BLEAK PROSPECTS FOR THE GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000800310001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 12, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 14, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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v
Washington, D. C.20SOS
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
14 July 1983
Bleak Prospects for the Gemayel Government
Summary
exercising tenuous authority over its territory and people.) 125X1
unlikely to be anything more than a government in Beirut,
The viability of Amin Gemayel's government depends upon his
ability to satisfy the demands of Lebanon's confessional groups
for a piece of the poIiticai action. The prospects for building
a new political consensus are slim, however. The prolonged
occupation has made confessional tensions worse, and it is
probably too late for Gemayel to capitalize on the change in the
domestic political balance brought about by Israel's sweep into
Beirut last summer. As a result, the government of Lebanon is
The central government can operate only in those areas that
Syria, Israel, and their surrogates will permit. There is,
consequently, a growing conviction among Lebanese factions that
de acto partition is inevitable and that little is to be gained
from cooperating with the central government. This mentality has
been fueled by the anticipated redepioyrnent of Israeli troops
which would Leave them in tighter control of more territory than
is provided for in the Lebanese-Israeli withdrawal accord. Under
these circumstances troop withdrawal is Iike~ contribute to
enewed outbreaks of factional violence.
Gemayel will not be able or willing to impose government
authority on any confessional area by force. Instead he will
This memorandum was prepared by Arab-Israeli 25X1
Division, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis. It
was coordinated within the Directorate of Intelligence and with
the Directorate of Operations. Information as of 14 July 1983
was used in preparation of this paper. Comments and queries are
welcome and should be addressed to Chief, Arab-~^~'-~ n~vision,
NESA M#83-10167
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seek to extend government control through back-room political
deals that will enable the Lebanese Army to deploy into
confessional areas without confronting local militias.
Gemayel's effectiveness in winning over Shia, Sunni, and
Druze leaders depends to a great extent on his ability to
distance himself from Maronite and Phalange interests. He wilt
also need to overcome his reluctance to deaf with younger
generation leaders who have come to prominence since the civil
war and who may be more representative of their communities than
tradtional clan leaders. We believe Gemayel is losing confidence
in his chances of ruling all of Lebanon, and he probably will now
place greater emphasis in strengthening his claim to be Lebanon's
preeminent Christian leader.
In our judgment, US failure to achieve its aims in Lebanon--
the withdrawal of foreign troops and the restoration of Lebanese
sovereignty and territorial integrity--will not alter Gemayel's
western orientation. He has no real alternative. The more
serious repercussions of US failure to achieve its objectives Ile
beyond Lebanese borders. Other Arab states will question US
ability to deliver on any new policy initiatives in the region.
The Lebanese-Israeli Accord: Refocus on Domestic Affairs
The signing of the Lebanese-Israeli accord on 17 May
represents a watershed in Lebanese domestic politics. During the
course of the negotiations on foreign troop withdrawals, Gemayel
enjoyed nearly unanimous backing from the country's various
confessional groups. This broad-based support created an
atmosphere for progress in forging a new domestic consensus,
according to US Embassy reports, because groups seeking new
power-sharing arrangements were willing to hold off on demands
for the duration of the negotiating process.
With the signing of the withdrawal agreement, this unifying
factor disappeared. Lebanese factional leaders are anxious to
get back to their real concern--the struggle for power inside
Lebanon.
Missed Opportunity
The Israeli invasion of Lebanon last summer broke the back
of the PLO, weakened its Lebanese leftist allies, and restored
the political power balance in favor of the Maronites. The
prolonged occupation, however, has relieved confessional groups
of the need to deal with each other politically. Leftists have
had time to rearm, and Maronites, taking advantage of this
renewed threat, have pressed their campaign to preserve Maronite
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hegemony in Lebanon. The window of opportunity may have passed
for the central government to capitalize on the change in the
domestic political balance brought about by Israel's sweep into
Beirut last summer. Ironically, troop withdrawal at this stage
is likely to contribute to renewed outbreaks of factional
violence.
