SECURITY OF FOREIGNERS IN IRAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000700860001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 15, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Security of Foreigners in Iran
Despite its success in imposing control throughout Iran, the
Khomeini regi a is not yet capable of providing guarantees of
personal security to members of diplomatic missions in Tehran.
Rivalries among prominent individuals, political factions, and
oryanizations--as well as the terrorist activities of the
weakened, but still active, opposition--make an extended stay in
Iran dangerous for anyone who does not blend in with the Iranian
lower classes.
Information on specific problems faced by the diplomatic
community in Tehran and visiting businessmen is limited. We are
not aware of incidents involving Westerners since the
unsuccessful attack last year on the West German ambassador. The
French mission, for example, has not suffered from the Iranian
regime's anger over the Mitterrand government's ties to Iraq. On
the other hand, the Fedayeen-e Khalq who attacked the German
Ambassador may have been behind an assassination plot against an
unnamed "ambassador or charge" foiled by Iranian security in
This paper was prepared by
Office of Near East South Asia Analysis
Persian
,
Gulf Division/Iran-Iraq Branch. Comments may be directed to the
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early February, according to a press statement by Revolutionary
Prosecutor Tabrizi. There is some evidence that Third World
missions have been harrassed recently, especially African and
Gulf states, but the only incident of which we are certain is the
Iranian-staged demonstration and flag-burning by Afghan refugees
at the Soviet Embassy last December.
The Stability of the Iranian Regime
Iran's clerical regime is tightening its grip and will
continue in power for the foreseeable future. The authorities
are increasingly able to maintain a sense of law and order
throughout the country. Tehran even appears to be making
progress against the endemic Kurdish rebellion in the
northwest. A successful challenge to the regime seems unlikely
as long as Khomeini lives. The longer he survives--and we have
seen no marked deterioration in his health--the more chance the
ruling clerics will have to institutionalize their power.
The clerics maintain the support of the lower class--the
overwhelming majority of Iranians--and have taken special care to
meet the needs of this core constituency. Their primary vehicle
for this is the pervasive clerical network throughout Iran. The
mosque serves as a central clearinghouse to monitor they needs and
to distribute required goods and services to the lower classes.
The system of mosques and religious organizations also provides
the framework for massive internal propaganda and intelligence
gathering on popular moods and opinions.
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Moreover, the regime has brutally repressed internal
opposition forces. Although dissidents can still carry out
isolated assassinations, they no longer appear a threat to the
regime. The Mu~ahedin-e Khalq, the main armed opposition group,
was decimated by a brutal government crackdown during late 1981
and early 1981.
The regular military has been tamed. Purges of suspected
opponents and infiltration of regime loyalists at all levels, as
well as the simple process of bringing in new recruits because of
the war--recruits that come from the lower classes--have reshaped
the regular military. Tensions between the regular forces and
the Revolutionary Guards are diminishing as a result. Both
appear loyal to the regime.
The central government has also begun extensive efforts to
centralize its authority. It is trying to bring under direct
control the various revolutiionary organizations that sprang up
in the chaos immediately following the revolution. A ministry
has been created for the Revolutionary Guards. The komitehs--a
structure parallel to the government to help bring about the
Islamification of Iranian society--have been placed under the
supervision of the Minister of the Interior.
The regime is split, however, by major philosophical,
institutional, and political divisions within the ruling elite
that often paralyze efforts to implement policy on a wide range
of foreign and domestic issues. If these divisions are not
settled, it will ensure some measure of continuing instability
that could become serious in a post-Khomeini era.
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Iran is a "mullocracy" in which the clerics rule, but from a
variety of different and competing power centers, only some of
which are part of the official government structure. The dozen
or so revolutionary institutions outside the government
structure--such as the Foundation for the Oppressed--only loosely
coordinate with the central government and jealously guard their
independence.
Moreover, there are host of philosphical differences within
clerical ranks. At least theree different groups are
discernable.
-- Socio-economic activists who favor extensive land
reform, nationalizations, and strong central control
over the economy. This group is usually refereed to
as the "Maktabiha." President Khamenei appears to
be a member of this group.
-- Religious-cultural radicals who wish to implement
Islamic law as Iran's penal code, govern daily life
according to strict Islamic norms, and "export the
revolution" to other muslim states. Clerics in the
Qom theological circle, such as Ayatollah Meshini,
have been identified with this group.
-- Conservative clerics who oppose economic reforms and
who wish to lessen somewhat the clergy's role in the
day-to-day running of the government. This trend is
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termed the "Hojjatiyah." Hojjat of Eslam Yazdi,
Deputy speaker of the Majlis, appears to belong to
this group.
-- Each of these groups appears able to block the more
controversial proposals of the others. Thus,
several bills remain bottled up in the parliament.
