PAKISTAN-CHINA-US: ARMS TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000800770002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: September 14, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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14 September 1983
Pakistan: Prospects for President Zia
President Zia ul-Haq is coping successfully with the current
disturbances in Pakistan--the most serious threat to his rule so
far. We believe his regime's capable handling of serious anti-
government rioting in Sind Province coupled with the
unwillingness of Pakistanis in other provinces to join the
protest move;r.ent increase the chances that Zia and the Army will
continue to guide Pakistan's political future for at least the
next one to two years.
Zia's authoritarian regime has avoided overly repressive
polir_ies, though it has dealt firmly with organized
demonstrations. 1"t has given the country more than six
years of_ domestic stability and substantial economic
progress.
Zia also has dealt effectively with external threats. r;e
has stood up to the Soviets on Afghanistan, while keeping
channels open to a negotiated settlernent; he has improved
relations with India; and he has succeeded in gaining
major economic aid and arms assistance from the United
The President ultimately depends on the Army to remain in
power. Most senior officers support Zia's plan for a phased
return to civilian government and a permanent oversight role for
-- No ruler, however, can be certain of the Army's support if
it is called upon to put down civil disorders, particu-
larly in the all-important province of Punjab.
Zia's main opposition, the Movement for the Restoration of
Democracy (MRD) a coalition of_ eight oppositions parties, is
This memorandum was prepared by the South Asia Division,
Office of: Near Eastern and ;:youth Asian Analysis, in preparatio;~
for tt~e Secretary of Defense's trip to i~akistan. Information as
of September 12, 1983 was used in preparation of this paper.
Comments and queries are welcome and should be addressed to
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poorly organized and so far has lacked both a popular issue or an
effective leader to galvanize a nationwide anti-Zia campaign.
-- 'he protest movement in Sind Province this summer was
launched largely by the Pakistan People's Party of former
Prime i~iinister Bhutto. ~i~he PPP has strong support in
Sind, Bhutto's home province, and succeeded in rousing
violent protests by playing on local grievances against
the Punjabi-dominated government and Army.
-- The PPP has substantial support among the urban and rural
poor of Punjab, but has found it difficult to mobilize
this support in the absence of a strong leader. Most of
the PPP faithful look to Bhutto's daughter Benazir, but
she has been kept under mouse arrest for the past t~;o anti
President Zia has promised to hold provincial_ and national
elections by March 1985, amend the Constitution to treat` a
strong presidential system, and withc~ra~~~ martial law. His
statements suggest he will bar hostile opposition parties--
including the PPP--from participating in the elections. These
parties and some influential interest groups believe they are
losing around under Zia and could coalesce against him.
Given the right circumstances, we believe a nationwi~~e
oppositi~~n movement could arise rapidly and with little
warning. In such an event, the Army probably would replace Zia
with another general who would negotiate a return to civilian
rule on terms the Army could accept.
-- In our view, the Army would attempt to preserve the
present US-Pakistan relationship, b~~t if a Pakistan
People's Party government succeeded in taking over, US-
Pakistan ties, as well as Pakistan's stand on Afghanistan,
probably would be significantly weakened.
SECRE'P
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14 September 1983
Pakistan: Perceptions of_ Relations ~.~ith the US
US-Pakistani relations have improved since 1y80, but these
gains are fragile. The two nations' Afghanistan policies and
caution regarr_ling Soviet aims in South Asia are convergent
interests. However, US arms
embargoes in 1965 and 1971 plus the temporary suspension of
economic aid in 1979 have convinced most Pakistanis that
Washington is an unreliable ally.
officia s
US.
Pakistani
in general are receptive to expanding contacts with the
Few Pakistani officials believe, however, that the US
would support Pakistan if it were attacked by India, arrd
there are doubts a~out US willingness--and capa~ility--to
come to Pakistan's assistance in the event of a Soviet
attack. some army officers
believe 'Lie has placed too much trust in Washington and
believe that the US may again abandon Pakistan after the
Afgi~anistan conflict is resolved.
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Popular per^_eptions of the US are more ambiguous
-- US military anc3 economic .assistance is widely publicized
and appears to have made a positive impact. However, most
Pakistanis reject US (viddle East policy, which they charge
`T'his memorandum was prepared by the South Asia Division,
Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, in preparation
for the ~~>ecretary of Defense's trio to Pakistan. Information as
of September 12, 1983 was used in preparation of this paper.
Comments and queries are welcome and should !~e addressed to
SECKL'L'
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is biased in favor of Israel. Many are suspicious that
the US remains hostile to 'Tehran because it cannot
tolerate a "truly Islamic government" and believe Pakistan
would be subject to sirnilar pressure should it follow
Iran's example.
-- ~4any Pakistanis, including those with ties to the military
and the bureaucratic elite, condemn US policy on nuclear
nonproliferation as applied to Pakistan. `Phey assert it
is intended to prevent the development of domestic nuclear
power Facilities and tc~ retard Pakistan's ability to
achieve economic independence. They reject as
hypocritical US claims it is attempting to stop the spread
of nuclear weapons and point to Washiizgton's willingness
to continue assistance to India, which has exploded a
nuclear device.
-- Zia's political opponents are attempting to exploit US 25X1
ilit
m
ary and economic assistance to portray the President
as a US puppet. Politicians on ttie left and center
repeatedly assert that pia could not survive without US
support. Scattered anti-American incidents occured during
recent anti-regime demonstrations in Sind Province.
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