TALKING POINTS LEBANESE ARMY CAPABILITY IN THE SOUTHERN SECURITY ZONE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000700830001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 2, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 11, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Talking Points
Lebanese Army Capability in the Southern Security Zone
Security Requirements
If all foreign forces withdraw from Lebanon, the Lebanese Armv
would still face several security problems apart from policing
the southern security zone.
Factional fighting would probably break out in several areas:
-- Between Druze and Christians following Israeli withdrawal
from the Shuf and Alayh regions.
-- Between Alawites and Sunnis in Tripoli following a Syrian
troop withdrawal.
-- Between the Christian Lebanese Forces militia and Siilavman
Franjiyah's militia in the north.
The Army or the MNF would need to maintain a strong presence in
the Bekaa Valley and in the north to prevent PLO infiltration
from Syria. The borders would be the first line of defense for
the southern security zone.
The Army would probably have to remain in the Beirut area to
maintain order and to demonstrate government dominance over the
Lebanese Forces. The Lebanese Army currently maintains the
equivalent of 2 brigades in the Beirut area.
Army Capabilities
Since the beginning of this year, US assistance and a major
shakeup by the Lebanese Army Commander, General Tannous, have
significantly upgraded the capabilities of the Lebanese Armv.
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-- Personnel changes have removed many incompetent and
corrupt officers.
-- US supplied equipment has corrected major deficiencies in
4 of the army's 7 brigades.
-- Morale and training have improved.
The Lebanese Army probably is capable of dealing with any single
challenge to its authority.
-- The Haddad Force in the south is ill trained and poorly
equipped, depending on the Israeli army for its support.
-- Any PLO infiltration would be on a small scale. PLO
guerrillas could not match Lebanese Army in strength or
firepower.
The Lebanese Army's job in policing the south probably would he
easier than what the Israelis now face, assuming continued
cooperation from the Haddad force.
-- PLO evacuation from Lebanon would eliminate a haven
bordering the southern security zone.
-- The population--strongly anti-PLO--would probably be more
cooperative in aiding the Lebanese Army.
Although it has the capability of policing the south effectively,
maintaining security throughout the rest of the country would
severely strain the manpower resources of Lebanon's 22,000 man
army.
In the near term, deploying one brigade in the southern
security zone, one brigade in Beirut and one in the Bekaa Valley,
will leave the Lebanese Army with only one brigade at 70%
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strength and three others seriously understrength for guarding
the northern borders and policing the rest of the country.
the Lebanese Army would require 7
brigades at 100% strength to extend government control throughout
Lebanon.
-- Lebanon's Army will have only 4 brigades plus 3 battalions
at 70 percent strength by the end of March 1983.
-- A fifth brigade is scheduled to be at 75 percent strength
by February 1984.
-- The two remaining brigades are at 50 percent strength or
less.
-- Reaching the 7 brigade requirement will require at least
two years.
-- Absorbing elements of the Haddad force, and using the
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Talking Points for the DCI
11 March 1983
ISRAEL: Intentions in Southern Lebanon
Israelis have been pursuing economic, military, and political
policies in southern Lebanon--some predating last summer's
invasion--designed to serve a number of purposes.
The most immediate Israeli goal is to prevent the return of a PLO
military structure to southern Lebanon. To achieve this goal,
the Israelis believe the area south of the Awwali River must he a
permanent Israeli military cordon sanitaire even at the expense
of Lebanese central government authority. In their view this
requires:
-- A network of Lebanese surrogates--controlled by Iaior
Haddad--who will keep the PLO out.
-- Substantial freedom of movement for the IDF in the south.
-- Neither a UNIFIL nor an 11NF presence in southern
Lebanon. The Israelis regard these forces as ineffectual
at best, and likely to interfere with Israel's ability to
control the situation.
Prime Minister Begin wants these kinds of security arrangements
to avoid any more second-guessing concerning the long-term value
of Operation "Peace for Galilee".
Israeli actions also are meant to enhance Tel Aviv's position in
the negotiations.