Others, such as nationalization of foreign trade,
that eventually were passed by the parliament, were
returned as "unIslamic" by the oversight Guardian
Council whose job it is to ensure that legislation
accords with the constitution and the laws of
Islam. Moreover, political maneuvering further
complicates the picture. A cleric, for example, who
advocates extensive land reform may oppose othe r
equally "extreme" measures, such as active export of
the revolution. Loose alliances form and reform,
depending on issues.
Succession remains the key political test. The
central characters in the succession struggle are:
Hoj~at of Eslam Hashemi-Rafsanjani, Speaker of the
Majles. In his early 40s, he appears to be a
political opportunist who decides positions on the
basis of political advantage.
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-- Hojjat of Eslam Ali Khamene'i, President of Iran and
Chairman of the Islamic Republic Party. Also in his
40s, he has been identified with the socio-economic
activists advocating extensive land reform but is
reported moderate on the war.
-- Ayatollah Mahdavi-Kani, former Prime Minister, now
sits on the Council of Guardians. In his SOs, he
has good connections to the local komitehs, is
reportedly a moderate.
-- Ayatollah Ali Meshkini, Friday Prayer leader in Qom
and head of the militant clerics society. In his
late 40s or early SOs, Meshkini is ambitious and
influential. Little information on his substantive
positions.
-- Ayatollah Hussein Montazeri. About 60, long
presumed Khomeini's favored choice as heir,
Montazeri exists in Khomeini's shadow, echoes
Khoemini's pronouncements.
Tha first step in the succession process took place on 10
December with the election of an 83-member Assembly of Experts.
Its term is 8 years but no date has been set for its first
meeting. Its main task is to select a religious authority, or,
if no agreement on one man, to select a council of either 3 or S
clerics. 25X1
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Given the lack of consensus, the leadership appears content
for now to have the necessary machinery in place but not to
confront the issue. Failure to resolve succession before
Khomeini dies, however--especially if the other divisions within
the elite are left festering--risks much larger instability in
Iran after he is gone.
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Iranian External Relations
Iran is following its "neither East or West" policy in
foreign relations. Relations with the US are nonexistent and
relations with the soviet Union are the poorest since the
revolution. Tehran is upset over Soviet arms deliveries to Iraq
(Soviet shipments to Iraq have been at prewar levels since mid-
1981). The Iranians also have been harshly critical of Soviet
policy in Afghanistan and have rounded up several East European
diplomats for espionage (the East Europeans were later allowed to
quietly leave Iran). Last month the head of the Iranian Tudeh
Party, Nur-ed Din Kianuri, and 30 other Tudeh members were
arrested for espionage.
Kianuri remains in prison.
Neither the Iranians or the Soviets are likely to allow
relations to deteriorate too far. Moscow still regards Iran as
the strategic "prize" of the region and probably hopes for better
relations in the post Khomeini era. Iran, for its part, depends
on the Soviets to facilitate imports through their rail links.
The Khomeini regime, moreover, receives most of its military
supplies through North Korea, Libya, and Syria, all of which
provide Soviet-style equipment. (North Korea and Libya are
Iran's main military suppliers).
Tehran has significantly expanded economic contacts with
Western Europe and Japan, but cannot obtain adequate military
equipment there. Iran has also recently expanded ties with Third
World states. It is exploiting them for political support,
economic deals, and to "export the revolution."
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The Khomeini regime remains committed to the "export of the
revolution"--especially in the Persian Gulf--but may become more
subtle in its methods. Iranian representatives abroad encourage
contacts with local Moslims and dissidents, however, even in
countries like Turkey and Pakistan with which Tehran is trying to
maintain good relations. Selected dissidents receive training in
Iran in paramilitary and propaganda techniques.
IRAN-IRAQ: Current Situation in the War
The first phase of Iran's offensive on the Doveyrich River
Front which lasted from 6 to 11 February was a complete
failure. The original plan called for a breakthrough in the
southern sector of the Front by Revolutionary Guards, followed by
larger attacks involving both regular and irregular forces in the
central and northern sectors. The attacking units eventually
were to link up and drive on Al Amarah some 60 kilometers to the
West. Iran assembled approximately 130,000 troops and more than
5UU armored vehicles, and spent nearly three months preparing for
the attack to ensure its success.
Iran, however, could not achieve a breakthrough in the south
and suffered as many as 15,000 casualties and about 1,000
captured. Iran may have lost up to 50 armored vehicles. Iraqi
losses mounted to approximately 3,000 casualties and a few
armored vehicles.
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Improvements in Iraqi performance and shortcomings in
Iranian intelligence and equipment were largely responsible for
Iran's defeat. The Iraqis were able to construct formidable
physical defenses and to amass a two-to-one advantage in armor
and nearly a three-to-one advantage in artillery along the
front. The combat performance of both Iraqi units and commanders
has improved significantly, and Iraq has been using its fighter-
bombers and helicopters more effectively.
