USSR: POLITICO-MILITARY OBJECTIVES AND OPTIONS IN THE CARIBBEAN BASIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000900070001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 17, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 14, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intdligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
14 July 1983
USSR: POLITICO-MILITARY OBJECTIVES AND OPTIONS
IN THE CARIBBEAN BASIN
Summary
The USSR is strengthening the military capabilities
of Cuba and Nicaragua as part of a long-term effort to
foster Marxism in the Caribbean and Central America. It
is seeking to expand Soviet influence by helping
consolidate pro-Soviet Marxist re mes and by weakening
and isolating the US.
Moscow probably sees substantial strategic advantage
to having the US preoccupied with developments in the
region. It welcomes this diversion of US resources and
energies from areas more vital to the USSR and also hopes
to profit from the growing US friction with West European
allies over regional policy. Although Moscow's main
motive in providing arms to Cuba and Nicaragua is to
deter US military action and consolidate leftist regimes,
the Soviets are undoubtedly pleased that this is also
forci the US to pay more military attention to the
area.
In our judgment, Moscow does not assign high
priority to a dramatic expansion of the Soviet military
presence in the Caribbean Basin. Nevertheless, the USSR
is likely to continue incrementally to expand its limited
military activity there-but in ways that do not provoke
the US or serve to rally American domestic or European
support behind stronger US policies in the region.
This memorandum was prepared by China Third World
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Branch, Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions and comments should be addressed
to the Chief, China Third World Branch, SODA,
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Moscow might continue improving Cuban defenses by
introducing such new weapons as SA -5 antiaircraft
missiles, SSC-3 coastal defense missile systems, and MIG-
25 high-altitude fighters. It could begin direct
delivery to Nicaragua of major weapons instead of just
sending military support equipment. And it might
increase the use of Cuban airfields by Soviet planes and
begin using airfields being built in Nicaragua and
Grenada. More extreme--but, we believe, unlikely Soviet
steps could include deploying land-based ballistic
missiles to Cuba or Nicaragua and basing Backfire bombers
there.
Soviet Strategic Objections
The main Soviet objective in the Caribbean Basin is to turn an area which
has traditionally been dominated by the US into an area of growing Communist
influence and a troublesome distraction for the US.
The USSR has seized the opportunities created by the Sandinista victory
in Nicaragua four years ago and by growing political radicalism in other
Caribbean basin countries. Moscow has reversed its long neglect of Central
America and Caribbean countries other than Cuba mainly because it saw
opportunities in its competition with the US. Although peripheral to major
Soviet interests, the area offers relatively cheap prospects for gains in the
worldwide political competition by damaging American interests in an area
vital to Washington.
As instability in the region has begun to preoccupy the-US more deeply,
Moscow has probably become convinced that the value of its own involvement has
grown. It has welcomed the diversion of US political energies and military
and economic resources from other international arenas which it views as more
vital to its interests. Furthermore, the Soviets may hope that the growth of
domestic dissension within the US over policy toward Central America will not
only shackle policy but also intensify what the Soviets perceive as a post-
Vietnam reluctance to maintain a global involvement. Finally, Moscow welcomes
the friction that has arisen between Washington and its West European allies
and hemispheric friends, and is benefiting from the distraction this has
afforded from its involvement in Poland and Afghanistan.
The Soviets do not seem to anticipate that revolutionary trends will
mature any time soon, but they probably hope that such problems as depressed
economies, population pressures, and racial and social divisions put time on
the side of Marxism throughout the area. They probably also hope that such
factors will keep their own costs down. Aside from its massive aid to Cuba--
some $4.7 billion in economic subsidies and supplies last year, plus more than
$500 million in military equipment--the USSR has tried to follow a low cost
policy in the region. Much of the armaments now being sent to Nicaragua, for
example, are obsolete by Soviet standards, and economic aid for Nicaragua, and
Grenada as well, has been kept limited.
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Moscow probably hopes that Cuba, Nicaragua, Grenada and-potentially--
Suriname can assist in further Marxist expansion. Working primarily through
Cuba, the USSR is:
-- Providing military support to new leftist governments.
