THE KHYBER: HEROIN TRAFFICKING CONTINUES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000600760002-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 23, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
24 August 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Clyde D. Taylor L-
Deputy Assistant Secretary for International
Narcotics Matters
Department of State
Chiet, International Security Issues Division
Office of Global Issues
SUBJECT: Heroin Trafficking in Pakistan
1. The attached memorandum was prepared in response to
questions you posed recently to the National Intelligence Officer
for Narcotics regarding heroin processing and trafficking in
Pakistan.
2. This memorandum was prepared by
International Security Issues Division, Office of Global
3. Comments and queries are welcome and may be addressed to
the Chief, Strategic Narcotics Branch, OGI
Attachment:
The Khyber: Heroin Trafficking
Continues GI M 83-10200, August 1983,
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SUBJECT: The Khyber: Heroin Trafficking Continues
Di str ibution:
Orig. - Addressee
1 - D/OGI
1 - NIO/NAR
1 - NESA
2 - C/ISID
2 - C/NAR
8 - PS
1 - CPAS/ILS
OGI/ISID/NAR
23 August 1983 25X1
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I I
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
23 August 1983
The Khyber: Heroin Trafficking Continues
Summary
Heroin seizures in Pakistan, Europe, and the United States
indicate heroin laboratories in Pakistan's North-West Frontier
Province (NWFP) still operate despite a November 1982 government-
inspired crackdown by tribal leaders. Tensions remain high as
tribal traffickers and authorities clash over the narcotics
issue. Although the Landi Kotal crackdown immobilized some
processors, eliminated some laboratories, and dispersed a few
refineries to surrounding areas including Afghanistan, we believe
the city of Landi Kotal and its environs probably remains the
center for narcotics processing in Pakistan. Sustained
enforcement efforts are hampered as high-level Pakistani
authorities disagree on the extent of heroin production in and
around Landi Kotal and the ability of tribal leaders to enforce
the ban. Stymied by their inability to close down the heroin
laboratories, Pakistani enforcement officials may well redirect
their efforts toward investigations of major international
traffickers operating outside of the NWFP. US assistance and
training programs may be of benefit in pursuing such
investigations.
This memorandum was prepared by
International Security Issues Division, Office of Global
Issues. This analysis is based on information available as of 10
August 1983. Comments and queries are welcome and may be
addressed to-the Chief, Strategic Narcotics Branch, OGI, on
GI M 83-10200
23 August 1983
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Enforcement and the Traffickers' Reaction
In 1982, the Pakistani Narcotics Control Board (PNCB)
reported publicly that Pakistan's rapidly rising heroin trade was
centered in Landi Kotal where 30 laboratories were believed
operating. Deep within the tribal areas of the North-West
Frontier Province, where the government has little authority,
this historical smuggling and trade city is strategically
'-situated to host the heroin trade. It i's close to the opium
growing areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan, not far from the
important narcotics brokering center of Peshawar, and near the
Afghan border, beyond which laboratories can safely relocate when
pressure mounts in Pakistan.
In November 1982, President Zia, publicly recognizing that
Pakistan faced a worsening heroin abuse problem and presumably
responding to mounting US pressure, directed his political agent
in Khyber Agency to order the tribal chiefs to stop the Landi
Kotal heroin trade. Shortly thereafter, the tribal elders
ordered the chemists to surrender their equipment or face fines
of $40,000 and public disgrace. Although Shinwari and some
Afridi tribesmen violently opposed this decision, government
officials told US Embassy representatives that by early December
traffickers had 'been persuaded to surrender the hardware from 27
laboratories and that heroin production had ceased in the Khyber
area.
to control anti-enforcement demonstrations organized by the
United Federation of Tribesmen, a small but vocal group of
agitators whose membership reportedly includes heroin
traffickers. When the alleged head of the Landi Kotal branch of
the Federation--himself a trafficker--was arrested, his followers
reportedly organized a demonstration that blocked the eastern
approach to the Khyber Pass. Outbursts such as these are
Khyber traffickers have emphatically objected to the ban and
to subsequent enforcement operations, viewing both as an
infringement on their tribal sovereignty as well as a threat to
their narcotics trade. Indeed, periodic rallies by tribesmen in
defense of arrested drug traffickers have kept the Khyber area
tense. In May, one Pakistani official reported to US Embassy
officials that he was calling upon the Khyber Rifles almost daily
probably directed in part at the United States which
is regarded by tribesmen ache
Despite the government-sponsored enforcement activities,
heroin production and trafficking in Landi Kotal and its environs
continues:
Landi Kotal heroin laboratory netted three traffickers,
including a ring leader who allegedly was responsible for
an April 10 raid on a
operating six of the seven laboratories that officials
believe had been reestablished in the city.
