TALKING POINTS ON LEBANON FOR THE DCI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000800980001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 25, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 3, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/25: CIA-RDP85T00287R000800980001-8
Talking Points on Lebanon for the DCI
(3 October 1983)
Political Situation
Although the cease-fire continues to hold, no progress has
been made on arranging a national reconciliation conference.
Developments of the past week cast considerable doubt as to
whether the conference will be held any time soon.
-- Druze leader Walid Junblatt, in announcing his plans to
establish a Druze civil administration for the Shuf
region, has revealed his pessimism concerning the
likelihood of talks and his willingness to settle for a
Druze mini-state if no national political solution is
forthcoming.
- No progress has been made on deciding where the national
reconciliation conference will be held. Syria and Saudi
Arabia do not want the meeting held in Saudi Arabia.
President Gemayel has so far vetoed Tunisia as a neutral
site, and government opponents will not agree to meet in
the Beirut area.
- Some Christian politicians may already be considering
boycotting the conference. Christian hardliners are
becoming increasingly suspicious of the US role in
Lebanon, and some believe the US will insist that Gemayel
make significant concessions to Muslims and Druze.
Military Situation
The Lebanese Army continues to exchange sporadic fire with
various militias; the Druze in the Shuf, and the Shia Amal
militia in Beirut's southern suburbs. The absence of neutral
observers means there is no one to police the cease-fire
effectively.
- There is, however, no immediate threat of renewed
hostilities at the level of last month.
The Army acquitted itself well during the recent fighting in
the Shuf, but its ability to hold together remains a prime
concern.
-- The confessional divisions of Lebanese society at large
are reflected in the Army.
-- The officer corps is about 55 percent Christian and 45
percent Muslim, while the enlisted ranks are about 55
percent Muslims~~ the Muslims, Shia ~~~ly are
the majority.
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If the national reconciliation talks drag on without
producing significant movement, all parties are going to view a
breakdown of the cease-fire as increasingly likely.
-- Soldiers of all confessional groups will be under
increasing pressure from their families to desert and
come home.
-- Desertions from the Army could snowball, weakening the
government to the point where it could no longer maintain
its authority even in the greater Beirut area.
-- According to the Druze, 600 Lebanese Army officers and
enlisted men, reportedly largely Druze, have recently
Prospects
If a national reconciliation conference is held, it is
likely to break down because of conflicting demands among
confessional groups.
-- Syria will urge Muslims and Druze to press for their
maximum demands.
- Maronite Christians--particularly the Phalange Party and
Lebanese Forces militia leaders--will resist reforms that
significantly reduce Christian influence.
The Gemayel government, as long as the Lebanese Army holds
together, could retain control over the greater Beirut area.
-- It would have to contend with efforts to create
autonomous Maronite and Druze heartlands and continued
Syrian and Israeli occupation.
-- It would face tough going if it tried to assert control
over Beirut's southern suburbs now dominated by the Shia
militias. The threat of a Shia uprising will keep much
of the Army pinned down near Beirut, and make it
impossible for the government to launch an offensive
against Druze positions in the Shuf and Alayh districts.
-- A rough balance of power could emerge and this situation,
while far from ideal, could endure for an extended
period.
Syria's key goals in Lebanon are a government responsive to
its interests and the minimizing of Israeli influence in the
country.
-- Damascus will continue to support its allies and
surrogates in Lebanon to weaken the government and force
it to reach an accommodation with Syria.
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SECRET
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/25: CIA-RDP85T00287R000800980001-8
-- Assad can use either indirect military pressure or
political negotiations to keep the government and the
Christians on the defensive indefinitely.
Syria is likely to avoid a direct military confrontation
with the United States in Lebanon.
-- Assad almost certainly believes he can attain his
objectives without significant direct Syrian military
llamascus, not Moscow, determines Syrian policy in Lebanon,
but Soviet support reinforces Assad's confidence.
-- Moscow has a strong interest in having the US military
presence in Lebanon removed, or be seen as ineffective.
-- The Soviets would prefer that the level of conflict
remain low so that a Syria-US or Syrian-Israeli
confrontation is avoided.
-- We do not envision direct Soviet military support to
Syria in the event of a major escalation in Lebanon, but
Soviet advisers could assist Syrian air defense units.
Israel's primary goal in Lebanon is to protect the security
of its northern border and prevent the establishment of a
Palestinian or Syrian presence in southern Lebanon.
-- We believe Israel can maintain its current positions in
Lebanon with minimum force--about 8,000 troops.
-- Although the Israelis hope to avoid military involvement
north of the Awwali River, they will respond to specific
Palestinian or Syrian provocations with air strikes or
artillery.
-- A Syrian drive on Beirut or the reappearance of large
numbers of PLO fighters there could lead to an Israeli
military move back into the Shuf or Beirut area.
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SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/25: CIA-RDP85T00287R000800980001-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/25: CIA-RDP85T00287R000800980001-8
SUBJECT: Talking Points on Lebanon for the DCI
NESA M#83-10252
DISTRIBUTION:
Orig - DCI
1 - DDI
4 - CPAS/IMD/CB
1 - C/PES
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - D/NESA
2 - NESA/PPS
1 - NESA/AI
1 - NESA/AI/I
3 - NESA/AI/L
DDI/NESA/AI/L/
3Oet83) 25X1
-4-
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/05/25: CIA-RDP85T00287R000800980001-8