IRAN-IRAQ: CURRENT SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000700580001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 14, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/21: CIA-RDP85T00287R000700580001-3
Iq
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/21: CIA-RDP85T00287R000700580001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/21: CIA-RDP85T00287R000700580001-3
14 February 1983
Iran-Iraq: Current Situation
The first phase of Iran's offensive on the Doveyrij River
front was a total failure.
-- The offensive began on the night of 6 February with an
Iranian attack on the southern portion of the Iraqi lines
east of Al Amarah.
-- On 9 February, Revolutionary Guards with limited regular
infantry and armored support penetrated five kilometers
behind the Iraqi lines. A subsequent Iraqi counterattack
cutoff and surrounded the Iranians.
-- As of 14 February the Iraqis still hold their original
front lines east of Al Amarah.
Copy .2 of
25X1
25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/21: CIA-RDP85T00287R000700580001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/21: CIA-RDP85T00287R000700580001-3
Apart from improvements in Iraqi intelligence and combat
performance, the Iranian defeat stems from a number of factors:
-- Inadequate intelligence on Iraqi tactical dispositions.
-- Poor coordination between regular and irregular units.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/21: CIA-RDP85T00287R000700580001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/21: CIA-RDP85T00287R000700580001-3
-- Severe material shortages that have caused sharp
reductions in support from artillery and attack
helicopters. Iranian fighter-bombers were not used for
ground attack missions.
In his Friday prayer session, Khamenei
took a typically hard line, reemphasizing Iran's
commitment to deal the Iraqis " final blow." He also
said that the "punishment of the aggressor is more
important to us than regaining" territories occupied by
Iraq, possibly leading to a misinterpretation of Iran's
position by diplomats in Tehran.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/21: CIA-RDP85T00287R000700580001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/21: CIA-RDP85T00287R000700580001-3
Iran-Iraq War: Military Forces
Iraq
Iran
Army
regular troops 400,000
200,000
irregular troops 300,000
300,000
tanks 3,000
900
APCs 2,900
900
400
1
till
775
ar
ery
,
Air Force
personnel
17,000
50,000
operational
aircraft
fi
ghter
250
70
Air Defense
personnel
20,000
20,000
operational
launchers
SA
M
350
40
(excluding
SA-
7s)
Navy
personnel
5,000
15,000
destroyers
0
3
frigates
0
4
missile boats
10
11
Forces on the Doveyrij River Front
Iraq
Iran
Regular divisions
6
3
Personnel
120,000
150,000
Armored vehicles
1,000
550
Artillery
375
140
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/21: CIA-RDP85T00287R000700580001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/21: CIA-RDP85T00287R000700580001-3
Iq
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/21: CIA-RDP85T00287R000700580001-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/21: CIA-RDP85T00287R000700580001-3
SUBJECT: DDI Talking Points
Iran-Iraq: Current Situation
Copy 1 - DDI
2 - D/NESA
3 - C/PES
4-7 - CPAS/CMD/CB
8&9 - NESA/PS
10 - NESA/PG
11 - NESA/PG/I
DDI/NESA/PG,
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/21 : CIA-RDP85T00287R000700580001-3