NIGERIA: SIX-MONTH OUTLOOK FOR THE BUHARI GOVERNMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000900990001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 15, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 2, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central
NhshiVon.aC20505
Directorate of Intelligence
02 February 1984
NIGERIA: Six-month Outlook for the Buhari Government
Summary
Nigeria's military seized power last December promising to
tackle corruption and government inefficiency, to revitalize
the economy, and to punish former officials. But, after a
month in office, Head of State General Buhari appears unsure of
how to begin tackling Nigeria's economic and political
problems. His government of senior military officers already
has encountered some criticism from the junior military and the
press that it is ill-equipped to handle the country's woes and
that it is little more than a continuation of the northern-
dominated
i
ili
c
v
an regime of former President Shagari.
Preoccupation with domestic matters is likely to preclude
Buhari from radically changing Nigeria's generally moderate
foreign policies. But in order to draw a distinction between
itself and the pro-Western Shagari regime, the military
of
frzcan and Gatzn American
Analysis. It has been coordinated with the Directorate of Operations.
Information as of 27 January 1984 has been used in the preparation of this
paper. Questions and comments are welcome and may be directed to the
Chief. Afr4&n n; 71 0;
A West
Africa Branch, Africa Division Office
This memorandum was prepared by
ALA M 83-10011
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government is likely to be more genuinely nonaligned,
stridently nationalistic, and critical of US policy in southern
Africa. Nevertheless, Lagos will continue to look to
Washington for economic help, assistance in meeting food needs,
and intercession with the IMF, which is ur in such tough
austerity measures as devaluation.
Prospects for an economic turnaround are poor, mainly
because of the present soft world oil market. Despite the
regime's promises to honor Nigeria's international financial
obligations and take necessary steps to revive the country's
economy --perhaps including devaluation-- we have serious
doubts that the military will prove more effective than its
civilian predecessors in stemming the economic decline. At
best, we believe the military will be forced to preside over
the implementation of austerity measures drawn up during the
Shagari administration, which will worsen living conditions in
the short run. At worst, the government could embark on a more
populist course, refuse to undertake IMF required austerity
programs, allow arrearages to accumulate, and blame the West
for Nigeria's economic woes. As a last resort, the military
government could even break ranks with OPEC by unilaterally
cutting oil prices--a move that would work to Nigeria's
disadvantage by provoking retaliatory price cuts by other OPEC
economic instability whether successful or not.
more "radical" measures to revive Nigeria's economy. We
believe that a coup by these officers would probably be
violent, and would usher in a prolonged period of political
Whatever approach the government pursues, we expect
increased grumbling and plotting within the military that will
make a countercoup a growing possibility during the near
term. Every successful coup in Nigeria has been followed
within six months by an attempted countercoup, and we think
Buhari may have even less grace time. In our judgment, the
greatest threat comes from middle and junior grade officers who
favor harsher steps against former civilian politicians and
instability, and possibly offer Tripoli and Moscow some
opportunities to develop closer relations and to meddle.
A government headed by such a group would be apt to seek
public support by making difficult-to-fulfill populist
promises, executing former top civilian and military officials,
scraping austerity measures and restrictions on oil production,
and blaming foreign scapegoats --mainly the United States and
the United Kingdom-- for Nigeria's woes. The regime would
prove more difficult for the West to deal with, bring further
S F C R F T
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international prestige.
Introduction
This memorandum assesses the outlook for Nigeria's new military
government over its first six months in power. Nigeria's fourth
successful coup since 1966 was engineered by senior officers (brigadiers
and major generals) who had been appointed to command positions because of
their supposed loyalty to former President Shagari's civilian
government. In our judgment, the coup leaders acted in part to preempt a
takeover by more impatient and less conservative middle grade and junior
officers, as evidenced by the regime's preoccupation with justifying the
coup to lower ranking military personnel. We also believe that although
the coup was well executed, senior officers seized power without fully
understanding the seriousness of Nigeria's economic problems. In our view
they lacked a clear plan of action beyond a desire to end corruption and
administrative chaos, revive the economy, and restore Nigeria's
is responsible for the day-to-day running of the government.
Nigeria's new leaders have drawn heavily on their experiences in the
last military government (1975-1979) in structuring and staffing the
government. Early appointments indicate the military will rely heavily on
senior civil servants to provide continuity and administrative expertise
for the ruling 19-man Supreme Military Council. In addition, the Federal
Executive Council --a cabinet of 11 civilian and seven military members--
Military Uncertainties
officer corps, and increase coup plotting.
