AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000700590001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 10, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 15, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Top Secret
Intelligence
41
IPiC/C3
Afghanistan Situation Report
15 February 1983
Top Secret
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15 February 1983
Copy O ' I
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TOP SECRET
QADER VISITS MOSCOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The US Embassy in Moscow believes the Afghan Defense Minister
discussed military matters, not political subjects.
IMPROVED ELECTRICITY SUPPLY IN KABUL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Kabul's electricity supply is back to normal despite the damage
caused by recent insurgent attacks.
IN BRIEF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
PERSPECTIVE
CORDOVEZ NEGOTIATIONS: SOME PROGRESS, MUCH FOG . . . . . . . . 4
Cordovez' talks raised hopes Moscow may be ready for concessions, but
the Pakistanis are wary that apparent flexibility may prove illusory.
This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near East/South Asia
and the Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments on the issues
raised in the publication should be directed to
15 February 1983
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25X1
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Names and boundary representation
are not necessarily authoritative.
15 February 1983
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QADER VISITS MOSCOWI 25X1
During his 5-9 February stay in Moscow, Afghan Defense
Minister Abdul Qader met Defense Minister Ustinov, Marshal
Sokolov, and a number of other high-ranking military officers,
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and visited several military installations. He apparently did
not meet any important political figures. The US Embassy in
Moscow believes the visit was useful to the Soviets in giving
them a close look at the man they have to trust to run the Afghan
military, but sees nothing to indicate that Qader is being
groomed to succeed President Babrak.
two of Afghanistan's corps commanders
accompanied Qader--thel in Kabul believes this also
points to a discussion of military rather than political matters.
Qader did not return to Kabul with the delegation, but the
substantive part of his visit apparently has ended.
Comment: There has been speculation that Qader--who arrived
in Moscow shortly after the UN Special Representative visited
Kabul--was discussing a peace settlement. Generally regarded as
more independent of Moscow than most Afghan Communist leaders, he
has been mentioned as a possibility to head a coalition
government that might be established as part of a negotiated
Kabul's electricity supply has steadily improved since the 4
February black-out, according to the US Embassy. Although
sporadic during the day, the power supply during the night is
better than it was before the late December resistance attacks on
the transmission line pylons.
Comment: Although Kabul's improved electricity supply is in
part a result of warmer weather, the Afghan Government has
demonstrated that it can repair damaged pylons relatively
quickly. The government is also probably paying "protection
money" to local leaders living near the transmission lines. The
local leaders, however, may still be cooperating with the
insurgents.
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TOP SECRET
-- UN officials report that the insurgents have driven out of the
Konar Valley about 13,000 Afghans who had not been allowing the
-- Pakistan claims to have 2,874,944 Afghan refugees on its
territory. The US Embassy believes that the refugee estimate is
inflated by about 15-20 percent.
-- The US Embassy in Kabul has received a thirdhand report that
the Soviets have offered the Afghan Government $180 per 1000
thousand cubic meters (cm) for the import of Afghan natural gas
beginning 21 March 1983. If accurate, the reported price would
represent a hefty increase over the $125 per thousand cm the
Soviets reportedly paid in 1982 for Afghan natural gas.
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TOP SECRET
CORDOVEZ NEGOTIATIONS: SOME PROGRESS, MUCH FOG
the Afghans and
Pa istanis have narrowed their differences on agenda items to be
included in negotiations for a political settlement. These limited
gains, however, are tentative and could prove illusory. Moscow's
positive reaction to Pakistani demands for a troop withdrawal timetable
and refugee repatriation have raised hopes at the UN and in Islamabad
that the Soviets may be more willing to compromise. Although a major
policy shift to disengagement cannot be entirely dismissed, this
conciliatory stance more likely marks a more activist Soviet diplomacy.
-- The Soviets probably want to project an air of reasonableness
prior to March NAM meetings.
-- They may want to satisfy UN Secretary General Perez de
Cuellar's insistance upon a constructive Soviet response to the
Kabul talks as a precondition for continued UN involvement.
-- The talks enable them to probe for flexibility in Pakistan's
position.
We anticipate much harder bargaining in April when UN-mediated indirect
talks resume at Geneva. The parties still have to agree on the
interrelationship of the agenda's items before negotiations on substance
can begin.
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 I ! I I II
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TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET
Soviet Perspective
In the immediate aftermath of Brezhnev's death, the new
General Secretary Andropov met with Babrak and Pakistani
President Zia. Soviet spokesmen known to be close to the new
leader went out of their way "unofficially" to emphasize that he
would be more flexible in the search for a political settlement.
These actions fanned widespread international speculation about
far-reaching Soviet concessions and also began causing problems
for Babrak. In early December the Soviets apparently decided to
damp down the speculation. Babrak, in Moscow for the 60th
Anniversary celebrations of the USSR, was given the signal honor
of having a press conference in Moscow and accorded a second
"warm comradely meeting" with Andropov, and Pravda on 16 December
authoritatively reiterated the USSR's position on the
irreversibility of the Afghan revolution.
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The test of Soviet seriousness probably will not come until
Geneva. If the Soviets are merely maneuvering to get past the
NAM summit and buy time for a new approach inside Afghanistan,
they may well balk at translating into a written document the
verbal concessions they made during the recent talks--as they did
last summer in Geneva. If they have decided to use the
negotiations to probe more seriously than heretofore for signs of
Pakistani resolve, however, they could agree to some sort of
document. As now framed, the assurances given Cordovez in Kabul
preserve Soviet negotiating flexibility and could, without
sacrificing consistancy, be used to advance a settlement that
would entail, significant risks for both the Pakistanis and the 25X1
resistance.
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Top Secret
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