand and Foreign Minister Cheysson in Paris
and with Prime Minister Lubbers in The Hague.
9-10 Nov 83 - Trudeau presents his plan to Prime Minister
Martens and Foreign Minister Tindemans in
Brussels, to Pope John Paul II in the Vatican, and
Prime Minister Craxi and Foreign Minister
Andreotti in Rome.
10 Nov 83 - Trudeau presents his plan to Chancellor Kohl in
Bonn.
- Canadian Deputy Minister for Foreign Policy
Marchand briefs US Deputy Secretary of State in
Washington on the progress of Trudeau's
initiative.
11 Nov 83 - The Prime Minister describes his proposals to
Prime Minister Thatcher in London. London was not
scheduled in Trudeau's original itinerary but was
added at Mrs. Thatcher's request.
13 Nov 83 - Trudeau makes a speech in Montreal depicting the
"consensus of support" he found in Western Europe
for his plan. Announces the dispatch of Geoffrey
Pearson, a Canadian diplomat and former Ambassador
to the Soviet Union, to Beijing and Moscow to
broach his plan. Also announces he will visit
Tokyo on 19 November to discuss his plan with
Prime Minister Nakasone.
15 Nov 83 - MacEachen briefs US officials in Ottawa on the
status of Trudeau's initiative and recommends
early discussion on the topic between the Prime
Minister and the President.
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19 Nov 83 - Trudeau discusses plan with Nakasone in Tokyo.
- He briefs Georgiy Arbatov, head of Moscow's
US/Canada Institute, on his initiative. Arbatov
had requested the interview through the Soviet
Embassy in Tokyo.
22 Nov 83 - Canada's Permanent Representative to NATO
distributes a background paper describing
Trudeau's initiative, and the West European
response to it, at a meeting of NATO's Political
Committee.
23 Nov 83 - Trudeau delivers keynote address at Commonwealth
Conference in New Dehli. He appeals for support
for his initiative and emphasizes his desire to
add signatories to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Endorses President's Mitterrand's desire to link
disarmament and Third World development.
25 Nov 83 - Trudeau's personal envoy, discusses the initiative
with Gromyko, First Deputy Foreign Minister
Korniyenko, and Arbatov in Moscow.
28-29 Nov 83 - Trudeau discusses his plan with Premier Zhao,
Foreign Minister Wu Xuegian, and Communist Party
leader Deng Xiaoping in Beijing.
29 Nov 83 MacEachen's speech to Chicago Council on Foreign
Relations describes Trudeau's desire to improve
the atmosphere between Moscow and Washington by "a
political act of high significance."
3 Dec 83 - Trudeau announces that the next step in his
initiative will be to "put pressure more directly
on the super powers." He says that this step was
urged on him by each of the world leaders with
whom he has spoken.
7 Dec 83 - In a statement opening Parliament, the Canadian
government reaffirms Canada's intention to
"continue to advance proposals to slow the steady
spiral of the arms race, halt the spread of
nuclear weapons, and create the conditions for
greater security at lower levels of armament."
9 Dec 83 - MacEachen informs Secretary Shultz in Brussels
that Trudeau may raise the possibility of a review
of NATO strategy and force structure during his
visit to Washington on 15 December.
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EURA/WE/BBC
- DDI
- ADDI
- OD/EURA
- EURA Production Staff
- IMC/CB
- Branch file
- Division file
- Author
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