US-PAKISTAN: MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF HARPOON SALE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000800520001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 26, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 23, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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i ~ ~ ~.~~
, Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
23 August 1983
US-Pakistan: Military Implications of Harpoon Sale
Summary
The sale of 16 submarine-launched Harpoon antiship missiles
to Pakistan will significantly improve the offensive capabilities
of the Pakistan Navy, but it will have little impact on India's
naval superiority or Pakistan's limited ability to intervene
independently in the Persian Gulf. The Harpoon sale increases
the potential for Zimited Pakistani miZitar cooperation with the
United States in a Persian Gulf conflict.
The Pakistan Navy, like most other navies with Harpoons,
could have difficulty targeting the missile, particularly if the
intended target is beyond the Line of sight. Pakistan intends to
upgrade its navigation and electronic support measures systems,
however, to improve the Navy's ability to use the Harpoon to its
maximum range.
The Harpoon sale wiZ1 give added impetus to India's efforts
to increase its naval superiority over Pakistan--particularly to
obtain advanced antiship missiles, close-in naval air defense
weapons, and sophisticated electronic warfare and antisubmarine
warfare systems.
Pakistan plans to buy 16 submarine-launched Harpoon antiship
missiles from the United States in FY 1984. The Harpoons, which
are scheduled for delivery in 1986, will be deployed aboard
Pakistan's two French-supplied Agosta submarines. The US Embassy
in Islamabad reports that Pakistan is interested in later
This memorandum was prepared by South Asia
Division, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian na yS1Assistant
response to questions raised by Howard Schaffer, Deputy
Secretary of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs. Information as of August 22, 2983 was used in
preparation of this paper. Comments and queries are welcome and
should be addressed to Chief, South Asia D
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purchases of the air- and surface-launched versions of_ the
Harpoon. Pakistan would deploy surface-launched Harpoons on its
five US Gearing-class destroyers and on the new European frigates
that it plans to purchase in the mid-1980s.
Impact on Pakistan Navy Capabilities
Pakistan's Harpoon missiles will not have all of t1~e same
system components as US Navy Harpoons but nonetheless will
substantially boost Pakistan's naval firepower and provide
improved naval missile technology
At present, Pakistan's naval strength lies
principally in its Gearing destroyers, Agosta and smaller rr^rench
Daphne coastal submarines, and a small inventory of air-]_aunched
French ::,xocet and ship-launched Chinese Styx antiship missiles.
The Harpoon will have better target discrimination capabilities
and greater effective range than Exocet and Chinese Styx rlow in
the Pakistan Navy or the modern Soviet Styx antiship missiles in
the Indian Navy. The missile also will be more resistant to
electronic countermeasures (see table).
the over-the-horizon attack capability of the Harpoon could
cause targeting difficulties for the Pakistan Navy because the
missile's radar seeker cannot discriminate between an intended
target and other ships in the target area (see annex). Other_
navies to which the Harpoon has been sold could have the same
difficulties. A US Navy evaluation concluded that the Pakistan
Navy's ability to accurately target ships over the horizon is
presently inadequate but can be made sufficient before the Tir.st
Harpoon deliveries if Pakistan makes specific .recommended
purchases to upgrade navigation and electronic support measures
systems. (Electronic support measures provide electronically-
acquired information for naval weapon systems to assist in
identifying and targeting ships.) The Pakistanis told the US
Navy evaluation team that they intend to correct targeting
deficiencies by purchasing an inertial navigation system for
their Atlantique maritime patrol aircraft, which would pass the
location of enemy ships to the missile-carrying submarine for
most over-the-horizon shots, as well as a satellite navigation
system and enhanced electronic support measures package for the
Agosta submarines.
Impact on the India-Pakistan Naval Balance
The acquisition of Harpoon antiship missiles is the Pakistan
~1avy's highest modernization priority, in our view, because of_
India's overwhelming naval superiority. The smaller and older
Pakistan Navy cannot contain Indian naval operations, and we
believe it either would be bottled up in port or quickly defeated
at sea in wartime. Pakistani Navy is most
concerned about India's growing capability to blockade Karachi--
Pakistan's only naval vase and port for maritime commerce. In
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the 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, India used a Styx antiship missile
against I{arachi.
