THE NEW DELHI NONALIGNED SUMMIT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000700650001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 19, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 1, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Product Review Record
TITE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT : INDIA'S CHAIRMANSHIP
AND RELATIONS WITH THE SUPERPOWERS
Purpose or Requirement; Target Audience:
This paler combines efforts by
OGI and NESA analysts in order
to highlig:it both the NAM as an
institution and India's national
objectives as Nonaligned chairman.
0 In DDI Research Program? No
Division I /~ 1
Office
DDI
r- iY Dd?
^ Typescript
O Intelligence Memcrandum
O Intelligence Assessment
O Research Paper
O Reference Aid
O Technical Intell. Report
O Other
Coordination:
Within DDI SOVA, EA, ALA
Outside DDI
Remarks (including extent of external consuttation) :
Office/Division/Branch:
OGI/ECD/TW and NESA/SO/S
' Reviewed by,
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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505
SUBJECT : The New Delhi Nonaligned Summit
1. Attached is our assessment of the upcoming Nonaligned summit in New Delhi.
The paper includes analysis of: the possibility that the LDCs will develop a new approach
to the North-South dialogue; India's attempt to use the Nonaligned chairmanship to
balance its relations with Moscow and Washington;
and the efforts by Nonaligned
equidistant between the superpowers.
2. Questions may be directed to Acting Chief, Third World Issues Branch,
Economics Divisio
Attachment:
The Nonaligned Movement: India's Chairmanship
and Relations with the Superpowers
GI M 83-10052C, NESA M 83-10048C,
March 1983
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Subject: The Nonaligned Movement: India's Chairmanship and
Relations with the Superpowers 25X1
OGI/ECD/TW NESA/SO/S 2Mar83 25X1
Copy 1 - Jeane Kirkpatrick, UN Rep
2 - Charles Meissner, State
3 - Lawrence Eagleburger, State
4 - Gregory Newell, State
5 - Gordon Streeb, State
6 - Thomas Dawson, Treasury
7 - Adm. John Howe, State
8 - Nicholas Veliotis, State
9 - Howard B. Schaffer, State
10 - Victor Tomseth, State
11 - Peter Burleigh, State
12 - Geoffrey Kemp, NSC
13 - Cmdr. Ronald Zwart, OSD/ISA
14 - Capt. Robert Anderson,DOD,
15 - Harmon Kirby, State
16 - Stephen Bosworth, State
17 - SA/DDCI
18 - ExDir
19 - ExReg
20 - ADDI
21 - DDI
22 - Ch/PES/DDI
23 - NIO/Economics
24 - DD/E/OGI, D/OGI
25 - Ch/ECD
26 - Ch/ECD/TW
27 - Ch/ECD/TW
28-35 - OGI/PS
36 - DC/NE/SAO
37 - DDO/EA
38 - NIO/NESA
39 - D/NESA
40 - C/SO/NESA
41 - Ch/SO/S/NESA
42-43 - NESA/PS
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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D. C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT: INDIA'S CHAIRMANSHIP
AND RELATIONS WITH THE SUPERPOWERS
Summary
The 7-11 March summit of the Nonaligned Movement(NAM) in New Delhi marks the
end of Cuba's contentious three-year chairmanship which gave the Movement a
pronounced anti-US bias and strained Nonaligned unity. We believe that Moscow is
nervous about the shift in chairm anship from a loyal client to India, a m ore independent-
minded country.
We believe that Moscow is
overreacting to the change in c azrm ans p. the NAM is
unlikely to condemn the USSR and will continue its criticism of US policies concerning
the Middle East, southern Africa, the New International Economic Order, and
For Prime Minister Gandhi, assuming chairmanship of the Movement provides an
opportunity to restore Indian leadership among Third World nations as well as her
personal prestige. Gandhi's aspirations for leadership in the NAM have constrained New
Delhi's association with the Soviets. The Indian view of nonalignment as equidistance
from the two superpowers provides the ideological rationale for New Delhi's moves to
balance India's ties with Moscow btq improving diplomatic relations with the West. At the
same time, New Delhi has been careful to avoid the appearance of a shift to pro-US
positions. To avoid divisive East-West political issues such as Afghanistan and
Kampuchea, New Delhi aims to highlight North-South economic issues of concern to both
moderates and radicals. India will try to lead the NAM away from the stalemated Global
Negotiations toward less ambitious proposals for reforms in such UN specialized agencies
as the IMF, the World Bank, and the GATT. New Delhi agrees these proposals will bring
im mediate economic assistance to the Third World.
