TALKING POINTS FOR THE DCI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000800940001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 20, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 30, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R000800940001-2
Talking Points for the DCI
(30 September 1983)
Progress in the cease-fire negotiations hinges on the speedy
resolution of some contentious issues:
-- The status of Beirut's southern suburbs, where Lebanese
Army and Shia militiamen continue to clash.
-- The cooperation between the Christian Lebanese Forces
militia and the Army in the coastal areas south of Damur.
-- The selection of observers to supervise the cease-fire.
Procedural matters, including setting the agenda, will delay
the conference on reconciliation. The opposing factions almost
certainly are using the cease-fire period to resupply and regroup
their forces, in the expectation that a breakdown of the talks is
inevitable.
Domestic stability in Lebanon depends upon reaching a new
balance-of-power arrangement that gives the country's majority
Muslim population a more equitable role and assures the security
of the Christian community. Rapid progress on these political
issues is essential if the cease-fire and the reconciliation
process are to endure.
Whenever a national reconciliation conference is held, it is
likely to break down, resulting in renewed factional fighting,
heightened confessional intransigence, and a prolonged partition
of Lebanon.
- Gemayel is not likely to take the lead in proposing
significant reforms.
-- If Damascus urges its allies to press for maximal
concessions, the Christians will balk.
Meaningful national reconciliation depends primarily on the
Lebanese and they seem unwilling to make the concessions and
compromises necessary for a lasting accommodation. We expect
that the weak central government will survive and probably
maintain control over the greater Beirut area but it will have to
contend with autonomous Maronite and Druze heartlands and a
prolonged Syrian and Israeli occupation.
-- This situation, while far from ideal, could endure for an
extended period.
-- A rough balance of power could emerge.)
#83-1024'25X1
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R000800940001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R000800940001-2
Both Syria and Israel want a central government in Lebanon
responsive to their own interests. Without such a government,
both countries will remain indefinitely in Lebanon and accept de
facto partition.
Damascus will continue to press Gemayel or a successor
regime to abrogate the Lebanese-Israeli agreement. We believe
that any Lebanese Government, at minimum, will continue to hold
the agreement in abeyance.
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SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R000800940001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R000800940001-2
SUBJECT: Talking Points for the DCI
NESA M#83-10247
DISTRIBUTION:
Orig - DCI
1 - DDI
4 - CPAS/IMD/CB
1 - C/PES
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - D/NESA
2 - NESA/PPS
1 - NESA/AI
2 - NESA/AI/L
DDI /NESA/
30Sep83)
-3-
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/20: CIA-RDP85T00287R000800940001-2