The Harpoon will greatly increase Pakistan's offensive naval
capability against the Indian Navy. Indian warships could not
electronically jam the Harpoon even though Pakistan's missiles
will have a degraded counter-electronic warfare capability
compared to US Navy Harpoons. Indian warships do not have a
radar-directed close-in gun or missile defense system capable of
shooting down the Harpoon. India is particularly concerned about
the vulnerabilit of its aircraft carrier to attack by Harpoon
missiles
The Pakistan Navy also will be able with submarine-launched
Harpoons to threaten Indian naval and merchant vessels far from
Karachi, potentially distracting the Indian Navy from a hlockade
of the Pakistani port. Pakistan's Styx-armed Chinese missile
patrol boats are too small and have too limited range to operate
far from port. Pakistan cannot use Exocet missiles beyond the
limited range of the Navy's Sea Kinq helicopters or the combat
radius of the Air Force's Mirage fighters, one squadron of which
will be converted to fire Exocets later this year. Pakistan's
Agosta submarines, however, could threaten Indian naval or
maritime ;shipping anywhere in the Arabian Sea and all along
India's western coastline, including the naval bases at 3ombay
and Cochin.
In our view, the submarine-launched Harpoon will have a
greater impact on the India-Pakistan naval balance than the air-
or surface-launched versions. The Indian Navy's limited
antisubmarine warfare capabilities could not prevent Pakistani
submarines from approaching Indian warships undetected to within
10 nautical miles, a distance at which they could launch the
Harpoon without having to rely on a supporting aircraft or ship
to provide targeting data. Pakistani aircraft or surface ships
armed with Harpoons would be much more vulnerable to detection,
interception, and possible destruction before they could threaten
Indian warships.
Although Pakistani Harpoons would make a naval war more
costly to the Indians, they will not, in our view, significantly
reduce India's naval superiority. India continues to strengthen
its Navy with more modern ships and weapons and is increasing its
nearly three-to-one advantage in major naval combatants. ~~e
believe that the number of Harpoons that Pakistan Mans to buy in
its first purchase of the missile--and the number it could afford
to buy in the future when India's naval strength is also
increasing--will be too small to cause serious attrition of the
Indian Navy. India also has naval air superiority that would
enable it to attack Pakistani warships at sea with near impunity
and the Karachi naval and air base with relatively light
losses. Airstrikes against the Karachi bases could destroy
Pakistan's Agosta submarines in port or, if both were at sea,
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seriously damage the logistics infeastlructure necessary ro
support sustained operations.
We believe the US sale wi]_1 give added impetus to Indian
plans to acquire new antiship missiles and to improve antimissilz
defenses aboard its ships. The Indian Navy recently concl_ucJed
agreements with France for air-launched Exocet missiles anti with
Britain for the new Sea .Eagle air-launched missile. Both are
scheduled for delivery about the same time that Pakistan receives
its first Harpoons. None of these missiles could match the
capabilities of the Harpoons, but Pakistani warships would he
unable to defend against them unless they had close-in air
defense systems such as the Vulcan/Phalanx, which they have
requested from the United States. We believe that India also
eventually will buy more sophisticated electronic
countermeasures, radar-directed close-in defense gun and missil?
systems, and wi_11 improve their antisubmarine warfare
capability.
Re Tonal Implications--The Tonger Term
We believe that deployment of the submarine-launched Harpoon
will do little to increase Pakistan's potential for naval
operations in the Persian Gulf in defense of the Arab countries
with which it has military ties. The Harpoon would give the
Pakistan Navy a formidable offensive capability against Dersian
Gulf navies--including Iran's--but its Agosta submarines could
not conduct sustained operations in the Persian Gulf witho~it
access to a local naval base for logistics support. The
submarines also would be Wore vulnerable to antisubmarine warfare
in the confines of the Gulf than in the expanse of the Arabian
p despite its military commitments co
Sea. In addition, akistan,
ional
i
n reg
many Arab states, wants to avoid invo t
conflicts between Islamic countries,
The planned, later acquisition of surface-launched Harpoons
would provide the Pakistan Navy with better capabilities for
operations in the Persian Gulf. Major surface combatants such as
the Gearing destroyers or the European frigates that Islamabad
wants to buy in the next few years could operate for extended
periods away from their home port. Pakistani surface ships,
however, would themselves be vulnerable to attack by Harpoon
antiship missiles, which have also been sold to Iran and Saudi
Arabia. Other Arab countries in the Persian Gulf are armed with
Exocet or Styx antiship missiles that could also potentially
threaten Pakistani ships.
The sale of Harpoon antiship missiles to Pakistan will
strengthen U5-Pakistani relations, increase the likelihood of
Pakistani military cooperation with the United States, and enabl.~
the Pakistan Navy to more effectively support US military
operations in the Persian Gulf region. The Harpoon sale would be
tangible evidence of US support for Pakistan's security
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interests, especially since the sale cannot be linked to the
Soviet threat from Afghanistan. In the event of a Persian Gulf
conflict, the Pakistan ?lavy armed with Harpoon missiles would
have the capability, albeit limited, of assisting iJS naval forces
in protecting the security of the sea lanes between the Arabian
Sea and the Gulf.
