TALKING POINTS FOR THE DCI (02 SEPTEMBER 1983)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000800630001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 6, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 2, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/06: CIA-RDP85T00287R000800630001-6
Talking Points for the DCI
(2 September 1983)
Current Situation in Lebanon
The Eighth Brigade of the Lebanese Army is reportedly moving
out of West Beirut in the direction of predominantly Christian
East Beirut. Government officials have stated that the Army
intends to establish an "effective presence" in Christian areas
and to close down Christian militia barracks.
Muslims and Druze are extremely fearful of Christian
retaliation following the reported massacres of Christian
villagers yesterday. According to press reports, large numbers
of Muslims are fleeing the city.
-- Christians throughout East Beirut are participating in a
general strike to protest the massacres.
Druze leader Walid Junblatt told our Ambassador in Damascus
today that he was prepared to meet with President Gemayel if
Gemayel is alone. Junblatt thinks that Nabih Barri and some
members of the National Salvation Front would be willing to join
the meeting.
-- Junblatt, however, said he did not know how
respond to the prospect of such a meeting.
Syria would
25X1
25X1
US Embassy Beirut reports that anti-American sentiment is
running high in West Beirut, fueled by rumors that US Marines
fought along side of Lebanese Army units against the Druze and
Muslims.
-- No additional US Marine casualties have been reported, but
two Marines were killed earlier this week.
The Lebanese Government has urgently requested that the US
resupply the Lebanese Army with ammunition as soon as possible.
Tank, howitzer, mortar, and other ammunition is involved.
The Beirut press is reporting today that France is willing
to hold national reconciliation talks among Lebanese Christian,
Muslim, and Druze leaders on the French aircraft carrier Foch,
which will soon be stationed off the Lebanese coast. In response
to a question from US Embassy Paris, a French Foreign Ministry
official confirmed a willingness to use the ship for such
talks.
NESA M#83-102i-5.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/06: CIA-RDP85T00287R000800630001-6
 - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/06: CIA-RDP85T00287R000800630001-6
f `A-layh District
b-a, =o~ %
Ash Shuf Distr--ic
I
f
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/06: CIA-RDP85T00287R000800630001-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/06: CIA-RDP85T00287R000800630001-6
SECRET
Talking Points for the DCI
(2 September 1983)
Prognosis on Lebanon
Prospects for continued factional violence are high. The
Army probably will not be able to operate successfully in both
West Beirut and the Shuf-Alayh region.
-- Most of the Muslims fighters in Beirut apparently eluded
the Army sweeps, and many are eager to resume attacks
against Army units.
The Army has still not entered in force the Shia Muslim
slums south of the city. If it does, heavy street
fighting is again likely, the Druze fighters probably will
resume shelling Beirut in support of Shia militias.
The Druze now are likely to offer even stiffer resistance
to the Army deployment into the Shuf-Alayh region.
The risk of more MNF casualties--particularly US--is
high. Druze and Shia fighters believe US played
significant role in Lebanese Army operations this week.
Prospects for resolving confessional problems are poor, and
Gemayel's position now depends largely on the Army's performance
and cohesion.
-- Druze leader Walid Junblatt and Shia spokesman Nabih Barri
believe that the government used recent talks to buy time
for the Army's offensive.
-- Barri and Junblatt's support among their respective groups
is high. Many Muslims and Druze believe recent government
actions reflect Gemayel's desire to preserve Christian
political domination.
-- Gemayel's problems with the Phalange Party and the
Christian Lebanese Forces militia have probably eased for
the time being because his current tough approach suits
Phalange interests.
Army Cohesion
The Lebanese Armv appears to be generally intact, but
continuing Army moves against Muslim fighters in Beirut and,
eventually, in the Shuf region, will further test the loyalties
of the Army's Muslims troops.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/06: CIA-RDP85T00287R000800630001-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/06: CIA-RDP85T00287R000800630001-6
SECRET
-- An unknown number of Shia soldiers reportedly deserted the
Army earlier this week and joined the Shia Amal militia.
