POSSIBLE IRAQI MILITARY ACTION AGAINST SYRIA TALKING POINTS FOR THE DDCI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000800840001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 17, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 19, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Iq
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Possible Iraqi Military Action Against Syria
Talking Points for the DDCI
September 1983
Summary
We see no possibility that Iraq could be induced to attack Syria to force
a reopening of the Iraqi oil pipeline. Iraq lacks the military capability to
credibly threaten Syria. The entire Iraqi Army is tied down along the Iranian
front and most vital Syrian targets are near the limits of the ranges of Iraqi
fighter aircraft. Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, already vulnerable to
domestic criticism over the war with Iran, will not risk a two front war.
Moreover, even if the Israelis were able to tie down Syria's forces, Saddam
would not risk attacking Syria and appearing in the eyes of the Arab world as
a tool of the Israelis. The Iraqis almost certainly realize that any attack
on Syria, rather than forcing Syria to reopen the pipeline, likely would
provoke Damascus into destroying it. Finally, we doubt Iraq would trust a
scheme in which Iraq's vulnerability to Syrian retaliation is linked to
Israel's attacking Syrian forces along the Golan. Iraq would expect Israel to
sucker them into attacking Syria, then do nothing themselves.
Iraqi Military Capabilities
Ground Forces
-- Iraq has an army of 600,000 troops, nearly three times that of
Syria. The Iraqis and Syrians are nearly equal in armor and
artillery.
-- All of Iraqi's 20 divisions, however, are stationed along the
Iranian front. Only a few Iraqi police and border guard units are
stationed along the Syrian border.
-- As a result, any move by the ground forces against Syria would have
to come at the expense of the Iranian front, something we believe
the Iraqis would not do. Baghdad would reason that, the moment it
NESA M 83-102360
GO y S
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launched an attack against Syria, Iran would launch an offensive
against the Iraqi forces still on the Iranian border.
-- Even if Baghdad was willing to send forces to the Syrian border, the
most we estimate it could spare would be about two divisions--
approximately 30,000 troops. This would be insufficient to
significantly threaten the Syrians.
-- Iraq would be aware that it actually would have to invade Syria to
have an effect, thus raising the possibility of becoming bogged down
in a two front war. In 1976 Iraq deployed some 75,000 troops along
the Syrian border and made threatening statements to the Syrians
over Lebanon. The Syrians simply ignored the Iraqis.
-- Moreover, Iraqi ground forces could seize neither the entire length
of the pipeline nor Syrian installations of sufficient value to
force Damascus to reopen the pipeline. The major Syrian dam on the
Euphrates, as an example, is some 250 kilometers from Iraq, too far
for Iraqi ground forces. The most the Iraqis could hope to seize
are some minor oil fields in northeast Syria and a few small border
towns.
-- Because the Iraqis could not seize the entire length of the
pipeline, Damascus would retain the option of destroying pumping
stations on the pipeline thus rendering it unusable for months.
Air Force
-- Iraq has some 400 operational fighter and bomber aircraft, about
eight times as many operational aircraft as Iran.
-- We estimate Iraq could spare some 200 fighter and bomber aircraft
for attacks against Syria. The Iraqis, who depend heavily on their
Air Force to defeat Iranian ground attacks, probably would judge
they could spare much less.
-- Even if the Iraqis used 200 aircraft against Syria, they would be
significantly outnumbered by the approximately 500 operational
Syrian fighter aircraft.
-- Moreover, most important Syrian targets are in the western third of
the country, near the limits of the ranges of the Iraqi aircraft and
heavily defended by Syrian surface-to-air missile sites.
Israeli Involvement
-- An Iraqi attack on Syria is militarily feasible only if Israel ties
down nearly all Syrian forces. Unless Israel actually goes to war
with Syria, however, Iraq would risk being left alone in a two front
war. Such a situation would be disastrous for Iraqi President
Saddam Hussein who is already vulnerable to criticism for having led
his country into the war with Iran.
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-- Yet, once there is a crisis involving Israel and Syria, the Iraqis
almost certainly will not attack Syria for fear of being perceived
by the other Arabs as an Israeli accomplice.
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SUJBECT: Talking Points for DDCI
NESA M 83-10236C
Distribution:
Copy 1 - DDCI
2 - Exec Director
3 - Exec Registry
4 - DDI
5 - NI0/NESA
6 - D/NESA
7 - C/PES
8-ii - CPAS/CMD/CB
12-13 - NESA/PPS
A - NESA/PG
15 - NESA PG I
ORIG:NESA/PG/D/I I (19Sept83) 25X1
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