SOVIET-SCANDINAVIAN RELATIONS STRAINED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000900560001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 19, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 27, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intdllg~rxe Agauy
vonnczosos
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
27 ,Tune 1983
SOVIET-SCANDINAVIAN RELATIONS STRAINED
Summary
The OSSB's relations with the Scandinavian countries
have recently been amore troubled than they have been for wad
years. The release of a Swedish goverment co^sdssioa's
report oa Soviet submarine intrusions has generated sharp
polesdcal ezchanges between Moscow and the wa~or Scandinavian
govermeats. The Soviets have tried to use the recent visit
of the Finnish President to Moscow and CPSO 4neral Secretary
Andropov's proposals for a Nordic unclear weapons-free sons
(NNWFZ) to divert attention to other Nordic security
concerns. Fecent atatesrents by the 9Medish Prise Minister
supporting a unclear free sons slay have reassured Moscow that
relations will iaprove.
The Swedish Submarine Report
Relations between the Scandinavian governments and the USSR were
immediately affected by the release on 26 April of a Swedish government report
alleging numerous and provocative violations of Sweden's territorial waters by
Soviet submarines. The Swedish government recalled its ambassador from
Moscow, lodged a formal protest with the Soviet government, and cancelled all
planned visits by Swedish political and military officials to the USSR.
Nordic defense ministers meeting in Bergen the day after the report's release
acknowledged publicly that the conclusions to be drawn from the report
represented a threat to all the Nordic countries. A scheduled visit to Moscow
by a Danish parliamentary delegation was cancelled, and Swedish, Norwegian,
Danish, and Icelandic di lomats were instructed not to attend May Day
The Soviets reacted swiftly, contending in a TASS article on 27 April
that the release of the report had been intended to prompt an increase in
armaments expenditures by Sweden and to aggravate tension in the Nordic res~ion
SOV M 83-10120
This s~esioranduw was prepared by the (~rrent Support
Division, Office of Soviet Analysis. Cosa~ents and anestions are welcoae and
sry be addressed to Chief, Nurope 3ranch
25X1
25X1
25X1
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The Swedes reportedly would have preferred to avoid a political
confrontation with the Soviets, but felt compelled by the persistence of
reports of submarine intrusions, and perhaps by frustration at their failure
to demonstrate conclusively the presence of intruding submarines, to take a
firm stand. According to assessments by the US Embassy in Stockholm, the
Soviets' denials of guilt had no impact and bilateral relations became
chilled.
On 23 May, the Soviets acknowledged in a Pravda article that the issue
was no longer merely a bilateral problem. The article rejected recent claims
by Oslo of violations of Norwegian waters by Soviet submarines and attacked
the Danish Prime Minister for his criticism of Soviet activities. Pravda
attributed the outcry to an indoctrination of Scandinavian public opinion by
Washington and other "NATO~tes" intent on stemming the tide of anti -INF
sentiment in Western Europe.
Moscow's denials continued to fall on deaf ears. Nordic leaders rebutted
Pravda's arguments and renewed their criticism of Soviet military activities
in tT a region. Arbatov publicly denied he had impugned Sweden's neutrality
and leadership, but the Swedish press claimed that a second Soviet official
had made similar remarks to a member of the government commission. Riksdag
Deputy Carl Bildt, who was under criticism for allegedly having discussed the
submarine report and Swedish-Soviet relations during a trip to the US in early
May, reportedly had been approached while the commission was still at work by
a Soviet diplomat in Stockholm. The Soviet tried to persuade the Swedes to
discontinue their hunts for submarines, a Swedish paper reported on 21 May,
asserting that submarine intrusions would continue.
The next mayor Soviet comment on the Swedish submarine report appeared
timed to exploit the controversy surrounding Bildt's trip to the US and his
debate with Prime Minister Palme over Sweden's relations with the USSR and the
US. Oa 2 June, the Soviets in ~Izvest~i a again accused the US of instigating
the Swedish charges and attacked- e~ cretary Weinberger for his claim the week
before to the Norwegian press that the USSR was expanding its military
presence in the Nordic region.
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The Nordic Nuclear Weapons~'ree Zone Proposal
In the midst of this polemic, the Finns in late May celebrated the 20th
anniversary of their proposal for a Nordic nuclear weapons-free zone. Palme
reaffirmed Stockholm's interest in such a zone in a 1 June address in
Helsinki. He asserted that submarine intrusions had not affected the
fundamental position of the Nordic countries on political and security
questions, but for the first time he called specifically for the Baltic Sea to
be formally included in a nuclear-free zone.
The Soviets have long encouraged the idea of such a zone, hoping to make
the de facto nuclear~ree status of the region de ure also in wartime.
Sweden a~l~inland as neutral countries have no nuclear weapons. Norway and
Denmark decided in 1953 to forbid the stationing of foreign troops on their
soil in peacetime, and in 1957 to prohibit nuclear arms on their territory in
peacetime. The NATO obligations of the Norwegians and Agnes would, of course,
require suspension of those prohibitions in time of war.
As a more immediate political objective, the Soviets have advocated the
zone in order to ingratiate themselves with the Nordic governments that
support it and to put NATO-member countries in the region on the defensive.