-- Encouraging Communist parties to change their traditional focus on
political and labor union activities and direct it toward groups
capable of revolutionary violence.,
-- Supporting broad leftist coalitions that unite not only Moscow-line
leftists but other radicals in opposition to existing regimes.
-- Providing--either directly or through third countries--military
training and equipment for Central American and Caribbean
~ insurgents.
The USSR is.playing a cautious, sometimes covert, hand in the region,
while Cuba is more visibly active. The Soviets have modernized and improved
Cuban defenses, especially air defenses, in the last few years, but Moscow
has, itself, avoided delivering major weapons directly to Nicaragua.
Moscow's low risk policy seems to stem from a wariness of provoking the
US to adopt a stronger policy in the region or making it easier for Washington
to rally greater domestic support behind its policies. The Soviets also want
to avoid a direct confrontation with the US over Soviet activity in the
region. Moscow knows that the US is capable of focusing overwhelming military
power on the region. while the USSR has only limited military capabilities in
the hemisphere.
Soviet Military Interests
Although Moscow's main motive in building up Cuba's military capability
is to deter the US from undertaking military action against Havana, Moscow
undoubtedly is pleased that this is forcing the US armed forces to dedicate
more military resources to the Caribbean area. Also, Cuba's growing military
capabilities enable it to support radicals in the Western hemisphere, as well
as to continue assisting Soviet clients in Angola and Ethiopia.
In our judgment, Soviet objectives in the Caribbean probably do not
assign high priority to dramatically expanding the USSR's own military
presence. Although Moscow can doubtless see hypothetical advantage in
deploying strategic forces--such as the SS-20-there, it recognizes that this
would provoke a major confrontation with the US. The trend in Soviet
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strategic missile submarine deployments has been toward keeping them closer to
home, rather than in areas near targets where they are more vulnerable to the
US ASW advantage.
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the USSR is likely to avoid committing scarce resources to an area so close to-
the US power in times of a major military confrontation with the US.
The USSR also lacks the military airlift or sealift capability to quickly
introduce large ground forces into the region. Its Motorized Rifle Brigade in
Cub a
remains essentially a personnel security force for President
Castro,
were to need foreign combat forces, Cuba might provide em, not the USSR.
Soviet Military Options
The Soviets, however, probably are likely to continue incrementally to
expand their limited military activity in the region in ways that do not
provoke the US. For example, the Soviets, who have long deployed TU-95
reconnaissance lanes to Cuba
There are a number of further steps available to the Soviets to improve
the military capabilities of their Caribbean clients or to increase the USSR's
own military capabilities in the area. Many of these options would be
troublesome from the point of view of the US not only because they would
increase Soviet influence but also because they would force the US to factor
them into our military contingency planning and divert military resources to
counter them.
Additional Military Aid. In order to enhance Cuba's security, the USSR
could:
-- Modernize and augment the Soviet brigade in Cuba, whose main
assignment still seems to be local security.
Deploy the SA-5 to Cuba, either manned by its own or Cuban forces.
This would considerably extend the range of Cuban air defenses and in
wartime would require the US to destroy the missiles. It would also
increase the risk to US intelligence gathering flights in the area.
-- Provide the Cubans with the MIG-25 high-altitude interceptor. This,
too, could complicate US intelligence efforts as well as creating
problems for any attempt to neutralize Soviet weapons that might be
stationed in Cuba.
-- Continue upgrading Cuban naval forces. This would force the US to
consider additional measures to provide some protection for its
shipping in the region.
-- As part of improving Cuban coastal defenses, provide the new SSC-3
system, which consists of two Styx missiles on a mobile platform.
This would add another layer of protection for Cuban coastal areas and
further complicate US military planning for global contingencies.
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If Moscow comes to feel that the Sandinistas are secure enough to risk
tying Soviet prestige to them directly, then the USSR could support them by:
-- Delivering weapons directly to Nicaragua, and sending significant
numbers of Soviet advisors and technicians with them. These weapons
could include the kind of air and naval defense systems that have been
supplied to Cuba.