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heroin "shops" in
Bara and Jamrud, both within 15 miles ot Landi Kotal, were
raided in June and several traffickers were arrested.
? During May and June the Khyber Political Agent, the Home
Secretary for the NWFP, and the Chairman of the Pakistani
Narcotics Control Board all reported to US Embassy
officials that they had information on laboratories
operating in the Landi Kotal area.
three laboratories
were set up at unspecified locations in Afghanistan after
the governor of Jalalabad invited processors from Landi
Kotal to Afghanistan, promising that they would be
permitted to manufacture as much heroin as they wished
under Democratic Republic of Afghanistan protection.
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five Shinwari tribesmen had accepted an invitation from
Afghan officials to reestablish their laboratories across
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Enforcement Effectivenss: The Pakistani View
Pakistani authorities are not in agreement, at least
publicly, over the level of the heroin trade and the steps needed
to conrol it. Comments by officials who have candidly reported
to Embassy personnel on the Khyber laboratories suggest that
tribal justice has been slow, uneven, and ineffective. These
officials have stressed that sustained enforcement efforts beyond
those provided by tribal leaders and greater enforcement activity
elsewhere in Pakistan will be needed to end the Pakistani trade.
In January 1983,
speculated that the dismantled laboratories wou
reestablish themselves "underground" in Landi Kotal making
them even harder to detect.
? Recognizing that heroin production had not abated, NWFP
Home Secretary Jamshed Burki opined that stronger
enforcement against processors rather than negotiated
settlements with tribal leaders was required to slow the
trade.
? Mairj Husain, Chairman of the PNCB, recently stated that
the time had come to arrest major traffickers and try them
in marital law courts.
Despite being advised of continued heroin production in the
NWFP, other influential Pakistani officials seem content with the
present level of enforcement in the tribal areas. By
characterizing the tribal crackdown as effective and taking a
cautious attitude toward further enforcement, these official may
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be trying to deflect anti-narcotics pressure away from the
NWFP.
We believe
they
are motivated in part by a desire to
prevent
President
Zia,
who now is commited publicly to bringing
heroin
production
under
control, from being embarrassed by a
failed
program.
Also,
they are probably concerned that
escalating anti-narcotics pressure in the NWFP could lead to
destablizing confrontations between government authorities and
militant Pathans. In this regard:
? Interior Secretary Roeded Khan recently told US officials
that a political agreement with the tribes has led to the
destruction of 41 heroin laboratories in the Khyber area
and stressed that future effort should be coupled with
developmental projects in the region.
President Zia's Chief of Staff, General Arif explained to
US officials that the government must be careful not to
upset the traditional society if it expects to maintain
the much-needed cooperation of the tribesmen on the
narcotics issue.
? North-West Frontier Province Governor Fazle Haq has
contended, until recently, that the November 1982 strike
against the Landi Kotal laboratories all but eliminated
heroin production in Pakistan. He has maintained that
heroin seized in Pakistan since November originated in
Afghanistan, citing a 396 kilogram shipment confiscated by
Pakistani Customs near Peshawar in December 1982 as an
example. Laboratory analysis, however, reveals that this
and other large seizures contained nothing more than
heroin residue, and
suggest that these seizures
by NWFP officials.
staged
Pakistani authorities--especially if prompted by US
officials--will probably continue to urge tribal leaders to move
against heroin laboratories in the Khyber area, but we believe it
likely that a nucleus of heroin processors will continue to
operate in the Khyber area beyond the reach of the government and
with the tacit consent of tribal leaders. Despite government
encouragement, tribal leaders probably will not pursue processors
across the border into Afghanistan, and their enforcement actions
in the Khyber probably will be selective, targeting first those
traffickers who are agitators drawing unwelcomed attention to the
area. Government officials who are worried that extensive
anti-narcotics sweeps could destabilize the tribal areas will
prevent enforcement authorities from carrying out major
operations on their own.
Stymied by their inability to close down the heroin
laboratories, Pakistani enforcement officials may well redirect
their efforts--activities that would benefit from US assistance
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I t.
agencies and insufficient manpower, intelligence, and
and training programs--toward investigations of major
international traffickers operating from brokering centers such
as Karachi., Lahore, and Rawalpindi. Enforcement activities
should be aided by improved anti-narcotics legislation that
Interior Minister Kahn has said is forthcoming, although problems
posed by the need for coordination among Pakistani enforcement
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investigative skills will still have to be resolved.
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