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annex: Targetin the Harpoon
The -riarpoon antiship missile can be difficult to ease in
over-the-horizon attacks, particularly for inexperienced navies,
because its radar seeker cannot discriminate between ships rind
will attack the first vessel that it acquires and locks onto.
Information on the enemy ship's position, heading, and speed
increases the probability of attacking the right ship.
Submarine-launched Harpoons can be fired against an enemy shin
knowing only its bearing, but other ships locate? between the
attacking submarine and the intended target could easily be hit
in such an attack. If range information also were available, the
Harpoon could be programmed to activate its radar seeker late in
its flight to lessen the chances of attacking the wrong ship.
Targeting information for over-the-horizon attacks by
Harpoon missiles can be provided to the attacking weapons
platform by another aircraft, surface ship, or submarine.
Sophisticated navigation systems would be required by both the
targeting ship or aircraft and the attacking ship to reduce
position errors. Navigational errors could result in a Harpoon
launch on an imprecise range or bearing *_hat would increase the
chances of the missile failing to acquire the enemy ship or
attacking the wrong ship in the target area. Passing and
correlating accurate Targeting data to a submarine for a ~iarooon
launch is more difficult than to a surface ship because of
communications problems associated with undersea operations.
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TABLE: Antiship Missiles in the Pakistan and Indian Navies
Missile Warhead Max. Range Remarks
Chinese Styx
51.5 kg.
25 nm.
Soviet Styx
480 kg.
45 nm.*
French Exocet
165 kg.
40 nm.*
US Harpoon
227 kg.
75 nm.
UK Sea Eagle
180 kg.
95 nm.*
Pakistan Navy, deployed on
missile patrol boats.
Indian Navy, surface-
launched.
Pakistan Navy, air-
launched. Air-launched
version on order for
Indian Navy.
Agreement in principle
with Pakistan Navy for
submarine-launched version.
Air-launched version on
order for Indian Navy.
* Range varies according to altitude of air launch.
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SUBJECT: iJS-Pakistan: Military Implications of ~?arpoc~n Sale
Internal Distribution:
C/SO/P
DDI
DDI Registry
VC NIC
NI NE A
PDB Staff
OCPAS Intelliq_ence
OCPAS/IMD/C3
C/PES
D/OGI
D/OSP7R
DDO/NE
C/BONA/TF
C/DDO/NE~
C/DDO/NE
CIA Liaison
CIA Liaison
D/NESA
DD/NESA
NESA/PS
C/NESA/PG
C/NESA/SO
C/NESA/SO/P
C/NESA/SO/S
DDI/NESA/SO/P
Officer
Officer
(23 Aug 83)
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SUBJECT: US-Pakistan: Military Implications of Harpoon Sale
1 - Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near3ast~~rn and
South Asian Affairs, Department of State (Howard B.
Schaffer)
1 - Senior Director, Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs,
National Security Council (Geoffrey ICemo)
1 - Assistant Under Secretary for Policy Resources,
Department of Defense, (Dov S. Zakheim)
1 - Ronald Zwart, Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs,
DoD/ISA.
1 - Intelligence Advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense
for Policy, (Darnell M. Whitt)
1 - Capt. Robert G. Anderson, Tar East/South Asia Division,
Plans and Policv Directorate, Joint Chief of Staff
1 - Assistant Secretary of Defense for Internationa]_
Security Policy, Department of Defense (Richard Peri2j
1 - Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs, DoD (Richard L. Armitage)
1 - Director, INS, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs, Department of State, (Victor Tomseth)
1 - Director, PAB, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs, Department of State, (Harmon ?;. 'Cirby)
1 - Cmdr. Phil Dur, National Security Council..
1 - Mr. Peter Burleigh, Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, Department of State
1 - Mr. Gary Posz, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs, Department of State.
1 - Ms. Shirin Tahir-Kheli, Policy Planning Staff,
Department of State
1 - (Defense Intelligence Agencv 25X1
1 - Mr. James F. Van Namee, Harpoon Project Office,
Department of the Navy
1 - Col. H. D. McKalip, Defense Security Assistance Agency,
De artment of Defense
1 - Defense Intelligence Agency 25X1
1 - Mr. Charles Carr, Intelligence Coordinator, DISC
1 - Lt. Col. David L. Fuller, TaLO/US Central Command,
Pentagon.
1 - Situation Room, West ~,4ing, White House
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