Iran on the other hand, failed to discerne accurately the
strength and dispositon of Iraqi forces in the souther sector of
the Doveyrich Front. Coordination between some units was poor,
and material shortages severely limited support to the attacking
infantry.
Despite its initial setback, Iran is preparing for
additional, probably larger, attacks on the Doveyrich River
h'ront. This attack probably will be launched this month although
the exact timing is not yet certain. It also will be accompanied
by attacks in the Al Basrah and Mandali areas.
P9andali is near the border due east of Baghdad. Basrah is near
the Persian Gulf.) The bulk of Iran's forces were not committed
during the attack in February and could attack at any time, but
Iran continues to make new plans and redeploy units. If Iran
decides additional forces or major changes in its battle plan are
required, many weeks could elapse before the offensive resumes.
Iran's chances of making major territorial gains in its next
attack are slim because it will be unable quickly to redress the
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basic tactical, numberical, and qualitative disadvantages which
caused its February attacks to fail. Nonetheless, Iran probably
is capable of recapturing the 100 square kilometers of Iran
occupied by Iraq on the Doveyrich Front and capturing some
limited Iraqi territory along the border. Iranian casualties
certainly will be massive, however. Probably on
the order of 30,000 dead).
Tehran's Probable Reaction
A second failure on the Doveyrich River Front is likely to
convince Iran's leaders that massive assaults using ill-equipped,
poorly-trained infantry cannot achieve their aims. The
liabilities of this strategy already were apparent last July
following failures east of Al Basrah.
Regime leaders publicly described the last Doveyrich attack
as part of the "final offensive," a claim they have now been
forced to moderate. The description suggests Tehran is sensitive
to the possibility of growing war weariness and the effect that
massive losses and repeated defeats will have on its core
supporters--the lower classes--who have provided the bulk of
Iran's infantry.
Tehran's Uther Uptions
Iran's ability to achieve a decisive victory using "human
wave" attacks apparently has peaked, leaving it with three other
options:
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-- Lower the scale of the fighting, hoping subversion
and growing economic problems will bring down
Saddam.
-- Move to a more conventional war, relying on heavy
equipment. This would require considerable time to
prepare, probably while Iran pursued option one.
-- Negotiate a peace agreement, extracting as large a
reparations payment as possible. 25X1
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Attrition and Subversion
We believe Iran will most likely opt to lower the level of
fighting to a border war of attrition while increasing its
subversive activities against Baghdad. Such a strategy would
maintain the pressure on Iraq while reducing the risk of a
popular backlash at home over casualties. Iran could pursue this
strategy by shelling and conducting infantry probes along the
border. It also could launch commando or air raids against Iraqi
oil or other economic facilities.
The Iranians, who have lower economic expectations than the
Iraqis, are better prepared to withstand the economic problems
resulting from a war of attrition. Indeed, by discounting the
price of its oil, Iran has boosted its exports to around 2.5
million barrels per day-up from only 500,000 barrels a year
ago. As a result, Iran ended the year with a current account
surplus of around $4.5 billion, and continues to add to that at
the rate of about $1 billion every 2.5 months. Iranian foreign
reserves have climbed from less than $4 billion at the end of
19131 to a current $7 billion.
Iraq's oil exports are only a fifth of its prewar level and
its foreign reserves have plummeted from $21 billion at the
beginning of 19132 to less than $6 billion--the equivalent of less
than three month's worth of imports. The resulting cash squeeze
has forced Baghdad to seek deferred payments on military
contracts and on a wide variety of economic projects already
underway. Uther projects have been postponed and contracts
cancelled. The Persian Gulf states, with economic difficulties
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of their own, will be increasingly reluctant to provide Iraq with
close to the $5.5 billion they gave last year--requiring further
cutbacks in Iraqi imports.
Iran almost certainly realizes that economic problems alone
will not bring down Saddam. Rather, Tehran hopes economic
difficulties will feed political dissident. A war of attrition
thus would be accompanied by a propaganda campaign directed at
Iraqi Shias--the majority of Iraq's population--and by attempts
to infiltrate Iraqi expatriates to generate unrest. Tehran could
also increase its support of Iraqi Shia and Kurdish dissidents
involved in subversion against Baghdad. Dissidents could also
blow up the pipeline through Turkey, Iraq's sole remaining route
for oil exports.
Iran could opt to rebuild its conventional forces in
conjunction with a war of attrition in hopes of eventually
imposing a military solution on Baghdad. This strategy would
require at least several years to make a significant dent in
Iraq's overwhelming numerical advantage in all categories of
major combat equipment. Iraq has more than a four-to-one
advantage in operational fighter aircraft and about a three-to-
one edge in tanks.
The Soviet Union is the only arms supplier which could
deliver large quantities of arms quickly enough to have an
appreciable impact on the war during the next year. Tehran,
however, has been highly reluctant to depend on Moscow for arms
because of political, ideological, and security reasons, and is
likely to remain so.
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