We have found that Nonaligned rhetoric, though critical of the United States, has
little impact on US bilateral relations with NAM members. We believe that most
Nonaligned members deviate from NAM positions and cooperate with the United States
when their interests require. If India wins Nonaligned endorsement for a change in
seeking reform in the specialized agencies, we expect the LDCs to press the United
States and other industrial countries to respond favorably at UNCTAD VIin June.
This memorandum was prepared by I I Office of Global Issues, and
Office of Near East and South Asian Analysis. Comments and queries are
welcome and should be addressed to the A cting Chief, Third World Issues Branch, 0 GI,
or Chief, Subcontinent Branch, NESA
NESA M 83-10048C
Copy Lk of ~~
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THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT:
INDIA'S CHAIRMANSHIP AND RELATIONS
WITH THE SUPERPOWERS
Introduction
The 97-member Nonaligned Movement (NAM) will hold its triennial summit
conference in New Delhi 7-11 March. At the summit, the Movement's chairmanship will
shift from Cuba, the host of the 1979 summit, to India. According to embassy reports
New Delhi wants the summit to avoid the East-West conflicts injected into the NAM by
Cuba and instead stress initiatives on economic issues. Since its inception in 1961 the
NAM has made proposals on disarmament and North-South economic relations to which
the United States has had to respond in such international organizations as the
Committee on Disarmament, UNCTAD, and the International Monetary Fund. For the
past three years, Cuba has used the Movement as a forum to condemn US policies in the
Middle East, southern Africa, and Central America. The Movement's heterogeneous
membership coupled with its convention that decisions require all members to either
concur or abstain has limited the areas on which it can agree. As a result, the NAM has
been making similar broad-brush proposals on the same issues for many years even though
they have produced meager results.
The Agenda
The summit's draft communique indicates that the heads of state will concentrate
on the NAM's four traditional objectives: the creation of a Palestinian state; black rule
in Namibia and South Africa; the establishment of a New International Economic Order
that would restructure international economic institutions to favor the developing
countries; and disarmament by both the United States and the Soviet Union with the
savings used to aid Third World development. We expect the New Delhi summit to repeat
the Movement's demand that the United States take prompt and decisive action to help
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STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION OF
THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT
The Nonaligned Movement was established in 1961 at a
summit conference of 25 countries in Yugoslavia. The
founders designed the movement as a refuge for countries
that did not belong to the alliance systems of either the
United States or the Soviet Union.
The NAM is characterized by a series of meetings and
declarations. It does not possess a mechanism for translating
its positions into action. The Group of 77, which contains 23
more members than the NAM, and its subgroups are
responsible for conducting multilateral negotiations for the
Third World in international organizations. The NAM,
however, has spawned ideas that the Group of 77 has carried
foward. For example, the NAM inspired:
0 The creation of UNCTAD
o The proposal for a New International
Economic Order
o Global Negotiations
o Special sessions of the UN General Assembly
on disarmament.
The NAM is led by a chairman and a 36 member
Coordinating Bureau. The chairmanship and the composition
of the Coordinating Bureau change at each summit.
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We believe three other Nonaligned issues will arise at the summit:
o Nonaligned moderates and radicals will debate whether the Movement
should be equally critical toward the superpowers or continue to single
out the United States for attack.
o ASEAN members will try to override Vietnamese objections and have the
Movement invite Prince Sihanouk, the leader of the Kampuchean
government in exile, to address the summit.
o India will try to gain Nonaligned approval for concrete action to break
the impasse in the North-South dialogue and to accelerate economic
cooperation among developing countries.
Several other issues outside the official summit agenda may also come up at New
o Our embassy in Cairo reports that Egyptian President Mubarak may try
to improve his standing in the Arab world by meeting at the summit with
the heads of the PLO and various Arab governments.
o Both Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and Iranian President Khamenei are
scheduled to attend the summit and, according to embassy reports, the
NAM will try to revive its effort to mediate the Iran-Iraq War.