-- IDF's strengthening of Haddad is intended to give the
Lebanese Governement no option but to retain Haddad as
military kingpin in the south.
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-- Israel believes that the development of economic ties with
Lebanon will make it more costly for Beirut to renege on
any normalization agreements.
Israeli policies in southern Lebanon preserve maximum flexibility
for Tel Aviv in the event negotiations drag on or break down.
-- Strengthening of surrogates in the area will ease the
IDF's burden during a prolonged stay.
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Israel's Occupation of Southern Lebanon
The Israeli Defense Force has now entered its tenth month of
occupation of Lebanon. During this time, the Israelis have
become involved in almost every aspect of southern Lebanese
life. Although much of the Israeli activity is justified by the
exigencies of military occupation, many of Israel's actions in
southern Lebanon reflect more extensive economic, security, and
political goals that Israel has been pursuing since Operation
Litani in 1978 when Haddad was set up as the head of "Free
Lebanon".
Israeli Policies
Economic. Israel's involvement in southern Lebanon's
economic affairs offers the most clear-cut example of actions
that have been taken for reasons other than just those pertaininer
to the military occupation. Just as quickly as the IDF secured
the area beyond the boundaries of Haddad land, Israeli
businessmen travelled there to explore the economic opportunities
available. By late summer, Israeli goods, primarily foodstuffs,
began appearing in southern Lebanese towns and villages, as well
as in Beirut. The disruption of the local economy durine the
fighting in the region and subsequent IDF prohibitions, for
security reasons, on certain forms of economic activity, such as
fishing, facilitated the Israeli penetration of Lebanese
markets. Moreover, the IDF has also prohibited some Lebanese
farmers in the south from trucking their produce to Beirut.
Precise information on the extent of current Israeli
involvement in the southern Lebanese economy is limited but press
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estimates of the monthly value of Israeli exports to the area
range from $10 to $70 million. Even the low figure of $10
million worth of goods per month exceeds the current level of
Israeli non-oil trade with Egypt. In recent months, Israeli
goods marketed under Lebanese tradenames reportedly have begun
appearing in other Arab states--a development that in part led to
the imposition of Saudi and Jordanian restrictions on trade with
Lebanon.
In addition to providing foodstuffs and manufacturer goods,
the Israelis have also begun extending certain basic services,
such as bus routes, to the area. Haifa has been opened to
southern Lebanese merchants as a duty free port. The Israelis
have quickly repaired infrastructure, such as electricity, water,
and telephone services, disrupted by the invasion. The Israelis
have recently demonstrated their sensitivity to Lehanese charges
of unfair trade practices by claiming to have halted the export
of agricultural products that compete with Lebanese-produced
goods. Nonetheless, observers note that Jaffa oranges are still
on sale in Beirut.
Military. The Israelis have made a number of moves aimed at
helping Major Haddad and his 1,500 man Christian-Shia militia
consolidate their control over Lebanese territory south of the
Awwali River. Israel is also attempting to create local
militias, which--the Israelis believe--will eventually ally
themselves with Haddad. These militias are intended to provide
the IDF with the flexibility to play one group against the other
or even against Haddad if his actions at some point run contrary
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to Israeli interests. The most important of these groups, the
Shiite National Guard--numbering to date less than 100 men, is
led by Karim Khalil, the scion of the most prominent Shiite
family in Tyre.
On 14 February, Haddad entered Sidon at the head of a column
of about a dozen tanks and APC's. Haddad seized a vacated
hospital in Sidon, declared it to be the permanent headquarters
of his "Free Lebanon" army, and informed the press that his
enclave now extended from the Lebanese-Israeli border to the
Awwali River. IDF heavy vehicles transported Haddad's equipment
to Sidon to prepare for his dramatic entry into the city.
Haddad's men had been active previously as far north as the
Sidon area, but their presence in the region had been limited
largely to a few scattered roadblocks. With this latest entry
into Sidon, Haddad--with Israeli backing--intends to stake his
claim as de facto military governor of the south. To this end,
Haddad has announced his intentions to enlarge significantly his
militia.
