AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000700070001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 2, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 4, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Afghanistan Situation Report
4 January 1983
Top Secret
NESA M 83-10001 CX
4 January 1983
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TOP SECRET
Insurgent activity in and around Kabul during the end of December
indicates that while the regime's control in the capital is still
strong, the surrounding area remains a no man's land.
The Soviets continue to tailor their Afghan
varying objectives in different places.
This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near East/South Asia
and the Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments on the issues
raised in the publication should be directed to
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During the anniversary week of the Soviet invasion, the
insurgents did not launch any spectacular operations, but
sporatic gunfire could be heard through many of the nights. The
insurgents did interrupt totally the capital's supply of
electricity for the first time by blowing up five power
transmission pylons outside the city. The regime, for its part,
organized an anti-US demonstration of 18,000 to 20,000 people,
which--although unenthusiastic--was the largest to date.
Comment: The Afghan government's ability to limit resistance
activity to sporatic fighting during the anniversary of the
Soviet invasion suggests that its security network in Kabul is
relatively effective. Similarly, its ability to organize a
large, if sullen, number of demonstrators underscores its control
of the Kabul populace. The insurgents' capability to cause the
power blackout, however, demonstrates that government control
remains weak just a few miles outside the capital.
A TASS statement on Afghanistan issued on December 31
authoritatively reiterates Moscow's interest in a political
settlement and denies Soviet use of chemical warfare. It calls
Administration statements about Soviet intentions in Asia and the
Middle East "dirty political speculation" and says Western
efforts to hold relations with the USSR hostage to develo ments
in Afghanistan evoke only "surprise and censure".
Earlier this month, a visiting scholar from the USA Institute
told a group of US academics that General Secretary Andropov
wanted to extricate the USSR from Afghanistan. He alleged the
Soviets were encouraging India to reach a rapprochement with
Pakistan so as to reduce Islamabad's concern about India and its
need for US security.
Twice immediately prior to the issuance of the TASS statement,
Soviet officials with prior access to Andropov in Moscow also
4 January 1983
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told US officials privately that he is looking for a way out of
the USSR's Afghan problem. One even hinted Babrak might be
expendable.
Comment: The Soviets hope that the appearance of greater
flexibility on problems like Afghanistan and Kampuchea will
facilitate resumption of bilateral dialogues with the West and
China. At the same time, they recognize the danger that too much
speculation could undermine an already fragile regime in Kabul.
The TASS statement is the fourth public gesture of Soviet support
for Kabul since Brezhnev's death.
The Soviets are not encouraging India and Pakistan to improve
relations.
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Afghan airlines, will soon begin passenger flights to Prague and
East Berlin via Moscow. These stops will replace the lucrative
landing rights lost in western Europe, but Austria, or other
small countries, may still eventually grant such rights.
--UN Special Representative Cordovez plans to arrive in Tehran on
21 January, be in Islamabad 23-25 January, go to Kabul 26
January, an
then return to Islamabad 30-31 January.
4 January 1983
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