In our judgment, the stability and cohesion of the military
government over the next few months depends on the ability of Head of
State Buhari to solidify support among lower ranking military personnel as
well as among fellow senior officers. Military discipline and authority
appear to have withstood the immediate aftermath of the coup, but we
believe that Nigeria's 100,000-man Army is likely to become increasingly
politicized and factionalized as a consequence of its renewed involvement
in running the country. The extensive shuffling of command assignments,
the retirement of many senior officers, and the promotion of more junior
officers to key line and staff positions, in our judgment, will give rise
to personal grievances and rivalries, heighten ethnic tensions within the
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Unless the Buhari government is able quickly to make a better showing
than the Shagari regime, we expect that it will soon be threatened
-- The US Consulate in northern Nigeria has heard from a number of
sources of complaints within the Army's middle ranks over
government slowness in getting the administration going, rooting
out corruption, and controlling prices.
some field
over tneir tai ure to receive
government posts.
7
13
With the elevation of senior officers to the ruling
council and the retirement of others, middle grade officers have moved up
to key brigade commands and headquarter staff positions. The US Defense
Attache believes these positions could give middle grade officers command
of the military resources needed to control events.
of his corrupt past.
Lie believe lower ranking officers will see Buhari's handling of
corrupt former civilian leaders and allegations of past corruption under
Shagari against some of the new regime's senior military members as a
litmus test of the government's resolve in carrying out reforms. Failure
of the government to take harsh punitive action, in our view, will
contribute to the impression that senior officers moved to prevent, rather
than implement, political changes and that they are more concerned with
preserving the status quo and covering up their own corruption under
civilian rule. Only 10 days after the coup, Buhari was forced to replace
one of his appointed state military governors following press revelations
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S E C R E T
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Economic Bind
Popular and military support for the Buhari government is likely to
be further undermined by continuing economic hard times. The government
can expect to win little domestic popularity by imposing tough austerity
measures to secure IMF assistance and to ensure access to large syndicated
bank loans--moves that will worsen living standards in the short run.
Although Buhari increasingly recognizes that continued delay in
facing economic reality will only worsen conditions and make inevitable
adjustment all the more painful, the government still has not clearly
signaled policy directions or announced specific recovery plans. The US
Embassy reports Buhari is particularly hedging his bets over the key issue
of IMF-mandated devaluation, which he fears would heighten inflation and
increase the shortage of essential imports.
market react.
Nevertheless, in the absence of an unlikely surge in world demand for
Nigerian oil, Buhari will have little choice but to continue some of
Shagari's tough economic policies, at least initially. As a consequence,
we expect that Buhari will at least attempt to reach agreement with the
IMF, reschedule short term arrearages, continue import restrictions, and
perhaps negotiate a new payments schedule for medium- and long-term debt
obligations. The Nigerian press speculates that, in an attempt to
increase revenues, Lagos soon will ask OPEC's approval for increased
production. We expect that the organization will not go along with such a
request, believing that such a move would prompt others --such as
Venezuela and Iran-- to follow suit and put renewed downward pressure on
oil prices. In the absence of official approval, we believe Lagos
probably will attempt to circumvent its OPEC quota of 1.3 million barrels
per day by quietly allowing production to creep up to about 1.5 million
barrels per day and see how other OPEC members and the international
We believe negotiations with the IMF will prove difficult and
protracted. Even if an agreement is reached, we believe the government
will find it difficult to resist short-term political benefits that could
accrue from watering down or scrapping certain austerity measures.
Furthermore, like its historical predecessors, we believe this military
government will be unable to make rapid and significant improvements in
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government efficiency and responsiveness or stem endemic corruption--major
contributing causes of the country's chronic economic morass.
Foreign Policy
On balance, we expect the Buhari government's preoccupation with
domestic matters will deter it from embarking on new foreign policy
initiatives or dramatically altering the substance of Nigeria's generally
moderate policies. Nevertheless, we expect the tone of the military's
foreign policy --particularly on important issues such as southern Africa,
the OAU, and Chad-- to be more assertive, stridently nationalistic, and
more visibly nonaligned than that of the conservative, cautious, and
inward-looking Shagari government.
-- Nigeria's new UN representative, retired General Garba --who served
as foreign minister under the activist Obasanjo military regime--
is favorably disposed toward the West but is also an outspoken
hardliner on southern African issues according to the US Embassy.
-- Our Embassy reports that the country's new foreign minister, Dr.
Ibrahim Gambari, has spoken wistfully of the regime's need for a
foreign policy "triumph" --analogous to Nigeria's recognition in
1975 of Angola's MPLA government-- to enhance its domestic
standing.
interests.