Extending Government Authority
The government of Lebanon holds undisputed political
authority in barely 10 square kilometers of the entire country.
Even within this area, however, it cannot maintain security. The
Lebanese Army,_backed by the Multi-National Force, provides
general stability, but so many individuals in West Beirut have
received paramilitary training and can easily acquire weapons
that radical groups can carry out attacks against targets in the
Beirut area at any time. What these armed groups cannot do is
challenge overall government authority in the greater Beirut
area.
The army's ability to handle security duties beyond Beirut
depends heavily on the political deals that Gemayel and Lebanese
Army Commander Ibrahim Tannous can work out with government
opponents and, to a lesser extent, on the popular perception that
the army is backed by the Multi-National Force. Although the
army is better armed and trained than the militias, we believe
Gemayel does not want to use force to eliminate these
paramilitary groups and risk splitting the army along
confessional lines as occurred during the civil war in 1975-76.
The government probably will have to be satisfied with some
sort of compromise with Christian, Druze, and Shia militias that
will. allow these paramilitary organizations to retain their light
weapons, provided no arms or uniforms are displayed in public.
Such arrangements may restrict factional fighting and preserve
army cohesion, but central government authority, in our view,
will remain weak. We believe these deals will be difficult to
make, let alone maintain, because Lebanon's confessional leaders
are increasingly convinced that partition is inevitable and
therefore see little to be gained by cooperating with the
government.
Fear of the Phalange
Internal divisions in Lebanon have widened over the past few
months, sparked by concerns among Muslims over Gemayel's domestic
political direction. In the early days of his presidency Gemayel
made overtures to all confessional groups and he promised to seek
a new domestic formula that could include revision of the 1943
national pact or the Constitution itself. At heart, however,
Gemayel remains a "Maronite firster," and his efforts to create
at least the appearance of intercommunal consultation have had
little effect.
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Non-Phalangists now accuse Gemayel of complicity in the
Phalangicization of the Lebanese Government and fear that a
party, not a president, has come to power. They point to Amin's
tendency to appoint Phalangists to many sensitive positions--for
example, his appointment of a longtime Phalange security
official, Zahi Bustani, to head the Surete Generale intelligence
organization. The Phalange is a minority even within the
Christian community. Other groups publicly have warned they will
not accept political domination by a minority and that the
consequence of a pro-Phalange policy will be new unrest and
violence.
The US Embassy points out that conversations with Phalange
leaders suggest that fears of Phalange domination are not
unfounded. The Phalange is doing its best to exert maximum
influence over Lebanese politics. The general Phalange view is
that the party has the right and obligation to prevent the return
of Palestinian/leftist/Nasirite influence and that the best
guarantee against this is as much Phalange control as possible.
The Lebanese Forces: Still a Problem
In our judgment, the Phalange-dominated Lebanese Forces
militia still represents the greatest domestic threat to
stability. All political factions in Lebanon fear domination by
the Lebanese Forces. The continued existence and activities of
the militia are costing Gemayel more political support than any
other single issue.
Gemayel's moves against the militia last February that led
to deployment of the army into East Beirut and the government
takeover of Lebanese Forces' illegally-operated ports led many
government opponents to believe Gemayel was prepared to bring the
militia to heel. Since then the continuing stridency of the
militia and Gemayel's failure to react has led many to suspect
that the President is either in league with its extremist aims or
cowed by them.
Gemayel is in an untenable position. He would have to use
the army to establish the authority over the Lebanese Forces that
is essential if he is to reach accommodation with the country's
non-Christian majority. At the same time Gemayel may be losing
confidence in his chances of ruling all of Lebanon and thus may
want to avoid alienating the militia whose backing he will need
to strengthen his claim to be Lebanon's preeminent Christian
leader.
