PAKISTAN: US OFFICIALS VIEW THE FUTURE: A TRIP REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000801520001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D. C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
1 December 1983
PAKISTAN: US OFFICIALS VIEW THE FUTURE: A TRIP REPORT
Summary
Discussions in late October and early November
between NESA analysts and US diplomats
in Pakistan revealed that
all expect martial law to end--probably before
Zia's deadline. Views differed as to whether Zia
can establish the kind of civilian government he
wants, and whether the transition to an elected
government will be peaceful.
Zia's Goals
Zia would like a government elected on a nonparty basis,
with little or no role for former Prime Minister Bhutto's
Pakistan People's Party, and with some constitutional means for
the military to retain ultimate control. A few US officials
argued that Zia will recognize that his goals are unacceptable to
most Pakistanis, and, rather than risk a popular uprising, he
will make major political concessions. He would much rather be
remembered as a leader who restored democratic rule
Most US officials believe that Zia will not make substantial
concessions. He believes his program is necessary for a stable,
This memorandum was prepared by~~South Asia
Division, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis.
Information as of 10 November 1983 was used in preparation of
this paper. Comments and queries are welcome and should be
addressed to Chief, South Asia Division
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effective civilian government, and he would risk serious
opposition in the Pakistani military were he to give in to the
politicians.
Differing Views on the Opposition
Many politicians--especially those in the People's Party--
are as inflexible as Zia, in the view of most US officials. The
politicians will insist on free elections with political party
participation and no constitutional role for the military.
The key question is whether these politicians have enough
popular support to cause civil disorders that would either force
Zia to abandon his goals or cause the Army to remove Zia. Some
argued that the politicians can mobilize the people. Zia has
little popularity anywhere in Pakistan. The Sind disturbances
showed the opposition's ability to foment unrest, and the
province will erupt again because basic complaints remain
unsatisfied. These officials believe that trouble might begin in
Punjab after an announcement of procedures that exclude most of
the PPP from the next government, any effort to give the military
a constitutional veto over the government, or a constitutional
amendment that would prevent the punishment of the military for
its actions--including overthrowing an elected government in
1977.
Other US diplomats doubt that a strong anti-Zia movement
will develop. In the North-West Frontier Province, military rule
has not been harsh and economic conditions are good. Zia is not
popular there, but there is little inclination on the Frontier to
take the lead in any movement against him. Sparsely populated
Baluchistan cannot pose a threat-to Zia by itself, and some US
officials believe that the absence so far of any serious anti-Zia
movement in the province indicates none is likely to develop.
In the view of these officials, Sind, despite the serious
disorders that began in August, is manageable in the short run.
Only ethnic Sindhis have been involved in the disturbances, and
rival ethnic groups, which dominate the main cities, are unlikely
to follow their lead. Zia can still buy off some Sindhi politi-
cians--including several of the most prominent--and can use the
Army to prevent serious civil disorder. Zia may exacerbate
Sindhi resentments, making Sind an even more dangerous problem
for Pakistan in the long run, but he will be able to hold an
election there on his own terms in 1984 or 1985.
Most Punjabis want a government elected on a party basis,
and the People's Party would probably carry Punjab in a free
election. Nevertheless, according to several US officials, a
popular anti-Zia movement is unlikely to develop in the province.
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-- Religious leaders believe Zia has moved too slowly to
implement Islamic practices but prefer Zia to the secular
politicians likely to rule Pakistan if Zia falls.
-- Landowners complain that they suffer from Zia's policies,
but they are still doing well enough so that they may be
unwilling to risk the economic uncertainties of political
instability.
-- Small businessmen have benefited from Pakistan's continu-
ing prosperity and may opt for stability rather than
agitation.
-- Peasants were the main support of the People's Party in
the past, but they too are living better than before, and,
in any case, rural opposition will have much less impact
than the situation in the cities.
-- Lawyers have already demonstrated against Zia and are
almost certain to do so again but have received little
support from a population that tends to distrust the bar.
US officials agreed that Zia can control the pace of-the
transition. He can move cautiously, testing the popular reaction
to each step in the process before moving to the next. He,
nevertheless, will have moved ahead fast enough to avoid any
impression that he is abandoning plans to end martial law. All
agreed that were Zia to cancel elections,,,the popular reaction
would be so severe that Zia would fall. He may not face a seri-
ous confrontation in the next few months, but by late 1984 it
will probably be clear whether Zia or the politicians have won.
Zia will either be well on his way to becoming the elected
civilian president of Pakistan or to being overthrown. The most
optimistic gave Zia only a 70 percent chance of carrying out his
plans; the most pessimistic believed Zia's chances were a little
below 50 percent.
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Distribution:
1 - D/NESA
4 - CPAS/IMr/CB
1 - C/PES
1 - C/SO/D
1 - C/SO/S
1 - S/SO/P
1 - C/SO/I
1 - C/DDO/NE/PAB
DDI/NESA/S 1 Dec 83) 25X1
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