Jordan and other Arab
moderates will seek strong Nonaligned endorsement of the Arab League's
Fez peace proposal, which implicitly recognizes Israel, in order to give
PLO Chief Arafat assistance in persuading PLO hardliners to back the
Fez proposal.
o Embassy reports suggest that the Soviet Union and Afghanistan will try
to enhance their image among Nonaligned members before or during the
summit by making positive statements about UN Secretary General
Perez de Cuellar's Afghanistan peace initiative.
Cuba's Chairmanship
Cuba's tenure as chairman radicalized and divided the NAM. Havana used the
chairmanship as a platform to denounce the United States and extol the Soviet Union as
the "natural ally" of the Nonaligned. Cuba's initiatives were opposed by a group of
moderates which believed the Movement should favor neither the United States nor the
Soviet Union. As a result, Nonaligned meetings usually pitted Cuba and 15 to 20 other
radical members against an approximately equal number of moderates.
The membership refused to adopt a resolution endorsing the "natural ally" thesis,
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but Cuba utilized its power as chairman to give Nonaligned positions a pronounced anti-
US bias. Although the NAM uses consensus decisionmaking procedures, Cuba sometimes
proposed resolutions and then declared consensus prematurely by cutting off debate. It
also exploited the chairman's prerogative of authoring or co-authoring the draft
communiques of Nonaligned meetings. As a result, the Movement blamed the United
States for causing or exacerbating conflict in the Middle East, southern Africa, and
Central America, and for retarding Third World development. According to embassy
reporting, some moderates acquiesced to Cuba's tactics because they did not think the
NAM important enough to challenge Havana; others did not want to be accused of
defending American interests.
India's Chairmanship
In assuming the chairmanship of the Nonaligned Movement, we believe India hopes
to refurbish its standing among Nonaligned moderates and eliminate the pro-Soviet bias
Cuba injected into the Movement. India wants to steer
the NAM toward a policy of equidistance between the superpowers and intends to play
down divisive East-West issues such as Kampuchea and Afghanistan. Instead, New Delhi
wants to initiate concrete proposals on North-South economic issues that can bring
radicals and moderates together. New Delhi's efforts to make the NAM equidistant
between Washington and Moscow imply concessions to both Soviet and American views.
According to our New Delhi embassy, India would prefer to avoid directly criticizing
either superpower at the summit, but will permit the radicals to use consensus
procedures to stymie any proposed final declaration that does not contain some anti-
American rhetoric.
Afghanistan
Reassertion of nonalignment has provided Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi with
the justification for a shift toward a more critical stance on the Soviet presence in
Afghanistan that has won her goodwill from some Nonaligned moderates,
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India's statement during the first UN debate
on Afghanistan-opposing UN consideration of the Soviet invasion-complicated New
Delhi's efforts to improve bilateral relations with moderate nonaligned states, including
the oil-rich Arab states and Pakistan. In our view, India's subsequent endorsement of the
established NAM position calling for withdrawal of "all foreign forces" from Afghanistan
affords Gandhi a public platform from which to advocate Soviet troop withdrawal while
reducing the potential costs of a more direct public confrontation with Moscow on the
issue. Despite the shift in India's policy on Afghanistan, New Delhi still parts company
with other moderates in opposing their calls for direct condemnation of Moscow. On
criticism of the USSR as on troop withdrawal the Indians hope to minimize political
controversy at the summit in March by invoking precedent.
Kampuchea
The issue of Kampuchea's representation promises to be the most divisive at the
summit. At the Havana summit, Cuba used its power as chairman to oust the Pol Pot
regime from the Kampuchean seat in the NAM and declared the seat empty. Nonaligned
members have since voted overwhelmingly to permit the Pol Pot regime and its
successor, the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), to retain the
Ka.mpuchean seat in the UN General Assembly.
India is one of the few non-radical members that recognizes the Soviet - and
Vietnamese - supported People's Republic of Kampuchea - a policy that Ghandi adopted
upon her return to power in 1980 after a three year hiatus. Gandhi's policy on
Kampuchea reinforced the close association with Moscow that characterized her earlier
governments. Differences over the issue of Kampuchea's representation in the
Nonaligned Movement have been a continual source of friction between India and other
moderates-particularly the ASEAN countries, Egypt, Pakistan, and India's other South
Asian neighbors-whose cooperation New Delhi seeks at the forthcoming summit.
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We
believe Gandhi's apparent decision to adhere to her controversial policy in Kampuchea
represents a concession to Soviet displeasure with New Delhi's recent efforts to distance
its foreign policy from Moscow's on other issues, including Afghanistan.