Partial Israeli Withdrawal
Israel has indicated it will redeploy its troops in Lebanon
soon. One plan under consideration calls for a phased
withdrawal, with Israeli troops initially pulling out of the area
around Beirut. Gemayel and Lebanese
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Army Commander Tannous are trying to put such a move in the best
light, arguing that this will allow the Lebanese Army to
gradually take over territory from the Israelis, and at the same
time set in motion a process that will encourage Syrian forces to
pull out. In our judgment, a partial withdrawal by Israel will
only encourage Syrian intransigence.
If Israel consolidates its position in the south, probably
in the vicinity of the Awwali River, it could spur renewed
factional violence. Unless the army effectively can fill the
vacuum as the Israelis withdraw, areas around Beirut could be
engulfed by factional violence. Moreover, a move to the Awwali
River would leave Israeli troops in tighter control of more
territory than provided for in the withdrawal agreement with
Lebanon. As Israeli security measures toughen in the South and
limit opportunities for the local population to retaliate against
its occupier, chances increase that the central government itself
will become the direct target of dissident groups.
We believe a phased Israeli withdrawal coupled with a "date
certain" for the complete evacuation of Israeli forces from
Lebanon, offers Gemayel the .best chance for reaching accomodation
with progressive and radical domestic factions.
Partition Mentality
If factional violence results from a partial Israeli
withdrawal, a partition mentality could quickly take hold among
confessional groups. In such an environment, Maronites would
attempt to establish their military and political superiority in
traditional Christian areas, abandoning the North and the Bekaa
Valley to Damascus and whatever Syrian-sponsored "Government of
Arab Lebanon" might be established there. At some point, the
Maronites could be tempted to extend their area to two Christian
enclaves under Syrian control--ex-President Franjiyah's area near
Tripoli and the Greek Orthodox market town of Zahlah in the Bekaa
Valley.
Partial Israeli withdrawal, in our view, might prompt the
Shia, to press a major campaign against Gemayel on behalf of
their co-religionists in the South, who would represent the
largest confessional group under Israeli occupation. Even the
conservative Shia majority is likely to become more radical under
these circumstances, perhaps opening the way for greater Iranian
involvement in Lebanon's domestic politics. The Druze and other
groups fearful of Maronite domination would again turn to Syria
for support in fighting the Phalange and the Lebanese Forces
militia.
Under these circumstances, the performance of the Lebanese
Army becomes crucial. If it collapses, the authority of the
central government would be so diminished, it would become
irrelevant in an outlaw domestic political process. If the army
can hold together and keep factional fighting under control--a
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less likely prospect--confessional differences could be forced
into the political arena. It is possible that a new consensus
for governing Lebanon--or what is left of it--could be worked
out. Without a reliable national armed forces, however, there is
no reason to believe that any new arrangement will be more stable
or enduring than in the past.
Coping with New Circumstances
Gemayel's difficulties stem to some degree from the fact
that he is a traditional politician caught in new
circumstances. His attempts to restore Lebanon's conservative
political balance by working deals with confessional elites and
clan leaders, in our view, are less effective than in the past.
Circumstances have radicalized younger generation Lebanese, yet
Gemayel persists in dealing with traditional political bosses
rather than with new leaders who have come to prominence since
the civil war and who may be more representative of their
communities. While Gemayel has made some efforts to keep lines
of communication open to radical and progressive groups in
Lebanon, in our estimation, he will continue to work within the
traditional political framework familiar to him.
Gemayel has had some success with this approach--it was the
support of traditional politicians in Parliament that enabled the
government to win approval of the Lebanese-Israeli withdrawal
accord. On domestic issues, however, the Lebanese civil war has
accelerated the generational and class split among Muslims,
sending more of their numbers into radical political
organizations less willing to accept the political status quo.
We believe the actual extension of government authority and the
forging of a new political consensus will depend in part upon
Gemayel's ability to draw the militants into a political
dialogue.
Gemayel has had some success in reestablishing the alliance
between the Maronites and the traditional Sunni Muslim elite, but
according to the US Embassy, the Sunni community overall is
becoming less supportive of the Gemayel government, viewing it as
serving only Maronite interests. Gemayel's dealings with the
Shia community also suffer from his preference for working with
old-line Shia politicians, such as Speaker of the Lebanese
Parliament Kemal al-Assad, than with more progressive leaders
such as Nabih Berri, head of Amal, the largest Shia organization.