These two views on foreign policy suggest to us that there may be some
potential on Lagos' part for unpredictable behavior detrimental to US
and is unlikely by itself to deter coup plotting within the military.
policy posturing would deflect domestic criticism for only a short time
We believe Buhari will continue to ask the United States for economic
assistance, help in meeting food needs, and intercession with the IMF. A
rapid worsening of economic conditions, coupled with an inability to reach
agreement with the IMF and international banks, could tempt Buhari to lash
out at the "lack" of US help and at Washington's policy on southern
Africa. We believe, however, that Buhari will stop short of an open
economic rupture with the United States or the West. In any case, foreign
past.
Early Tests for Buhari
In our judgment, Buhari will have to try to take more decisive steps
to counter a growing impression of governmental drift. Otherwise, the
public perception will grow that Nigeria's economic and political problems
have reached such magnitude as to defy the regime's ability to solve
them. Moreover, popular support will be short lived if signs mount that
Buhari and his fellow officers do not represent a clean break with the
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suited by background and experience to their assignment.
In our judgment, the delay in naming a cabinet and outlining policies
reflects the government's difficulty in finding capable civilians willing
to serve in the new government as well as likely differences of opinion
and jockeying for position among key senior officers. Furthermore, the US
Embassy reports that most civilian members of the new cabinet appear ill-
attempt to find a more "acceptable" ethnic and regional mix.
We expect the government to be faced with growing criticism that it
--like its predecessor-- is too dominated by northerners. While the new
regime has tried to ensure a relatively representative balance among major
ethnic groups, regions, and military services in making high level
appointments, senior officers of northern, Muslim Hausa-Fulani origin
appear to dominate the Supreme Military Council and top Army positions.
So far, we are not aware of any incipient polarization of Nigerian
attitudes toward political and economic issues along strictly regional
lines, a condition prevalent throughout the early 1960s that led to
secession and civil war (1967-70). If this recurred, however, it could
fuel an anti-northern coup attempt by southerners and minority tribal
officers. If the government hopes to keep regional tensions from bubbling
over, we believe it must shuffle some of its appointees --on the ruling
council as well as cabinet ministers and state military governors-- in an
pledge to expedite the payment of salary arrears.
Public disenchantment with the regime is unlikely to spark
widespread, violent protests in the short run, but we believe unrest is
likely to increase if it becomes more evident that the government is
unable to meet the expectations generated by the coup. The US Consulate
in Kaduna reports that the regime already has been faced with a protest by
northern textile workers demanding that the government honor its post coup
harsher retribution, especially as the economy continues to slide.
choice but to bow to public pressures and junior military demands for
We expect that the new government will find especially troublesome
the issue of how severely to deal with former civilian officials--
including former President Shagari. Although the government has arrested
hundreds of civilian officials and promised to hold them accountable for
malfeasance and economic sabotage, we believe senior officers would prefer
to avoid fostering a political climate of vengeance and retribution in
which they themselves could become entangled. Public trials --and any
subsequent executions-- almost certainly would heighten ethnic tensions,
produce charges that certain groups were being singled out, do little to
improve administrative effectiveness, and deflect resources from more
pressing economic matters. Nevertheless, Buhari in the end may feel no
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NF NC OC
coup.
Future Coup Scenarios
In our judgment, the possibility of an attempted countercoup will
remain high for the near term. Every successful coup in Nigeria has been
followed within six months by an attempted countercoup, and we think
Buhari may have even less grace time. Nigeria's economic crisis will
compound Buhari's political vulnerability. We foresee little likelihood
that the government's new economic team will quickly devise a
comprehensive plan of action. We expect that negotiations with Nigeria's
creditors and the IMF will be drawn out until the regime's economic
advisers gain a clearer understanding of the depth of the economic crisis,
and as Buhari attempts to strike a better deal than Shagari could. As a
consequence, we believe Buhari soon will find his government subject to
criticism for drift and indecision that will enhance the potential for a
assassination and be bloody.
Countercoup by Middle and Junior Grade Officers. In our judgment, a
countercoup is most likely to come from the level of middle and junior
grade officers--lieutenant colonels and lower-- groups about which we know
little. We believe that Buhari, despite his leadership strengths, will
have difficulty balancing the more conservative and cautious instincts of
his fellow senior officers with demands from frustrated middle and junior
grade officers for more far reaching retribution and reform. A coup by
such younger and less conservative officers, whether led by radical
northerners or by southerners and minority tribesmen frustrated with
northern domination, probably would target senior officers for
United Kingdom-- for Nigeria's woes.
