ETHNIC MOVEMENTS AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000600460001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 12, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 29, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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~r-
CONF I DENTIAL
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C 20505
293 APR ?~!33
MEMORANDUM FOR: (See Distribution)
Acting Director 'of Global Issues
SUBJECT: Ethnic Movements and Political Instability
In the course of research into a wide range of ethnic
movements worldwide, our Scholar-in-Residence has 25X1
developed a set of policy prescriptions which have been effective
in dealing with ethnic dissent. To the extent that ethnic
movements are a concern in your area of interest, you may find
the attached study useful.
1. Ethnic Movements and Political
Instability, GI M 83 10117,
29 April 1983
CONFIDENTIAL
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Central Intelligence Agency
t shinsgton. D. C. 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
29 April 1983
ETHNIC. MOVEMENTS AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY
Summary
Ethnic discord and the desire for greater autonomy by
minority ethnic groups will continue to be a major threat to the
political stability of most Third World countries as Melt as a
number of Western and Communist countries. Some governments have
been more successful than others in tranquilizing and abating
this threat to national stability. We believe that these more
successful policies have broader applicability.
This memorandum was prepared by Scholar-in-
Residence in the Political Instability Branch, Instability and
Insurgency Center, Office of Global Issues. Comments may be
directed to Chief, Political Instability
Branch
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Effective and Ineffective Governmental Policies
Ethnic movements. result from the reluctance of one ethnic
group to ascribe legitimacy to a political system perceived as
dominated by another. Their primary goal is not social or
economic reform but greater autonomy and, in many instances,
independence. As a consequence, ethnic movements have
contributed to political instability in all types of states:
developed and underdeveloped, democratic and authoritarian,
Communist and non-Communist.
A global survey of ethnic movements indicates that, since
1965, more than half of the world's states have suffered
ethnically inspired discord. In a world consisting of some 3,000
ethnic groups and only about 160 states, the revolutionary
potential is enormous. The level of political instability
arising from this ethnic heterogeneity will be heavily influenced
by the policies governments adopt toward their ethnic groups.
Barring, such extreme policies as genocide and mass-expulson-
-each of which has had its recent practitioners (in Rwanda and
Uganda, for example)--no government has found a fully effective
technique for solving ethnic problems. Some governments,
however, have been clearly more effective than others in
accommodating aspirations and avoiding violent separatist
activities.
We have compared the policies of those states most
successful at peacefully accommodating ethnic aspirations with
those that appear to have inadvertently encouraged ethnic unrest
or separatist sentiment. While each country's situation is
somewhat unique and the same policy may therefore produce
different results in different milieus, our survey suggests that
the following prescriptions are the most effective in
ameliorating ethnic discontent:
o Grant local autonomy in matters which are most apt to
arouse ethnic sensibilities, particularly in the areas of
education, language, and religion. A policy of cultural
pluralism, if directed from the center, may not provide
sufficient immunity against secessionist sentiment, as
attested to by the histories of Belgium and Canada. The
Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China offer
further illustrations. Cases where autonomy has
ameliorated ethnic discontent include Finland (the Swedish
community), Panama (the Cuna Indians), and Switzerland.
o Staff local law enforcement agencies (particularly at the
"street level") with members of the group indigenous to
the locale. Otherwise, perceptions of police brutality
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and discrimination are apt to fuel ethnic hostility, as
has been the case in Croatia, Malaysia, and Northern
Ireland.
o In general, have local representatives of the central
authorities maintain as low a profile as possible. States
and empires, such as China, Ethiopia, Persia', and
Thailand, prevailed for centuries without serious ethnic
discord because the center's control was largely in name
only. Such systems were in reality a series of quite
independent, ethnically homogeneous political units. With
improvements in transportation and communications, the
presence of the center has become increasingly felt in
Third World countries. As a result, China, Ethiopia,
Iran, and Thailand are all currently troubled by
secessionist movements. Special care must be taken to
distinguish between the desired provision of services and
undesired central direction, if stability is to be
maintained. State-building in the political sense
done exceedingly slowly under the circumstances.
o Avoid in-migration of outsiders into traditional ethnic
homelands. A homeland is more than territory in the
perceptions of the indigenous group; it takes on a highly
emotional content evident in such universally used terms
as the homeland, the motherland, the fatherland,the.
ancestral land, etc. Indigenous people believe they have
a unique and exclusive proprietary right to their
homeland,and a significant intrusion by non-indigenes
typically gives rise to hostility. There have been
numerous recent cases of this phenomenon within Western
Europe, China, the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and
Yugoslavia.- Third World examples include the resistance
to intruders shown by the Assamese of India, the Moros of
the Philippines, and many Indian peoples of Latin
America. The resettlement of enormous numbers of
outsiders within a homeland can, of course, reduce or even
eliminate the threat of secession. (Mongols, for example,
now account for only some thirteen percent of the
population of China's Inner Mongolian Autonomous
Region. )
o Avoid creating any administrative unit that approximates
an ethnic homeland or
that is larger than the homeland but leaves a particular
ethnic group clearly dominant (as in the case of the
former Nigerian province of Biafra). In either case,
there is a strong probability that the administrative unit
will become an emotional focus for separatist sentiment.