-- Stationing a Soviet brigade in Nicaragua similar to the one in Cuba to
provide a symbolic security commitment to the regime.
The Soviets could also play a more active role in providing military aid to
Grenada and Suriname.
Increased Soviet Military Presence
There are a number of potential steps that Moscow might take to convey a
sense of growing Soviet involvement in the region while complicating US
defense planning.
The USSR might increase its naval visits, begin using Cuban port
facilities for logistic support, or seek access to facilities elsewhere in the
region. Such activities could include:
-- Increased and more regular naval deployments in the region. They
could exercise more frequently in. the Gulf of Mexico, as we
occasionally do when we send ships from the Mediterranean into the
Black Sea. Moscow might hope that deployment in the Caribbean would
force the US to devote more attention to watching the Soviets there.
-- Assisting in developing naval facilities in the region.
The Soviets could
increase their use of Cienfuegos in Cuba.
-- Increasing Soviet aircraft use of Caribbean fields. The completion of
the Point Salines airfield in Grenada will make it possible for the
kind of TU-95 Soviet naval reconnaissance planes that now operate
periodically from Cuba to expand their coverage somewhat into the
South Atlantic. New airfields now being built in Nicaragua and other
improvements there would also enable the USSR to show the flag and
extend its military reach by regular military flights over the eastern
Pacific. Moscow, however, has little military need for such activity.
-- Permanent deployment of ASW aircraft or ASW naval craft in Cuba. This
could be aimed at monitoring training and transit areas of US Trident-
class SSBNs. Moscow may not think that such defensive deployments
would violate the US-Soviet "understanding" regarding strategic
weapons in Cuba.
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Potential Strategic Deployments. Pro-Soviet nations in the Caribbean
Basin make it possible for the USSR to take more extreme measures that would
pose even more substantial military problems for the US. However, we think
that Moscow is unlikely to try to turn them into forward bases for Soviet-
controlled offensive weapons systems. Such deployments would involve the
Soviets in a major confrontation with the US, forcing Moscow to choose between
backing down in the face of superior US regional conventional forces or
escalating its response to a global strategic scale.
Soviet attempts to establish strategic bases in the region could include:
-- Deploying land-based ballistic missile systems, such as the SS-20?or
the SS-23, to Cuba, Nicaragua, or Suriname. This would pose serious
military problems for the US because of the missiles' shorter flight
time, the fact that US early warning capabilities would have to be
increased, and the fact that it could cover most time-urgent US
targets such as national command centers and SAC air bases.
-- Deploying submarines equipped with cruise missiles to the region,
possibly basing them in Cuba. This would force the US to increase our
ASW resources in the region.
-- Using these countries as bases for Backfire bombers.
While an augmentation of the USSR's strategic posture, none of these
moves would add decisively to the already great Soviet potential for attacking
the US. They would be more to distract American attention and resources.from
areas of more vital Soviet security concern. They might also be conceived of
by Moscow as bargaining chips to seek the withdrawal of some US forces from
areas close to the USSR.
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SUBJECT: USSR: Politico Military Objectives and Options
in the Caribbean Basin
Cy 1 - DDI
2 -= SA/DDCI
3 - Charles A. Briggs, ED/DCI
4 - Senior Review Panel
5-9 OCPAS/IMD/CB /
10 - D/SOVA
11 - DD/SOVA
12 -OCR
13 - OCPAS/ILS
14 - NI0/USSR-EE
15 - NIO/LA
16 - NIO/WARNING
17 - D/ALA
18 - C/MAC/ALA
19 - C/Central America Working Group/ALA
20 - C/C-C/MAC/ALA
21 - C/PAD/SOYA
22 - DC/PAD/SOYA
23 - C/PA/F/SOYA
24 - C/TFD/SOVA
25 - C/TF/N/SOVA
26 - C/SED/SOVA
27 - C/SFD/SOVA
28 - C/EAD/SOVA
29 - C/DID/SOYA
30 - C/CSD Chrono
31 - CSD/C
SOVA/CS/C
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