India has attempted to deflect criticism from other moderates in the NAM by
treating Phnom Penh's representation as a procedural matter beyond New Delhi's
The Indi
ans argue that nampucnea's seat in the
Nonaligned Movement remains vacant in accordance with the policy established at the
Havana summit.
only a new Nonaligned consensus can
change the policy to which New Delhi is bound to adhere, and India will join the radicals
in blocking any consensus that would alter the "empty chair" formula. Aware that India
and the radicals will prevent the CGDK from claiming the Kampuchean seat in the NAM,
the ASEAN members have focused their efforts on having Prince Sihanouk invited to
address the summit in his capacity as one of the NAM's founding members. To achieve
this the ASEAN members would have to mobilize enough support among the heads of
state to force Vietnam and other radicals to relent. We doubt ASEAN will succeed. F_
India's Economic Initiatives
While we think India will follow the summit consensus on political questions,
embassy reporting indicates it will be assertive on North-South economic issues.
According to embassy reports India wants to use the summit to capitalize on the
willingness to compromise it detects in several West European governments.
India recognizes that Global Negotiations, the centerpiece of
the North-South dialogue since 1979, has almost no chance of success; consequently it
favors less ambitious sectoral negotiations. Global Negotiations entail the establishment
of a Third World-dominated central political body in the United Nations to guide and
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coordinate discussions on economic issues in such UN specialized agencies as the IMF,
the World Bank, and the GATT. Sectoral negotiations would involve discussions in the
specialized agencies without guidance from a central political body. According to
embassy reporting, some industrialized nations - particularly France, Canada, and the
Nordic countries - are ready to consider reforms in the specialized agencies, such as
permitting the IMF to allocate more Special Drawing Rights to the LDCs and creating an
energy affiliate in the World Bank to finance Third World energy projects.
Because they are less politicized, sectoral negotiations could produce results in a
relatively short time and, therefore, we believe many Nonaligned members will find them
attractive. However, embassy reports indicate that some members still hope Global
Negotiations will bring about major reforms in the specialized agencies and will resist
India's attempt to deemphasize the global approach. We believe India will make headway
at the summit only if it bills sectoral negotiations as a partial remedy for the immediate
problems of the Third World rather than a substitute for Global Negotiations. If India
should win Nonaligned endorsement for sectoral negotiations, we expect the LDCs to
press the United States to respond favorably at the quadrennial UNCTAD negotiating
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We suspect that the summit will also make an initiative on the Third World debt
problem. The New Delhi draft communique calls for the creation of an International
Debt Commission to find ways of helping debt-ridden LDCs. We are not aware of any
specific measures the LDCs have in mind, but they may crystallize at the summit. In our
judgment, debt discussions in New Delhi may lay the groundwork for proposals that could
surface at UNCTAD where we anticipate a strong LDC push for financial relief. 25X1
The NAM and the Superpowers
We believe Moscow is nervous about the passing of the Nonaligned chairmanship
from a loyal client to a more independent-minded country.
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According to an academic study, the Soviet Union has traditionally influenced the NAM
by using the radicals, many of whom are Soviet clients, to block consensus on positions
critical of the Soviet Union. As a result, Moscow has helped keep Nonaligned attention
focused on American rather than Soviet policies in the Third World. We believe Moscow
is overreacting to the change in chairmanship since, in our judgment the NAM will not
include the USSR in its condemnation.
Regardless of the effectiveness of Soviet efforts, we believe the NAM's core
concerns -- the creation of a Palestinian homeland, black rule in southern Africa,
disarmament, and New International Economic Order - will continue to yield sharp
criticism of the United States. However, a State Department study demonstrates that
Nonaligned resolutions have little effect on the United States' bilateral relations with
Nonaligned members. Nonaligned procedure permits the members most involved in an
issue to shape the Movement's position on it; the rest usually join the consensus in
exchange for support on issues of importance to them or for the sake of Nonaligned
unity. We believe most Nonaligned members would deviate from Nonaligned resolutions
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and cooperate with the United States if their interests so required. 25X1
India and the Superpowers
We believe Gandhi's effort to cooperate with other leading moderates in moving the
NAM away from the Soviet camp, despite limited prospects for success, aims in part to
restore her credibility as a truly nonaligned leader. Following her return to power in
1980, Gandhi's policies on Afghanistan and Kampuchea threatened to isolate India from
other Nonaligned moderates at the 1981 NAM ministerial in New Delhi.
