ISRAEL-LEBANON: TALKING POINTS FOR PRESENTATION TO SPC JASONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000700990001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 17, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 26, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

HIli1'1 III I I' 1111 I
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Talking Points for Presentation to SPC Jasons
30 April 1983
Air War in Lebanon _
The air war in Lebanon once again revealed Israeli
superiority in every critical category. Superior leadership,
weapons systems, pilots and support personnel, complimented by
close knit command and control and real-time intelligence, have
and will remain the key to superior Israeli military operations.
Israel employed lessons learned from the 1973 war and from
numerous skirmishes with Syrian aircraft over the past four years
to defeat the Syrian air force so decisively last June.
-- In 1973, Israel lost 108 aircraft, 74% of which were lost
to SAMs and AAA while conducting close-air support. Most
,=oft these losses occurred, however, in the first days of
the war.
-- In Lebanon last year, only two Israeli attack aircraft
were lost;
In the air war over Lebanon, the numbers of fighter aircraft
involved were fairly balanced. Israeli success was due primarily
to technologically superior weapons systems and well-trained
aggressive aircrews.
-- The F-15 and F-16 mixture enjoyed advantages over the
Syrian MIG-21s and MIG-23s in almost all areas of
performance.
-- Israeli F-15s shot down 40 Syrian fighters while the F-16s
accounted for 43.
-- Israeli fighters probably damaged an equal number of
Syrian aircraft in air-to-air engagements
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Ground Operations in Lebanon
Helicopter Warfare
Use of attack helicopters was seen as very important to both
sides in Lebanon operations.
-- Israeli's in particular see the need to field effective
anti-helicopter weapons and to use their helicopter
gunships more effectively in ground support operations.
-- Syrians need more coordination between ground forces and
gunships and better pilots.
-- Out of 20 Syrian helicopters shot down--of which 12 were
HOT-equipped Gazelles--5 were hit by F-15/16s, 1 by
ground-launched TOW, 1 by a 105-mm tank round, and 13 by
Mound fire.
-- Several downed by ground fire actually crashed because of
pilot error; they flew into the ground trying to avoid
Israeli fire.
-- Israel lost 4 helicopters; 2 to ground fire, 1 to Israel
ground fire, and 1 to pilot error.
Heliborne TOW proved to be very effective on the
battlefield.
-- Israel helicopters fired 137 TOW missiles during the
conflict and scored 89 hits, for a kill rate of 72
percent.
-- Syrian Gazelles firing HOT anti-tank missiles scored only
about 10 hits for approximately 100 missiles fired.
Armored Warfare
Relative to Soviet tanks, Israeli tanks (M-60s, Centurions,
Merkava) are superior in speed, agility, reliability, fire
control, ammunition storage capacity, and crew protection.
-- Soviet T-55/62s are difficult to operate because of the
cramped space.
-- Fuel and ammunition are vulnerable to burning when the
tank is hit and an automatic extinguishing system sprays
corrosive fluid on the crew.
-- The T-62 is especially sensitive to burning when hit in
the front because of fuel tanks.
-- Both the T-66 and T-62 are difficult to steer and shift.
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-- Crew seating is cramped and produces a punishing ride with
high fatigue effects.
Israeli tank gunnery is far superior to Syrian gunnery and
this remains the key factor in Israeli success.
-- Israeli gunners regularly engage targets beyond 2,000
meters while on the move.
-- Israeli accuracy and rate of fire is approximately triple
that of the Syrians who do not fire except at close range
amd when stopped.
-- Israelis destroyed 21 T-72s in Lebanon with ground-
launched TOWs and 105-mm anti-tank rounds fired at the
upper side of the turrets. Engagement occurred at close
range (1,100-2,200 meters) from ambush.
-- All T-72s experienced catastrophic explosions due to open
storage of ammunition in the automatic loader system.
TOW proved to be one of the most versatile and effective
anti-tank weapons.
-- In 1973 the Arabs fired an estimated 6,000-8,000 AT-3
Saggers of which less than 1 percent hit their target.
The same ratio applied in Lebanon.
-- Israeli's used 105-mm Beehive rounds, artillery, and
infantry fire to defeat the Syrian SAGGER teams.
-- The RPG-7 was effective against tanks and APCs from close-
in ambush positions but its effectiveness was neutralized
to a large extent by add-on explosive armor. AkMJAI)
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Mobile Warfare
Soviet BMPs and BRDMs are no better armored or shaped than
the US M-113.
-- Soviet APCs are hard to operate, crew quarters are
cramped, and crew fatique is high.
-- Rear-door fuel tanks on the BMP make it particularly
vulnerable to burning when hit in the rear.
-- APCs are most useful in transporting ammunition and
infantry to forward areas. They should not be used as
fighting vehicles because of their vulnerability to ATGM
fire.
MG Tal emphasized that future Israeli APCs will have
"modular`'armor" that can be bolted to the vehicle.
-- This armor should protect against 60 percent of all ATGMs,
all 14.5-mm weapons, and 20-mm fire from longer ranges.
-- Reduced lethality can be accomplished by designing a
ballistic curtain inside the vehicle to protect against
fragmentation if the armor envelope is penetrated.
-- The optimum design for an infantry carrier should include
two machine guns and a rigid mortar fired from inside the
vehicle.
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SUBJECT: Israel-Lebanon: Talking Points for Presen ation to
SPC Jasons
NESA M# 83-10097
Orig - D/NESA
4 - CPAS/IMD/CB
1 - C/PES
2 - NESA/PS
1 - NESA/AI
2 - NESA/AI/I
1 - NESA/AI/L
DDI/NESA/AI/I
(26Apr83)
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SECRET
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