Israeli efforts to develop local militias among
non-Christian groups in southern Lebanon--particularly among the
Shiite Muslims, who account for 80 percent of the region's
population--are intended to strengthen Haddad's hand. The IDF so
far has armed over half a dozen local militias--most of which
number only a handful of men--with jurisdictions limited to small
defined areas, such as Tyre.
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To further strengthen Haddad's hand in the south, the IDF
has engaged in a protracted harassment of UNIFIL to limit its
authority in its areas of responsibility. Tel Aviv probably
hopes that by preventing UNIFIL from performing its duties, it
will discourage participating nations from renewing their mandate
and demonstrate the ineffectiveness of UNIFIL as a viable
peacekeeping force. Harassment of UNIFIL also demonstrates to
the local population that authority rests with the IDF and
Haddad.
Political. Israeli actions in the political field have
tended to undermine the authority of central government
institutions in southern Lebanon, which, in any case, had little
real authority in the region. The IDF has appointed a civil
action team for southern Lebanon that has begun to offer some of
the services for which the Lebanese Government theoretically is
responsible. In addition, the Lebanese governor for the south
has accused the Israelis of harassing him and his employees by
forcing them to evacuate many of their Sidon offices, and, in
some cases, by threatening to deport officials who do not
cooperate with the Israelis.
In late January, the IDF called a meeting of village heads
to discuss the formation of village committees and a coordinating
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council that would cooperate with Israeli authorities. The
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Israeli and Lebanese Negotiating Positions on Security Arrangements as of P March
Israeli Position Lebanese Position
s proposals may differ)
Observation Posts in Security Zone
Status of Major Haddad
Joint Supervisory Teams/Patrols
Operations Center in Security Zone
Israeli Flights Over Lebanon
Insists on five Israeli-manned No residual Israeli presence on Tehanese
observation posts unless Lebanese soil; security maintained by Lehanese
offer more effective alternatives Armv alone.
than they are now willing to consider.
Appointed cammander of territorial Will not agree to any of these
brigade in southern Lebanon; his proposals. Will treat Naddad
forces integrated as a unit into "honorably", possihly retainina-
territorial brigade. Selection of him as an officer in brigade, hilt
brigade's officers subject no command position; sane of his
to Israeli approval. Approval also forces integrated as regulars,
would be required for any changes in others converted into naramilitarv
the brigade's organization, deployment force.
or equipment.
Daily patrols to verify eaTpliance
with security provisions.
Regular verification by ioint 9-man tentns
accompanied only by Lebanese troops.
Israeli me-her not to rinain o,erniaht.
24-hour per day joint operations
center to operate as part of the
military liaison committee, and
serve as departure point for
supervisory patrols.
Insists on right to conduct
reconnaissance missions over
Lebanon.
Wants detailed navy-to-navy
coordination and cooperation, to
include right to hot pursuit in
Lebanese territorial waters.
Lebanese negotiators deferred issue,
but Tehanese Armv romTwnder 'rannniis
privately agreed in principle.
Lebanese unwilling to include issue
in agreement, hut concede
they cannot prevent Israeli flights.
Accept in principle naval
coordination and cooperation, but
do not want agreement in writing.
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Intelligence Coordination Wants coordination between Details of coordination not
intelligence services and cooperation appropriate to withdrawal agreement
on special operations against and should he left to the
terrorist activities; freedom of intelligence services to effectuate.
access and movement within security
zone for Israeli intelligence
personnel.
Contact Between Cormianders in Wants direct contact, including face Lebanese concur.
the Border Area to face meetings, to coordinate
anti-terrorist activities.
Border Entry Points
Pardon of Collaborators
Besides officially established border Lebanese oppose.
checkpoints, Israel wants unofficial
entry points for joint supervisory
team personnel.
Proposed that Lebanese who have Maintains this is not a security
collaborated with Israel he free issue and should he handled through
from punishment or prosecution other channels.
for that collaboration after
Israeli withdrawal.
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