We believe that a coup by middle and junior grade officers --
depending on how radical and narrowly ethnic its coloration may be-- has
the potential to increase ethnic and economic turmoil. In our view,
middle and junior grade officers would take power with no precise policies
beyond a strong feeling that change requires a sweeping and violent
"cleansing" of the armed forces and public life. The aim would be to
improve the quality of political and economic life for Nigeria's less
privileged groups by trying to reduce corruption, impose government
accountability, lower prices, and severely punishing former civilian and
military officials. Such a government would also be apt to seek public
support by scrapping austerity measures and restrictions on oil production
and by blaming foreign scapegoats --mainly the United States and the
Palace Coup by Senior Officers. Buhari could be ousted by fellow
senior officers on the ruling military council if a power struggle
develops or if it appears that he cannot garner wider support among middle
and junior grade military officers and the population at large. The
danger of a palace coup will increase if top military leaders believe that
plotting by middle and junior grade officers has reached a serious
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problems would remain unresolved.
stage. In our judgment, a new senior-level coup would be led by a key
officer, such as Chief of Army Staff Babangida, who probably would espouse
more reformist-populist policies than Buhari in a last-ditch effort to
appeal to lower ranking military personnel. Such a palace coup would
represent a holding action, however, and we doubt that its leaders could
stay in power for long because Nigeria's underlying economic and political
subversive training in Libya.
Outlook and Implications for the US
At present, we are not aware that any major group in Nigeria --
military, ethnic, political, or religious-- is advocating the sort of
revolutionary change that would undermine the country's legacy of
federalism, a free market economy, and nonalignment. Nor in our view, do
the Libyans or Soviets have many new opportunities for meddling so long as
the Buhari government continues in power. US Embassy reporting indicates
that Tripoli has scarcely acknowledged the latest change of government in
Lagos. To date, government vigilance and Nigeria's size and diversity
have prevented Tripoli from gaining much influence, despite some funding
for local Islamic organizations and recruitment of Nigerians for
involved.
The US Embassy in Moscow notes that while the Soviet media is giving
increasingly favorable coverage to Buhari's takeover, this probably is
intended mainly to avoid jeopardizing Soviet-Nigerian economic
relations. US Embassy reporting indicates that the Soviets in recent
years, while continuing undercover ties with some leftist Nigerian labor
and student groups, have emphasized outwardly correct relations with
whatever Nigerian government is in charge in the interest of developing
trade for hard currency earnings. We believe that the Soviets recognize
that the litmus test of Nigerian-Soviet relations will continue for the
foreseeable future to depend on successful completion of the long overdue
$4 billion Ajaokuta steel plant in which 6,000 Soviet technicians are
or the USSR.
In our judgment, however, another coup may bring Nigeria closer to a
Ghana-like collapse into tribalism, radicalization, and further
instability. We believe such a development would make the country more
difficult for the West to work with and create opportunities for Tripoli
and Moscow. Nigeria's regional and tribal rivalries are potentially
exploitable, but we expect no central Nigerian government will tolerate
blatant Libyan or Soviet meddling. Moreover, in our view, neither Tripoli
nor Moscow is willing or has the wherewithal to assist Nigeria in solving
its economic problems and Nigeria has little need for arms aid from Libya
Nevertheless, we believe the Libyans and Soviets can offer moral
support, radical doctrine to emulate, and an alternative source of advice
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to an impressionable government of younger officers. In our judgment,
both Libya and the USSR would like to see a radical regime come to power
in Nigeria that could be encouraged to side with Africa's progressive
states in the OAU on such issues as Chad and in other international
forums. We also believe that northern Nigeria's large Muslim population
is an attractive target for the Libyans, who doubtless hope that domestic
chaos would reduce Nigerian effectiveness in playing a moderate and
constructive role on the African scene and afford Tripoli a freer hand to
meddle in the region.
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Distribution:
Orig - Frederick L. Wettering, Director African Affairs, NSC
1 - Chester A. Crocker, African Bureau, Department of State
1 - James Bishop, African Bureau, Department of State
1 - Princeton Lyman, Africa Bureau, Department of State
1 - Rear Admiral Jonathan T. Howe, USN, Political Military Affairs,
Department of State
1 - Edmund Perkins, AF/W, Department of State
1 - Hugh Montgomery, Director, INR, Department of State
1 - Leonardo Neher, Director, INR/AF, Department of State
1 - Judy Johnson, Nigeria Desk Officer, Department of State
1 - Peter Spicer, D10/AF, Defense Intelligence Agency
1 - Noel C. Koch, Department of Defense
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - Executive Director
1 - SA/DCI/IA
1 - DDI
1 - ADDI
2 - DDO/Africa
1 - NIO for Africa
1 - NIC Action Group
1 - PDB Staff
1 - ILS
1 - C/DDI/PES
1 - D/ALA
2 - ALA/PS
1 - ALA Research Director
4 - OCPAS/IMD/CB
2 - ALA/AF
2 - ALA/AF/W
4 - ALA/AF/W
ALA/AF/W:I (Jan1984)
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