Current illustrations include several states of India
(Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Tamil Nadu), a number of
the republics of the Soviet Union (Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, and the Ukraine), and the republics and
provinces of Yugoslavia (particularly Croatia, Slovenia,
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interests and ambitions of the various ruling elites.
and Albanian dominated Kosovo). 25X1
o Draw administrative borders so as to subdivide any
significant ethnic groups into several administrative
units in each of which they are dominant. Drawing the
borders of a state's administrative subdivisions in a
manner designed to dilute the numerical power of an ethnic
group should be avoided; the denial of majority status at
the local level by such gerrymandering tends to anger
affected ethnic groups and increase secessionist
sentiment, as has occurred in the cases of the Tibetans
and Uighurs of China and the Baluch of Iran. Division
into a number of units in which the group is dominant,
however, gives rise to several sets of administrative
elites whose status would be threatened by any movement,
secessionist or otherwise, involving the entire ethnic
group. These administrative units should be endowed with
sufficient powers to give the elites a vested interest in
the survival of their particular unit. Switzerland offers
one successful model. A further illustration is found in
the division of the "Arab Nation" into many states, which
has inhibited concerted action because of the competing
give rise to a more militant leadership.
o Co-opt ethnic leaders. Appointing leaders of important
ethnic groups to positions of high visibility and prestige
is a common ploy of governments, but, unless accompanied
by real concessions to the group's ethnic aspirations,
this tactic is unlikely to succeed and may be
counterproductive. Total exclusion of a national minority
from office will almost certainly increase secessionist
sentiment, but a policy of co-optation will boomerang if
members of the group interpret appointments as the tossing
of scraps. Indira Gandhi's appointment of a Sikh
dignitary to India's presidency, for instance, was
followed by more militant actions in the name of.an
independent Kalistan. Co-optation may also lead to
charges that ethnic leaders have "sold out" and therefore
o Avoid allocating resources in a manner that is markedly
inequitable to major ethnic groups. Flagrant economic
inequality can inflame separatist passions. However,
awarding special economic privileges to a minority is not
likely to quell its political aspirations. Thus, Basques
and Catalans within Spain, Croats and Slovenes within
Yugoslavia, and Estonians and Letts within the USSR are
all economically better off than the state's politically
dominant group and yet manifest autonomist or separatist
aspirations. Moreover, governments must realize that
popular perceptions of a group's economic situation are
more significant than its actual situation. Several
studies confirm the propensity of ethnic groups to
perceive discrimination where it does not exist. The
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Sikhs of India, for example, complain loudly of
discrimination, although they are one
mobile groups within Indian society.
of the most upwardly
o Any important concessions to autonomy should be granted
simultaneously to all roughly equivalent ethnic groups.
Ethnic groups are extremely sensitive to perceptions of
unequal treatment, and concessions made to one-group
trigger expectations by others. For instance, when the
Telegu-speaking people were given their own administrative
unit within India in 1953, all other major ethnic groups
demanded and received similar status over the next two
decades. Within Panama, the Choco and.Guaymi Indians are
currently exerting pressure for an autonomous district
(comarca) similar to that granted to the Cunas.
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GI M 83-10117
ETHNIC MOVEMENTS AND.POLITICAL INSTABILITY
External Distribution: (1 Copy each)
Mr. Geoffrey T. H. Kemp
Senior Staff Member/Middle,East
National Security Council
Washington, D. C.
Mr. Roger W. Fontaine
Senior Staff Member
Inter-America
National Security Council
Washington, D.C.
Mr. Fred Wettering
Senior Staff Member
Africa
National Security Council
Washington, D.C.
Mr. Gaston Sigur
Senior Staff Member
East Asia/South Asia
National Security Council
,Washington, D.C.
Mr. Stephen Bosworth
Director, Policy Planning Staff
Room 6263,Department of State
Washington, D.C.
Mr. Philip Kaplan
Chief of Staff of Policy Planning
Room 7316, Department of State
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Mr. Robert D. Blackwill
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bureau of European Affairs
Room 7317, Department of State
Washington, D.C.
Mr. Edward Di l le ry
Director, Office of Southern European Affairs
Bureau of European Affairs
Room 5509, Department of State
Washington, D.C.
1
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External Distribution: (continue.d)
Mr. Ralph Lindstrom
Director, Iran
Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Room 5246A, Department of State
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Mr. Nathaniel Howell
Director, Lebanon, Jordan, Syrian Arab
Republic, Iraq
Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
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Mr. Harmon G. Kirby
Director, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bengladesh
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Director, Regional Affairs
Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
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Mr. David T. Schneider
.Deputy Assistant Secretary, NESA
Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
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Mr. Victor Tomseth
Director, India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka
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Mr. John Blacken
Director, Central America
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Director, Panama
Bureau of Inter-American Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D.C.
2
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External Distribution (continued)
Mr. John Bushnell
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Office of the Assistant Secretary
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Department of State
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Mr. Everett Briggs
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Office of the Assistant Secretary
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Mr. James Buchanan
Chief, South America Division
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Mr.. George S. Harris
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Mr. Frederich Z. Brown
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Burma and Singapore
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External Distribution (continued).
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bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
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Mr. Robert A. Brand
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Mr. James K. Bishop
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Mr. Princeton Lyman
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Mr. Richard Bogosian
Director
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Mr. Larry Williamson
Director
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Mr. Robert Bruce
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External Distribution (continued)
Mr. Daniel H. Simpson
Director
Office of Southern African Affairs
Room 4238, Department of State
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Mr. Nicholas Murphy
Director
Office of Central African Affairs
Bureau of African Affairs
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