Gandhi's renewed commitment since then
to a policy of "equidistance" from both superpowers has provided an ideological rationale
for her moves to balance New Delhi's need to refurbish India's credentials as a nonaligned
state against the desire to avoid jeopardizing Soviet weapons assistance, economic ties,
and diplomatic support.
Despite efforts by New Delhi to avoid incurring Soviet displeasure, Moscow has
exerted major pressures on India with a view-we believe-to dissuading Gandhi from
working to remove the pro-Soviet bias of the Nonaligned Movement. The Soviet
disinformation campaign directed at India and the NAM has probably influenced Gandhi's
estimate of the domestic and international costs of greater moderation in Indian policy
and heightened her longstanding suspicions of US intentions.
Nevertheless, we believe Gandhi will continue to sidestep Soviet pressures to
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THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT: A TOOL OF INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY
As India assumes the chairmanship of the Nonaligned Movement, New Delhi's
efforts to promote unity and moderation in the movement will-in our view-serve also to
further Prime Minister Gandhi's foreign policy objectives:
- Restoration of India to a position of recognized international leadership in the
Nonaligned Movement which Gandhi's father helped to found. We believe that the
rapid growth and regional diversification of the membership has enhanced the
movement's importance as a forum for Indian diplomacy.
Gandhi has reportedly chosen the issue
of disarmament as a platform for projecting her leadership. She will also continue
to seek a central role for her government as a mediator in disputes between NAM
countries. Most recently, New Delhi has offered India's good offices in promoting
a Middle East peace settlement both before and during the NAM summit,
according to US embassy sources.
- Re-balancing India's foreign policy to afford greater flexibility for New Delhi.
Gandhi stresses the independence of Indian policy stands, its equidistance between
Washington and Moscow, and the value of good relations with other third world
countries-especially nonaligned moderates. We believe Gandhi's dialogues with
China and Pakistan reflect in part her desire to broaden India's options.
- Reducing the superpower presence, especially in South Asia. Gandhi seeks to
reduce the likelihood of superpower confrontation there and enhance India's
hegemony on the subcontinent. We see efforts to promote the regional resolution
of conflicts and friendship pacts between neighbors throughout the third world as
likewise aiming to reduce opportunities for superpower intervention. The Indian
press suggests New Delhi views the growth in NAM membership as indicating a
welcome reduction in the number of countries subject to the obligations of
superpower military alliances.
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provide greater support for Moscow's foreign policy goals. Her pursuit of a more
consistent nonaligned policy has added momentum to her efforts to expand India's foreign
policy flexibility. Concerned over India's isolation as a result of its close identification
with the USSR, Gandhi has improved relations with Washington. She has worked to
strengthen political, military, and economic ties with West European states, which
provide her with an alternative to superpower sources of military and economic
assistance. Longstanding preoccupation with potential threats to India's security
continue to limit breakthroughs in India's relations with China and Pakistan, but Gandhi's
desire to achieve an international leadership role through the Nonaligned Movement has
contributed to the more flexible policies she has adopted in relations with Islamabad and
Beijing.
In our view, India will continue to make policy choices that strike a rough balance
between the two superpowers. Gandhi's aspirations for leadership in the Nonaligned
Movement have constrained New Delhi's close association with the Soviets; her muted
opposition to Moscow's Afghanistan policy signals her determination to pursue Indian
interests even at some potential cost to Indo-Soviet ties. We believe Gandhi will avoid
closer identification with the Soviets by refusing Moscow basing rights in India and
ignoring Soviet proposals for an Asian or Persian Gulf collective security scheme but will
not risk an open break by abandoning Indian policy on Kampuchea.
At the same time, Gandhi and her senior officials have been careful to avoid the
appearance of a shift to pro-US positions.
Gandhi will continue to use nonalignment as a basis on which to criticize the
US presence in the Indian Ocean and US security assistance to Pakistan.
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Opposing hostile
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reference to the United States, however, will permit India to counter moderate efforts to
condemn the Soviet Union by name on Afghanistan.
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Nonaligned Radicals and Moderates
About 40 Nonaligned members seek to influence the Movement's
direction. Most of these members can be characterized as either
moderate or radical, though some, like Algeria, display both
tendencies. The remaining members are interested in issues
dirctly affecting them but are largely apathetic toward others.
