LIBYA: QADHAFI'S DOMESTIC & INTERNATIONAL POSITION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000700160001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 17, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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17 January 1983
LIBYA: Qadhafi's Domestic and International Position
We believe that Muammar Qadhafi has sought to transform the
social and economic systems of Libya in the hopes of creating an
Arab state capable of rivaling Israel
We believe that he is genuinely committed to the spread of Islam
and to the promotion of what he considers the revolutionary
ideals outlined in his Green Book
Although his actions do appear to serve Soviet interests more
often than not, we do not consider Qadhafi a Soviet surrogate
because
-- Qadhafi is fiercely independent and extremely nationalistic
-- and because he considers himself a good muslim who must
necessarily be uncomfortable with the "godless" Soviets
We do not consider Libya another Cuba--nor do we expect to see
this kind of relationship develop--because
-- Qadhafi has too much money to allow himself to be placed in
a dependent role
We do not consider Qadhafi a "madman", although we believe he may
react unpredictably when he is under stress. We believe his
actions are largely consistent with an internal logic which has
been shaped by his Bedouin background and his intellectual 25X1
NESA M#83-10011
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development as an admirer of Egypt's Nasser during the height of
With these notions in mind, we believe that a number of factors,
both domestic and international, have conspired to place Qadhafi
in an uncertain position at this moment.
-- On the domestic scene, popular acceptance of Qadhafi and
his revolutionary regime has eroded dangerously over the
past several years
-- dissatisfaction is no longer confined to the middle and
upper classes--the main targets of revolutionary reform-
-but has spread within the lower classes as well.
The main reasons are:
-- repression in the form of corruption trials, regular
purges, and increasingly powerful "vigilante"
revolutionary committees
-- political and social programs that offend the muslim
values and the generally comservative nature of the
Libyan people, ie. the conscription of females
-- eradication of private enterprise, confiscation of
property and savings, and poor economic planning
causing regular dislocations in the daily lives of
all Libyans
-- Qadhafi's mistrust and high-handed treatment of the
military has amplified discontent there, particularly in
the officer corps. Coup plotting and assassination
attempts have stepped up since the mid-1970s with two or
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three attempts occurring on the average every year
can confirm that most efforts to oust Qadhafi come
from disaffected military officers--the most serious
recently occurred in December 1981, when Qadhafi
apparently was shot in the shoulder
-- Qadhafi's intelligence service and his network of
loyalists, however, has been very effective in
aborting attempts to unseat the regime. Nonetheless,
we believe that Qadhafi and company have been
increasingly forced into a seige mentality
-- Libyan exiles located in the Middle East and Europe have
organized into active but still largely ineffectual
opposition.
-- Most of these exiles come from the discredited
classes which flourished under the monarchy deposed
by Qadhafi in 1969.
-- Few of these exiles have any significant following in
Libya or have demonstrated any talent for organizing
a serious challenge to the regime
-- Their propaganda efforts, however, apparently have
badly unnerved Qadhafi
-- and he publicly threatened this past October to
revive his notorious assassination campaign against
them if they did not acknowledge their crimes against
the Libyan people and return to Libya
-- We believe that some Libyan hit squads already
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have been deployed to Europe and are awaiting
orders to kill key exile leaders.
-- All of these indications that Qadhafi's social
revolution in Libya is not proceeding as he had hoped it
would undoubtedly are a source of great frustration for
-- On the international scene, Qadhafi has a difficult time
projecting real power much beyond the borders of Libya
-- His neighbors--Chad, the Sudan, and Tunisia--it is true,
do fear his proclivity for promoting subversion in their
countries
-- And Qadhafi's minions have recruited dissidents and have
provided funds, supplies, and in some cases arms to
opposition groups in many African and some Carribbean
and Latin American countries
-- But threatening one's neighbors with domestic political
chaos in the hopes that they might some day come to
power and then remain receptive to Libyan influence are
poor substitutes for the genuine ability to inspire
respect and to exercise influence based on that respect
-- Because of his marked lack of success in any direct
fashion over other governments and a succession of
recent failures and problems, we would not be surprised
to see Qadhafi resume support for international
terrorism--
-- His failures and problems are:
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-- His current sense of isolation in the Arab world
stemming from the position he carved out for himself
after the evacuation of the PLO from Lebanon
-- The soft oil market and the effects of US sanctions
which have caused temporary dislocations in the
Libyan economy and for which Qadhafi blames the US
and Saudi Arabia
-- His failure to convene an OAU summit under his
chairmanship--not once, but twice in recent months--
and the prospect that a third try in Addis Ababa too
will fail aggravates him
--Now that the OAU chairmanship is virtually a moot
point, we believe there is little to encourage him to
restrain his tendancies toward international trouble-
making
-- His renewed interest in Chad lends credence to this view
-- While we have no evidence that Qadhafi is planning to
send Libyan troops into Chad in the near future
-- We cannot rule out this possibility eventhough the
previous Chad campaign was wildly unpopular with
the military
-- We do expect to see Qadhafi continue to provide
support to anti-Habre forces wherever he can
-- Other more general things which we expect to continue
to see are:
-- Attempts to buy the sympathy or allegiance of
governments or their officials through promises of
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financial or military aid
-- Support for dissident movements which are opposed
to unfriendly established governments via arms,
terrorist training, and funds
-- Attempts to create new dissident movements where
none currently exist
-- either by recruiting migrant workers in Libya
for terrorist training
-- or by dispersing funds to indigenous muslim
groups, hoping to buy Libyan influence
-- Backing of coup attempts in support of favored
factions
-- Broadcasting propadanga in local languages to
potentially disaffected groups and encouraging
them to work against central governments
Despite his problems at home and his often difficult domestic and
international position, short of a successful assassination, we
expect that Qadhafi could continue in power for some time to
come.
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SUBJECT: LIBYA: Qadhafi's Domestic $ International Position
Orig. - Requester
1 - CPAS/IMD/CB (No further dissem)
1 - C/PES
1 - D/NESA
2 - NESA/PS
1 - NESA/AI
1 - NESA/AI/M
DDI/NESA/AI/M~ ~17 Jan 83)
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