Muslim troops may desert in large numbers if Army moves in 25X1
West Beirut and the Shuf-Alayh region remain focused on Muslim
and Druze adversaries.
Plans to deploy the Army's strongest units--now in
Beirut--into the Shuf will encourage Muslim militia
attacks on Army units remaining in the capital.
Druze fighters using guerrilla tactics, probably will put
up stiff resistance to the Army's move into the Shuf.
The survival of the Gemayel government probably depends on
the ability of the Lebanese Army to maintain order in West
Beirut.
-- Army units remaining in West Beirut will have difficulty
keeping the lid on the explosive situation in the
capital.
Syrian Intentions
Clashes in the Shuf after the Israelis withdraw would almost
certainly prompt greater Syrian involvement. Damascus' mid-term
options include:
providing increased support to the Druze militia;
pressing the Shia and other pro-Syrian militias in Beirut
to stir up fighting in the city to divert LAF units;
deploying Syrian troops in Druze uniforms in dire t
support of its allies in the Shuf and Alayh.
The Syrians will probably use the opposition National 25X1
Salvation Front to increase political pressure on Gemayel. The
Syrians and their Lebanese allies will deny the legitimacy of the
current regime and probably will call for new power-sharing
arrangements and a new government of political leaders that would
be responsive to Syrian interests. 25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/06: CIA-RDP85T00287R000800630001-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/06: CIA-RDP85T00287R000800630001-6
Israeli Intentions
Beain's departure is likely to have little immediate impact
on Israel's Lebanon policy.
-- There is no indication that Shamir plans any significant
departures. He said yesterday that his main goal will be
to get Israeli troops out of Lebanon while insuring the
security of the north. We expect Arens, for at least the
near term, to continue to play the major role in Lebanon
policy.
-- In the longer term, much will depend on Sharon's influence
in the new government. If he is given an influential
post, Israeli policy will become more hardline.
-5-
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/06: CIA-RDP85T00287R000800630001-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/06: CIA-RDP85T00287R000800630001-6
SECRET
Talking Points for the DCI
(02 September 1983)
The Syrian Role
The Syrians at a minimum have been involved indirectly in
the fighting.
-- The massacres of Christians Wednesday night took place in
Syrian-controlled territory, but it is unlikely Syrian
troops were directly involved.
Foreign Minister Khaddam claims that Syria's position is to
favor national reconciliation in Lebanon, but it is clear that
Damascus wants reconciliation on Syrian terms.
-- The Syrians are pressing Junhlatt and Shia leader Nabih
Barri to hold out for sweeping concessions from Gemayel;
-- Khaddam told Ambassador Paganelli Thursday that a pre-
condition for political talks will be the withdrawal of
the LAF from West Beirut and a declaration by Gemayel
that he will not use the Army until reconciliation is
achieved.
Damascus sees an opportunity to press for the realization of
its goals in Lebanon:
-- halting progress toward an extension of government
authority which, in the Syrian view, would amount to
consolidation of Christian Phalange control over Lebanon;
-- abrogation of the Israeli-Lebanese Agreement;
-- the establishment of a national unity government that
would propose constitutional reforms for new power-
sharing arrangements, be responsive to Syrian interest
and unwilling to reach an accommodation with Israel.
-6-
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/06: CIA-RDP85T00287R000800630001-6
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/06: CIA-RDP85T00287R000800630001-6
SECRET
SUBJECT: Talking Points for the DCI (02 September 1983)
1 - DCI
1 - DDI
1 - C/PES
4 - CPAS/IMD/CB
1 - NI0/NESA
1 - NIO/W
1 - D/NESA
2 - NESA/PPS
1 - NESA/AI
1 - NESA/AI/I
4 - NESA/AI/L
DDI/NESA/L/
(02Sep83) 25X1
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/06: CIA-RDP85T00287R000800630001-6