Radicals
1.
Afghanistan
10.
Nicaragua
2.
Angola
11.
North Korea
3.
Cuba
12.
Seychelles
4.
Ethiopia
13.
South Yemen
5.
Grenada
14.
Syria
6.
Iran
15.
STNAPO
7.
Laos
16.
Vietnam
8.
Madagascar
17.
PLO
9.
Mozambique
Moderates
1.
Bangladesh
11.
Oman
2.
Botswana
12.
Pakistan
3.
Egypt
13.
Nigeria
4.
Jamaica
14.
Saudi Arabia
5.
India
15.
Senegal
6.
Indonesia
16.
Singapore
7.
Ivory Coast
17.
Sri Lanka
8.
Kenya
18.
Yugoslavia
9.
Malaysia
19.
Zaire
10.
Morocco
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Nonaligned Membership
The Nonaligned Movement presently has five, loosely interpreted, criteria for
membership:
o An independent foreign policy based on peaceful coexistence.
o Support for national liberation movements.
o Non-membership in multilateral military alliances related to great power conflicts.
o Non-membership in bilateral or regional defense pacts related to great power
conflicts.
o No willing acceptance of foreign military bases.
Nonaligned membership is regionally skewed. All Arab and black African states belong
as do most Asian countries, but only 14 of 32 Latin American states are members. Latin
America's under-representation reflects the Movement's preoccupation with decolonization,
a Palestinian homeland, and black rule in southern Africa.
1. Afghanistan
2. Algeria
3. Angola
4. Argentina
5. Bahrain
6. Bangladesh
7. Belize
8. Benin
9. Bhutan
10. Bolivia
11. Botswana
12. Burundi
13. Cameroon
14. Cape Verde
15. Central African Rep.
16. Chad
17. Comoros
18. Congo
19. Cuba
20. Cyprus
21. Djibouti
22. Ecuador
23. Egypt
24. Equatorial Guinea
25. Ethiopia
26. Gabon
27. Gambia
28. Ghana
29. Grenada
30. Guinea
31. Guinea-Bissau
32. Guyana
33. India
34. Indonesia
35. Iran
36. Iraq
37. Ivory Coast
38. Jamaica
39. Jordan
40. Kampuchea
41. Kenya
42. Kuwait
43. Laos
44. Lebanon
45. Lesotho
46. Liberia
47. Libya
48. Madagascar
49. Malawi
50. Malaysia
51. Maldives
52. Mali
53. Malta
54. Mauritania
55. Mauritius
56. Morocco
57. Mozambique
58. Nepal
59. Nicaragua
60. Niger
61. Nigeria
62. North Korea
63. Qnan
64. Pakistan
65. Palestine Liberation
Organization
66. Panama
67. Peru
68. Qatar
69. Rwanda
70. Sao Tame and Principe
71. Saudi Arabia
72. Senegal
73. Seychelles
74. Sierra Leone
75. Singapore
76. Somalia
77. South-West Africa
People's Organization
78. Sri Lanka
79. St. Lucia
80. Sudan
81. Suriname
82. Swaziland
83. Syria
84. Tanzania
85. Togo
86. Trinidad and Tobago
87. Tunisia
88. Uganda
89. United Arab F}nirates
90. Upper Volta
91. Vietnam
92. North Yemen
93. South Yemen
94. Yugoslavia
95. Zaire
96. Zambia
97. Zimbabwe
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP85T00287R000700650001-5
 I II
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP85T00287R000700650001-5
MEIVIERS OF THE GROUP OF 77 MD DO NOT BELONG
TO THE NAM
13.
Haiti
1.
Bahamas*
14.
Mexico
2.
Barbados*
15.
Paragua
3.
Bolivia
16.
y
Philippines
4.
Brazil
5.
Burma**
17.
Romania
6.
Chile***
18.
Solomon Islands
19.
South Korea
7.
Colombia*
20.
Thailand
8.
Costa Rica
21.
Uruguay
9.
Dominican Republic
92.
Venezuela
10.
El Salvador
23.
Western Samoa
11.
Fiji
12.
Guatemala
*
-------------------------------------
**
Will apply for Nonaligned membership at New Delhi sunmit
.
Withdrew from NAM in 1979.
***
Unofficially withdrew from NAM in 1976.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP85T00287R000700650001-5