Moscow has been hampered in its efforts to exploit the issue, however, by its
refusal to share the obligations of an agreement. The Nordics have hoped in
particular that a nuclear~ree zone would encompass the Kola Peninsula, where
the presence of mayor Soviet nuclear submarine bases and other military forces
has long been of considerable concern.
In June 1981, in an apparent attempt to stir anti-nuclear sentiment in
the Nordic region and elsewhere in Western Europe in the wake of NATO's INF
decision, President Brezhnev said that the USSR was prepared to pledge not to
use nuclear weapons against countries belonging to a Nordic nuclear-weapons
free zone and offered for the first time to consider "measures applying to our
own territory in the region adjoining the nuclear-free zone." Although his
phrasing implied that no Soviet territory would be included in the zone
itself, Nordic governments were encouraged and said they awaited more specific
proposals by Moscow.
In March 1983, Soviet General Staff arms control spokesman General
Chervov said publicly that the USSR might, in negotiating a Nordic nuclear
weapons~ree zone, consider withdrawing ite six ballistic missile submarines
from the Baltic. Oa 10 May, evidently in an attempt to calm the initial
outcry over the submarine report, Andropov reiterated Brezhnev's offer, adding
that measures the Soviets might consider regarding their own territory
adjoining the zone could be "quite substantial." He made no reference to
Chervov's idea and did not allude specifically to the Baltic.
On 6 June, at a dinner for visiting Finnish President Koivisto, Andropov
enlarged upon his 10 May initiative to indicate for the first time Moscow's
willingness to discuss giving nuclear-free status to the Baltic Sea. The
timing of the speech, five days after Palme's reference to the Baltic in
Helsinki, suggests that the Soviets intended the initiative primarily to blunt
the impact of the submarine report and improve Moscow's image in the Nordic
region.
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Norway and Denmark reacted cautiously, claiming Andropov's offer was too
ambiguous to be meaningful. Finland's response was positive, as was Sweden's
more reserved reaction. Palme has subsequently repeated his call for such a
zone before the North Atlantic Assembly on 13 June and elsewhere, and
underlined the need for the Baltic to be included.
It is unlikely that the Soviets would agree to do more than discuss
nuclear~ree status for the Baltic Sea. Any agreement on a nuclear-free
Baltic would, for example, have to include the six G-class diesel-powered
ballistic missile submarines based there, although these are aging and may be
retired soon anyway. The removal of nuclear-armed torpedoes and antiship
missiles from other Soviet submarines and surface ships in the Baltic would be
difficult to verify, and could be reversed quickly. Moscow would refuse to
make any serious concessions concerning the Kola Aeninsula.
The Soviets clearly hope that the submarine issue will disappear and that
broader issues such as the Nordic nuclear weapons free zone and concern about
INF-will come to predominate in Moscow's relations with the Nordic
countries. In the Soviets' treatment of Koivisto during his visit --at which
time he extended the 1948 Soviet-Finnish Mutual Assistance Treaty for another
20 years -fit was evident that Moscow considers its relationship with Helsinki
to be an example it would like other Nordic governments to emulate. On 13
June, Pravda hailed Soviet Finnish relations as "the prototype not only of
peaceful, proper ties between states with different social systems and
ideologies, but of relations of real friendship, mutual respect, and mutual
trust."
Palme's recently more active promotion of the Nordic nuclear weapons-free
zone proposal may reassure Moscow that it can begin again to portray itself as
the champion rather than a violator of Swedish~tyle neutrality. The Soviets
have also been heartened by the Danish parliament's vote in late May to call
for postponement of NATO INF deployments and to demand that British and French
nuclear forces be considered at Geneva. Pravda on 2 June hailed the vote as
"a decision in favor of Europe, peace, and cooperation."
As INF deployment dates approach and Moscow's appeals to West European
opinion become more intense, the Soviets can be expected to cultivate a benign
and cooperative image in the Nordic region even more assiduously. Amore
specific offer with regard to a nuclear weapons free zone or some other
initiative within the next several months cannot be discounted, although it is
unlikely the Soviets will consider measures that would seriously affect their
military posture. Soviet commentary will continue to highlight visits by US
officials and US statements on Nordic policies as alleged examples of US and
NATO pressure on these countries.
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SUBJECT: SOVIET-SCANDINAVIAN RELATIONS STRAINED
Orig - DDI
1 -~ IBA/DCI
1 - Charles A. Briggs, ED/DCI
1 - SA/DDCI
1 - Senior Review Panel
5 - OCPAS/IMD/CB
1 - D/BONA
1 - DD/BONA
1 - C/ PA
1 - C/TF
1 - C/SE
1 - C/SF
1 - C/DI
1 - C/EA
1 - C/PA/F
1 - C/TF/N
1 - C/CS Chrono
1 - C/CS/E
1 - SOVA/CS/E/Wetzel
1 - C/NSD/OSWR
1 - D/EURA
1 - C/NE/WE/EURA
External Distribution:
1 - State/PM/OD (Jeremy Azrael)
1 - State, D/EUR/SON, (Thomas W. Simons)
1 - State/INR/SEE (Robert Baraz)
1 - State/INR/SEE (Anita Friedt
1 - Pentagon, DIA/JSI-2C
1 - Pentagon, DIA/JSI-4A
SOVA/CS/E~
(28Jun 83)
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