The Druze community, largely represented by the Progressive
Socialist Party of Walid Junblatt, has long been at odds with the
Maronites. Junblatt has told US Embassy officials that last year
he hoped to reach an accommodation with Gemayel, but now there is
a growing perception among the Druze that Gemayel no longer is
interested in dealing with them on a political level. The Druze
suspect that government "cooperation" may not qo beyond settling
the Druze-Lebanese Forces military conflict.
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The Myth of Lebanon
Gemayel and other Lebanese officials are publicly optimistic
over the ability of Lebanon's communities to work out a modus
vivendi, if outside forces would only leave them alone. In fact,
it is the long standing hatred and mutual distrust among
confessional groups that led in the first place to what amounted
to an open invitation by these communities for outside
involvement in Lebanon's domestic affairs. Ironically, Syria and
Israel were both invited to enter Lebanon by Maronite leaders.
We believe Syrian, and now Israeli, involvement in Lebanon
is a permanent fact. The government can only operate in those
areas that Syria, Israel, and their surrogates will permit.
Barring all out civil war, we believe the Gemayel government will
survive and the myth of Lebanon persist for some time--even in
the face of continuing factional violence. In reality, however,
the government of Lebanon is unlikely to be anything more than
the government in Beirut, exercising tenuous authority over its
territory and people.
Implications for the United States
The goals of the United States in Lebanon--withdrawal of
foreign troops and the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty and
territorial integrity--are being jeopardized as much by Christian
militancy, which has exacerbated factional tensions, as by the
stalemate in the withdrawal process. Confessional polarization
has reached the point that the withdrawal of foreign forces could
produce as many problems for the central government as continued
occupation.
In our judgment, failure to win foreign troop withdrawal
from Lebanon will not alter Gemayel's western orientation. He
has no real alternative to US support. While he will publicly
oppose continued occupation of portions of his country, he is
unlikely publicly to accuse the United States of reneging on its
commitments to Lebanon. Instead he will continue to emphasize US
"obligations" to Lebanon and to concentrate on the need to expand
the Multi-National Force and rebuild the Lebanese Army.
The Christian-dominated "Marounistan" that would result from
de facto partition will need protection, putting greater demands
on the US relationship, such as seeking special commitments to
guarantee its economic and political survival.
The more serious repercussions for US policy lie beyond
Lebanon's borders. Other Arab states will perceive US failure to
achieve its objectives in Lebanon as yet another example of US
unwillingness to bring pressure to bear on Israel. They are also
likely to be vocal in their criticism of what they see as the
United States' inadept approach on the withdrawal issue to the
Syrians. Moreover, perceived US acquiescence to Israeli
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occupation of the South will frustrate other US policy
initiatives in the region. Jordan and the PLO, for example, will
be even more unlikely to put faith in US commitments on the
future status of the West Bank. Lebanese officials frequently
have stressed that Lebanon is the test of US credibility in the
region and have warned that if the United States fails in
Lebanon, it will fail throughout the Arab world.
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SUBJECT: Bleak Prospects for the Gemayel Government
NESA M#83-10167
DISTRIBUTION:
External
1 - Office of VP (Gregg)
1 - NSC (Kemp)
1 - NSC (Dur)
1 - State (Veliotes)
1 - State (Pelletreau)
1 - Defense (Marshall)
1 - Defense (Armitage)
1 - Defense (Tixier)
Orig - DDI
1 - Exec Director
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - C/PES
1 - DDO/NE
1 - OGI/PPD
1 - PDB
4 - CPAS/IMD/CB
1 - CPAS/ILS
1 - D/NESA
2 - NESA/PS
1 - NESA/AI
1 - NESA/AI/I
2 - NESA/AI/I
DDI/NESA/AI/L
(14Ju1y83)
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